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NOTICE TO READERS: Beginning today, 26 February 1990, the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT will feature a new section entitled "REGIONAL AFFAIRS." It is divided into five subsections: "Baltic Republics" (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia); "RSFSR" (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic); "Western Republics" (Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia); "Caucasus" (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia); and "Central Asia" (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia, Kazakhstan). The new "REGIONAL AFFAIRS" section will include material from all sources on exclusively regional matters, including Moscow central media coverage of developments at the regional level and of central leadership activities and speeches in the republics.

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Foreign Ministry Collegium Statement on Germany

LD2402182990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1735 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Feb (TASS)—A session of the USSR Foreign Ministry collegium took place today. It examined a broad circle of questions linked to the development of the situation in Europe.

The USSR Foreign Ministry collegium considered it necessary to make the following statement on the results of the discussion of the "German question."

"Recently in the discussion that has been taking place concerning the complicated set of questions linked to the possible unification of the two German states, the question of what the military and political status of a united Germany should be has come to the forefront.

Interest in this aspect of the problem is understandable since fundamental questions of security on the European Continent are indeed involved here. Less understandable are those prescriptions some countries in the West are bringing forward. They lead to the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO. Moreover this is presented in such a way that such a variant corresponds to the interests of the Soviet Union since, they say, a possible future united Germany cannot be left to its own devices without establishing some kind of external control over it.

It is not acceptable to the Soviet side that someone is trying to determine on its behalf what the essence of Soviet security is and what the best way to guarantee it is. The Soviet Union in this respect has its own conceptions. In no way do variants envisioning the membership of a united Germany in NATO fit into these conceptions. It is clear to everyone, including those who are not very knowledgeable in military issues, that their implementation would in contemporary conditions lead to an unacceptable disruption of the military strategic balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. M.S. Gorbachev indicated this circumstance quite definitely in his answers to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent on 21 February, where our principled approach to German affairs as a whole is laid out.

A determining factor from our point of view is that, in the process of building German unity, a point of discussion should be that Germany should cease, for once and for all, to be a place from where there could be threat of war. This is precisely required by the Potsdam agreements, the UN Charter, and the security interests of European, and not only European, people.

Another issue of a fundamental order also arises. It is well known that an accord was recently reached in Ottawa to the effect that the FRG and GDR foreign ministers would soon discuss the external aspects of building German unity with the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, including issues of the security of neighboring states. A machinery was thereby defined within whose framework solutions should also be found to a question of such indisputable priority as that of the military-political status of a united Germany. In consideration of this it would be, at the least, unproductive to run ahead, and especially, to attempt to impose upon the other side, even before the meeting of ministers, any models that disregard the interests of its security. We must even now dispose ourselves to practical work and a search for solutions that would ensure genuine security and stability in Europe. The Soviet Union is in favor of embarking upon this within the framework of the machinery of "the six" which has been set up without delay, particularly on the level of experts.

TASS Notes Kohl-Bush News Conference

LD2502210790 Moscow TASS in English 1913 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 25 TASS—United States President George Bush and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke at a joint news conference early on Sunday at the end of two days of talks on German unification at Bush's residence in Camp David, Maryland.

Bush said they discussed recent political developments in Eastern Europe and relations between the East and West.

According to Bush, both he and Chancellor Kohl welcome the accelerating pace of German unification.

"We share a common belief that a unified Germany should remain a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, including its participation in its military structure," Bush told reporters.

In a unified Germany, the current GDR's territory could be given a special military status, in order to "include the legitimate security interests' of neighbouring countries and the Soviet Union, Bush said.

Kohl described the talks as cordial and friendly. He supported the idea of the unified Germany's NATO membership and said U.S. troops should remain in Europe.

The border issue should be finally settled by the government of a unified Germany, he said.

Responding to Kohl's statement, Bush said the United States, in accordance with the final act of the Helsinki conference, accept current European borders, including Poland's western border.

Kornilov Comments

LD2602134190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Feb 90

[By TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov]

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS)—Running ahead and ignoring the point of view of one's partners is not the best way of solving political problems. This is perhaps the least one could say about the results of the Washington talks between G. Bush and H. Kohl, during which the two leaders, touching on the problem of German reunification, unambiguously advocated that a united Germany should be a "full-scale member of NATO." It is well known that at the recent international meeting in Ottawa, both Bonn and Washington were in agreement that the external aspects of building German unity should be thoroughly discussed by the leaders of the foreign policy departments of the FRG and GDR, and by the foreign ministers of France, Britain, the USSR, and the United States. So now what—has it now been decided in Washington to replace the "two plus four" formula adopted by the participants of the Ottawa forum by a "one plus one" scheme? This is an unproductive and unpromising approach.

As regards the essence of the issue, it is appropriate once again to mention the USSR's position, which states definitely: The plans for including a united Germany in NATO do not fit into the options for unification of the two German states which are acceptable for a number of European countries; and these plans cannot be understood and accepted by the Soviet public. Furthermore, the essence of the matter is in no way changed by harebrained schemes dreamed up by various people in the West for maintaining NATO armed forces only in one, western part of a united German state. The inventors of this clearly artificial design are striving not to find mutually acceptable solutions, but merely to divert public attention from their own dangerous plans, the realization of which would mean destruction of the existing military-strategic balance in Europe.

"We respect the legitimate interests of the security of all states," H. Kohl said, speaking at a news conference in Washington. Such a position can only be welcomed, especially if it is backed up in Bonn and Washington with specific deeds.

Shevardnadze on German Relations, Helsinki Meeting

LD2202131990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1215 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Feb (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, believes that "today, unfortunately, the process of the rapprochement and unification of the two German states is outdistancing the formation of common European structures that could become a guarantee of stability." He stated this in an NOVOYE VREMYA interview, published in the weekly's ninth issue, describing the situation that has taken shape as a result of the evolution of the inter-German relations.

Discussing the possible forms of such structures, the minister pointed out that the Soviet Union proposed a summit conference as a permanently functioning body. Within the framework of such a conference the leaders of 35 states could assemble once or twice a year and discuss the most serious problems requiring a collective decision in the context of the development of the all-European process. As Eduard Shevardnadze notes, one could "also create an institute of ministers of foreign affairs" which would meet several times a year, taking into account the new situation in Europe and the world.

Answering a question on prospects for convening a "Helsinki II" all-European summit meeting and its agenda, the Soviet minister said: "First, we will sign a treaty on reducing conventional weapons. Second, we will determine subsequent stages of talks. Third, we will work out a final document."

In the words of Eduard Shevardnadze, "there are also other proposals," but, in his view, "the main thing is to clearly define the structures."

'Observers Roundtable' Discusses Germany

LD2502181290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 25 Feb 90

["International Observers Roundtable" program presented by Boris Andrianov, with Nikolay Agayants and Gennadiy Venedyapin, foreign policy commentators for All-Union Radio]

[Excerpts] [Andrianov] Hello, Comrades. We are starting our regular meeting of "International Observers Roundtable." At the microphone is announcer Boris Andrianov and next to me are my colleagues, foreign policy commentators for All-Union Radio, Nikolay Agayants and Gennadiy Venedyapin.

There is no doubt that one of the main issues of contemporary international politics continues to this day to be the German question. As you know, we proceed from the fact that two German states exist and it is for history to decide in what state form the German nation will exist. [passage omitted]

It may seem strange to many people but even now, you know, there is no peace treaty with Germany since Germany itself does not exist. Perhaps now, 45 years since the end of the war, this matter seems purely theoretical?

[Agayants] But Boris Vasilyevich, the lack of a peace treaty enables the Constitutional Court of West Germany to declare that even today the German Reich exists within the 1937 borders and that, in turn, gives rise to natural concern among their German neighbors.

[Vedenyapin] It's true that the governments of both the GDR and the FRG recognize, say, Poland's western border which runs along the Oder-Neisse line. The question is, however, what will happen following reunification? Chancellor Kohl gives an evasive answer. He says that the question of the Oder-Neisse border will be decided by a united German parliament and a joint government. In other words, parents do not answer for their children.

[Andrianov] All of this explains the fact that foreign policy experts are stating that it is essential to conclude a peace treaty, which would clearly record what Germany is allowed to do and what is forbidden it. [passage omitted]

[Vedenyapin] Indeed, the task is to discuss comprehensively and gradually all external aspects of German unification and prepare this most serious matter for inclusion in the all-European process and for an examination of the bases for a future peace treaty with Germany.

[Agayants] It goes without saying that the success of these consultations depends on the degree of trust between all those taking part. One must not propose an approach here where three or four will begin by talking among themselves and then present an already-agreed position to the other participants. That of course would be unacceptable.

[Vedenyapin] A natural question occurs here: Isn't there a certain degree of discrimination here regarding other countries which also took part in the war? Poland, for example, while not laying claim to the same status as other participants in the future talks—this is already basically resolved—does believe, nonetheless, that in the initial phase of a conference at which matters affecting its state interests as Germany's neighbor are discussed, it at least has the right to, and should, take part.

[Andrianov] It is a perfectly legitimate question. The special interest of a number of other countries not indicated in the two-plus-four formula can also be explained and understood. It is understood that it is their legitimate right to protect their national interests. Above all, Poland's vital interest in this, in wishing to have a guarantee of the stability of its postwar borders, is understandable. In the very nature of things, such a guarantee can only be an international legal enactment. [passage omitted]

[Agayants] As the weekly DIE ZEIT notes, it is not only in the East but in the West too that concern is now growing as to what weight a united Germany will carry and what orientation it will have. What place will it have in its military policy and foreign policy environment?

[Vedenyapin] Such concern is completely understandable. It is enough to recall that the present defense minister, Stoltenberg, has proposed, in the event of a single German state's being created, stationing Bundeswehr units on the territory of the present GDR, which would not, moreover, be subordinate to NATO command. True, it is taken for granted that a future united Germany would be a member of NATO. This is clear from what Chancellor Kohl has said and from the words of U.S. President Bush.

[Andrianov] This is why many people in Europe are asking what is, if you like, the most urgent question in this set of problems: Just what place will be allocated to a united Germany in the military-political structures that now exist on the continent? You have already heard the FRG defense minister's point of view. True, Hans-Dietrich Genscher has distanced himself from it, saying that that was Stoltenberg's view, that it did not reflect the government position, and that in the event of German unification the NATO zone should not move eastward. Note, however, that the FRG Government has not yet developed a definitive position on this.

[Agayants] Be that as it may, it already seems fairly ambiguous in my opinion. From this follows, quite clearly, the fact that some people in Bonn, and elsewhere too, would unequivocally like to see a future united Germany only as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance—and this cannot be concealed by streamlined formulae proclaiming that a united Germany should be linked to NATO, or be a country in which NATO armed forces will be stationed in the western part alone.

[Vedenyapin] Head of the GDR Government Modrow, understanding the apprehensions of people in Europe, is suggesting neutrality—even prior to the creation of a united Germany. This, incidentally, would correspond entirely to the Yalta Conference communique: To disarm and dissolve all the German armed forces, destroy the German General Staff, and confiscate or destroy all German military equipment. Helmut Kohl gives a definite no to this, however.

[Andrianov] No doubt it should be said here that whatever the case, security has, for a prolonged period of time, been maintained by the presence of two military political alliances, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

[Agayants] At the same time, for the moment, only preconditions are indicated for the creation of a fundamentally new security system in Europe, since the role of these alliances is being preserved, albeit substantially changed as military confrontation drops and the political aspects of their activities are strengthened. It follows from this that even unification of Germany should take into account the fact that violating the military and strategic balance of these two international organizations is impermissible. [passage omitted]

There really are, you know, a great many questions if one judges by the letters received by our editors, and they are not easy to answer. Questions like this, for example: What is happening in the countries of the socialist community and can they be called socialist? Where are Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia going? Are they not threatened by the restoration of a capitalist order? Will the Warsaw Pact survive? Does the collapse of the socialist system threaten the Soviet Union with a new war? What will become of CEMA? etc, etc. These questions are asked with varying degrees of sincerity and concern and, on occasion too, harshly and rudely.

[Vedenyapin] Well, since we cannot get away without answering these questions, let's try to answer them together in a considered manner and without giving way to emotions, relying only on the facts.

[Andrianov] That makes sense, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich. The wind of change which blew in gusts across the countries of Eastern Europe at the end of last year swept away the weighty concrete structures of the administrative and bureaucratic system that had seemed unshakeable and which, through lack of thought or malicious intent, was called socialism. That wind of change is fundamentally changing our approaches to events taking place and our outlook on the outside world.

Stalin's concept of the irreconcilable struggle between two systems, socialism and captialism; the idea of the priority of class conflict in international relations; and the theory of a world revolutionary process which lay at the basis of those approaches for decades, are being destroyed and at the same time are showing not just their complete theoretical and practical bankruptcy, but their hostility to the idea of the unity of the world in which we all live and the idea of the priority of common human interests and values, of making relations between states and peoples more humane and more democratic—of which we speak today on all, including the most elevated, platforms without fear of being falsely accused of revisionism, appeasement, or other mortal sins. [passage omitted]

Many of our listeners today write in, alarmed at raging anticommunism and anti-Sovietism in the countries of Eastern Europe. We even hear irritated reproaches that we have, allegedly, allowed our younger brothers to get out of control and through our restructuring have almost pushed them into rejecting socialism.

[Agayants] Unfortunately, ideas of this kind are common currency and are even spread enthusiastically by some people but, I'm sorry: What kind of socialism in Eastern Europe are we talking about? The socialism of Honecker, Jakes, Ceausescu, and Zhivlov? It was not without our direct influence and participation that, in the postwar period in the East European countries, there was a gradual rejection of national ways of development and a transition to complete uniformity in methods of building a new society. As a result, this led to copying the model of—if you'll allow me to say it—socialism that had developed in our country. For many people, this model was an alien one that did not correspond to the specific features or character of national development. Moreover, it proved inefficient in both the political and the economic respects, and later these models gave birth to unattractive Stalinist systems. Stagnation in economic development, the fall in living standards, and the lack of broad democratic freedoms led to growing discontent among people—it was this that led to the crisis, the outcome of which is irreversible.

[Vedenyapin] Since this concrete administrative and bureaucratic system, we will say—since that's what it used to be like—was actively imposed with our participation, it seems that certain anti-Soviet excesses at the moment should be looked upon from pecisely this angle. What about events in Hungary in 1956 or taking troops into Czechoslovakia? Unfortunately, actions like these did nothing to promote genuine friendship between people. What can we say, when we still can't sort out the nationalities issues at home? This is a delicate and painful question and, in general, armed with the new political thinking, it too needs to be solved calmly, with restraint and pragmatism.

[Andrianov] Is that so? I am convinced that the present situation should not be dramatized. Our basic relations with the East European countries are determined by the fact that they are our neighbors and allies. In the new conditions, the accent in cooperation with them will, evidently, be more and more blended in with the interstate sphere, and this is natural. Relations between parties, while not losing their specific significance, are ceasing to set the tone of our mutual relations. [passage omitted]

Concern Over Hasty German Unification Noted

PM2002160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Colonel V. Markushin "Observer's Opinion": "It Is Easy To Remove Fence"]

[Text] Following Chancellor H. Kohl's visit to Moscow, the question of German unity does not seem merely to be an item that has been placed on the agenda. Already the reversibility of the incipient process can hardly be seen as an alternative. There are few people outside the two German states who object to the Germans living as one family. However, virtually everyone warns against excessive haste in the actual process of unification and expresses concern that this unification may be detrimental to the Germans' neighbors.

Helmut Kohl assures those ill at ease that only peace will henceforth emanate from German soil. There are no reasons to doubt his sincerity but the belief that this will indeed be the case would be considerably stronger if the chancellor were to pronounce himself clearly and unequivocally in favor of the inviolability of the postwar borders, particularly with regard to Poland's western borders. At present he prefers to keep silent on this score. You only have to guess why.

Quite possibly the FRG leader considers the existing borders to be a historical injustice. Then there is no point in his making known this opinion in front of a European audience. But Kohl may simply not believe that. In that case it is again better for him to refrain from voicing his own opinions, thus avoiding the risk of incurring the disfavor of the far from small section of the West German public who believe that their nation was humiliated to no avail.

These arguments are by no means idle ones. After all there may be different kinds of peace in Europe. Ranging from a lasting peace that reflects security and comprehensive cooperation between equal participants to the confrontational state which cannot be described as anything but "neither war nor peace." Serious thought must obviously be given to this when promoting the solution of the German question. That is by and large what is happening at the level of big-league politics. An accord has already been reached for the the external aspects of German unification to be discussed by the foreign ministers of the FRG, the GDR, and the four victorious powers in World War II. That is, the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France, who retain responsibility for the future of Germany.

The internal aspects of unification are the affair of the Germans themselves. A rapid increase has been observed in the number of champions of a united Germany. Polls show that no less than three-fourths of people in the GDR are advocates of this. The influence of the mass hullabaloo associated with the demonstrations and rallies is evident here. This is changing the minds of those people who are terrified by both mental unease and the confused outlook associated with a change in familiar conditions. Conditions are changing under pressure from activists promoting unification and demanding the fulfillment of their aspirations "overnight." Strike while the iron is hot, these activists intone. Their wealthy neighboring relation is proposing that the fence be removed and that they set up home together. No need to pause for reflection!

It is easy to remove a fence. However, as is often the case in life, after losing their independence, some relatives are simply left with the status of dependents in a manor house. Obviously, the principle of complete equality must operate in the situation of FRG-GDR unification rather than the principle of one engulfing the other. The hotheads should reflect on this.

'Questions, Answers' Program Views East Europe

LD2302222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 23 Feb 90

["International Situation—Questions and Answers" program, presented by Stanislav Blazhenkov, foreign political commentator of All-Union Radio, with international affairs journalist Rafail Nadzhipovich Moseyev and "colleagues" Vladimir Pasko, Yuriy Isayev, and Viktor Levin]

[Excerpt] [Blazhenkov] Greetings, comrades. The majority of letters from listeners which have been coming in to us lately begin with questions, assessments, and judgments concerning events in the countries of East Europe. In expressing their attitude to these events, many of our listeners define it by saying that the countries of East Europe are our neighbors and allies. As the letters note, in the new situation, the determining principles in our relations should be respect for sovereignty, noninterference, taking mutual interests into account, and recognizing that the people of every country have the right to choose their own path of development.

However, listeners express disquiet at the increased activity of various antisocialist forces and the manifestations of anti-Sovietism in those countries. Our listener, Comrade Ivanov from the town of Saratov—unfortunately he does not give his first and second names—but he does give one piece of additional information that is particularly important in this case: He is an invalid from the Great Patriotic War. I would even say that this is not simply important, but fundamental because he expresses indignation at the violation of the statue to Soviet servicemen in Berlin's Treptow Park. He asks the question: What must be done to guarantee the principle of the inviolability of the borders that have arisen as a result of and after World War II? I will ask my colleague Viktor Levin to reply.

[Levin] First of all, I would like to remind you a little about the event in Treptow Park. Undoubtedly the desecration of the graves of the Soviet servicemen who fell in the battles against the Hitlerite aggressors is an extremely outrageous action that is totally intolerable. I consider it essential to stress that this action was assessed in this way not only here in the USSR; the GDR Government made an official apology. Literally on the day after this attack by neo-Nazis, over 200,000 citizens of Berlin held a demonstration in Treptow Park to protest their actions.

It is important to bear these facts in mind so as not to lose one's way, so as not to lose one's bearings. Yes, it has to be admitted that there are neo-Nazis in the GDR, but the handfuls of these types are counteracted by thousands and thousands of other Germans. We should not forget this.

Comrade Ivanov regards the vile attack by the neo-Nazis in Treptow Park within the general context of the development of the German problem. Here I too am in complete agreement that there are grounds for alarm and concern. The impression is being created that the two German states are rushing toward unification with the speed of jet aircraft, but at the same time even some major politicians are, in effect, giving additional grounds for alarm and concern.

How, for example, should one assess what I would even call the stubborn unwillingness of FRG Chancellor Kohl to recognise the Oder-Neisse border? GDR Council of Ministers Chairman Modrow, when he was in Warsaw recently, quite reasonably considered it essential to confirm once again the inviolability of this border, but Kohl asserts that the question should be resolved only by an all-German parliament and does not even express his opinion as to how it should be resolved.

Or take the recent statement by FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg of the intention, after the unification of the two German states, to station Bundeswehr units on the territory of the present GDR. This statement was immediately subjected to acute criticism by FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, and the next day Stoltenberg took back what he had said. But I am far from inclined to think that the defense minister simply made a slip of the tongue. I am more inclined to believe that he improvidently divulged intentions that Bonn does not discuss out loud today.

I am deeply convinced that Comrade Ivanov and our other listeners attentively read Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's replies to questions from a PRAVDA correspondent which clearly set out the USSR's position on the German problem. I will recall only the provision directly related to the subject of our discussion: It should be clear from the very beginning, Comrade Gorbachev said, that neither the process of the drawing together of the FRG and the GDR, by itself, nor a united Germany must present either a threat to or be to the detriment of the national interests of its neighbors or of anyone outside it. Of course, any encroachment upon the borders of other states is excluded.

Comrade Ivanov writes as follows: Let our state security chairman, Comrade Kryuchkov, not open up the borders that arose after the Great Patriotic War. I would say more precisely that Comrade Kryuchkov, or more exactly, our border troops, perform their service to protect the borders of the USSR. As far as the principle of the inviolability of other borders is concerned, this has been clearly discussed by Comrade Gorbachev and it would be superfluous to add anything to that.

[Blazhenkov] We continue to receive many questions about the situation in the Middle East and the development of events in long-suffering Lebanon. Ivan Frantsevich Ventselevich, from Mogilev, Ivan Dmitriyevich Korochenko, from Smolensk Oblast, and other listeners particularly ask about the situation in the occupied Arab lands and the reasons for the escalation of the settlement in these territories by immigrants arriving in Israel. I will ask Rafail Moseyev, journalist on international affairs, to comment on these questions. He worked in Arab countries for many years. Rafail Nadzhipovich, please.

[Moseyev] I will start with what in my view is the most important thing. Lately the Arab press increasingly has been carrying material expressing concern about the continuing immigration of Soviet Jews into Israel, some of whom, in accordance with Tel Aviv's wishes, are settled on the illegally occupied Arab lands. The matter has gone so far that the leaders of some Arab countries, expressing both the official viewpoint and the mood of the public, have requested the urgent convening of a summit conference to discuss the situation that has arisen.

Why have emotions become so heated around a problem that would seem to concern only the personal interests of Soviet citizens leaving the country? What is the reason for the alarm in the Arab world? For in essence, immigration into Israel has not ceased in recent years. In replying to these questions, one seemingly should remember, first of all, that in conditions of perestroyka, when unjustified obstacles to entering and leaving the USSR have been removed and when the state has begun to live in accordance with international laws, the flow of Soviet citizens abroad has increased considerably.

People are crossing the border in order to join their relatives. They go in search of better living conditions and better use of their abilities. However, far from all those leaving head for Israel. Last year, for example, 13,000 people went there from the USSR, which is about 16 percent of all those who left. Nonetheless, Israeli official propaganda, whipping up passions, clearly is trying to exaggerate these figures. An active part in this propaganda campaign is played by officials, too, including Israeli Prime Minister Shamir. By deliberately overstating the possible number of immigrants, Tel Aviv is attempting to put pressure on the United States and its other Western allies to obtain an increase in economic aid from them. The point is that when Israel receives a new citizen it expends about $60,000 on his adaptation. An increase in the number of arrivals, even a fictitious one, gives the Israeli authorities a pretext for new appeals for financial aid.

The policy of propaganda hullabaloo which has been unleashed in connection with the immigration of Soviet Jews is addressed not only to the West. One must not fail to take into account the Arab world and the Palestinian resistance movement. It is obvious that lately, thanks to peace efforts, a certain amount of positive progress has been made toward reaching a settlement of the Middle East conflict. The development of the situation in that region gives rise to quite considerable hopes for the possibility of a peaceful political solution of that problem and its key—Palestinian—aspect. In this situation, the Israeli authorities repudiate the demands of the world community and are accelerating the illegal settlement of these lands that were seized by force and also are using the Jews arriving from the USSR for this purpose.

[Blazhenkov] Rafail Nadzhipovich, what is the attitude of Soviet governmental circles to these events?

[Moseyev] Of course, Soviet citizens have the right to emigrate in accordance with the Vienna agreements and other international documents. That is their right. However, the Soviet Government comes out resolutely against the settling of the occupied lands contrary to the desire and will of those to whom they have, of old, legally belonged. These actions are contrary to the sixth Geneva Convention of 1949, which forbids occupying powers from settling on occupied territories people who do not belong to the population of these territories. By the way, this document bears Israel's signature. That country also is violating a number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations in the 1970's and 1980's which are directly addressed to the Government of Israel and which demand that it cease this practice of settling the occupied territories.

In this connection, the USSR Foreign Ministry has published an official statement that says, in part, that the USSR has never recognized and still does not recognize

Israel's occupation in 1967 of Arab—including Palestinian—territories, considers this occupation illegal and demands its cessation in accordance with the well-known UN resolutions. It comes out resolutely against Israel's settlement practice, calls on its government to cease any measures to change the physical nature, demographic make-up, organizational structure, or status of the occupied territories.

[Blazhenkov] Rafail Nadzhipovich, in this way our citizens are acting involuntarily on behalf of the occupationists and helping them to perpetuate injustice?

[Moseyev] To a certain extent, yes. I think that not all the emigrants who leave are fully aware of what awaits them in Israel. Our mass media pay little attention to this. At the same time, the chauvinist and anti-semitic utterances that have begun to appear lately give rise to fears and have encouraged emigration. It is sufficient to say that in January this year the number of Jews who left the USSR reached 5,000. Evidently, it is necessary urgently to put an end to the attacks of anti-semitists and chauvinists, and to calm people.

All the same, it would be naive to suppose that the immigrant who arrives in Israel immediately finds himself in the promised land. There are difficulties ahead of them, and no small difficulties, at that. These include unemployment and the hostile attitude of the native inhabitants, and for young people, obligatory service in the Army, which is virtually in a state of war. It is particularly difficult for members of ethnically mixed marriages. As the Israeli press reports, officials of the Israeli Ministry of Internal Affairs refuse to register immigrants as Jews if they cannot provide documentary proof of their racial purity. Frequently they are required to have with them a detailed genealogical tree which would prove the the Jewish origin of each new settler. Only if they have a detailed family tree showing their ancestors, especially in the maternal line, can Israeli Jews enter into marriage with newly arrived Israelis. [passage omitted: question and answer on the fighting in Beirut; Blazhenkov replies to questions about the peace process in Cambodia; Pasko answers questions about the situation in Afghanistan; Pasko notes that the United States gradually is coming around to recognising the role of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and its leadership; Blazhenkov discusses the status of the Vatican state, the economic situation in Turkey where there is high inflation, and replies to a question about the leadership of Zaire; Isayev replies to a listener who inquires about the current location of former Paraguayan dictator Stroessner]

'Top Priority' Examines Future of Europe

LD2402193290 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 23 Feb 90

["Top Priority" program, presented by Sergey Goryachev, with Sergey Koraganov, "an expert from the Institute of Europe", and Jonathon Sanders of CBS in Moscow]

[Text] [Goryachev] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to "Top Priority". I'm Sergey Goryachev. And the prime goal today is to discuss the future of Europe and the roles of the superpowers in a future Europe in light of the German reunification. To share their views here are today Sergey Koraganov to my left, an expert from the Institute of Europe, and Jonathon Sanders of CBS bureau here in Moscow.

Now to begin with I would like to ask you, Sergey, a straightforward question. Taking into account the complexity of the German question and its unpredictable character, do you think that the Soviet Union would rather prefer not to see Germany reunified? Do you think the Soviet Union would rather to keep the status quo?

[Koraganov] Well, I'll be as straight as possible in my question, the question of Soviet preferences is not on the table. Germany is to be unified and that is the reality we have to deal with. In the long run I think the Soviet Union could, and as everybody else in Europe, could even win or gain quite a few profits from the Germany being unified, because the Germany divided is one of the prime causes of the confrontation in Europe. But of course the Soviet Union, as I think most of the European countries, the United States being for that matter a European country, have some causes of concern taking the consideration the history of unified Germany, one thing and another the fact that this unification happens on the background of a very significant and potentially unstable changes in Europe.

[Goryachev] Does this present some danger to the Soviet Union, undermining Soviet positions in Europe?

[Koraganov] I don't think there is any significant danger to the Soviet Union; I think that probably we, being one of the two most powerful, militarily, nations in the world, we are less to, we are less to suffer in security terms than anybody else, but generally speaking of course, psychologically, it could especially, it could pose a certain concern, especially taking in the consideration that we are now undergoing a very painful process of perestroyka. Yes, which is, which causes additional psychological, political strain in our population and under those circumstances the German question could, the German question could play a rather important role in our internal foreign policy debate.

[Goryachev] Right, Jonathan, to involve you in the conversation, how do you see the future of Europe—as part of NATO or neutral? That is the basic question.

[Sanders] Well, the American Government's position is that they'd like to see a united Germany and they say that it's for the Germans to decide and there's a great deal of talk in Washington about a new greater Germany being part of NATO. I'm not sure that that will work if you think of NATO in the old terms—NATO as a military alliance. If you think of NATO as dropping its military features and being an economic cooperative venture, well perhaps. But I don't think things are that simple. I think that a larger Germany that includes East Germany is a natural kind of progression from the problems we've had for a long time. I think much of the Cold War did grow out of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States over the German question, over what was going to go on in Berlin. But I don't think that seeing the two Germanies united is absolutely going to mean the end of confrontation, the ends of strains, the end of change that brings friction in Europe. Europe is a battleground of economic ideas now, and a battleground of political ideas, and I think in some time in the future we're going to see the economic really take precedence over the political and at that time I think theres going to be even more friction as socialist economies shift into market economies, and as they shift in a way that nobody knows what it means or how to do it. There's no rule book from going from a planned economy to a market economy.

[Goryachev] And this will probably be a test ground?

[Sanders] Oh, it's certainly going to be a test ground, and the German case is going to be a very interesting one if they do unite, how a western econonmy tries to aid the transition of an eastern economy, being East Germany.

[Goryachev] Would you, Sergey, tell me if you think it would be more useful for Europe, for the superpowers, for all the countries in Europe if Germany remains in NATO or becomes neutral?

[Koraganov] First of all, I'll question you on your question, and that is we are superpowers. The changes which have been going on in Europe and elsehwere are showing that we are losing our superpower status very quickly, and I think to the better of us. As to your question, I think that, you know, that our official position, or, you know, at least as it is discussed, is that the most preferable choice is neutrality. I think it's, my own position is that I think it is hard to achieve; one thing, another thing, I would rather see, I would rather see Germany tied down by as many, as many ties and as many ropes as possible. But after saying all that I would say that, that the position which is put forward by some people in the West, and that is that Germany is kept within NATO and within the military organization of NATO is, I think, completely unpalatable. That would change, for at least for me, that would change the psychological, military balance so significantly that I think no new political thinking could embrace it.

[Goryachev] Well, Jonathan says that it is difficult to achieve Germany's memberhip in NATO, you say it is different to achieve Germany's neutrality, the future of Germany; so what is the way out?

[Sanders] It's hard to find a way out. I agree with Sergey, I'd like to see Germany tied down by as many constraints as possible. What surprises me in all the discussion is that nobody talks about the one historical analogy that we have, and that is the Soviet Union and the United States got together and made one German state neutral—they made Austria neutral and Soviet troops withdrew from Austria after the neutrality. Nobody's talking about that. Nobody talks about what Germany is, but in effect Austria was a German state. We don't talk about that. Now, we can't replicate, we can't repeat that experience, because it was at a specific historical time, but perhaps there is something to be learned in that kind of agreement. The problem is if both sides are saying, like naive little girls, we want the Germans to decide themselves and then we'll help formulate the circumstances. That just doesn't work. The real politic, the real party and the real political hard ball that goes on means that the Soviet Union and the United States are going to have a major, if not decisive, role in the final shape that any larger Germany takes, with France and Britain also having something to say. And Poland having something to say through the Soviet Union. The Poles have legitimate concerns that the Germans want to change their boundaries.

[Goryachev] And they insist to be included into that two plus four formula.

[Sanders] And I don't now why the Czech's don't have some concerns. After all, Germany went into the Sudetenland at one time.

[Goryachev] You raised the question of Soviet-American cooperation role in Eastern Europe and in German question. What that role can be, Sergey? How do you see the Soviet-American, well, I don't know, disagreements, or cooperation or whatever?

[Koraganov] Well, I think I have to, first of all, agree with Jonathan that the Soviet Union and the United States have more common ground to cooperate on European issues than at any time in the recent history because we are less and less in a confrontational, on a confrontational road here because we less and less compete there. We are being a little bit pushed out, you know, objectively, subjectively, psychologically, politically, and militarily in many cases. So, but after saying all that I'd say that that statement has another side and that is that we have less capabilities than....

[Goryachev] You mean the Soviet Union?

[Korganov] And the United States, so I'm not sure whether even our closest cooperation would produce significant results, so I would rather stress the other side of Jonathan's statement and that is that we should play a significant role in an all-European settlement, and that is involving as many countries as possible, because these multiple, though sometimes small countries, have a say in European affairs, and they could create some kind of a corset which could direct their development.

[Sanders] And they're the ones who are going to suffer, in some ways, or benefit from a greater Germany. Not so much with tanks, I think those days are over for a while, but economically, because a larger Germany is going to have a large labor force and its econmic strength is going to grow and I think what we're going to look at in the next decade, two decades, or three decades, is a dominance of international politics by economics, and as we have a united Western Europe with an integrated market, the largest role in that market is going to be the German role, and so all the countries of Europe have something to say about this. But how they say it?—it's very hard. We keep talking about new thinking, but as far as the European countries' ideas of how they're going to help regulate Germany—I don't see any new thinking.

[Goryachev] Well, there is one factor which we haven't covered and that is the Germany herself, or the German, the two Germanies so far, and I think that the two German states, and eventually one German state is interested even more in having a stable and peaceful Europe than anybody else, because it is a country which has a very vulnerable position and it is to benefit more from a peaceful and friendly outside environment.

[Korganov] Of course, the reunification of Germany is actually designed to somehow defuse tensions in Europe, but it is also potentially unstable.

[Sanders] Well, change by its very nature is destabilizing because it changes the status quo. And to see how Germany changes is something that amazes everyone. I don't think that either the Soviet side or the American side had any idea of how quickly things would happen. And I think behind all the rhetoric on both sides of how wonderful democracy is, how its better to have freedom of choice, I think there are large significant groups of people who are very worried about what's going on, worried because for them Germany reminds them of war, Germany reminds them of the Holocaust, Germany reminds them of an economic giant that could push its weight around and could push the world into war. People don't like to say this, but I think that fear is lingering here.

[Goryachev] Yes, some commentators suggest that a lot of Soviet people would be against the German reunification because all of them remember the Second World War, especially World War II veterans. Sergey, do you think it would be easy for Gorbachev to sell this idea of unified Germany to Soviet people in the Soviet Union?

[Koraganov] Well, first of all, I think that the recent polls which I have seen, I think that some of them were published in "ARGUMENT AND FACT", has shown that not a majority of Soviet people is opposed to reunification, but nevertheless a very significant portion of the population. And I think many things will depend on how it will be, how the unification will take place and under what circumstances. If it takes place within as, for example, some NATO figures are proposing, that is within NATO, within military structure of NATO and we do not get additional security guarantees etc. that would be inevitably taken very seriously. And I think it will be played very significantly by some of the conservatives in our internal policy debates, and I do not know how it will play and how it will influence the positions of the present leadership.

[Sanders] Sergey, I think too, it will (?display) in different ways depending on what goes on inside the Soviet Union. I think that if this question had happened six or seven years ago there might have been much greater opposition, but right now people in the Soviet Union are so preoccupied with problems at home—everything seems to be getting worse in daily life, people are having greater difficulty, the political horizon looks very uncertain. And I think that because of that people are looking at what's going on inside their own country much more attentively than they're looking at what's going on some place that, although it's not very far away, is abroad, is outside the borders.

[Korganov] Sure, I agree with you completely, it's one of the, you know, it's sugar-coating for our internal problems, so they do not only...they also bring something positive, too.

[Goryachev] The West German leaders predict that reunification can come about before the end of the year, while the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, noted in his recent newspaper interview that this may require several years. what are your predictions, what are your timetables and what stages would you single out on the road to tomorrow's Germany?

[Sanders] Well, I....

[Goryachev] Sergey, go ahead.

[Korganov] Yes I think, I think that the decision to unify could be taken at the end of this year. It is definitely [words indistinct].

[Goryachev] The decision by whom?

[Korganov] By the Germans. And then it would, the road will be open. But though of course I'm not a clairvoyant. But the process of unification will take quite a few years and there, it is there where we could influence the events and where all could influence the events, because you cannot unify by a decree, you have to change social security systems, railway systems, communications systems. That will take quite, quite a few years. And so that is why we could in the meantime, together with our Western partners and Eastern partners, create some kind of a web of constraints which will channel the process of unification so it would not look threatening to its, to the neighbors of Germany and to European security and European balance.

[Sanders] Yes, I think that that's right. I didn't bring my crystal ball with me today, but I could see if you looked ahead a little bit that de facto by the end of the year the idea of German reunification would be accepted by citizens in both Germanies and they'd be moving in that direction. But for some of the partners in the four-power agreement there isn't a peace treaty, there are still questions over four partners' control of Berlin. There are a whole range of issues, including membership in the Warsaw Pact and in the NATO alliance, and these things do take a while to work out. De facto I think you will see people talking about one Germany in a very short period of time, faster than any of us could have imagined, and I think that it still remains for the Germans to try and determine what is that Germany that's going to be one Germany, what are its borders, does it have a manifest destiny that it can change its borders? If it says that it does, I think the process of reuniting Germany is going to take longer rather than shorter.

[Koraganov] yes and will be greatly complicated.

[Goryachev] What difficulties do you see on the road to reunified Germany, Sergey?

[Koraganov] What kind of difficulties?

[Goryachev] Well, whatever. Do you think the process will be smooth?

[Koraganov] I cannot predict but nevertheless I see some of the problems and one of the problems will be that the process will inevitably create quite a few tensions within Germanies, and now what we are getting is only the first glimpses of the whole thing and that is, the process will inevitably bring about a polarization of Germany. I think there some of the rightwing forces will strengthen their hand and their voice. And I think that so-called revanchist voices will be heard from Germany from next year, and they will be much louder. So I'm, in the short term or mid term, I'm rather concerned about the situation; in the long term of course I hope that we will survive.

[Goryachev] Right Jonathan, very quickly in short, what are your concerns? What the Soviet Union and the United States should not do along the road to a unified Germany?

[Sanders] Well, I think what the Soviet Union and the United States should not do is think they know the answers, because they don't, they don't know what's happening. I don't think either side has fully thought out what's going on and they have to try and remain flexible in their policies. I think the United States is in some ways further behind than the Soviet Union in trying to think of what's going to happen next, what it wants. I don't think that other than the rhetoric of a free and united Germany being selected by the people itself there is a policy in the United States. I think there's a policy in the Soviet Union, but it's a policy in negative terms, what the Soviet Union doesn't want. And both sides have to try and get together, each separately, and find out what kind of Germany it wants and devise a policy that will be flexible but will try and go in that direction.

[Goryachev] Well, that's "Top Priority" for today, hosted by Sergey Goryachev. Taking part today were Sergey Koraganov of the Institute of Europe and Jonathon Sanders of CBS. Thank you for listening.

Gerasimov Holds Tokyo News Conference

Arms Cuts Explained

LD2302163790 Moscow TASS in English 1621 GMT 23 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo February 23 TASS—Current Soviet large-scale cuts in armed forces and armaments, announced by President Mikhail Gorbachev at the U.N. General Assembly session in New York in December 1988, were prompted by new political thinking and a transition to the defence sufficiency strategy, and not by modernisation, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov told a news conference at the Japanese Press Club in Tokyo on Friday.

Gerasimov is visiting Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese news agency KYODO Tsushin.

Commenting on allegations in Japan that the cuts in Soviet armed forces in Asia will not change the situation in substance because modernisation makes up for the cuts, Gerasimov pointed out that no modernisation can compensate for cutting Soviet armed forces in Asia by 200,000 men.

"We are withdrawing from combat readiness more than 50 pacific navy ships. No modernisation can make up for that number. We are withdrawing Migs and Tupolev combat aircraft from Cam Ranh [Bay]. What can make up for that? There were aircraft there, now there are none—what kind of modernisation is that?"

Gerasimov cited the eliination of medium- and shorter-range missiles formerly deployed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and capable of reaching Japan as a step towards lowering the level of confrontation in Asia.

Gerasimov described as salutary the proposed cuts in U.S. troops in some Asian countries, announced by U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney during his Asian trip. At the same time he pointed out that these cuts were "very insubstantial and were mainly prompted by budgetary concerns and that same modernisation."

Koreas Discussed

LD2302190490 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo February 23 TASS—Korean unification could possibly result in removing from Soviet politics all problems relating to the Korean peninsula, visiting Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a news conference in Tokyo today.

"Peaceful reunification of Korea," he said, "is the proclaimed goal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korea constantly puts forward new initiatives for unification. On January 1 this year they proposed tearing down the wall separating the peninsula. This is the time when walls are crumbling. The Berlin

Wall has collapsed. I have been told there is no wall there (between the North and the South in Korea) but I saw it with my own eyes in Panmunjom."

One should not think that North Korea is a threat, the Soviet spokesman said. He noted that no foreign troops are stationed in the North, while some are in the South.

Gerasimov said that Soviet-South Korean relations are developing fairly well on an unofficial level. South Korea has signalled its desire to promote these relations by appointing a diplomat ranking as ambassador to head the consular department in Moscow. The Soviet side has not raised the question about the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Gerasimov stressed that the Soviet Union cannot and will not exert influence on North Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an independent country proceeding along a path of its own choice and in accordance with the church ideas. It is incorrect to view it as a Soviet satellite."

Gerasimov recalled that the Soviet Union has not interfered with developments in East European countries. "When the revolution broke out in Romania some Western officials said they would understand and not protest against Soviet intervention on the side of the revolution. We sympathized with the revolution but we did not intervene. This is part of our general policy."

Shevardnadze's Visit Noted

LD2302184290 Moscow TASS in English 1828 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo February 23 TASS—"The Soviet side regards Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's forthcoming visit to Japan as very important, because it is one stage in preparations for Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to that country," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a news conference here.

He pointed out the Soviet minister's enormous workload and proposed that it would be better if diplomats from both sides prepare this visit.

On the question of the so-called northern territories, as a group of South Kuril Islands is called in Japan, which are the target of Tokyo's territorial claims, Gerasimov said: "It's a pity that this question becomes an obstacle to the development of our relations and introduces an unnecessary element of confrontation and mutual accusations in relations. If we develop our relations and they are improving, it will be easier to talk on this theme."

He said that arguments about the ownership of the islands are put forward both in Japan and the Soviet Union, and noted that there can be no letup in disputes on this theme. "We should look forward rather than backward," Gerasimov stressed. Gerasimov said that the Soviet leadership does not conduct discussions on the territorial question. He recalled that bilateral political consultations are now under way on concluding a peace treaty, during which any country can raise any question.

Gerasimov said that the USSR and Japan had ample opportunities to expand cooperation. Questioned on Japan's involvement in developing areas in Siberia, he said that it was, of cause, welcomed but "this does not at all mean that we want to invite only Japan to develop Siberia."

Perfilyev 22 Feb Briefing on World Issues

EC, Israeli Actions

LD2202141590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1328 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Feb (TASS)—The position taken by the European Community regarding Israel's creation of settlements on the Arab territories it occupies "fully coincides with the USSR's approach" in this matter and testifies to the fact that the unlawful actions of the Israeli authorities are subject to widespread condemnation by the world community. This was stated today at a briefing by Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate.

He recalled that on 20 February at its meeting in Dublin, the EC Council of Ministers passed a statement that says in particular the EC member of countries, from the viewpoint of international law, regard the creation of Jewish settlements on the occupied Arab territories, including East Jerusalem as illegal, and express grave concern over the possibility of immigrants arriving in Israel being settled there. The ministers appealed to the Israeli Government "not to jeoparidze the prospects of achieving peace in the region by allowing Jewish immigrants, or encouraging them, to settle in the occupied territories." The ministers also expressed satisfaction at the liberalization of the rules for leaving the USSR, stressing at the same time that the Soviet Jews exercise of the right to leave their country should not be at the expense of the rights of Palestinians.

"The Soviet Union," Vadim Perfilyev noted, "advanced the initiative of a review by the UN Security Council of the matter of the illegal actions by Israel, and presumes that, supported by a true international consensus on this matter, including the coinciding principles of the USSR and the countries of Western Europe, the Council will make an effective decision in the near future preventing Israel's colonization of Palestinian lands."

Israeli Air Route

LD2202163190 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—The Soviet Union and Israel are not linked by direct and regular air services at present, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today. He commented on reports on some news organizations about negotiations regarding such flights.

The spokesman said that there had been several charter flights between Moscow and Tel Aviv to carry teams of entertainers and sportsmen and that this was a result of the widening humanitarian and cultural contacts between the two countries.

Asked if the Soviet Union links the establishment of direct air services to Israel with the settling of immigrants in the Israel-occupied territories, Perfilyev said that unlike Washington, which does not see this connection, the Soviet side does, and the U.S. side is well aware of this.

He said that the establishment of an airlift to carry to emigrating Jews to Israel is out of question.

At the same time the spokesman said that the USSR does not preclude the development of relations with Israel also in air services. It believes, however, that the establishment of direct air services requires a certain level and character of relations between Israel and the USSR.

Horn's Remarks on NATO

LD2202161390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1540 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Feb (TASS)—Commenting on the statements by Hungary's Foreign Minister Gyula Horn about Hungary's possible participation in NATO, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, stated at a briefing today that "at present, that country is observing the obligations ensuing from its membership in the Warsaw Pact."

At the same time, the Soviet diplomat noted, the Warsaw Pact member states advocate the establishment of contacts between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, both in the political and in the military spheres. "That is in accordance with our approach," he said.

According to Vadim Perfilyev, the USSR is in favor of the creation of a fundamentally new security system in Europe, outside blocs. NATO adheres to largely similar standpoints, the Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed, recalling in this connection the speech in Zurich last Wednesday by Manfred Woerner, secretary general of the North Atlantic bloc, who advocated the development of a world order in which all countries, including the Soviet Union, would tackle security problems jointly.

Havel Address, Visit

LD2202180890 Prague CTK in English 1608 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 22 (CTK correspondent)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev said at a press conference here today that several ideas of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel contained in his Wednesday's address to the U.S. Congress are interesting for the Soviet Union, especially his stand on the development of the all-European process.

As regards President Havel's initiative concerning regional cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the Soviet Union paid great attention to it. The Soviet Union cannot however, assume a more specified stand as it does not have detailed information on this proposal at its disposal, the Soviet spokesman said.

He pointed out the significance of the forthcoming visit of Vaclav Havel to the Soviet Union that starts on Monday [24 February]. "The visit of President Havel to the Soviet Union is very significant as it is his first visit to the Soviet Union in his new function", he stressed.

Afghan Rebel Attack

LD2202163790 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev today denied Western reports that Afghan rebels had seized a truck convoy heading from Kabul to Gardeyz.

Speaking at a briefing here today, Perfilyev said that according to the Soviet Embassy in Afghanistan, only 15 trucks out of 700 had not reached Gardeyz. The convoy was protected by forces of the Afghan Defence Ministry, Ministry of State Security and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. A large group of rebels was routed: 720 insurgents were killed and 900 were wounded. The Kabul-Gardeyz road is now in government control.

Asked about rebel intentions to shell Soviet villages bordering on Afghanistan, Perfilyev said that he did not have such information. At the same time, he noted that "the Afghan Government controls territories bordering on the Soviet Union" and that "Soviet border guards can take all necessary measures to prevent violations of the Soviet border."

Further on Afghan Incident

LD2302100790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0730 GMT on 23 February carries a recording of Perfilyev's comments on Afghan rebel activity, which adds: "Several thousand rocket missiles, more than 20 rocket missile launchers, other weapons, and ammunition have been seized. Along the entire route of the column and in Gardeyz, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan have placed posts which reliably ensure that transport vehicle traffic is maintained. Apart from ammunition and arms, some 1,000 tonnes of food have been delivered to Gardeyz, along with medicines and other vital supplies for the town's population. The Kabul-Gardeyz road is now in government control. In all, observers appraise the Gardeyz operation as an important success of government troops and a major defeat for the insurgents.

"There was one question, in particular: Some leaders of the Afghan mujahidin state that they will open fire on any Soviet plane, military or civilian, carrying military or peaceful cargo, landing at Kabul International Airport. What can the Soviet side's response measures be? In reply, one can say that we have repeatedly stated that shelling an international airport—and the airport in Kabul is an international airport—represents a terrorist act. It is necessary to fight against this, not just for those who are directly affected by it, but also for all the countries of the world. We have repeatedly warned the Mujahidin and those who are behind them that such actions are impermissible. We hope that common sense will prevail."

Hun Sen-Sihanouk Meeting

LD2202210190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Feb (TASS)—In the Soviet Union, we welcome the resumption of a dialogue between Hun Sen, head of the Government of Cambodia, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate, said today at a briefing on the meeting of these two statesmen in Bangkok on 21 February.

The Soviet diplomat hopes that the results of the meeting, which calls for the creation of a supreme national body in the country as a symbol of national sovereignty and unity, "will serve as a good prelude to the regional forum on the Cambodian problem which will open in a few days in Jakarta within the framework of the Paris conference."

UN Observers Laud Nicaragua Electoral Process

LD2002103790 Moscow TASS in English 1014 GMT 20 Feb 90

[By TASS corespondent Yuri Dmitriyev]

[Text] Managua February 20 TASS—Iqbal Riza of Pakistan, head of the U.N. observers in Nicaragua, praised the development of the electoral process in the country. He noted at a news confernce here on Tuesday that observers from the Organization of American States [OAS] and the Council of Western Hemisphere heads of state, led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, also confirm the normal process of the electoral campaign.

Riza noted that difficulties encountered during the electoral process should not cast doubt onto its normal course.

The fact that the process was praised by international observers up to this day, gives grounds to expect that the elections on February 25 will also be positively assessed, he continued.

Riza pointed to a sharp decrease in the number of incidents during electoral demonstrations, as a result of an agreement signed by political parties to prevent disorders.

He said that in the past two weeks international observers were worried by calls by opposition parties on their sympathisers "to come to polls" on February 25 "to prevent" Sandinistas from "stealing the victory."

Only "fraud" can prevent this victory, opposition representatives said. Riza stresed that these calls and statements increase the chance of violence.

Present measures of control preclude mass tampering with the polling results, he noted.

The chief observer also expressed the hope that political parties would support a resolution by the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council, currently being drafted, that aims to prevent violence.

Replying to journalists' questions, he said that another 160 UN observers had arrived in Nicaragua. Their total numbers will top 200, from over 50 countries, by February 25.

Together with OAS observers, they will visit 70-80 per cent of the polling stations on the election day. UN representatives will do their own ballot-counting at 8-10 per cent of the station to monitor preliminary official results.

OAS observers will act in a similar way. Then, the supreme electoral council will supply international observers with the originals of the ballot-counting certificates from all 4,400 polling stations of the final official results, Riza said.

The United Nations will provide a regular report on the electoral process in Nicaragua on Febraury 23. On February 26 U.N. secretary-general's personal representative Elliot Richardson will make public in Managua preliminary expert conclusions on voting results.

The final conclusions will be prepared by March 2, Riza noted.

According to the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, over 2,000 foreign observers, including U.N. and OAS representatives, parliamentary delegations, politicians and clergymen from various countries, will monitor the elections in the republic.

United States & Canada

Soviet Citizen Recruited by CIA Executed

OW2502094490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA [date not given] has published new information about the recruitment of Moscow resident Tolkachev by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as a special agent in 1985.

Tolkachev, who once worked for a science institute, sold at high prices classified information about the USSR's latest rockets and military planes. Because of his colleagues' alertness, his crimes were exposed.

The paper points out: Papers in the West have carried all kinds of rumors about this case. Tolkachev was given the death sentence and was executed.

Further on U.S. 'Agent' Tolkachev

PM2402202190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 6

[S. Borodin article under the "Security Officers' Story" rubric: "Treason"]

[Text] The following news item appeared in the Soviet press back in 1985: "KGB organs have arrested a U.S. intelligence agent—A. Tolkachev, staffer of a Moscow scientific research institutes." CIA leaders used to call him their "No. 1 agent in the USSR."

Why have we decided to report this case in greater detail? First, readers' letters contain requests to explain who Tolkachev was, what drove him to treason, and how he was exposed. Second, foreign—and especially U.S.—mass media carry considerable numbers of dubious stories, conjectures, and downright fantasy about the "Tolkachev case."

What drove Adolf Tolkachev to treason? A skilled engineer, he was married with one child. The investigation revealed that, secretly from those around him, Tolkachev thought that he was a strong personality, some sort of superman. At the same time, he considered that he had been ill-treated by fate. He had spent 30 years at the scientific research institute and was just a leading designer, whereas many of his contemporaries had become "personalities." The "strong personality" had a leaning toward fascist ideology. The first thing Tolkachev did when he established espionage contacts with the CIA was to ask for a copy of "Mein Kampf," the handbook of Hitlerism, which he subsequently received from the U.S. intelligence agents. He greatly wished to be at least a little like his namesake of notorious memory.

But even so, money was the main motivation. No, he earned quite a respectable sum and could not have complained about financial difficulties. "I set myself the goal of getting rich," he declared openly. "I needed money, a lot of money, and I was determined to get it at any cost."

A commodity was found—important secret information about the equipment of the latest missiles and combat aircraft, on which his scientific research institute was working. The only thing left was to find a buyer, and Tolkachev found him.

His expectations of "business interest" on the part of the CIA proved correct. The U.S. intelligence agents to whom Tolkachev gave his home telephone number together with his proposal for cooperation got in touch with him: They called him and instructed him to urgently collect from a telephone booth a packet meant for him wrapped inside a dirty glove. That was the beginning of an agent's training in the skills of a spy's craft.

Painstaking preparations for work with Tolkachev were made at CIA Headquarters in Langley and at its resident's office concealed behind the facade of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The spy was supplied with everything needed for communications: a cleverly compiled schedule for meetings, radio equipment, and material for receiving and decoding encoded radio messages from the intelligence center in Frankfurt-am-Main. They took care to supply special photographic equipment which Tolkachev would use to photograph documents of interest to the U.S. intelligence service at his work. It appears that the CIA instructors made provisions for even the tiniest of details: The miniature camera was accompanied by detailed instructions, and there was also a light meter. Not a single line should be omitted when photographing the documents.

Friendly female and male names—"Olga," "Nina," "Anna," "Valeriy," and "Petr"—were used by the CIA "poets" to indicate locations in Moscow where clandestine meetings with Tolkachev should take place. Let us give the CIA experts the credit due to them: They worked really hard to find poorly illuminated and deserted places in Moscow. They also developed suitable signals to enable the spy to notify them when he was ready for a meeting.

Anyone unfamiliar with CIA tricks would never imagine that if a light were to burn behind a certain window in the U.S. Embassy building in Moscow, this could be a coded message to a spy. But that was the communication method chosen for Tolkachev. He should stroll opposite the Embassy at a set time and watch the windows.

The U.S. intelligence service highly rated the information transmitted by Tolkachev. Here is an extract from a CIA message sent to him in 1984: "Once more, thanks for the valuable information. The loss of this information would have been a heavy blow. The risk of losing you is simply unacceptable for us." In another letter to the agent (June 1985), which actually failed to reach the addressee for reasons beyond his and the CIA's control, the customary "heartfelt thanks" for the espionage information appear right next to an expression of annoyance because people in Washington "were unable to develop his latest film." The poor exposure was probably due to dull weather in Moscow—that was Langley's conclusion. The CIA did not want to believe that all this was a harbinger of the imminent end of "agent No. 1," and relied on the effectiveness of safety measures that had been taken.

From a memorandum by a staffer at the scientific research institute's technical documentation department:

"I consider it necessary to note some features that I regard as suspicious in the behaviour of research institute staffer A.G. Tolkachev. I have repeatedly seen Tolkachev asking the department's staff responsible for issuing documents to give him a particular document to work on in exchange for a signature alone. Today I remembered an incident that occurred approximately six months ago, to which I attached no significance at the time. Before lunch I went to the document issuing section and saw Tolkachev receiving important material against a signature. Later, when I went out into the street on my way to lunch, I thought I saw Tolkachev leaving in his car. Returning to the department, I checked for the presence of the document Tolkachev had taken, but it was not in its place. If Tolkachev had left the research institute he should have returned the documents to the library and to the technical documentation department. And I decided at the time that I must have been mistaken in the street. Tolkachev is one of the people who often takes documents from the department. Perhaps my suspicions are misplaced and all these cases have some other explanation, but I considered it my duty to report it."

No, she was not mistaken. American intelligence had prepared three forged documents for Tolkachev—two "Permits for the Use of Technical Documentation" and a pass to enter the research institute building. The need for these documents arose because, after obtaining secret materials from the technical documentation department, in his lunch break the spy secretly removed them from the research institute and photographed them in his apartment. In order to obtain the documents it was necessary to leave his pass in exchange for them. When a stricter regime was imposed at the institute, Tolkachev began to resort to deception, explaining, when he obtained documents from the special stock, that he had left his pass in the library. They believed him, and gave him the materials in exchange for a signature alone.

The USSR KGB took the report seriously. Especially since by then certain other alarming pieces of information about Tolkachev had been received. It was noticed that a considerably smaller number of documents was recorded on Tolkachev's "permit card" than had actually been issued to him. The assumption was that Tolkachev was carrying out cunning manipulations with his pass and his "permit card." A subsequent check uncovered a number of other facts, too. Adolf Tolkachev was patently living beyond his means: In a short space of time he had acquired a car, bought a dacha...

Fearing exposure, he now stopped taking the documents home. On the CIA's advice, he adopted a different method—he started photographing the secret materials in the rest room at the institute. On this occasion he spread out on the windowsill the pages of the document he had brought with him, and took a miniature camera out of his pocket. Unscrewing the top of a key chain and thereby revealing the lens, he started taking photographs, nervously looking around at the slightest sound from outside. After preparing the next consignment of materials, he plucked up the courage to give the sign that he was ready for a meeting. The little window that Adolf Tolkachev opened in his apartment at 1210 hours—the agreed signal for a secret meeting on that day—was noticed not only by the American intelligence agents. And it was not only they who prepared for the meeting...

It was getting dark when the agent, carrying a book with a white cover—as the CIA instruction sheet demanded—approached a telephone booth on Khodynskaya Street. This was the meeting place mentioned in CIA instruction sheet "Sasha." The American intelligence agent was prompt—at precisely 2140 hours he approached Tolkachev and immediately got down to business. A cardboard box brought by the CIA staffer was transferred into the agent's hands, and Tolkachev's package into the American's pocket. The intelligence agent began to explain in a businesslike way what the box contained: new instructions for the collection of information, three miniature cameras fitted in key chains, and, of course, money.

The CIA staffer who had this meeting with Tolkachev was John Yakli [name as transliterated], who carried out his true activity in our country under cover of the post of attache to the personnel department at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Langley displayed really "touching" care for its agent. If he needed medicine, everything was provided. In every instruction, efficiently setting out his assignment, they checked up on his health and went to great pains to stress how much they valued him and how concerned they were for his well-being.

Mr. Yakli, a modest attache, was one of the U.S. intelligence operatives instructed to constantly demonstrate this ostentatious concern for his agent, as well as to give him all manner of gifts.

Then they began discussing plans to illegally smuggle Tolkachev out of the Soviet Union: They considered whether it would perhaps be safer to conceal the spy in a U.S. aircraft and get him out that way, whether it would be better to arrange his flight in a car bearing diplomatic license plates, or....

The culmination of CIA "concern" for its agent was, of course, a special fountain pen presented to him one day by a U.S. intelligence operative: The pen contained a special "medicine," the invention of Langley specialists.

Inside the fountain pen handed over by the coordinator—this was how the associate of the CIA embassy residence introduced himself to Tolkachev—an ampoule containing fast-acting poison had been skillfully concealed. Experts were later to establish that exactly the same kind of "gift" had once been given to the U.S. agent Ogorodnik, exposed by the KGB, so that he could dispatch anyone he wanted to, with the blessing of his coordinators. Tolkachev did not manage to put this terrible weapon into effect.

The "medicine" obligingly handed to Tolkachev by the U.S. intelligence operative did not save the spy from a constant, oppressive feeling of fear and attacks of despair. He began to drink: He had to seek treatment from an addiction expert. Even tranquilizers could not help him. One day, something snapped and he could not stand it anymore: He rushed home, smashed his espionage equipment to smithereens, and burned some of the money. Then he stopped: Everything seemed to be calm and he sadly lamented the money he had burned.

That day, 13 June 1985, Tolkachev managed to get home during his break, opened the window at the appointed time, and signaled to the U.S. intelligence operatives that he was ready for the next clandestine meeting. Meanwhile, Paul Stombaugh, second secretary at the U.S. Embassy but in reality a CIA staffer, began to prepare carefully for his evening rendezvous. Betsy Stombaugh actively assisted him in this: attentive wife and professional assistant to her husband in his espionage activities.

This is how the Stombaughs' evening stroll through Moscow ended. Here is an extract from the protocol:

"A foreigner named Paul Stombaugh, second secretary at the U.S. Embassy, was arrested during an espionage meeting with a Soviet citizen. A staffer of the embassy summoned to the USSR Foreign Ministry confirmed that the detainee was indeed a U.S. citizen. The following items were confiscated from him: CIA instructions printed on miniature sheets of paper which dissolve rapidly in water, five mini-cameras, maps of the region where the meeting took place, and so forth."

The material found on Tolkachev and Stombaugh shows that the CIA had been using this agent to conduct a long-term operation to gather important information of a military and scientific and technical nature about the Soviet Union.

New circumstances, new names, new participants in an espionage operation. How many of them were there altogether? During the investigation, Tolkachev named five U.S. intelligence operatives with whom he had had clandestine meetings. Stombaugh was the sixth.

The court carefully studied all the circumstances of the case and, considering the substantial damage Tolkachev had caused Soviet defense potential, passed the following sentence: the supreme penalty. This sentence has been carried out.

Reading these lines, some people will say: "This is all in the past. Today, in the period of openness in the military sphere, no one needs spies like Tolkachev." We would like to believe this. But, on the eve of 1990, U.S. ABC television reported this: "The CIA plans to increase the number of its agents working abroad. This primarily applies to regions where the situation is changing rapidly. This means the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe first and foremost. The precise amount of money the CIA proposes to allocate for this purpose is being kept secret."

TASS Analyst on Cheney Asia-Pacific Tour

LD2302163590 Moscow TASS in English 1609 GMT 23 Feb 90

[By TASS political analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—When the Soviet Union announced its decision to reduce Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, the Pentagon welcomed this step and expressed the conviction that it would contribute to the strengthening of regional stability.

Spokesmen of the U.S. Administration said then that Cheney would discuss during his visits to South Korea, the Philippines and Japan possible American measures to cut U.S. forces in the region. And what are the results of his visit that ended recently?

The talks in the three capitals focused on the reduction of the 120,000-strong U.S. Armed Forces by approximately 10 per cent. The fact that such a cut will be made within the next two or three years is indicative in itself, even if it will reportedly involve only logistical services and, according to Chief of Japan's Defence Agency Jsuro Matsumoto, will "not affect the fighting capacity of American troops."

Cheney said in Manila that his Asian-Pacific tour was linked with America's reassessment of military strategy in the light of positive world changes, particularly in American-Soviet relations.

But are the mentioned reductions adequate to the positive global changes and do they testify to American's desire to revise its strategy in the region? Maybe it means only a structural reorganisation designed to reassure congressmen who believe that the 30 billion dollars the Pentagon annually spends on U.S. military presence in the region are much too heavy a burden for the American treasury. As a matter of fact, Cheney's actions followed this cue. He called for bigger contributions by U.S. allies to the maintenance of U.S. troops deployed in their territories.

Judging by what was discussed during the negotiations, it is too early yet to speak of any changes in U.S. regional strategy. Cheney claimed during his tour that the USSR's military potential remained formidable despite the

Soviet leadership's efforts and the progress in disarmament. He repeatedly said that America planned "comparatively modest changes" that would "allow the United States to save money." He also said the U.S. commitments in the region remain unchanged.

Echoing him, Shigeo Takenaka, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, noted that the United States was not yet ready to renounce its "advanced deployment" strategy. It is pertinent to recall in this connection about the notorious "instruction for defence planning" that was drafted with Cheney's personal participation. It says that the United States is not ready to renounce the use of strength abroad. And isn't this in keeping with the "advanced deployment" strategy?

The Asian-Pacific public is aware of the broad-scope Soviet initiatives to lower the level of military confrontation and to strengthen mutual confidence among states. It is also aware of the Soviet Union's consistent efforts to considerably reduce the Soviet Armed Forces inthe eastern part of the USSR, to switch them over to purely defensive rails.

All this is received with satisfaction in this region of the world and is regarded as a practical embodiment of the new Soviet military doctrine. A large-scale reduction of Soviet and American military presence not only in Europe, but also in Asia, will undoubtedly serve the cause of consolidating peace and stability in that part of the globe.

Bush Meeting With CSSR's Havel Reported

PM2302152790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "Czechoslovak President in United States"]

[Text] Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, who is paying an official visit to Washington, has secured trade concessions from U.S. President George Bush but was sharply rebuffed by the latter when he voiced the opinion that there is no longer any need for U.S. troops to be in Europe. That is how REUTER correspondent Laurence McQuillan sums up in one sentence the first results of the head of the Czechoslovak state's visit to the United States and his talks with the White House incumbent.

Even against the backdrop of the stormy political activity that the world has experienced over the last few weeks, V. Havel's visit to the United States was one of those events to which news agencies devoted heightened attention. First, the Czechoslovak president was the first leader of an East European state to visit Washington. Second—and this imparts additional resonance to his talks in the United States—Vaclav Havel will visit Moscow in the next few days. In an interview with NBC TV he said that he has high expectations of his visit to the Soviet Union. According to Havel, this concerns the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and further cooperation between the two countries' security bodies. The fate of the Warsaw Pact, Havel said, depends in part on the further development of the world situation but its disbandment must not be forced by unilateral steps.

Before his visit to the United States the Czechoslovak president said that he had no intention of asking for economic aid or credit, the aim of his talks in Washington being to establish equitable cooperation. Judging by a report from the U.S. capital, this aim was achieved. G. Bush announced that he had notified the Congress about waiving the Jackson-Vanik amendment with regard to Czechoslovakia. Thus Czechoslovakia will obtain most favored nation status in trade. Bush also supported Czechoslovakia's wish to join the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Moreover, the U.S. President said that he had instructed the Export-Import Bank of the United States to begin operations in Czechoslovakia.

Apart from bilateral relations the situation in Eastern Europe was discussed at the meeting between the two presidents.

V. Havel's statements regarding U.S. troops in Europe, which came in the wake of the recent USSR-U.S. accords, provoked a sharply negative attitude. Both sides, as is well known, agreed that the level of their armed forces in Central Europe would total 195,000 men. What is more the United States will be allowed to keep another 30,000 of its servicemen outside the Central European zone.

In response to this accord, the Czechoslovak president told CNN TV: "I believe that U.S. troops can leave Europe, there will no longer be any need for them." Citing official U.S. Administration spokesmen, REUTER gave G. Bush's reaction. He is supposed to have told V. Havel that the U.S. military presence is necessary to stabilize the situation. At the end of a meeting lasting two and a half hours the U.S. President said that the Atlantic alliance would continue to play a vitally important role in guaranteeing stability and security in Europe "at this great historic moment," and America would continue to play its part in this, including a "strong military presence in the interests of its own and European security."

The program for the last day of the Czechoslovak president's visit included a visit to the Capitol accompanied by U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle to address both chambers of the Congress. REUTER surmises that the topic of the speech is the necessary Western support for Czechoslovakia.

U.S. Slow To Lift Immigration Restrictions

PM2102111590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[G. Deynichenko report: "Protracted Farewell"]

[Text] Acting with circumspection and even with caution, America and the Americans are trying to rid themselves of the burden of the "cold war" legacy which has given the "image of America" some fairly unattractive traits and has generally served as an obstacle to normal relations between the United States and the rest of the world. At the beginning of February the U.S. Senate approved the repeal of the most offensive provisions of the law which prohibited the issuing of entry visas to foreigners on political grounds.

It concerns the so-called McCarran-Walter law. Adopted in 1952, at the height of the "witch-hunt"—the persecution of Americans with political beliefs differing from those of the establishment—this law was, for almost four decades, both the target of critical attacks and the object of ridicule because of efforts made by the U.S. authorities to put up an "iron curtain" which would protect the United States from the influence of "subversive ideas." On the basis of this law, thousands and thousands of foreigners were, so to speak, turned away from the gates of America. In 1984 alone 8,000 people were affected by the McCarran-Walter Act when they were refused entry into the United States because of their ideological views and political convictions.

The list of people who have suffered because of the excessive suspiciousness of the U.S. immigration authorities is striking. The slightest hint of "communist links" was enough to slam the door in the faces of writers and influential political activists of world renown. Graham Green, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and the widow of the Chilean president, Hortensia Allende, are just some of the people humiliated by the refusal of an entry permit. Even the future Canadian prime minister, P. Trudeau, was rashly put on the lists of proscribed people—because he participated in an economic conference in Moscow in 1952 and on this basis was placed among the "communist sympathizers."

Although there have been sporadic Soviet-U.S. human contacts for many years, Soviet citizens—trade union workers and public figures—also fell victim to these prohibitive articles of the 1952 Immigration Law.

Of course, the law's restrictive framework was sufficiently broad. It could be the basis for refusing an entry visa to a known terrorist, an ideologist of apartheid (former Prime Minister of Rhodesia Ian Smith was refused entry permission), a believer in polygamy, or a courier for the drugs mafia. But as a whole, despite the adoption of measures in 1977 to ease the prohibitive practice, the law, a child of the "cold war," served as the instrument of the latter by provoking suspicion, sowing the seeds of mutual distrust, and working on ingraining the "enemy image" into Americans' minds.

Even when it became clear that the "cold war" is receding, and that a different atmosphere has come to replace the former hostility and alienation in international relations, U.S. legislators have not been in a hurry to part with the McCarran-Walter Law. Its provisions were twice repealed—in 1987 and 1988, but only temporarily. Now, with the U.S. Senate decision (it is still awaiting presidential ratification), an important step has been taken toward rejecting the previous habit of measuring possibilities for human contact with an ideological yardstick.

However, U.S. defenders of the law and their like-minded colleagues in other countries are not making haste to celebrate. First of all, only those provisions of the law are being repealed that concern the issuing of visas for temporary stays in the United States. The law remains in full force for those who choose the United States as a place of permanent residence. So that if, for instance, Graham Green wanted to spend the rest of his days somewhere in California, he would probably not be able to. Second, new immigration legislation is being urgently drawn up in which it will be easy to preserve the former restrictions if so desired.

The "cold war" years have built up a great deal of ice in international relations and, unfortunately, it is thawing very slowly. On the American side too. The McCarran-Walter Law is receding into the past, but the Jackson-Vanik Law, which brought an ideological aftertaste into trade and economic links between the United States and socialist countries, remains. Restrictions imposed by the Americans on their allies through the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls—which controls the export of so-called strategic goods—remain.

Yet after all, it would seem to be time to reject all this...

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Covers U.S. Visit

Group Visits Norfolk Naval Base

PM2302103190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent A. Golts dispatch: "'We Must Maintain Greater Contact'"]

[Text] If we were to try to determine which of the U.S. military centers was most involved in developing Soviet-U.S. contacts, the naval base at Norfolk could lay claim to one of the most prominent places in this sphere. The arrival of the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee was thus the continuation of the dialogue begun by the visit to Norfolk of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev and the visit to this naval base by a detachment of Soviet warships.

The U.S. Atlantic Fleet Command gave the Soviet parliamentarians an opportunity to familiarize themselves with those ships that are considered the pride of the U.S. Navy. These are the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, named the best ship in the fleet by the command; the missile cruiser Ticonderoga, equipped with the AEGIS system; and, finally, the destroyer Comte de Grasse, armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles. Of course, the size and the combat might of the modern aircraft carrier, its three aircraft hangars, and the 400-meter flight deck make a strong impression. The AEGIS system, which makes it possible to ensure efficient antiaircraft defenses, was of special interest to our delegation members. At the same time it was pointed out that the Americans, having equipped their ships to the hilt with the most modern electronics and armament, prefer rationality and modesty, if not to say asceticism, in the ships' internal finish.

As regards personal impressions, I was interested in the fact that in the majority of cases it was not officers but fleet petty officers hardly more than 20 years old who provided the explanations in the most important command centers and armament control posts. And quite young guys were sitting at the control panels. As Captain M. Foot, commander of the Ticonderoga, reported not without pride, the operators' average age is 19-20 years. I asked V. Lich [name as transliterated], commander of the destroyer Comte de Grasse, how long it takes to train skilled specialists. Six months at the training center and three-four months on board ship, he replied. It would probably be worth pondering on the intensiveness and efficiency of the training of fleet specialists in the U.S. Navy.

"What have these three visits changed in the attitude of the U.S. military toward us?"—I put this question to Admiral F. Kelso, commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

"Previously," he replied, "I simply did not know any Soviet people. But now all of us here in Norfolk can see that you smile and laugh just as we do. Of course, personal relations are personal relations, and politics are politics. But I believe that we must maintain greater contact."

Well, it is possible to agree with this.

Yesterday the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee arrived in Washington.

Members Tour NORAD Command Center

PM2102114190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts report: "The Secrets of Cheyenne Mountain"]

[Text] 1616 GMT. This was the exact time of a recent spacecraft launch. There is nothing unusual in this information, or in a report that the temperature in Moscow was minus 4. What is unusual is that members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions delegation obtained this information at the NORAD (North American Air Defense) command center, and the NORAD specialists, in their turn, obtained it not from the mass media but from their reconnaissance satellites.

Having flown from California to Colorado, the Soviet delegation visited this center, one of the most important American military command centers. They had to travel over two miles through a tunnel inside the granite of Cheyenne mountain to reach the actual command center. I do not know what is usually projected on the biggest display screen, but this time it said in Russian "Welcome." The guests from the USSR were met by D. Piotrovsky, commander of NORAD and the space command.

After an inspection, there was a detailed conversation. American officers explained how the NORAD command center works in the case of detection of a rocket being launched on USSR territory, how the trajectory of its flight is calculated, and how the target of the launch is identified. It was stressed in particular that parallel analysis of such information is carried out by independent computer systems. This is done so to avoid any possible mistakes.

Another area of NORAD's activity is tracking over 6,000 different objects in space. The time of their possible descent into the dense strata of the Earth's atmosphere appears on the display. The Soviet guests were equally interested in the air defense system in which airborne warning and control system aircraft and ground based radar stations are used. Explanations were shown on the same working display that shows the immediate air situation around the United States. Thus, the members of the delegation saw an unidentified aircraft fly into NORAD's observation zone and a couple of F-15 fighters being launched to identify it.

It must be said that the American officers answered all the delegation members' questions very amicably. In particular, General Piotrovsky reported that the NORAD center possesses an automatic life-support system and is capable of surviving a nuclear attack and subsequently functioning for at least 60 days.

"And what would it be needed for after a nuclear attack?" V.A. Opolinskiy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, asked.

"Well, there are people who believe that an attack could be followed by another one. But with satellites at its disposal, the center is able to report on the second attack as well," was the response. It appears that some people can seriously contemplate a prolonged nuclear war.

Apart from the NORAD center, our delegation visited the Air Force training school, where they met with teachers and students.

Stereotypes Noted During Visit

PM2102105990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent A. Golts dispatch: "'Cold' at Offutt Base"]

[Text] This was probably the hardest day of the entire U.S. trip by the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions. And it was not the fact that, having flown out of

Colorado in the morning, we visited first the Luort [name as transliterated] base of the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces in South Dakota and then the Offutt base, where the headquarters of SAC [Strategic Air Command] is located, before ending the day in the city of Killeen in Texas. The point is that the Soviet parliamentarians saw for themselves—perhaps for the first time during their stay—how strong the stereotypes of the past still are in the United States.

On heading for Offutt base, the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee were reckoning on learning how this important center of the U.S. military leadership functions. However, the SAC Command had prepared for something else. After a brief introductory speech by Air Force General J. Chain, the commander, a major appeared on the platform and, showing slides and diagrams, started speaking... about the Soviet military threat. And the "arguments" were utterly antiquated: The USSR military budget is supposedly growing rapidly, the Soviet Union has a tremendous advantage in nuclear forces, and so forth.

In general, you can understand why all this was needed. For L. Aspin, chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, arrived at the base together with the Soviet delegation. At the end of last week, when the Soviet parliamentarians were present at the hearings in this committee, which were devoted precisely to the Air Force budget, L. Aspin certainly did not express readiness to unhesitatingly accept the Pentagon's arguments with regard to the need for the simultaneous deployment of two strategic ICBM's and one bomber. And it was, by all accounts, for L. Aspin that the additional lecture on the "Soviet military threat" was laid on at the SAC.

Honestly, it was not for this that the Soviet parliamentarians came to the United States. But since a dispute had been imposed, and in quite an aggressive manner too, it had to be accepted.

"You listen to the major, and you might as well take fright," this was how V.L. Lapygin, chairman of the Defense and State Security Questions Committee, began his speech, not without irony. "While we are in the United States, the Soviet Union will suddenly up and inflict a strike with all its might..."

Lapygin, a prominent Soviet designer in the sphere of rocket technology, went on to show with specific examples that it is certainly not our country that is the initiator in the sphere of developing various strategic offensive arms systems. Then Army General V.M. Shabanov, USSR deputy defense minister and a member of the committee, spoke.

"We could argue for a long time," he said, "over who took the initiative in the sphere of deploying particular weapons systems, but something else is beyond doubt—it is precisely our country that has solemnly declared that under no conditions will it unleash nuclear war. Unfortunately, the United States has not made such a statement." Army Gen. Shabanov went on to mention the U.S. missile-carrying submarines of the Trident system and sea-launched cruise missiles—the very arms systems which threaten the existing strategic stability.

L. Aspin, chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, also spoke in conversation with your correspondent about the fact that people who tackle military problems in one country must learn to understand the other side. As regards the discussion which developed at the SAC Headquarters, in the congressman's opinion even it was to some extent useful. After all, it is, perhaps, not a bad thing that different approaches to nuclear programs were set forth right there, at SAC.

Northeast Asia

'Limited' Contacts With Seoul for Time Being

PM2502202190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Dispatch by Own correspondent A. Shalnev: "Three Reports From Seoul"]

[Text] New York—Three reports which came in from Seoul on the same day were forwarded to me by personnel at the South Korean mission attached to the United Nations. The theme of all three reports is similar: the prospects of Soviet-South Korean relations, diplomatic and economic.

Addressing a session of the republic's National Assembly Thursday, South Korean Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun said that South Korea "will try to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the near future."

Such relations do not exist between our countries at present, and the only thing that the two countries can probably expect in the immediate future is the building of limited consular contacts, when consular sections open at our respective trade missions in Moscow and Seoul.

Judging by the South Korean premier's statements, the republic's government remains committed to the so-called northern policy of President No Tae-U, which presupposes the normalization of relations with socialist countries, including the DPRK. According to Kang Yong-hun, Seoul is going to spare no effort to "improve relations with China as soon as possible and speed the pace of practical improvement in relations with the East European countries."

The second report confirms that one of South Korea's biggest industrialists and the founder and honorary chairman of the "Hyundai" Corporation, Chon Chu Yen [name as published], will be arriving in the Soviet Union at the beginning of March. His visit has a dual purpose: First, to open a "Hyundai" Corporation office in Moscow and, second, to complete negotiations on setting up several joint enterprises. The construction of a soap works and some mining enterprises is being considered, in particular. It is proposed—or, in any case, the South Korean industrialist hopes—that the realization of the joint projects, which will be concentrated in the Far East, can begin in the first half of this year.

One additional point from other sources: The Seoul newspaper KOREA TIMES has written that "Hyundai" intends to set up a trade center in Nakhodka, which, as the newspaper reminds us, "is one of the special economic zones being opened up by Moscow to attract foreign capital and technology."

And the last report. I will quote it exactly as it was conveyed by the South Korean news agency YONHAP:

"Russophiles in South Korean business circles intend to set up a working committee responsible for questions of developing growing trade with the Soviet Union. The dearth of information on the Soviet economy and growing competition among Korean firms have created the need to establish a group of experts on trade with the Soviet Union. The committee will be instituted on Friday. It will meet once every three months, inviting economic policymakers in the Soviet Union to its sessions. The committee will work to ensure that Korean companies exchange information and the results of research among themselves which could have bearing on trade with the Soviet Union."

I will point out that at the end of October last year the volume of trade between the USSR and South Korea had reached $432 million in comparison to $58 million in 1985. I will also point out, however, that the volume of trade between South Korea and the PRC is several times higher than this.

USSR-South Korean Trade Contacts Discussed

SK2502034190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Talk from "Businessmen's Club" program]

[Text] Although economic contacts between the Soviet Union and Korea date back nearly 20 years, they have been sporadic and have been conducted through third countries.

Since the middle of last year when the two countries exchanged trade missions, these contacts have been carried out on a new level and in a normal way.

The (Lareva), a national fisheries industry association, is among the first enterprises which forged direct connections with Korean business counterparts.

(Valeriy Surikov), a station commentator, interviewed (Kimuse Luzhikov), deputy manager of the External Economic Liaison Department of the (Lareva).

[Begin (Luzhikov) recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] Korean businessmen visited Vladivostok on several occasions. They represented various business firms. They hoped to meet our fishermen and functionaries in the fisheries field. Korea is one of the leading countries in the fisheries field. It is also well known for success in the maritime products processing field. Processed marine products from Korea are seen in Asian and West European countries.

Regrettably, we have not reached this level. For this reason, we plan to expand contacts with businessmen of this country.

Our delegations have also visited Korea on several occasions. They have acquainted themselves with the status quo of the fisheries field there and have toured a series of enterprises.

We expect that the industrial potential of Korea and its advanced know-how will be conducive to solving our pending problems in the future. [end recording]

[Station reporter (Surikov's) question, read by announcer] In what form have contacts with Korean businessmen been made?

[Begin (Luzhikov) recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] We have cooperated with Korean businessmen, taking advantage of various conditions.

Simple transactions are also included in these contacts. In other words, raw materials are traded for, in cash. [passage indistinct].

Contacts have become complicated. Even joint venture enterprises are being formed.

The (Stast), a [words indistinct] boat, was completely repaired in the Daewoo Shipyard and changed into a new boat which is capable of completely processing marine products. This year five ships will be sent to the Korean shipyard and modernized there.

Efforts are being made to help every enterprise affiliated with [words indistinct] to have contacts with Korean business firms and encourage them to form joint venture enterprises with them. [end recording]

[Station reporter (Surikov's) question, read by announcer] What other companies beside Daewoo are you cooperating with?

[Begin (Luzhikov) recording in Russian with superimposed Korean translation] We are studying the matter of forming joint venture enterprises with many Korean companies.

The first step in this direction has already been taken. An agreement has been signed with the (?Taerim America) company. Representatives of this company have visited Vladivostok, have inspected our fishing boats, and have toured fish processing enterprises.

We view the (?Taerim America) as a very reliable company. We think cooperation with this company will be long-sighted and mutually beneficial.

Also, we have signed a contract with a Korean company which will offer our ships service in Korean ports. In addition, the question of forming a company to arrange joint venture is under study. This company will estimate demands for marine products and [words indistinct] in the world market.

Korea is a new partner for us. We are learning to understand each other. We want to acquaint ourselves better with the possibilities, production potentials, and capital of Korean companies. Thus, we would like to find reliable partners on the basis of far-sighted prospects.

At present, the question of exchanging missions [taepyobu] is being raised. These missions will make it possible to immediately solve any pending problem.

We note once again that we greatly expect that cooperation with Korean companies will be beneficial. [end recording]

Seoul Institute Director on Ties With USSR

PM2202143590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

["IZVESTIYA Interview" with O Se-ung, director of South Korean Institute of Parliamentary and Political Relations, by Yevg. Bay: "Reasonable Compromise Is Necessary"; date not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The first Soviet-South Korean symposium "Contemporary Situation in Socialist Countries. Problems and Prospects of Soviet-Korean Relations" has ended in Moscow. We already reported that prominent South Korean parliamentarians, representatives of major industrial corporations, and journalists took part in it. The day before the delegation left for Leningrad IZVESTIYA's correspondent met with its head O Se-ung, director of South Korea's Institute of Parliamentary and Political Relations.

[Bay] What is your opinion of the prospects for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea?

[O Se-ung] In our opinion, economic relations must be organized above all. We are also interested in rapidly establishing official diplomatic relations and securing a reconciliation between our states, which were previously separated by a wall of mistrust and enmity. As is well known, trade and economic cooperation is not as yet being implemented at government level but on the initiative of individual firms and corporations.

We single out two aspects of the Soviet stance. The USSR and other states of Eastern Europe are experiencing considerable economic difficulties. Your desire to diversify foreign economic ties and seek new markets and partners is understandable. We also want this but we cannot help but be disappointed by the USSR's passivity in securing political relations with South Korea. An accord has been secured between our states to send some South Korean consular personnel to Moscow. However, their functions are still limited; they do not, for instance, have any opportunities of flying the national flag over the mission's building.

[Bay] In your view, what are the main difficulties in the way of establishing diplomatic relations?

[O Se-ung] The policy of new political thinking is the only correct path for the Soviet Union and all mankind. At the same time M. Gorbachev's great perestroyka has made no impact at all on the USSR's relations with the closed society of North Korea. In our view, continuing military cooperation with North Korea does not fit in with the new thinking. Now when the whole world is entering a new era of detente and reduction in tension, such recurrences of past policy provoke concern in our state.

At the same time we by no means want relations between Moscow and Pyongyang to deteriorate. The best thing would be if we all lived by principles of international justice, and reasonable compromise. The South Korean Government recently submitted a draft law to the National Assembly on creating a special foundation to promote the development of economic ties with North Korea and set up joint enterprises. We will finance these enterprises even if third countries, say, the USSR, India, the United States, participate in their activity. From the economic viewpoint, the creation of such a foundation is essential to guarantee profits for South Korean firms, which as yet inevitably lose out when trading with the North. From the political viewpoint this is the way to strengthen mutual trust. We do not want any country's establishing contacts with us to have an adverse effect on its relations with Pyongyang.

[Bay] What is the significance of the establishment of interparliamentary ties between our states?

[O Se-ung] I worked at the Interparliamentary Union 1983 through 1987. I maintained friendly ties with a number of Soviet colleagues, in particular with A. Voss. We all strove not to complicate the already delicate relations between our states.

The institute which I represent could play an active role in establishing bilateral ties between South Korean and Soviet parliamentarians. As far as I know, leading politicians in your country also want that. This March Mr. Kim Yong-sam, cochairman of the Democratic Liberal Party, is to come to the USSR. I am in frequent contact with him and I know that we share an identical stance on this question.

[Bay] Returning to trade and economic contacts, how do you see future avenues of relations between our countries?

[O Se-ung] By and large the prospects for economic relations are very good. There are two main obstacles. While there are no official diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea, our businessmen encounter legal difficulties when they come to Moscow. The South Korean Government cannot offer them any help and their interest in concluding transactions is declining. Another obstacle is the lack of an opportunity to bring convertible currency out of the USSR, but that is partially surmountable. Some South Korean concerns are interested in acquiring a number of commodities in the USSR. The firm Hyundai, for instance, exports timber from here. "Lotte," which owns the largest department store in South Korea, will soon open a fast-food cafe in Moscow and proposes setting up its own store there in the future. Another firm, Jindo, produces fur goods; it has set up a joint enterprise at an "Inturist" base. I know the proprietors of all three firms, they are well-to-do people, prominent businessmen. But none of them has hitherto ventured to make capital investments in the USSR of more than $600,000. They are all very cautious. However, if the political-legal problems are resolved, trade and economic cooperation will boom.

North Korea Denies Plans for Nuclear Expansion

LD2602150290 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 26 TASS—The Korean Central News Agency described as a mere invention allegations by Japanese and some western news organisations that the democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is expanding its nuclear facilities, which would enable it to create its own nuclear weapons.

This story slurs the anti-nuclear and peaceful policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government and plays into the hands of those who look for excuses to prevent the withdrawal of U.S. troops and their nuclear weapons from South Korea, the news agency stressed.

The agency recalled the DPRK's proposal to create a nuclear-free and peace zone on the Korean peninsula. It also announced that North Korean studies of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being conducted within the framework of IAEA guarantees and that the construction of a nuclear power plant has been accelerated to satisfy the mounting demand for electricity.

The agency called on the international public to support the DPRK's policy in this sphere and consider the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region, primarily in South Korea and Japan.

USSR 'Pleased' With PRC Border Talks

OW2402233490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Report by station reporter Kulikov from Beijing, from "World Today" program]

[Text] The Soviet Union and China held talks in Beijing on reduction of border troops and measures for building up trust. On this, our station Kulikov has filed the following report:

The talks were not easy. The longstanding military confrontation on the Soviet-Chinese border has left many problems. Life has time and again proved that it is more difficult to establish ties than to draw up a military formula [sentence as heard].

In an interview with this reporter, Kireyev, head of the Soviet delegation and chief of a section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said: The talks marked the beginning on a long process of continued Soviet-Chinese dialogue on reduction of border troops and measures for building up trust. The purpose of the talks is to substantiate, with concrete actions, the agreement reached in May 1989 between the leaders of the two countries in the meeting in Beijing.

The head of the Soviet delegation continued: We are pleased with the recent talks, and the Chinese side also seems to be satisfied. The talks, which were held in a businesslike, positive, and frank atmosphere, will help the two sides better understand their respective stand and create the conditions for continuing the talks in the near future. Reduction of the troops and measures for building up trust will be conducive to further stabilizing the border situation between the two countries and promoting mutual trust. They will make important contributions to solving the security problem in the Asian-Pacific region. For the first time in three decades, the Soviet and Chinese military officials not only sat down at the negotiation table but also visited each other's military installations. The Chinese officials visited a Soviet tank division and viewed the air force technology, while the Soviet side watched an inspection of Chinese armored troops and visited an infantry division.

The head of the Soviet delegation said: The Chinese troops are quite modernized today. They have attached importance to electronics equipment and the computer technology.

Gerasimov Exchanges Views With Japan's Nakayama

LD2302122690 Moscow TASS in English 1124 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo February 23 TASS—Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama today received visiting Gennady Gerasimov, member of the collegium of Soviet Foreign Ministry and head of the ministry's information directorate.

There was an exchange of views on matters aimed at deepening Soviet-Japanese political dialogue.

Nikolai Solovyov, Soviet ambassador to Japan, was present during the meeting.

Gerasimov Speech on Northern Islands Reported

OW2502062690 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Gerasimov, chief of Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Administration, held a press conference at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on 23 February. Chief Gerasimov is currently visiting Japan at the invitation of the KYODO NEWS SERVICE.

Japanese observers hold the view that since the Soviet Union's modernization of its armament will compensate for its plan to reduce Soviet military strength in Asia, there will be no changes in the situation, qualitatively speaking. When asked by a TASS correspondent to comment on this, Chief Gerasimov replied that no amount of modernization can ever compensate for the reduction of 200,000 Soviet troops in Asia. Then, he added as follows:

We will relieve over 50 vessels of the Pacific Fleet from combat readiness. No matter what the modernization will be, it will never compensate for the withdrawal of such a number of vessels. At the same time, we will also withdraw two fighter planes and [words indistinct] from Cam Ranh Bay. In this case, nothing can replace them and there will be no modernization wathsoever because the fighters deployed there will be withdrawn.

After making these remarks, Information Chief Gerasimov cited as a proof of reduction in military confrontation in Asia the abolition of short and intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching the Japanese territories that were stationed in the Soviet Union's Asian part. Furthermore, Chief Gerasimov spoke highly of the statements made by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, who is currently on a tour of Asian nations, on reducing U.S. military presence in various Asian countries. While welcoming Secretary Cheney's announcement on the reduction, Chief Gerasimov pointed out that the reduction is extremely small-scale, dictated by budget problems, and occurs as part of the modernization.

Furthermore, Chief Gerasimov disclosed that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan because his visit will be a stage in the preparations for Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Japan. In replying to a question on the timing of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan, Chief Gerasimov pointed out that the Soviet foreign minister has an extremely busy work schedule, and proposed that the two nations' diplomatic channels should make sufficient preparations in this connection.

In answering Japanese journalists' questions on the so-called northern territories, for which Japan claims sovereignty, Chief Gerasimov stated as follows:

It's regrettable that this problem has served as an obstacle to the future development of bilateral relations and brought about unnecessary conflicts and mutual apprehensions in the bilateral relations. If bilateral relations are developed and there is an atmosphere for further progress, it will become easier to talk about this problem.

Then, Chief Gerasimov stated that both Japan and the Soviet Union had already pointed out their respective grounds of arguments on the question of the title to the southern islands of the Kurile Islands; pointed out that there would be no end to this debate; and stressed that our two nations should not look back to the past but look to the future in handling this issue. And then, Chief Gerasimov added as follows:

The so-called territorial issue has not been brought up for discussion among the Soviet leadership. At present, the Soviet Union and Japan are engaged in political consultations on concluding a peace treaty. And it is quite possible for the both sides to bring up any problems at these consultations. There is a great potential for both Japan and the Soviet Union to expand their cooperation. Japan's participation in developing Siberia will certainly be welcomed. However, we are not entreating Japan alone to join in the development of Siberia in one way or another.

Mongolia's 'Informals' Form Alternative Party

PM2302105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Nabatchikov dispatch: "Informals Uniting in Party"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—Last Sunday the constituent congress of representatives of the largest organization of informals—the Mongolian Democratic Union [MDU]—was held in Ulaanbaatar. More than 600 delegates took part in its work, most of them members of the party and the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. They were representing 101 MDU branches in 16 aymaks and four Mongolian cities—including Ulaanbaatar—as well as a branch of Mongolian students studying abroad.

The most important event at the constituent congress was the creation at it of the Mongolian Democratic Party—the MDP. Its statutes were adopted and its nine-person political consultative center, which is charged with leading the new party, was elected. In the words of its organizers, the party emerged within the MDU and its name wholly accords with the current crucial stage in the country's social development.

The leaders of the new party stated that the MDP is a new type of party "having nothing in common with the party apparatus, much less with direct interference in the state's activity." At this stage the MDP, as the brainchild of the union, will pursue the same aims as those formulated in the MDU program.

The congress adopted an appeal to the Mongolian people and a petition to the Mongolian People's Great Hural and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee. The petition contains a demand that the members of the Council of Ministers, People's Great Hural, and the current MPRP Central Committee resign for having been "directly appointed by the ruling party Central Committee and for having demonstrated their inability to justify the people's trust."

The congress was partially broadcast live on Mongolian radio and television. It is too early as yet to make an exhaustive assessment of its decisions. They are largely controversial, contradictory, and, in my view, short-sighted and immature, and bear the imprint of the MDU's enthusiasm for sloganeering and issuing declarations...

Time will tell whether the informals and their new party will be in step with those striving for a better future for their country and people.

Recent Changes in Mongolia Discussed

LD2402222790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1815 GMT 24 Feb 90

["World in Mirror of Events" program, with Yevgeniy Krachev and Nikolay Agayants]

[Text] [Krachev] You know, over the past months we have spoken a great deal about events in Eastern Europe. We have been trying to understand these events, analyzing and assessing them.

[Agayants] Indeed, there have been many changes and generally speaking they have ceased to amaze us.

[Krachev] Now the time has come when we have started to be amazed by changes in Central Asia, in Mongolia, to be more precise. Not long ago we were saying that Mongolia had successfully carried out a transition from feudalism to socialism, passing over the capitalist stage of development. We were saying that mighty industry was being established in the country and cooperative agriculture was flourishing. Now in Mongolia they are saying something else. Its citizens are describing their country as a developing one and are seeking international recongition of this status.

[Agayants] If truth be told, a year ago no one cast any doubts over the rights of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] to the leading role in the state; it was believed that it enjoyed absolute trust and support on the part of the popular masses. But now, judging by the reports from Ulaanbaatar, the citizens of Mongolia are openly criticizing the party for its inconsistency in implementing perestroyka and for the slowness with which it is coming about. A multitude of informal associations and organizations have appeared in the country which are not only casting doubts over the MPRP's right to a leading role, but are also demanding a transition to as multiparty political system. Real steps in this direction have already been taken.

[Krachev] You probably mean the creation of the Mongolian Democratic Party?

[Agayants] Yes, but not just that. Incidentally, speaking about the party of the Mongolian democrats: its leader, Boshigt, has told journalists that the Mongolian Democratic Party now has 200 members.

[Krachev] Well, you can't say that it's a mass party.

[Agayants] That's true, but, you know, according to its leadership it doesn't intend to become a mass party in the future either. However, it is calculating that its political programs will gain the trust of the people and that the party will be able to become a realistic alternative to the MPRP. So for a whole week now an alternative party with its own program and statute, which, indeed, are so far only familiar to the founding members themselves, has officially existed in Mongolia.

[Krachev] Why are you talking about a week?

[Agayants] Because it was established exactly a week ago, on Sunday 18 February. Of course, it is difficult only a few days after the creation of the Mongolian Democratic Party to say whether it will become a real force or not, but a formation such as the Mongolian Democratic Union already carries considerable weight in society. This union unites various informal organizations, associations. The Mongolian Democratic Union arose a little over two months ago at the initiative of a small group of intellectuals and workers, and now it has in its ranks more than 70,000 people. You will agree that for a republic with a population of 2 million this is a considerable political force.

[Krachev] Yes, but you know, this begs a comparison with the well-known movements of the Eastern European countries, such as Solidarity and Civic Forum.

[Agayants] Yevgeniy Tikhonovich, political comparisons are something very, very, relative, especially since, unlike the organizations you have mentioned, the Mongolian Democratic Union by no means intends to exclude Communists from public life and does not consider the Mongolian revolution to have been a historical mistake. On the contrary, the members of the union proceed from the premise that the ideals of the Mongolian revolutionaries have been distorted during their time and that the time has now come to return to those ideals.

[Krachev] As far as I know, there was a congress of the Mongolian Democratic Union not long ago at all.

[Agayants] Yes, not long ago at all. The congress adopted the union's program, or platform, to be more precise. Incidentally, the sittings of the congress were relayed in full on Mongolian national television. In their addreses to the people, the congress delegates called for a break-up of the administrative bureaucratic system so that each citizen could be given the opportunity to be master of his land and to enjoy the results of his labor. In the opinion of the representatives of the democratic forces, the congress demonstrated the start of a new era in the development of the Mongolian nation.

[Krachev] I think there were reports that documents were adopted at the congress demanding the dissolution of parliament, the holding of before-term elections, the resignation of the Central Committee and the government....

[Agayants] Indeed, such documents were adopted and sent to the Presidium of the Great People's Hural and the MPRP Central Committee. So far as one can judge from the reports from Ulaanbaatar, no response has so far been given to these messages. We will await the development of events.

Near East & South Asia

Future, Employment of Emigres to Israel Discussed

PM2002134190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by special correspondents K. Geyvandov and V. Skosyrev: "New Wave: What Awaits Emigres From Soviet Union in Israel"]

[Text] Tel Aviv-Moscow—"The right to emigration, the right to freedom of movement, is a universal right. Everyone should have it. That is why we cannot object to the emigration of Soviet citizens to Israel. But what we do object to resolutely is the fact that emigres from the USSR have been settled on Palestinian land. Y. Shamir wants to use them to resolve the conflict at our expense. That will not happen. Your people should know that they are risking a lot if they come to live on occupied territory. The Palestinians will treat them as enemies."

That is said by Mustafa Barghuthi, a doctor of education and chief of the Palestinian center for medical mutual aid near Jerusalem. Like the other Palestinians with whom we talked during our 10-day trip to Israel, he is angry at the statement by Prime Minister Y. Shamir, who has linked emigration from the USSR to his country with the Israelis' settlement of Arab land on the West bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. ("Large-scale emigration requires a great Israel" was how the premier put it).

The reaction was very keen, and not only from the Palestinians. The leaders of the Arab states protested stormily. Some of them, like the head of the state of Jordan, for instance, directed their anger not only against Tel Aviv but also against Moscow, demanding that it put an end to emigration.

For its part Moscow has not remained an impartial observer either. As has already been reported, (IZVESTIYA No. 45) the USSR Foreign Ministry expressed concern at Y. Shamir's plans and raised this question with the UN Security Council. Washington too was far from delighted with them. An anonymous spokesman for the Bush administration said that if Israel sends immigrants from the USSR "beyond the Green Line," that is to the West Bank and the Gaza stripe, it will hardly receive additional aid from the United States (it is a question of approximately $400 million for housing construction).

Yet while this war of words is raging our former fellow citizens, evidently attaching no special significance to it or else totally unaware of it, are continuing to arrive at Ben Gurion airport near Tel Aviv. You can recognize them among the arrivals from other places by their fur hats, inappropriate in a Mediterranean climate, and by their shabby suitcases and bundles of scanty belongings. Indeed, the authorities were also concerned to separate them from the other airline passengers. An official in civilian clothing goes out to the line which has formed in front of the passport control counter and says in Russian: "Those who have come to take up permanent residence in Israel, please follow me." The formalities are obviously extremely simple. The line of immigrants dispels almost instantly.

Will the transition to a new way of life continue to be smooth? In the city we met with two former compatriots, aged about 35, who arrived from central Asia a month ago. They are entirely optimistic. A construction engineer from Tashkent and his family have been given a temporary apartment and are being paid a small "grant" while he studies at courses of Hebrew, which is the official language here. He is promised work since thanks to the growing flood of emigres from the USSR a housing construction boom is expected.

It is true that absorption (that is, the settling in of new arrivals) is already not always taking place serenely. It is the Ministry of Absorption which is the first state institution where arrivals usually go. But in late January, for instance, lines awaited visitors there. Those who arrived after 1100 hours were not admitted at all. The point is that the Ministry clerks have held a kind of strike, demanding that staffing be increased and wages raised in connection with the increase in the volume of work.

"We grew accustomed to lines in Russia and now we are encountering them here," Yu. Zarkhan, who had flown in from Moscow, complained to local newsmen.

Many of our interlocutors said that if the new, third, wave of immigration from the USSR becomes a reality, they expect an aggravation of social problems. That is why organizations like the Jewish Agency are urgently engaged in collecting funds abroad and at home to cover the mounting expense of receiving new citizens.

The attitude toward the new arrivals, at least among the intelligentsia, is, we were convinced, on the whole favorable. The intelligentsia is prepared to offer them hospitality even though it is aware that the majority are by no means guided by adherence to the ideals on which the State of Israel rests and, if they were able to choose, would prefer the United States. But the U.S. Government, which for many years "demanded" that Moscow open its doors for the free exit of Jews, has now established its own barrier to them. A restrictive quota has been introduced—50,000 people a year. And so the final destination for many is a state drawn into a fierce conflict with the Arabs.

Yes, the composition of the arrivals is different from a few years ago. But there is also another side of the coin, extremely unpleasant for us. At Sheremetyevo Airport in

Moscow, before embarking in the Hungarian airline aircraft which was to take us to Tel Aviv, a young woman said: "In Russia in hard times they always accuse the Jews of everything. So I have decided to leave."

It is a sad fact that the present instability in the country is urging on emigration and not only, unfortunately, of Jews. People are leaving, counting on acquiring not only material prosperity on new soil but also a sense of security. Will they?

Forecasts in this case are not very appropriate. Better that we describe our meetings with former Soviet citizens who have sunk roots here relatively recently.

Fate cast Itskhak Zelekovich from Transcarpathia on the "promised land" at the age of 16. He studied Hebrew, finished school, and spent three years in the army. "At the time service was more peaceful, there was not the intifada, there was not such hostility between us and the Arabs," Itskhak says. "After the army I started studying to be a mechanic but I soon realized that you cannot go far in that speciality. And no one at all needs higher education. I went to work for an elderly grocer, he needed an assistant. In three years I had enough money to open my own restaurant. Now I have 20 canteens. It is a kind of family enterprise, my parents, my sister, her husband, everyone takes part."

Ofer Neyeman, vice president of a large company producing chocolate, categorically disagrees that emigres do not need institute diplomas. "On the contrary, skilled specialists will come from the Union, will settle down and find a place for themselves despite the almost 10-percent unemployment, and will even help Israel accomplish an economic leap forward. And you should not worry on this score either. After all many of them will not break their ties with the country where they were born and, who knows, when they have had access to sophisticated technology and the laws of the free market, they may subsequently come to you with suggestions for creating joint ventures or with other ideas..."

Indeed, who knows... At any rate, a programming engineer from Kishinev working at a plant connected with a military department confirmed that the Israelis are strongly drawn toward contacts with the Soviet Union. The programmer was not loquacious about his own firm and we did not question him. But he had no problem finding work.

There are examples of the direct opposite. A linguist with a degree is serving as a courier at a factory. An opera singer spent a long time waiting for a contract, could not wait any longer, and found work in a restaurant washing dishes. Perhaps these are exceptions. But even the staffers of organizations engaged in reception admit that many people will have to agree to a drop in social status. A professor becomes simply a teacher, an engineer a technician, and a doctor will probably have to be content with the role of feldscher.

Yet alongside the home where our emigre manages to settle there is a completely different world where the harsh laws of war operate. Army Lieutenant Daniel, who accompanied us on a trip to the occupied territories, put it like this: "In Tel Aviv people go to the cinema and restaurants and the streets at night are completely safe, but about an hour's drive from here human life is only worth a ruble."

Nearly every Israeli inevitably encounters this pitiless reality—some sooner, some later. People are relieved of army service only for health reasons. Men serve three years, women two years, but even after that men under the age of 45 assemble for retraining or continued service for at least a month a year.

It is true that Aleks, from Kiev, has not yet been called up for retraining. He was given two years' deferment after he did his service in the special troops—first in Lebanon, then in the Gaza Strip. Aleks took the fancy of the owner of a popular restaurant serving Russian cuisine and he was taken on to keep order. When you look at the boy's athletic figure you realize that someone like him would overpower any rowdy customer in an instant. He tells us: "In Lebanon you go out on patrol and you don't know where a shot will come from. Several boys from the company died. It is easier in Gaza: There it is mainly stones that get thrown at us. But when you encounter the Arabs you feel they hate you. They have nothing—no passport, no country, they have nothing to lose."

That is how the intifada is seen from "the Israeli shore." And, of course, Shamir's statement could in no way cool passions: On the contrary, the bitterness has been aggravated still further.

"Since the start of the uprising many Israelis have begun to leave the settlements, reluctant to enter into conflict with us. But now the settlements on the West Bank may receive reinforcements. This will primarily intensify extremist feelings among the Palestinians and consequently make a peace settlement even more remote," Mustafa Barghuthi says.

Alas, life is already confirming this prediction. The "Hamas" Islamic fundamentalist grouping, which is trying to vie with the PLO for influence on the Arabs, has managed to organize a protest strike on the West Bank and in Gaza. We can only imagine what reception from the land's legal owners awaits our former compatriots if they actually begin to come here.

So far, it is true, of 70,000 Israelis who have settled beyond the "green line," only a few originate from the USSR, just one-two percent, it is said. "No one wants to live on the border," our acquaintance from the West Ukraine made clear to us. Having toured the occupied territories we understood what "border" means to him. A typical Israeli settlement consists of rows of cottages enclosed in barbed wire and with watch towers. By day the Israelis work but by night they take turns at combat sentry duty.

The reluctance to link their fate with these "ghettoes" is entirely understandable. But in that case, you ask, why the din, why are the Palestinians upset? Their disquiet is absolutely justified. The point is that every aircraft carrying Soviet Jews is welcomed both by representatives of the authorities and by settlers from the occupied territories. They promise boons which the state cannot give: an individual house and well paid work. And if the number of emigres does indeed increase many times over, then under conditions of competition among them offers to go beyond the "green line" may become tempting. That is exactly what Y. Shamir and his supporters need as they dream of how to accomplish "creeping annexation" as swiftly as possible.

Is there a possibility of avoiding the spiral of the conflict from tightening still further as a result of mass emigration from the USSR and the East European countries? Yes, there is, on condition that all interested sides approach the matter without emotion, seeking a sensible compromise. Above all it must be said immediately that appeals to Moscow to halt exits are unrealistic and unfeasible. To undertake such a step after we have signed the Vienna agreements would mean violating international commitments and striking against the democratic process within the country. Incidentally, those leaders in the Near East who are pointing an accusing finger at the Soviet Union should remember that in the forties to sixties there was a mass "exodus" to Israel from the Arab states and emigres from those states now comprise 40 percent if not more of Israel's Jewish population.

But it in no way follows from this that we cannot influence events in our own country. The time has come to cut short the propagandist onslaughts of chauvinists and anti-Semites and to reassure those people who do not feel safe in their own fatherland. At the same time those of our fellow citizens who have decided to emigrate to Israel should realize that people are anxious, with their involuntary participation, to perpetuate an injustice perpetrated against another people. That is why the proposal of the Palestinians with whom we talked in Jerusalem seems sensible to us. They believe that representatives of the Palestinians and the Jewish organizations in Moscow should meet and try to find a common language.

Since the problem has acquired international repercussions, we should also mention the role of the United States, without whose financial injections Tel Aviv would be totally unable to receive a large number of emigres. It is well known that Washington is against the creation of Israeli settlements since this is illegal and undermines the changes of peaceful dialogue with the Palestinians and of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Is it not time for the United States to express itself clearly and specifically on Shamir's plans?

No one denies Israel the right to accept emigres from any country. But that does not mean the right to settle them on other people's land. The first president of that state, C. Weizmann, said: Israel will ultimately be judged by how it treats the Arabs of Palestine. That is true!

First Israel Friendship Society Meeting Held

LD2002135190 Moscow TASS in English 1257 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Birobidzan, February 20 TASS—A constituent meeting of a society of friendship and cultural ties with the peoples of Israel was held in Birobidzhan, the centre of the Soviet Jewish Autonomous Region. The activities of this new public organisation will range from tourist exchanges to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

USSR People's Deputy Leonid Shkolnik was elected the society's chairman.

"For many years official propaganda has been giving censored and not always true information about the state of Israel and the socio-political processes taking place in this country," Shkolnik told TASS.

"I think it's abnormal that the Jewish autonomous region in the far east, that was given the status of a state structure in 1934, did not have contacts with Israel. Restructuring in the Soviet Union and new political thinking have started the rapprochement of the two historically related people."

"Growing national identity increased the interest of Soviet Jews in Israel. Many of them would like to know more about Israel and visit it as guests or tourists. The new society wil contribute to this process. It will work in close contact with the Birobidzhan branch of the Intourist firm, the International Club of Friends of Jewish Culture Einikait and other public organisations."

"National Jewish culture is now being actively revived in Birobidzhan. It would be difficult to do it without close contact with Israeli cultural traditions. During my recent trip to Israel I managed to establish useful contacts with Israeli public organisations. The society's task includes the establishment of an Israeli general consulate and the development of different forms of people's diplomacy," Shkolnik said.

East Europe

Shevardnadze Backs Poland on Germany Negotiations

LD2302221290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1808 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Feb (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR minister of foreign affairs, today received Stanislaw Ciosek, ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the USSR. The ambassador handed him a message from Tadeusz Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers, to Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov, setting out Poland's position on the question of the unification of the two German states and Polish participation in the discussion of the external aspects of this process. On behalf of his country's government, the ambassador expressed his gratitude to the Soviet leadership for its support for the Polish approach to German problems, something that had been convincingly reflected in Gorbachev's replies to questions from a "PRAVDA" correspondent.

While in no measure detracting from the role of the four powers, the envoy said, the Republic of Poland has the moral and juridical right to take part in the discussions at those stages in the meetings between the USSR, United States, Britain, France, the FRG and GDR ("two plus four") where problems concerning Poland's security are going to be considered. It is a vitally important task for the Polish people that legal guarantees of the inviolability of her Western borders be drawn up on a multilateral basis.

Shevardnadze expressed understanding of Poland's profound concern over the need to guarantee her Western borders. This concern is all the more justified in that despite the Federal Republic of Germany's recognition of the Western border of the Republic of Poland under the bilateral Warsaw Treaty of December 7 1970, many politicians in the FRG still retain an ambivalence as to whether the recognition of this border should be considered definitive. And that is against a background whereby the decision of the FRG Constitutional Court on the legal existence of the "German Reich" within the 1937 borders remains in force.

The accord reached in Ottawa on establishing the "two plus four" discussion mechanism creates serious levers for influencing the external aspects of the construction of German unity, including issues concerning the security of neighboring states.

E.A. Shevardnadze drew the ambassador's attention to the fact that the statement adopted in Ottawa specifically concerns the "construction" of a German unity, that is a process of rapprochment and unification of the two German states spread over time and in stages. We consider, the minister stressed, that it must be synchronized with the common European process and the forming of a new structure of European security on collective principles, which will take the place of the bloc structure.

As far as Poland's involvement in the discussion of the border question within the framework of the mechanism of the "six" is concerned, the Soviet side agrees with the Republic of Poland's incontestable moral and juridical right to have its say and its place in the negotiating process. Neither the Soviet leadership, nor I, stressed E.A. Shevardnadze, can conceive of the discussion of matters relating to the security of states neighboring with Germany without the participation and agreement of the Polish side. We are proposing this to the three powers and to the GDR and FRG, and we shall insist that this proposal is adopted.

It is very important that the accords of the "six" on the German question, drawn up with the participation of other interested countries, should be approved by a conference of CSCE participant-states at summit level and that they should be put on an international legal footing.

The question of the military and political status of a future united Germany was also dealt with. This, stressed E.A. Shevardnadze, is one of the key questions in a German peace settlement and all the indications are that it will hold an important place in the discussion. The arguments that to include a united Germany in NATO would contribute to keeping it under scrutiny and to eliminating a threat from German soil do not stand up to criticism. There is every reason to believe that such a turn of events will, on the contrary, upset the balance of forces in Europe. The statements of certain Western leaders to the effect that the armed forces of NATO would not be deployed on the territory of the present German Democratic Republic does not alter the question in essence. The proposed set-up, whereby one part of the state will be a member of NATO and another will not, is artificial. It is evidently designed more to assauge European public opinion.

During the conversation E.A. Shevardnadze highlighted the importance of a project such as the creation of a center for reducing military danger and averting sudden attack in Europe.

On the Polish leadership's behalf S. Ciosek stressed the objective need for a well-considered and staged implementation of the process of the drawing together and unification of the two German states with account being taken of the interests of all European countries.

As a whole the USSR foreign minister's conversation with the Polish Republic's ambassador was a continuation of the broadranging and useful Soviet-Polish dialogue on German affairs.

Withdrawal of Troops From CSSR Begins 26 Feb

LD2602112490 Moscow TASS International Service Russian 0822 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, 26 Feb (TASS)—Today the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSSR is beginning. The first to leave are units and subunits of the tank division. In accordance with the agreement between the two countries initialed recently, the withdrawal will take place in three stages: the first will end on 31 May, the second at the end of 1990, and the third and final stage in 1991.

The Czechoslovak side regards with understanding the problems connected with the withdrawal of troops. Yesterday an appeal to citizens and drivers by the regional public security service was circulated to ensure order on the roads in North Moravia in connection with the passing of military columns and to urge the following of instructions of Czechoslovak and Soviet traffic controllers.

Newsmen Briefed on Troop Withdrawal

PM2502150390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev from the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "Press Conference in Milovice"]

[Text] Some unusual guests were received 24 February in one of the Milovice Garrison's military units. Representatives of the mass media accredited in Prague came here at the invitation of the Central Group of Forces Command. The journalists were shown military hardware and installations. They had the opportunity to meet and talk to military servicemen and members of their families. This was followed by a press conference in the group's House of Officers on the subject of the forthcoming Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovak territory.

Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces and USSR people's deputy, briefed the journalists on the results of the talks which had ended the day before, at which the Soviet side had declared its willingness to start withdrawing its troops. The withdrawal will be conducted in three stages. The first stage will begin 26 February, without waiting for the official agreement to be signed between our two countries. Military units of the tank division stationed in the region of Bruntal (North Moravia) will leave for home that day. A substantial proportion of other tank subunits, as well as rocket and air force subunits, will be withdrawn from Czechoslovak territory by 31 May.

The second stage will be completed by the end of this year. The last Soviet serviceman will leave Czechoslovakia in 1991. The commander stressed that no temporary intervals between stages are planned. Organizational difficulties could arise, of course. After all, more than 73,000 military servicemen, 1,200 tanks, 2,500 infantry fighting vehicles, 1,218 artillery pieces of more than 100-mm caliber, 77 aircraft, 146 helicopters, and other military hardware have to be withdrawn.

Estimates show that more than 1,500 trains will be needed for this purpose. The capacities of the Chop border railroad junction (it is through here that the main bulk of the troops being withdrawn will pass) are limited. The junction can handle no more than two extra trains per day. The withdrawal will keep strictly to schedule despite this. All wheeled equipment will make its way to the state border under its own power.

Questions connected with providing all the necessary facilities for the troops in their new posts, as well as for the servicemen's families, were also raised at the press conference. Virtually one in two families do not have anywhere to live in the Soviet Union and so it is essential to urgently resolve these difficult questions now.

CSSR's Havel Pays Working Visit to USSR

Gorbachev, Havel Meet for Talks

LD2602131990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] A meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Vaclav Havel, president of the CSSR, who arrived in the Soviet Union this morning on a working visit, has begun at the Kremlin.

The attention of the interlocutors is focussed on present and future relations between our two countries. In addition to various aspects of bilateral relations, including matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the CSSR, they are discussing a wide range of current international problems. Considerable attention is being given to the present situation on the continent of Europe and the prospects for its development.

Havel Grants Pre-Visit Interview

LD2502214990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From the "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev; interview with CSSR President Vaclav Havel by Prague correspondent Andreyev in Prague on 23 February—recorded; Havel speaks in Czech with superimposed Russian translation]

[Excerpts] [Sagalayev] Now for the events of next week. Tomorrow, the visit to our country by Vaclav Havel, president of Czechoslovakia, will begin. He will meet Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He is a former dissident who has been imprisoned for his political views, and a well-known writer, and playwright. The complex processes taking place both in his country and in Eastern Europe as a whole have been reflected in the figure of Havel. [passage omitted]

[Andreyev] The people who came to the old town square on Friday to welcome Vaclav Havel on his return from a major trip to Iceland, Canada, and the United States, naturally were his supporters, even perhaps his enthusiastic admirers. There are others who regard the president critically or negatively, but undoubtedly the president's popularity is great.

Immediately on arrival, he gave a brief account from the balcony of the results of his trip. Then there was a press conference for Czechoslovak and foreign journalists, after which there was an interview especially for Soviet Television. [Video shows Andreyev speaking to Havel]

[Andreyev] On several occasions, you have said that humanity is in a global crisis, a great crisis, and that if people's consciousness does not change, danger awaits them. What areas have you seen in which consciousness is changing?

[Havel] Above all, that people—and I have written this many times in various essays and I spoke about it just recently while speaking in the U.S. Congress—it is necessary for the interests of society and humanity to be higher than personal interests. [sentence as heard] I understand that this is hard sometimes. For example, if some inhabitant of Africa has to kill the last antelope so as to feed his family, and this species of animal will thus disappear, there is nothing remarkable about this; it is understandable. Nevertheless, I repeat that humanity must think and do more for overall existence, in order for nature to live, in order for people's children to live, and it must subordinate its own interests to this main, common interest.

[Andreyev] But this is not so simple. People have wanted this for a long time, but how, by what means, through the help of belief or conscience? What is the method? What is the technique?

[Havel] You ask what belief can change a person, to make him respect some authority higher than himself, than his instantaneous interests of the moment? It is hard to say. Humanity, fortunately, is so diverse. Groups of people, countries, and continents have different religions, their own different philosophies and cultures. As the Dalai Lama stressed while he was in Prague recently, different schools, religions and philosophical schools always have something in common, and this is a common respect for a higher authority, an appeal for love, understanding, and forgiveness. As for what form this takes in this or that people or culture is another question. However, if someone were to attempt artificially to create a new, common world religion, I think this would be wrong.

[Andreyev] The responsibility of all for everything, as Dostoyevskiy wrote over 100 years ago. I may possibly be the last Soviet person with whom you will converse before your departure for the Soviet Union, but I also will be the first to wish you a good trip and welcome to the Soviet Union.

[Havel] I admit that I am very much looking forward to this meeting, to this trip. I have not been in the Soviet Union for a long time. I had not been to the United States for 22 years, and I have not been to the Soviet Union for 23 years. Of course, I will be glad to visit your country again. I am interested to see how the talks at state level will go. I also am looking forward to other meetings, particularly with cultural representatives.

[Andreyev] Thank you.

[Havel] Thank you.

Dienstbier on Prospects for Visit

LD2402235790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1825 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, 24 Feb (TASS)—To renew friendly relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, to eliminate barriers, and to restore strong ties between the peoples of the two countries—such are the main aims of the forthcoming visit to Moscow by CSSR President V. Havel. This thought was expressed today in a conversation with a group of Soviet journalists by CSSR Foreign Minister J. Dienstbier. The program for the visit to Moscow is a working one, and many matters and specific issues are due to be resolved, he said.

Dealing with topical problems facing the people of Europe, the minister singled out the great importance of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The time has come to move from division into blocs, to a new understanding of security and the creation of common institutions within the framework of the Helsinki process, he pointed out. Thinking in the military-political sphere is still lagging behind real political developments. Nobody was ready for these developments, in the East or in the West. Diverse opinions may be heard in the discussion of this matter, and only after they have been studied will it be possible to take up a definite position.

Expressing his attitude to the proposals being made concerning the formation of a confederation made up of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the minister said that the Czechoslovak side would not have put the question in such a way. It is essential first and foremost to develop cooperation with those countries and other neighboring states to tackle specific power engineering, ecological, and other problems.

We are not taking any sensational proposals to Moscow, J. Dienstbier said, but if there are some things, it is better first to discuss all of them in talks. There are "blank," or rather dark spots in the history of bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. It must be remembered that there was a time when the world was divided; 1968 was an absurd year, with the action against Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Warsaw Pact. At that time we had our own perestroyka in our conditions. The justification for the intervention was false and stupid, it was a mockery of common sense. Almost everyone in our country, with the exception of some individuals, understood that the country could develop no further in the old conditions; it had exhausted the possibilities provided by the system.

In response to a question about his attitude to the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, whose 20-year term runs out this year, J. Dienstbier noted that there are a number of other agreements that were concluded in the years 1969-1970. It is now more useful to think about the fact that treaties and agreements function not on paper but in life. The minister expressed a desire to consolidate Soviet-Czechoslovak relations on the basis of joint cooperation and enterprise.

Touching on the negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, J. Dienstbier said that a certain failure to understand the problem is prevalent in society. Voices are being heard saying that if the army arrived in one day, it must leave in the same period of time. In spite of this, our people are capable of understanding well-founded arguments. We have come to the conclusion that the problems surrounding the troop withdrawal really are complex, and that a certain amount of time is needed for them to be solved. The main thing is that we have started along the right road.

Speaking about the problem of German unification, the CSSR foreign minister stated that in essence it is a matter that has been decided. Only the period of time when this will take place remains the question. It is necessary to use the process of German unification to accelerate the Helsinki process and the convening of Helsinki II, which should make decisions on the creation of political, economic, cultural, humanitarian, and ecological structures within the framework of this process, in other words create an all-European home. J. Dienstbier noted that it would be more correct to speak not of a home, but of a European homeland. After all, a home has a basement, floors, and a yard, and the question arises of who will live where.

The CSSR foreign minister answered other questions from journalists.

Topics of Havel Visit Noted

LD2602095290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Excerpt] The official visit to Moscow by CSSR President Vaclav Havel begins today. Our correspondent Aleksandr Samoylin reports:

[Samoylin] Interest in this visit in our country is enormous, and the president himself, who, it seems, has not been in the Soviet Union for 23 years, has great expectations of the talks in Moscow. The situation in CEMA and the Warsaw Pact has changed. New approaches to the development of bilateral relations have emerged. Some tension has been created by the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the CSSR, but this has now been clarified: the pullout is beginning, and under the treaty it is due to be completed in 1991.

A number of rather difficult economic problems also exist. Above all, they concern mutual accounting in external trade deals, Czechoslovakia's participation in joint construciton projects and deliveries of Soviet oil and gas to that country. It is necessary to discuss the transition to a market economy and the convertability of currencies. [passage omitted]

TASS Reports Havel Talks at United Nations

LD2302203690 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] New York February 23 TASS—President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia visited the United Nations headquarters in New York and met U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar on Thursday.

They discussed the situation in Central and Eastern Europe in the light of current democratic transformations, as well as questions of economic development, including the difficulties the countries of the region face while changing the structure of their economies.

Havel stressed his country's intention to play a more vigorous role in the United Nations.

At a news conference at U.N. headquarters, the president pointed out that German unification will result from talks involving all European states, that Czechoslovakia did not intend to take part in the preliminary deliberations of the six (four great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France—and the two Germanys).

"However," he noted, "I view without understanding the desire of Poland to take part in the discussion."

Responding to the question relating to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Israel, Havel said that both sides of the conflict in the Middle East may count on Czechoslovakia's mediation if the need arises.

Havel Interpretation of CSSR History Noted

LD2502200890 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Prague February 25 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valeriy Rzhevskiy:

Mass rallies held in Prague and other Czechoslovak cities today offered a new interpretation of the country's post-war development.

The February 1948 revolution was branded a "communist coup" that led to a totalitarian regime.

In a symbolic ceremony heralding a break with the recent past, protesters threw a statue of a militiamen from the Karlov Bridge into the Vltava River.

Thousands gathered for a rally in downtown Prague at the site where Klement Gottwald declared the victory of the workers over reactionary bourgeois forces 42 years ago.

The rally was addressed by President Vaclav Havel, who gave his own interpretation of the country's history, presenting a critical analysis of more than four decades of Czechoslovak development under the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and mapped out new tasks for the country.

Havel said general elections should be held in two year's time in order to complete the dismantling of old structures and put the country on a road to prosperity and progress.

"We won freedom a short time ago, but if anyone will try to take it away, we will protect it," Havel said.

Shevarnadze, CSSR Ambassador Hold Meeting

LD2402164790 Moscow International Service in Slovak 1600 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Soviet minister of foreign affairs, had a meeting yesterday with Rudolf Slansky, the Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union, at the latter's request.

In an open and to-the-point discussion, Eduard Shevardnadze spoke about the current stage of restructuring in the Soviet Union, its difficulties and prospects. On Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, the minister stressed the Soviet Union's interest in the further development of cooperation with Czechoslovakia in all spheres. All the preconditions exist, he said, for our contacts to attain a qualitatively new level.

Rudolf Slansky reported on the process of democratic transformations in Czechoslovakia. For his part, he also emphasized that relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have a rich tradition, and the immediate task now is to rid them of the vestiges of the past and make use of the existing positive experience for the benefit of both countries' peoples.

Going on to examine the main aspects of the European process, they discussed matters associated with the unification of Germany. Both sides expressed the wish for active cooperation in this sphere. Matters relating to the coming visit to the Soviet Union by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel were also discussed. Both sides confirmed their interest in active cooperation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in the international arena, in the interests of boosting security, confidence, and cooperation in Europe and the whole world.

Political Scene in Czechoslovakia Assessed

PM2302151390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch written for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by TASS correspondent V. Rzhevskiy under the rubric "On the Political Situation in Czechoslovakia": "Who Is Threatening Democracy?"]

[Text] Prague—In Czechoslovakia just now many people are wondering: Who is threatening the current sociopolitical transformations, who wants to "divert the country from the path of returning to the bosom of European civilization?"

Czechoslovakia's new leaders did not take long to come up with an answer. R. Sacher, minister of internal affairs, indicated directly that "dark forces and friends of the old order" are preparing a putsch. He read out to journalists practically a full list of people from the country's former leadership who had the right to own a personal weapon, leaving no doubt as to who should be included as conspirators. And since they had exercised undivided control over the state security organs in the past, a very specific order followed: To abolish the old state security structures. The minister of internal affairs stated that under "Civic Forum" 's auspices commissions will be set up to check all state security officials without exception. After this check it has been decided to set up a new security organs apparatus to ensure that the policy of the government of national accord will be implemented. This, strictly speaking, is the entire prehistory of the purge which has begun in the security organs. Because of this it was necessary first to frighten the layman with the prospect of a coup and to throw burning coals into the furnace of the "velvet revolution" in order to attract world press attention once again to the "intrigues of the supporters of the totalitarian regime," and also to Czechoslovakia itself.

Speaking recently on Czechoslovak television, one "Civic Forum" spokesmen plainly stated that it is necessary to skillfully take advantage of this attention being focused on Czechoslovakia. In his words, they must hurry to build bridges with Western partners, primarily the United States. God forbid that somewhere on the planet, especially in the Western hemisphere, there should be a destructive earthquake, because then the Americans' generosity would go to other purposes, this analyst argued before the television camera.

In continuing to push the topic of state security, the newspapers are not forgetting to hunt for spicy details. They lap them up in President V. Havel's activity. People, of course, are interested to know that, after visiting Prague's "CKD" enterprise, he dropped by a bar for a pint of beer, that he travels round the city in a car without a motorcade, and that he is not given the "green light" at intersections. From now on, ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY reports, black "Tatras" will not take the children of prominent leaders to school, and statesmen's wives will do their own shopping. Now broad scope for glasnost has opened up to journalists. All the same some interesting topics are not being raised—for instance, about the putsch in the People's Party which lead to the promotion of a new leadership. It is difficult for readers to disentangle the process of crystallization of the most diverse political courses. Now there are about 190 parties, organizations, and clubs in the country.

Many in the active headquarters of this revolution have already taken up their places in the state administrative organs. The process of moving former dissidents into positions of power is happening rapidly. It is only three months since the student demonstration in National Avenue in Prague. Slightly longer since the meeting in Wroclaw where there was a special "Fili council" [allusion to 1812 council of war preceding Battle of Borodino] at the beginning of November last year. There are also still no articles on this historic subject, but it makes no difference. Polish Wroclaw can rightfully be called the cradle of the "Prague fall." The final concept of the present sociopolitical transformations in Czechoslovakia, on which the entire intellectual might of the then internal opposition and Czechoslovak emigres worked, was born precisely there.

The Czechoslovak Communists are now experiencing a difficult period. Life provides many examples of the party's crisis. Organizational restructuring in the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] has begun, but the formulation of its political and ideological platform is much more difficult. The think tank formed around the new CPCZ leadership is trying to fumble for a conceptual sense of a socialist program based on the experience of the European countries' left-wing parties. At one meeting in the CPCZ Central Committee press center journalists were acquainted with the theses of the party's program. It is proposed to exclude the principle of democratic centralism and abandon the idea of dictatorship of the proletariat.

The responsibility of the former CPCZ leaders for the crisis in the party and society will be the subject for detailed examination at the forthcoming CPCZ Central Committee Plenum and then at the party congress. But that does not make it easier for ordinary Communists who are forced to answer for the mistakes of the party's top leaders. Many CPCZ members, and this particularly affects the middle- and top-level nomenklatura, are being forced to look for new jobs, and it is not easy to find it. Insults, resentment, and justified but often unjustified complaints by nonparty people and those who were removed from public and political life for their views are boiling over. So the main concern now, as P. Weiss, chairman of the Slovak Communist Party Central Committee Executive Committee, stressed in his television speech, is that the monopoly of one power and ideology should not be replaced by another. This was mentioned repeatedly also by CSSR President V. Havel in bringing to the forefront the implementation of the ideals of democracy, humanism, social justice, and happiness for everyone.

But the realities are still far from the declarations which are particularly plentiful today.

Hungary Troop Withdrawal Accord Within 'Weeks'

LD2302122890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1107 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest, 23 Feb (TASS)—It is expected that a Soviet-Hungarian intergovernment agreement on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary will be signed within some weeks. Colonel General M.P. Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces, stated this.

In the first stage, tank division, rocket and aviation subunits will be withdrawn from the country. The withdrawal of the remaining troops and of material and technical resources is planned in the second stage.

Responsibility for the maintenance of the Southern Group of Forces lies wholly on the Soviet state. Payments for goods which the Southern Group of Forces receives from Hungarian enterprises are implemented by the USSR Ministry of Defense or within the framework of foreign trade agreements. Moreover, such payments are not always favorable for the Soviet Union. Col Gen M.P. Burlakov noted that firm and friendly ties have been formed between the Soviet servicemen and the local population. On more than one occasion, the Soviet troops have helped the population during a difficult winter, harvesting, or during natural disasters. The Soviet servicemen leaving Hungary will always keep in their hearts feelings of friendship and deep respect for the Hungarian people.

Burlakov on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD2202184890 Budapest MTI in English 1812 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest, February 22 (MTI)—The Hungarian-Soviet inter-governmental agreement on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is likely to be signed in a few weeks.

Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the southern army group and government commissioner in charge of Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the Republic of Hungary, has given an interview to MTI on the subject.

Burlakov said that the decision on the troop withdrawal was no surprise to the Soviet military leadership, because the Moscow administration has dealt with the reduction of foreign-based military forces since 1985 as part of the novel way of political thinking.

A major step along this line was the decision taken by the Soviet Government in 1988 on a significant, unilateral reduction of Soviet Armed Forces. Accordingly, last year 22 units were removed from Hungary, including the 13th tank division, more than 10,000 soldiers and substantial amounts of technical devices and weapons.

The Hungarian-Soviet talks about the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops is expected to cover a wide range of issues, such as the stages and dates of the pullout, as well as solutions to property and legal problems.

The draft of the relevant accord has been completed, and the detailed schedule of troop withdrawals and the transportation of material-technical devices is shortly to be drawn up.

The units constituting the basis of the combative force of the southern army group, namely a tank division, missile units, airborne units and other troops, would be removed in the first stage, and the remainder of the troops and the material and technical devices in the second. At the request of the Debrecen municipal council, however, a concrete deadline—end of May—has already been set for withdrawing the Soviet airborne unit stationed at the airport near the town.

The commander stressed that the preparation of pullout was a particularly complicated task. The southern army group has not only 50,000 troops but also hundreds of thousands of tonnes of military equipment, including hundreds of tanks, troop carriers, technical devices and arms.

Mr Burlakov denied that the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary imposed high costs on the Hungarian Government. He said this view might have emerged because of inadequate information. The costs of maintaining the southern army group are covered by the Soviet state, Mr Burlakov said. The southern army group maintains close business contacts with a number of Hungarian firms and covers its purchases from the funds granted by the Soviet ministry of defence or pays under foreign trade deals. In some cases, accounting is even unfavourable for the Soviet side. For instance, the electric energy imported form the Soviet Union is available at the Hungarian prices which are much higher than the Soviet ones.

Colonel General Burlakov reconfirmed that during the run-up to the Hungarian parliamentary elections the Soviet troops would not hold maneouvres and the soldiers would not leave their barracks. The maneouvres of the units had been postponed and the exercises of the columns of military vehicles suspended, he said.

KGB Official on Relationship With Hungary

LD2202173490 Moscow TASS in English 1719 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—A USSR State Security Committee (KGB) spokesman has denied allegations that appeared in some Hungarian newspapers last January about the presence of KGB "advisers" at the Hungarian Interior Ministry.

Those publications presented in a wrong light the relationship in this sphere, said Vladimir Lutsenko. He took part in a briefing at the Soviet Interior Ministry today.

Lutsenko said that the Soviet Union and Hungary, which are allies in the Warsaw Pact, are cooperating in the sphere of defence and state security. Relations betwen the KGB and the Hungarian Interior Ministry are based on principles of full sovereignty and are regulated by corresponding agreements.

Cooperation is exercised by specially assigned officers of the KGB and Hungarian Interior Ministry, who work in Budapest and Moscow accordingly. They do not perform any advisory functions.

The two countries cooperate in ensuring the security of the state border and fighting against international terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking and organised crime, Vladimir Lutsenko explained. He pointed out that the Soviet law enforcement agencies maintain contacts with their counterparts not only of Warsaw Treaty member states, but also of developing and industrially developed capitalist countries.

Hungarian Multiparty Election System Explained

PM2302095190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p4

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov: "Road to Parliament"]

[Text] Budapest, 19 Feb—What are multiparty parliamentary elections? For the first time in the last 43 years Hungary, which now has 50 registered parties, is about to form a parliament based on the principles of political pluralism. Not only parties may nominate candidates for deputy but social organizations and individuals as well.

The new electoral law provides for a fairly complex electoral procedure. Some of the delegates will be elected from territorial districts, some from political parties on local lists, and some from national lists of parties.

A total of 176 single-seat territorial districts have been formed in the country. In order to register as a candidate for deputy from one of these districts, you need to have 750 voters' signatures. NEPSZABADSAG recently published a list of candidates.

But, in addition to this, a further 152 deputies will be elected from local party lists in large multiseat districts. This means that every voter will be given two ballot papers. In one he must indicate the name of a specific candidate and, in the other, the name of the party whose program he supports. In their turn, the parties are compiling lists of those people they would like to see as parliamentary deputies. There is one restriction, however: Parties will take part in the allocation of seats only if they collect at least 4 percent of the vote in their given district.

Specialists believe that, because of the 4-percent barrier, only five-seven parties and social organizations will be represented in parliament.

A further 58 seats mandates will be allocated on the basis of national lists of parties in order to ensure that the composition of the future parliament reflects parties' influence in the country as accurately as possible.

It became known today that the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] has entered the following candidates at the top of the national electoral list: Imre Pozsgay (the MSZP's presidential candidate); Rezso Nyers (chairman of the MSZP); Gyula Horn (Hungarian foreign minister); Matyas Szuros (Hungarian president ad interim); and Miklos Nemeth (chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers).

All parties are being given almost 1 billion forints—in proportion to their size—from the state budget for the election campaign. Radio, television, and information agencies are being placed at their disposal for the purpose of waging the election battle.

'Anti-Russian Sentiment' Spreads in Romania

PM2402185090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Volodin report: "Looking for a Culprit?"]

[Text] Bucharest—The Romanian revolution is two months old. To mark the occasion, in Bucharest, Timisoara, and the other martyr cities, as they call them here, the inhabitants laid flowers and lit memorial candles on the spots where people died in December. In the evening millions of television viewers once again saw documentary pictures that took them back to 22 December, when, immediately after the occupation of the television studio by the insurgent people, the well-known Romanian poet Mircea Dinescu addressed the country. He spoke then of the victorious people, having in mind all the ethnic groups who live in Romania and had contributed to the overthrow of the Ceausescu dictatorship.

But at the very time when the poet's stirring words were going out on the air, an appeal of a very different kind saw the light of day in the newspaper DREPTATYA [as transliterated], press organ of the National Peasants Party. It is headlined "Concern Over the Situation in Northern Bukovina in the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and Southern Bessarabia." Its author, Gheorghe (Gabriel or Gavril)-Copil, chairman of the "Bucharest-Kishinev: Free Crossing" national action committee, writes that "after annexing Bessarabia, the Soviets turned their expansionism to Northern Bukovina," subjecting the Romanian people from the eastern shores of the Prut and the Dnestr to a fiendish assimilation plan. He reports the mass deportation of Romanians to Siberia and the banning of the native language for those left behind.

"Russian imperial forces," G. Gavrile-Kopil goes on, "are encroaching on the Romanians' right to exist in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina," citing as examples the attempts of Russians and Gagauz to form independent "republics" in Tiraspol and in regions where the Gagauz population is predominant. Because of unreasonable actions by "the USSR's colonialist forces, which oppose the process of decolonization," the present-day Soviet Union could be taken to court for genocide, the author concludes, ending on a threatening note: "The Romanian people are kind and patient, but that does not mean that they will tolerate what no other people in the world would tolerate."

How can one describe this appeal in the newspaper DREPTATYA, if not as incitement to interethnic conflict and the kindling of national strife in Soviet Moldavia, and an insult to the national feelings of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples? In this context I cannot but note the wave of anti-Russian sentiments that is gradually rising in Romania. It should be stipulated, of course, that by no means everyone shares these sentiments. But there are such forces, and they are beginning more and more actively to exploit the thesis that "the Russians are to blame for everything."

'Heated Debates' Noted at Romanian Plenum

LD2302213890 Moscow TASS in English 2117 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest February 24 TASS—There are heated debates at a plenary meeting of the Provisional Council of National Unity that opened here on Friday.

Its participants started to discuss the first item on the agenda—events that occurred in Bucharest's Victoria Square on February 18 and decisions taken in this connection by the Executive Bureau of the Provisional Council of National Unity on February 19.

A report by chairman of the Provisional Council of National Unity Ion Iliescu caused controversy.

He spoke about the draft decree on measures to guard state institutions and headquarters of political parties and maintain public order in the country.

A representative of the association of former political prisoners emphasised in his speech that although some hooligans had created a dangerous situation in the square, this should not entail measures that would be an obstacle to free expression of opinion by people.

A speaker from the bloc of democratic parties, uniting seven political groups, said that at first it is necessary to analyse the causes of the January and February demonstrations and then to start working out a law that would prevent such events.

Expressing consent with the main provisions of the decree, a representative of the Romanian Liberal Democratic Party suggested that it should include a provision envisaging the disbandment of parties whose members participated in acts of vandalism.

The chairman of the Socialist Liberal Party emphasised that the police is commanded by the government and accused it of hesitancy.

He also said that the decree should apply to the events of February 19 when miners arrived in Bucharest to support the leaders.

Most participants in the meeting condemned criminal actions of a group of demonstrators who got inside the building of the Romanian government on February 18.

It was suggested that the event should be analysed in detail to establish who masterminded provocative actions of some demonstrators and to subject them to punishment.

Speakers urged citizens to keep from such demonstrations and to create conditions in which the government could work calmly to stabilise the political and economic situation.

The meeting of the Provisional Council of National Unity continues.

Minister Views Romania's Economic Plight

90UI0381A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 16 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Romanian Minister of National Economy Victor Stanculescu by TASS correspondent D. Dyakov in Bucharest: "Romania Without Mirages"; date not given]

[Text] Bucharest—Prior to the popular revolution, Victor Stanculescu was first deputy minister of defense of Romania and one of the most popular leaders of this department. Ceausescu did not trust the Army. It performed more the functions of a vast construction battalion—built, gathered, and transported the harvest, and so forth. Therefore when the people rose up, the Army, headed by virtually all its commanders, took the side of the revolution. One of the latter was today's interviewee, Victor Stanculescu, the new minister of national economy of Romania.

[Dyakov] Mr. Stanculescu, was your appointment as minister of national economy of Romania a surprise?

[Stanculescu] Yes and no. No, because I am an economist by profession, have worked in the planning authorities, studied science, and defended my doctoral thesis "in civvies". Only then came service in the Army, where, incidentally, I also studied problems of the economy. Yes, because our Army today has many problems, and its obligations to the people are great also.

[Dyakov] How fully were you informed earlier about the true state of affairs in Romania's economy? Had you discussed these problems with your colleagues and friends?

[Stanculescu] We had, of course. Everyone felt and knew that what was being asserted by official propaganda, which was directed by Ceausescu personally, was not the truth. People spoke the truth only in lobbies and among friends, afraid of bugs, which had been installed in the most unimaginable places.

[Dyakov] May it be said that the majority of leaders of ministries and departments were aware of the real picture which the country's economy presented?

[Stanculescu] Of course. They understood that the country's economy was little by little collapsing before their eyes. And the instructions that were being received by one single office were leading only to an exacerbation of the situation. But it was only after the revolution that we learned the true scale of this national disaster.

[Dyakov] Please tell us the main problems which you have encountered in your new office?

[Stanculescu] It took several days to find the actual indicators reflecting the state of affairs in our economy. Many figures had been falsified and served the regime's foreign policy and domestic propaganda. The true state of affairs was carefully concealed from the people. Just one example. At the beginning of December the statistics authorities reported the results of "overfulfillment" of the plans of 11 months. We discovered, following a check, that the sum total of industrial output was less by 93 billion lei and that exports were less by $392 million, and foreign-exchange rubles, by 203 million.

In agriculture, where the difference between propaganda and reality was enormous, we simply started from scratch. For not just the specialist but the ordinary citizen knew that this phantasmagoria with 60 million tons of grain was the fruit of the "leader's" sick imagination.

[Dyakov] How long will it take, in your opinion, to rectify the situation?

[Stanculescu] One thing I may say firmly: 1990 will be very difficult for our economy. In 1991 and 1992 we or those who will be here after the elections will have to do a great deal of work, find the optimum versions of a way out of this crisis, and organize the provision of industry with material and raw material resources.

[Dyakov] Imports?

[Stanculescu] What country today lives without imports? Ceausescu alone was squarely opposed for he himself had everything. The fate of the country and the people did not concern him. To our great regret, the list of commodities which we have to import is great: from raw material and equipment through foodstuffs, medicines, and other commodities, of which prior to the "Ceausescu era" the country had always had a sufficient quantity.

[Dyakov] In the first days following the revolution, and now also, the Romanian newspapers have been writing frequently about the decentralization of the economy. How will it proceed?

[Stanculescu] There are no final versions yet, and we still have to study a good deal and supplement current laws. But the main path that we intend to take is clear even today: accord the enterprises and the work force more rights. Whereas previously more than 1,800 types of products were allocated in the country in a centralized manner, only 400 types, which, we hope, will in the near future be reduced also, now remain on this list.

[Dyakov] Many people in Romania are saying that the announcement of the elimination of the foreign debt was also made for propaganda purposes.

[Stanculescu] Proceeding from the data which I have at my disposal today, it may be concluded that it really was the case. Although the amount of this debt was not that great. But something else needs to be said here. This debt-elimination campaign had no real basis, that is, there was no need to have brought the country and the people to such a state merely to tell the world: "We owe nobody anything!" Everything possible was exported: food, clothing, footwear. The people used to say even: "If something is in fact found in the store, it is something rejected by our exporters."

[Dyakov] Many Romanian citizens are, as they themselves say, worried by certain decisions by the new authorities concerning the future of the Romanian economy. There are opinions to the effect that many enterprises will as a result fall into private hands and that the country will be unable to avoid inflation, unemployment, and so forth. How justified are these concerns?

[Stanculescu] If our people have the patience for all today's problems to be solved gradually, on the basis of an in-depth study of economic processes and trends, I do not believe that our country will encounter great upheavals. But the current situation in the economy is very tense. Therefore all the measures aimed at the elimination of the administrative-bureaucratic, centralized methods of management will, we hope, help us organize the economy better.

[Dyakov] In what way is the debate concerning the role of the National Salvation Front and other political parties in the life of society influencing the activity of the state's economic organisms? Do you consider this process natural for the current stage of the Romanian revolution?

[Stanculescu] Of course. New political parties are being formed in order that the atmosphere in the country become diverse. Although it has to be acknowledged that this process is unusual for us. Many people are worried that the campaign connected with the preparation of elections could develop into serious disagreements. I believe that this "disease" is temporary. It is necessary to cooperate with the new formations, as the National Salvation Front leaders have stressed repeatedly.

[Dyakov] Incidentally, about international cooperation. It is known that the USSR accounts for more than one-third of Romania's commodity turnover with other countries. Other CEMA countries also occupy an important place in the structure of Romania's exchange. What do you think, will this ratio change appreciably in the future?

[Stanculescu] I do not believe so. Romania's cooperation with the Soviet Union and other neighboring countries has very deep roots. It has linked our countries for many years. In the course of the recent meeting in Sofia the leaders of the governments and planning and economic authorities of the CEMA countries reached the common conclusion that it was necessary to develop cooperation within the framework of this international organization in every possible way, simultaneously perfecting its structure.

It is necessary to extend bilateral cooperation also. After all, it is no secret that Ceausescu only paid lip service to an expansion of relations. In practice these relations were confined to a mass of instructions and his personal directives. Scientists and specialists of our two countries had in practice ceased to meet, not to mention the former joint research enterprises and scientific laboratories. It was a difficult time for our economies generally.

[Dyakov] To what extent might the Soviet Union be useful in this respect to present-day Romania?

[Stanculescu] We primarily have to establish normal contacts between enterprises and specialists of the two countries. The past exclusiveness caused us, as I have said, much trouble.

[Dyakov] The majority of developed capitalist countries sets various conditions when it is a question of actual economic assistance to Romania. The USSR, on the other hand, from the first days began to send your country a considerable quantity of oil, gas, and other raw materials and energy products. At the same time, however, many Western journalists who have come here believe that the USSR is acting imprudently in allocating these extra supplies.

[Stanculescu] I believe that such things are being specially inspired. We are grateful to the Soviet Union, which is rendering us actual material assistance in such a difficult situation. Electric power, gas, oil—these are products without additional quotas for which things would be very, very difficult for our economy. And this applies not only to industry but also the social sphere for, after all, people have been literally freezing in their apartments, at work, and in theaters and stores. The situation is now changing and changing largely thanks to the timely and palpable assistance of the USSR. So let the comments and commentaries of the Western media be on the conscience of those who are composing them.

[Dyakov] The leaders of three Romanian ministries have already visited Moscow. There was a meeting in Bucharest recently of the Soviet-Romanian Economic Cooperation Mixed Commission. What do you expect from this meeting?

[Stanculescu] A great deal. First, as I have already said, we will discuss problems associated with the restoration of normal contacts with many USSR ministries and departments which in recent years were reduced by the dictator virtually to nothing. Second, the extent of the Soviet side's participation in the reequipping of the enterprises which were built in Romania with its assistance, but which have long been awaiting major renovation and modernization, will be discussed.

We are sure that the popular revolution in our country and the principles of democracy and openness proclaimed by the National Salvation Front will contribute to the rapprochement of our two countries and a broadening of contacts not only between enterprises and organizations but between people also.

[Dyakov] Thank you, Mr. Minister, for the interview. I hope that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's readers will have a chance once again to meet you some time hence, when you have more free time and can talk about actual results of the Romanian revolution.

[Stanculescu] I am happy to have had the opportunity to appear in the principal worker's paper of your country. And I would like to hope, of course, that our relations will expand and intensify. Then the Romanian economics minister also will have something to tell Soviet readers.

Romanian Labor Leader on Trade Union Status

90UI0382A Moscow TRUD in Russian
16 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Shtefan Kelinesku, coordinator of the temporary organizational national committee of the Free Trade Unions of Romania, by special correspondent A. Komarkov in Bucharest: "A Difficult Business—Freedom"; date not given]

[Text] [Komarkov] More and more cases of crimes of the Ceausescu regime against the people are being made known. But how did the people react to the encroachment on their rights and freedoms and were the trade unions able to withstand the political pressure?

[Kelinesku] As concerns the trade unions, nobody has taken them seriously as protectors of the interests of the workers: This organization has always "stood calmly on the sidelines" or, rather, half bent over, and an attitude of "at your service" has attended to the orders of Ceausescu.

Our people were well aware of their oppressed condition and only with the help of a ramified investigative apparatus and violence was the dictator able to keep them obedient for all these years. Although there was no possibility of protesting publicly, this certainly did not mean that there were no forms of resistance. The workers expressed their dissatisfaction primarily through passivity both in production and in political life. It was this passivity that was perceived by the higher echelons of power as submissiveness.

But any amount of tolerance comes to an end. The tension increased as real revolutionary transformations occurred in the countries of East Europe. The first signal of the active resistance of the workers was their strong uprising in November 1987 in the City of Brashov. The regime drowned it in blood. Two years later the December revolution—a spontaneous uprising of youth and workers which was supported by the Army—achieved success although it was at the expense of even more blood.

[Komarkov] How are the new Romanian trade unions formed?

[Kelinesku] First of all I must say that the trade unions were not mentioned in the decision of the National Salvation Front [NSF] to break down the old sociopolitical structures and it would seem that formally they could continue to operate in the future. But the fact that the trade unions disbanded themselves was one more piece of evidence of the complete lack of any kind of authority among the workers.

As early as 23 December of last year we formed the Temporary Organizational National Committee of the Free Trade Unions of Romania which presented its own program platform. It declares the complete independence of the free trade unions and their federations from state organs and political parties. From now on the workers have the right to form truly independent trade unions, to adopt their own regulations, and to join into federations formed on the basis of the professional or branch principle.

At many enterprises of Romania there are already initiative committees in operation for creating trade unions and as of today they have formed 585 trade unions with 750,000 members.

[Komarkov] Previously there were about 7 million trade union members in Romania...

[Kelinesku] Yes, the process of their formation has been held up somewhat, and here is the reason. From the very beginning of the revolution the power at the enterprises was exercised by local committees of the NSF. At a certain stage they became an impediment to the formation of trade unions: The front's committees performed functions both of the administration and of a kind of unique party committee. Only recently when the NSF officially began to act as one of the political forces (the activity of parties is now prohibited in the work place here) were the committees at the enterprises disbanded and the formation of trade unions proceeded more rapidly.

It must be emphasized that this process is indeed free: Nobody is driving anybody and people do not impose their decisions on anyone. Perhaps the only thing that is clear today is that there is a quite objective tendency toward the creation of 32 branch trade unions instead of the previous 11 extremely concentrated ones. Previously we had, for example, a union that united workers of culture, the press, publishing, and education. Now people do not want such an artificially created association.

[Komarkov] A couple of days ago I was in the Semenetoare agricultural machinery plant in Bucharest and there the workers of the metallurgical shop (there were about 1,000 of them out of a total of 7,000 workers in the plant) told me that they did not want any contacts with the national trade union center. That is, as of today—with your committee. Their plan was to unite the workers of all the hot shops of Romania and cooperate directly with the international associations of their colleagues.

[Kelinesku] Automotive transportation drivers are also planning something like that. And although we do not think that these trade unions will be able to defend their rights effectively, nonetheless our program platform does not rule out such a variant. Incidentally, it is not without reason that we call this document "open": Any changes and additions can be made to it as a result of an exchange of opinions. We do not rule out the possibility that certain trade unions and even confederations of them will want to enter the International Confederation of Labor; it is quite possible that in Romania there will appear one or several more trade union centers. I wish to emphasize once again that this process is absolutely free and depends only on the expressed will of the people. We shall not interfere.

[Komarkov] What problems in addition to organizational ones do you now consider to be the most important for the country's trade unions?

[Kelinesku] There is an immense number of them and they must be solved now without waiting for the congress, which will possibly take place at the end of April or the beginning of May. In the first place, it is necessary to restore elementary order to production. Up to this point chaos has reigned—all you have to do is shut down one enterprise and there is a chain reaction of shutdowns of others, from which, of course, the workers suffer. The second important problem—and it is being resolved fairly successfully—is the restoration of the benefits that were illegally canceled in various years by the Ceausescu regime. I have in mind, for example, the special pensions for miners and metallurgists. We also consider it important to support the families who suffered during the revolution, especially those with members who died.

The trade unions must learn to operate in an absolutely new setting. We do not know what will be the results of the elections to the country's parliament on 20 May—whether a coalition government will be formed or if a government will be formed by one party. But we must be prepared to fight for the rights of the workers against any government, any ministry, or any parties there may happen to be.

West Europe

FRG's Genscher on Unification, CSCE Meeting

LD2502074490 Moscow TASS in English 0657 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Bonn February 25 TASS—According to the press service of the West German Foreign Ministry, Hans-Dietrich Genscher came out in favour of including German reunification in the European process and holding a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating states this year.

Prospects for a future Europe to which the CSCE process would become the guarantor of stability must be clearly outlined at such meeting, he stressed.

The development of the process, in which all parties are interested, would be promoted by the establishment of an appropriate mechanism of cooperation, specifically regular conferences of the CSCE participating states and the founding of a European environmental protection agency and a European centre to verify compliance with agreements reached.

The German reunification problem and its influence on political development in Europe call for discussion both with NATO allies and within the framework of the European Community, Genscher said.

"We favour the achievement of German unity. We have nothing to conceal from our allies and from neighbours in the East. Nothing will happen behind their backs," Genscher emphasised.

FRG, U.S., UK Attitudes on German Unity

PM2202163990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS reports under the general heading "Discussion Heats Up"]

[Text] Bonn, 19 Feb—Sharp polemics on the question of the military status of a united German state have started up between the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Free Democratic Party [FDP], which belong to the Bonn government coalition. This was provoked by statements made by FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU), who at a press conference in Bonn last week, advocated NATO membership for a united Germany and the application of "Western alliance defense guarantees" to the GDR. The military department chief proposed Bundeswehr units enjoying a special status and not coming under NATO command be stationed on the territory of the present-day GDR after the creation of a united Germany.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) regarding this stated during an interview on the Westdeutsche Rundfunk radio station that the defense minister's proposal meant extending the North Atlantic Alliance's influence to GDR territory. He pointed out Stoltenberg's statements represent his own personal opinion and do not reflect the government's stance, which has not yet been worked out. Genscher stressed it is essential to present a clear stance at the upcoming international talks on German unity involving the participation of the two German states and the four victorious powers.

Such an unequivocal statement by the foreign policy department leader drew an irritated respose from the defense ministry. Its representative issued an official statement that pointed out Stoltenberg sticks to his opinion.

O. Feldmann, an FDP faction foreign policy expert, described Stoltenberg's utterances as "political provocation." Such views, he said, hamper the process of attaining German unity and undermine trust in the Germans.

New York, 19 Feb—Washington's desire to see a united Germany part of NATO has been confirmed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. "The United States considers that a united Germany should be a NATO member closely bound up with the West through participation in NATO and the European Community," the chief of the American foreign policy department stated.

London, 19 Feb—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has come out in favor of a future Germany remaining part of NATO. At the same time, she stated, "it would be perfectly reasonable," given the Soviet Union's interests, to leave a certain proportion of Soviet troops on GDR territory, at least during the so-called transitional period.

Importation of Foodstuffs From FRG Examined

LD2002235490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] An accord was just reached in the FRG on delivering a large amount of food goods to our country. Here is a program interview.

[A.K. Krivenko, chairman of the All-Union Foreign Economic Association, Prodintorg, identified by screen caption] The particular feature of this accord is that the amount that has been bought will be supplied with a subsidy of 220 million West German marks, which amounts to about 60 million rubles.

[Announcer] Will this be a one-off delivery, or is it proposed to have long-term cooperation.

[Krivenko] This will be a one-off delivery of about 142,000t of foodstuffs, including dried milk, butter, beef, pig meat, and beef [word indistinct].

[Announcer] When will these goods appear in our shops?

[Krivenko] We expect to bring in these goods during three to four months. But, unfortunately, even now we are experiencing a number of serious problems. In the first place, the Ministry of Merchant Marine replied to our request that we do not have sufficient tonnage to carry these goods. The Railways Ministry said it could carry only one-third of this freight for us. There is only one way out, to charter foreign tonnage.

[Announcer] But this is foreign currency and the sense of the subsidy is being lost?

[Krivenko] Yes, partially. But all the same, it probably is necessary to go in for this in view of the need to deliver these goods to the consumer in good time.

Kornilov Comments on Norwegian Military Spending

LD2202225390 Moscow TASS in English 1706 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—By TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

The Norwegian Parliament has endorsed the new military budget for 1991, under which military spending will increase by 2.5 per cent.

The REUTERS news agency notes that Norway is perhaps the only NATO country to increase military spending to such a large extent.

The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE asks why Oslo is increasing military spending at a time when many European countries are doing the opposite. Why, indeed?

Norwegian Prime Minister Jan Per Syse said on Norwegian radio that the volume of the country's military budget depends on the situation in Eastern Europe and that, before deciding to cut the military budget the Norwegian Government should establish if the military spending has really been reduced in Warsaw Treaty countries, above all in the Soviet Union.

This is quite a sound view. It is not clear, however, what prevents Jan Per Syse from getting a full and precise notion about the state of things in disarmament in Eastern Europe.

It is well know that the Soviet Union unilaterally decided to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men, that it proposed the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, that it supported Washington's proposal for deep cuts in [passage indistinct]

Latvia's Bresis Holds Helsinki Press Conference

LD2302183690 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] Latvia wants to develop cooperation with Finland to improve its economy and protect the Baltic. Talks on these have been held by Latvian Prime Minister Vilnis Bresis, who is in this country at the invitation of the Finnish Technical Trade Association. Bresis says that Latvia's independence is a realistic goal, about which debate is intense. Juhani Lehtola:

[Lehtola] Prime Minister Bresis and his party, which includes Latvian Foreign Minister Ejzens Pocs, are inspecting the operation of the Finnish chambers of trade and holding talks on new opportunities for economic cooperation with Finnish enterprises. This afternoon Bresis also met Premier Harri Holkeri. At a press conference in Helsinki, the Latvian prime minister emphasized how sharply the economic and political situation has changed in the Baltic countries and all over the Soviet Union.

According to the prime minister, in Latvia there is strong discussion of national independence and autonomy. The Supreme Soviet has appointed a committee of experts which is to closely examine the independence question in collaboration and good mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. In the political sense, independence is a realistic goal in all the Baltic countries; it is needed, Prime Minister Bresis pointed out. But economically Latvia is still very dependent on the Soviet Union, and that has to be taken into account. The people and the country can only be indpendent when its economy is completely independent. True, the Soviet Union has granted Latvia economic independence, but that independence is still in the initial stages.

Enterprises and organizations were formerly subordinate to the Soviet ministries; now they function according to Latvian laws and statutes. In Latvia private ownership is accepted, as well as private enterprises and foreign enterprises. As an example the prime minister mentioned the 4,000 independent farmers. The goal is the Latvianization of the banks and the formation of a State Bank. Their own currency can only be adopted when the economy has been balanced. Technically it is easy to print their own money, but it is much harder to get the economy in order—an economy that would protect the currency. In the prime minister's view Latvia cannot yet operate strongly enough in Western markets, and therefore it wants cooperation, particularly with Finland and the other Scandinavian countries. Finland could supply wood technology and agricultural machinery; Latvia has the raw material, wood, on offer. Its forests are hardly touched. Prime Minister Bresis also said it is very important to intensify protection of our common sea, the Baltic, and mentioned that during his visit there have been talks with Finnish experts on the matter.

Comparison of Report on Ryzhkov-Stoleru Meeting

PM2202105590

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 22 February 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 5 a TASS report on N.I. Ryzhkov's 21 February meeting with French planning official L. Stoleru. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "Reception in the Kremlin," with the item headlined "Ryzhkov, France's Stoleru Discuss Economy" published in the 23 February issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 21, reveals the following variations:

First paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...Council of Ministers, received on 21 February Lionel Stoleru, secretary of state to the prime minister of France in charge of planning, who is in Moscow for consultations about cooperation in economic management. As N.I. Ryzhkov noted, the French experience of the combination of the elements of the plan and the elements of the market in... (rewording);

Last paragraph, last sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...other European countries. L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; J. Merillon, French ambassador to the USSR; and J. Mistral, economic adviser to the prime minister of France, took part in the conversation.... (adding final paragraph).

Latin America & Caribbean

Nicaraguan Elections Termed 'Free, Democratic'

LD2602073990 Moscow TASS in English 0657 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Managua February 26 TASS—By TASS correspondents Yuriy Dmitriyev, Igor Pshenichnikov and Aleksandr Trushin:

The polls closed at 6 p.m. local time in Nicaragua on Sunday after a busy day at voting stations.

Observers from UN commissions and the Organisation of American States noted that the vote was free and democratic.

According to Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council, nobody has the right to announce the winner before the results are officially made public.

The vote was fine, Elliot Richardson, the UN secretary-general's personal representative for the monitoring of the electoral process in Nicaragua, said after visiting a number of Nicaragua's provinces.

In Richardson's opinion, about 90 percent of electors cast their votes. It would be good to see such a high turnout in elections in the United States, he noted.

Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council has begun to count the votes. The first results, from four countryside polling districts, have already been made public.

Most of the electors in two of them, located in the north, cast votes for candidates of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). As many as 75 electors out of 79 in the polling district of the Arenales settlement voted for the FSLN candidates for the Presidency, National Assembly and local government bodies.

But seven out of 11 electors of the Trinidad settlement, in the Esteli department, favoured the Opposition National Alliance. Twenty-four people out of 35 in a central Boaco Province's polling station cast their votes for the opposition alliance candidates.

The vote count is continuing. Partial preliminary election returns will be announced after 15 percent of the votes have been counted.

Litvintsev, CPSU Delegation Visit Colombia

PM2302112290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] Bogota, 20 Feb—A CPSU delegation headed by Yu.I. Litvintsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Tula Oblast party committee, which is here at the invitation of the Colombian Communist Party leadership, met with members of the Colombian Communist Party Central Committee Executive Committee.

Welcoming the CPSU delegation, Gilberto Vieira, general secretary of the Colombian Communist Party Central Committee, emphasized that the visit to Colombia will serve to strengthen ties between the two parties. During a talk which took place in a warm, friendly atmosphere, the CPSU representatives and Colombian Communists exchanged information on their parties' activities. The head of the Soviet party delegation briefed the Colombian Communist Party leaders on the process of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, the results of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, and the progress of preparations for the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress.

The CPSU delegation held meetings with the leadership of the Colombian Unitary Trade Union Center—the country's largest labor organization, and with Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, leader of the ruling Liberal Party, and Misael Pastrana Borrero, leader of the main opposition party, the Social Conservative Party.

Brazil's Collor on Meetings With Gorbachev

LD1002044290 Moscow TASS in English 0808 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Text] Brasilia February 9 TASS—"I am fascinated by Gorbachev's actions and would like to establish personal contact with him," Brazil's President-Elect Fernando Collor said in an exclusive interview with the CORREIO BRASILIENSE newspaper, summing up the impressions of his recent visit to Moscow.

"The visit to Moscow was of political importance. Gorbachev is a man of extraordinary courage," he said.

"One needs immense courage to stand up to so many problems. The struggle of the Soviet leader and his proposals are admired all over the world and prompt wishes for his success."

"My meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev was extraordinary. He spoke bluntly about all the problems his country is facing, leaving out nothing."

Brazilian President-Elect's World Tour Viewed

PY1702121190 Moscow in Portuguese to Brazil 2200 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Aleksey Baladin commentary]

[Text] Brazilian President-elect Fernando Collor de Mello has ended his world tour and given a news conference on the results. Here is a report by Aleksey Baladin:

Mr. Fernando Collor de Mello's 20-day world tour was characterized by information gathering. Before starting his tour, the president-elect of Brazil stated that his intention was to adjust the new government's steps to the future. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that interconnected issues, or issues that have taken on global significance, were discussed during Fernando Collor de Mello's meetings with leaders in three continents.

Judge for yourself. The links of the chain are the following: foreign debt, economic development, environmental protection, and cooperative development. Brazil's huge foreign debt is a heavy burden on the country's economy. It is perfectly understandable that Brazil's foreign debt was discussed at the meetings between Brazil's president-elect and IMF, IRDB [International Reconstruction and Development Bank], and IDB [Inter-American Development Bank] representatives in Washington. There is no doubt that should foreign debt payments or the pressure for these be reduced, the country will breath more freely and be more able to direct economic activities at the development and strengthening of the national economy.

Development is currently particularly dependent on the exploitation of the virgin forests of the Amazonas, which are a true natural resource. These forests are vitally important as they serve as the planet's lungs. Considering the interdependence of the modern world and its realities, it is obvious that mutual steps are necessary to solve problems like the foreign debt, economic development, and ecological protection. To this end, cooperation is a marvelous method of communication among nations, a cooperation that is as necessary as life itself. The areas in which cooperation takes place depends on the world's political situation and on the concrete steps taken by all countries without exception.

At meetings between Fernando Collor de Mello and Mikhail Gorbachev during the former's two-day visit to Moscow, it was stressed that cooperation and interaction between Brazil and the Soviet Union will be an important factor in strengthening wholesome principles of international coexistence. Although Brazilian-Soviet relations have gained stability, it should unfortunately be recognized that the potential is far from being exhausted.

The Brazilian president-elect's visit and his conversations in Moscow confirmed Brazil's interest in developing international relations, bolstering Soviet-Brazilian ties, and confirming interdependence in the modern world.

Lukyanov, Vorotnikov Receive Brazilians

PM1202100990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meetings With Parliamentarians"]

[Text] On 7 February A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received a Brazilian National Congress delegation headed by A. Paes De Andrade, chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, which was in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

During a conversation which took place in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere, A.I. Lukyanov familiarized the Brazilian parliamentarians with the practical measures being taken in the USSR with respect to the radical renewal of all aspects of life in Soviet society and the basic results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum which has just been held. He noted that, despite the existing difficulties, a sound basis is being laid for successful progress in the formation of a new model for a socialist state. A creative search for effective ways of implementing restructuring processes has started in the country, and radical transformations are taking place in the economy, in the political structure of our society, and in spiritual and cultural life.

It was stressed that the USSR's foreign policy has become a sphere of vital activity for the Soviet state, in which the revolutionary process of perestroyka is materializing in the shape of significant and really tangible positive results.

The Brazilian parliamentarians gave a high evaluation of the Soviet Union's contribution to the resolution of cardinal contemporary problems and expressed their support for the USSR's important peace initiatives geared to the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They noted the importance of the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet Union regarding the reduction of the armed forces and armaments and the practical implementation of conversion in the defense industry.

The Brazilian parliamentarians spoke about the internal political situation in the country in the light of the results of the recent presidential election. The direct election for the head of state, held for the first time in 30 years, had shown that the country has stepped firmly onto the path of democratic renewal and the strengthening of constitutional bases, the Brazilian guests noted.

Expressing satisfaction with the current state of Soviet-Brazilian relations, the parliamentarians of both countries advocated extending cooperation between the USSR and Brazil, namely by reaching in the near future a level in ties corresponding to our countries' real potential. The important role played by interparliamentary links in the implementation of this task and in the further comprehensive extension and deepening of Soviet-Brazilian relations was stressed.

S. do Rego Barros Netto, Brazilian ambassador to the USSR, was also present at the conversation.

On the same day, V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, received the delegation.

During the conversation, which took place in a friendly atmosphere, V.I. Vorotnikov told the Brazilian parliamentarians about the substance of the restructuring processes in the USSR and basic directions of economic and political reform. It was stressed that the policy of renewal is geared to the construction of humane and democratic socialism, a fuller exploitation of potential opportunities in our society, and the resolution of large-scale socioeconomic tasks. It was also noted that the election campaign to republic and local organs of power that is currently being carried out marks the start of the second phase of political reform and is intended to guarantee the working people's real participation in governing the state.

An important place in the conversation was devoted to clarifying the CPSU's role in restructuring processes and in the political system as the Soviet people's ideological, political, and moral vanguard.

V.I. Vorotnikov familiarized the National Congress deputies with the activity of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and the tasks facing the republic at its current phase of development.

When discussing the international situation, the sides established with satisfaction that, under the influence of the new political thinking, the general international climate is changing perceptibly and mutual understanding and trust between peoples is growing, thus creating conditions for even more active involvement of all states in the process of the collective search for paths to resolving current key problems.

The sides expressed satisfaction with the progressive development of Soviet-Brazilian relations. The belief was expressed that the increasingly strong, direct, friendly links between the USSR republics and the Brazilian states and between cities in the two countries would have a positive influence on their further development. The mutual benefit of cooperation in the sphere of protecting the environment was noted.

The guests held a discussion at the USSR Supreme Soviet.

R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of nationalities, spoke about the work of the new Soviet parliament, its chambers, commissions and committees, about progress in the preparation for the upcoming session, and about the way in which working people's interests can be taken into consideration when new draft laws are being elaborated.

USSR people's deputies G. Safieva, Yu.M. Marinichev, V.L. Maslin, A.P. Vladislavlev, and A.V. Reshetnikov took part in the conversation.

A lunch was held in honor of the delegation on behalf of the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers.

Brazilian Legislators' Visit Reported

PM2002112190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

["Joint Announcement on Brazilian National Congress Delegation's Visit to Soviet Union"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] A delegation of the National Congress headed by A. Paes de Andrade, president of the Chamber of Deputies, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union 6 through 15 February 1990 at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet in return for a visit to Brazil by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation in 1989.

In addition to Moscow, the Brazilian parliamentarians visited the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Leningrad. They laid wreaths at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum and the grave of the unknown warrior.

The Brazilian deputies were received by A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and by V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Meetings and talks were held with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, with members of committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and of commissions of its chambers, and with USSR people's deputies.

During the talks, which were held in a frank and friendly atmosphere, the Brazilian parliamentarians were briefed in detail on the present stage of perestroyka in the USSR, on the substance of and progress in realizing the political and economic reforms, on the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost, on the work of the First and Second Congresses of USSR People's Deputies, and on the lawmaking activity of the Supreme Soviet of the new convocation.

The Brazilian representatives expressed support for the perestroyka process in the USSR and for the Soviet people's efforts to put into practice the adopted policy of renewing all spheres of the life of Soviet society on the basis of democratization and glasnost. They in turn spoke about political, economic, and social aspects of life in modern Brazil and the activity of the National Congress in consolidating democratic transformations in the country, as well as in the sphere of international policy.

The Soviet parliamentarians noted the organic connection between perestroyka in the USSR and the Soviet Union's principled foreign policy line, explaining the essence of the Soviet initiatives geared to delivering mankind from the nuclear threat, creating a reliable system of universal security, building a nonviolent, demilitarized world, and democratizing and humanizing international relations.

The parliamentarians of the Soviet Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil noted with satisfaction the coincidence of their countries' positions on a majority of central problems of the international situation. They were unanimous in their assessment of the beneficial impact on the international climate of the new political thinking, whose nucleus is recognition of the priority of panhuman values. It was emphasized that the shift away from the "cold war" toward cooperation has created conditions for movement toward a new peaceful period, for the further dynamization of political dialogue and mutual understanding among states, and for the activation of the joint search for ways to resolve the global problems facing mankind. It is the conviction of the Soviet and Brazilian representatives that the United Nations is called upon to play the role of the strategic center for strengthening international peace, cooperation, and stability.

After noting the great significance of the successful implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was the first practical step on the path of nuclear disarmament, and the results of the Soviet-U.S. top-level meeting in Malta, which helped to deepen the positive trends in Soviet-U.S. and East-West relations and helped the international situation as a whole, both sides advocated the speediest conclusion of an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States, the complete cessation of nuclear tests with effective international verification, the prevention of the militarization of space, and the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The parliamentarians confirmed their countries' adherence to the principles of nuclear nonproliferation and their support for efforts aimed at creating zones free of nuclear arsenals.

In this connection the USSR people's deputies noted the positive role of the Brazilian initiative in creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic, which was approved and enshrined in UN decisions.

The Soviet and Brazilian parliamentarians voiced the conviction that real progress on the path of disarmament will make it possible to free additional resources to resolve urgent economic, social, and ecological problems in the interests of development. They emphasized the need for the cardinal restructuring of international economic relations with a view to establishing a more fair, stable, and balanced economic order on the basis of the principles of equality and democracy, and they noted the importance of taking specific measures to reduce the developing countries' level of foreign debt within the framework of an all-embracing decision on the basis of respect for national sovereignty and the creation of conditions for economic growth. Both sides agreed that an international division of labor which restricts access to advanced technology should be avoided.

During an examination of regional conflicts the two countries' parliamentarians noted positive trends in resolving crisis situations in a number of parts of the world and firmly advocated their peaceful resolution on the basis of freedom of choice in accordance with the universally recognized principles and norms of international law with maximum use of the United Nations' peacemaking potential.

During a discussion of the situation in Central America the Soviet and Brazilian parliamentarians confirmed their conviction that it is possible to achieve lasting peace in the Central American region only by means of a political settlement by Latin Americans themselves and on the basis of a balance of interests with strict respect for the principles of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and recognition of every people's inalienable right to free self-determination. In this connection they came out in support of the negotiating process and the full realization of the accords of the presidents of the Central American countries. The parliamentarians of the USSR and Brazil condemned external interference in the region's affairs, which can only complicate the resolution of the crisis situation in Central America.

The sides emphasized the need for the speediest settlement of the situation in Afghanistan and the convening of an international conference on the Near East under UN auspices, hailed the process of forming an independent Namibia, and came out in support of the South African people's right to create a democratic state in the Republic of South Africa under conditions of the elimination of the system of racial discrimination.

The Soviet and Brazilian representatives pointed out that the problem of protecting the environment has today become one of the most urgent tasks of modern times. Emphasis was placed on the need to formulate all-embracing solutions to ecological problems, including in the spheres of funding, scientific cooperation, and nondiscriminatory access to ecologically clean technology. They welcomed the idea of convening a UN conference on environmental protection and development in Brazil in 1992 and supported the USSR's proposal to hold it at the highest level.

The USSR people's deputies and the deputies of the Brazilian National Congress expressed profound satisfaction with the ongoing development of Soviet-Brazilian relations in the spirit of the "Declaration of Principles of Interaction in the Name of Peace and International Cooperation" signed by the two countries' leaders at the time of President J. Sarney's visit to the USSR in 1988. They noted the fundamental importance of the Moscow meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and President-Elect F. Collor of Brazil in January 1990, which confirmed a mutual readiness to ensure positive continuity in relations between the two countries and to contribute in every possible way to the deepening of their political dialogue and the further expansion of friendly relations in various spheres on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage.

Emphasis was placed on the need to dynamize trade, economic, scientific, and technical ties between the USSR and Brazil, and a mutual desire was expressed to promote the development of exchanges in the humanitarian sphere and in the spheres of culture, education, and sport with a view to strengthening mutual understanding and trust between the peoples of the two countries.

The sides expressed the conviction that the further development of ties between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Brazilian National Congress will promote the deepening of Soviet-Brazilian cooperation in all spheres.

Panamanian Leaders Assess Current Situation

PM2302125290 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 6, 6-12 Feb 90 pp 17-18

[Yuriy Kudimov dispatch incorporating reports on interview with Panamanian President Guillermo Endara, Foreign Minister Julio Linarez, and Vice President Ricardo Arias Calderon: "After Invasion. How Panama's New Leaders Assess Current Situation and What They Can Promise the Country"]

[Text] Panama—We didn't even notice that we had crossed the border between Costa Rica and Panama. Only after travelling half a mile of the Panamanian territory, we discovered our error and returned to the checkpoint to apologize to Panamaian custom and border officials who were taking a nap and to complete entrance formalities.

I recall this episode of my business trip to Panama with no intention to bait Panamanian authorities. Several weeks ago, at the height of the U.S. invasion hundreds of journalists assembled at border checkpoints, but all their attempts to break inside the country and to the "hot news" were futile.

After the American aggression Panama looks differently. Buildings reduced to rubble during air raids, once luxurious ransacked and pillaged shops in the Avenida Central or Via Espana,barbed wire entanglements surrounding some embassies, numerous U.S. army patrols, and last but not least streets deserted in the evening—the curfew has been shortened but still is in force. Scars of war are slowly healing. By the way, the Pentagon dispatched to Panama a battalion of army engineers. News agencies reported that the U.S. decided to allocate one billion dollars on restoration of Panama and elimination of the consequences of the U.S. economic blockade.

The moral danger inflicted on the Panamanians' national feelings will be harder to compensate for, however.

The new president of Panama, Guillermo Endara, impressed me as an optimistic, mild man with a fair sense of humour. The new head of state devoted much of his interview to a team of Soviet journalists to the attempts to demonstrate the legitimate character of his administration which, as he said, received the mandate to govern from the majority of the Panamanian people at the elections on May 7 last year. Endara admitted that a few hours before the invasion started, the opposition leaders were warned about it by a U.S. administration official but stressed that they had never asked Washington to dispose General Noreiga by force. "It so happened," said Endara as if apologetically, "that we assumed power in the wake of the U.S. invasion; but as a matter of fact, we had been elected by a democratic way."

If most Panamanians support the Endara administration, then why are American GIs still in the country? They are guarding the presidential palace and feel quite at home there. Waiting to be received by the president we peacefully chatted with one of his aides—former university lecturer Luis Martins. All of a sudden a U.S. serviceman in camouflage fatigues burst into the room and started discussing his problems in English with the secretary of the head of state rather impudently. The intelligent and good- mannered Martins obviously felt ill at ease....

When asked about the deadline of the U.S. troops pullout, Endra answered rather vaguely: "The U.S. troops will withdraw when national police forces adjust to the sitaution and become able to keep it under control."

The question of the international recognition of the current Panamanian administration is closely connected with the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Endara told us that his administration had no problems with recognition by the Common Market countries, the United States, Japan and Central American countries, except Nicaragua. He said he was sorry to see some Latin American leaders being reluctant to recognize the new regime in Panama before withdrawal of U.S. troops. Many other members of the international community of nations stick to this viewpoint as well.

The Soviet government condemned the U.S. armed intervention to Panama. I asked Mr Endara what he thought about the future of the Soviet-Panamanian relations.

The president noted that the queustion had not been discussed so far, since the country was facing more pressing domestic problems, first of all those connected with formation of executive, legislative and juridical bodies. He said he favoured more extensive ties between the Soviet Union and Panama.

Foreign Minister Julio Linarez said the Soviet-Panamanian relations had very favourable prospects. He said that Panama wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. To justify this point of view the minister said all countries in the world had a stake in normal functioning and naturality of the inter-ocean link. He spoke highly of the Soviet attitude to the process of democratization presently underway in Eastern Europe and of perestroyka in the U.S.S.R. itself, regarding the two processes as additional arguments in favour of broader Soviet-Panamanian ties.

It is for nearly 25 years already that the Soviet Union has been using Panama as an international banking and trading centre to sell Soviet-made goods in Latin America. We spoke to Lev Rodin, owner of the Panamanian firm Motores Internacionales, and Soviet representative Nikolay Ushakov, executive director of the firm in its impressive glass-and-concrete headquarters in downtown Panama City. The firm has been selling Soviet-made Lada cars, KamAZ lorries and other makes to Latin American countries for quite a long time. It operates branches in 28 countries. I was surprised to come across the firm's mission in El Salvador. My interlocutors told me that countries like Chile and Haiti were among its regular customers.

It is obvious that this kind of Soviet "presence" is profitable for Panama. Motores Internacionales earns millions, part of which is deduced to the Panamanian budget in the form of taxes. The firm provides jobs for over 500 workers which is specially important to the Panamanian government at the present time when the Endara administration's economic policies can result in an aggravation of social problems. We had a thorough discussion of economic matters with the first vice-president of the republic, the minister of internal affairs and justice, Ricardo Arias Calderon.

A professor of philosophy in the not too distant past, Ricardo Calderon is known as the main ideologist of the current administration. The vice-president formulated the two major tasks of the government: formation of democratic institutions and restructuring of the national economy. He argues that the first task is nearly fulfilled, while the other is only starting to be solved.

Arias Calderon blamed the country's old rulers for the economic crisis in Panama and cited impressive statistics: unemployment reaching 30 per cent, the GNP which has been reduced by one fourth in the past two years and a half, a gigantic foreign debt (interest rates alone amount to $800 million). Besides, the vice-president stressed, the U.S. invasion inflicted a 1.5 billion dollars damage to the national economy.

The government suggests the following guidelines of economic policies: considerable cuts in state expenditure, giving a freer hand to private business and seeking financial assistance abroad. Panama's business quarters favor the government programme in general. But what does it have in stock to the people?

Speaking for me, one economist working for the Panama-based centre for social studies said this programme would inevitably lead to the aggravation of social problems, primarily unemployment. According to his calculations, the number of jobless will increase by 10 more per cent as a result of new layoffs. The government intends to abolish free preschool education which will be a heavy blow at low-income families. Experts of the centre predict that in the near future the Endara administration may confront serious soical tensions and lose a considerable section of the electorate which voted for it in May 1989.

A new police force is being formed under the direct supervision of Arias Calderon. The national Defense Forces formerly headed by Gen. Noriega have been disbanded. It must be noted that Panamanians display enough willingness to enlist in the new police force called the Panamanian Public Force—I saw long queues to recruitment stations myself. Crew cuts and athletic stature of many volunteers betray the fact that only several weeks ago they were wearing the NDF uniform.

Is there an armed opposition to the Endara government? Arias Calderon replied that such an opposition did exist and even present some threat to the new regime. It has considerable stockpiles of weapons. As for the legal opposition, stressed the vice-president, it will be given every guarantee for normal functioning. This applies to both left-wing and ultra-right parties and organizations. But during the days I spent in Panama no activity of the legal opposition was visible.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Sessions Resume 26 Feb

LD2602084790 Moscow TASS in English 0817 GMT 26 Feb 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Separate meetings of the Soviet parliament's two chambers—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities—began in the Kremlin this morning.

The Council of the Union is discussing bills dealing with the legal basis of a state of emergency, the duties and rights of Interior Ministry troops, the enhancement of responsibility for encroachment upon the national equality of citizens and for forcible disruption of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union.

The latter bill is also expected to be considered in the Council of Nationalities today. The council will examine a new version of the bill on general principles for managing the economic and social spheres in the union and autonomous republics. At the autumn session last year the versions of the bill were rejected twice.

The second reading of two major acts—a bill on ownership and draft fundamentals of land legislation—was endorsed in recent days. The two bills are expected to be put to an article-by-article vote soon.

Today's discussion of the package of bills, aimed at strengthening law and order, will be followed by a debate on them at a joint meeting of the chambers.

Revision Could Introduce Presidential System

OW2402192290 Tokyo KYODO in English 1417 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb. 24 KYODO—Officials of the standing legislature of the Supreme Soviet said on Saturday they will submit a proposed revision of the Soviet Constitution introducing a presidential system to the Supreme Soviet next Tuesday.

If the Supreme Soviet approves the constitutional revision, Mikhail Gorbachev, currently president of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, is likely to be elected as new president at a special session of the 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies expected to be held in early March following its formal acceptance of the revision.

The officials said in an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE that the new Soviet president, to be set up under the proposed revision, will be head of the state and will have authority to declare war and state of emergency.

The president will be directly elected by the people. However, the first president is to be elected by the Congress of People's Deputies for a term of four years, according to the draft.

The draft also will change Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution which guarantees Communist Party monopoly of political power, the officials said.

Committees, Commissions Continue Work

Radio Commentator Reports

LD2302212590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] At the USSR Supreme Soviet session: Over the All-Union Radio correspondents' center at 27 Kalinin Avenue. At the microphone is Olga Vasilenko:

[Vasilenko] Today the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet are continuing their work. Discussion of a package of draft laws connected with economic reform is in progress. Thus, the Commission for Consumer Goods, Trade, Municipal, and Other Services to the population is considering, from its own viewpoint, the draft laws on taxation. A group of deputies who are members of the Committee for Legislation and Legality are taking part in additional work on the draft laws on ownership and land. The Committee for the Work of Soviets, Government, and Self-Government is examining yet again, from the most varied viewpoints, the draft law on local self-government and local economic management. As you know, the committee prepared its own version of the draft law, but there also were versions from the government and the State Law Institute. So the deputies are—if one can apply the word to a draft law—polishing every article, especially since there are questions on the framing of the budget in the primary sections of the soviets, and other problems also require clarification. I visited one other committee first thing this morning, the Committee for Glasnost, Citizens' Rights and Appeals. Here the day is also devoted to current work. In other words, there is no sitting, but the deputies have such a huge quantity of complaints, letters, and appeals that they are making the most of every minute of their free—if such they can be called—days. Incidentally, I will say that this committee is preparing a draft law connected with working people's letters and complaints, in which the responsibility of each department and organization for a letter or complaint is defined, and the time limit for replies is specified. With the adoption of this law, the inexhaustible flow of complaints sent to the various bodies will, perhaps, be diminshed. Nataliya Yuryevna Reshetova, leader of the group of deputies preparing that draft law told me that one of the declarants [zayavitelnits]—as they are called in legal language—sent one and the same complaint to 80 bodies. The draft law on the press is also with the committee for additional work.

I also want to come back to the Committee for Legislation and Legality. They are starting to draft laws on the militia, the KGB, the state of emergency, and the holding of rallies, gatherings, processions, and demonstrations.

So far, I have been talking about the law-making work of the committees and commissions, but our Supreme

Soviet also has monitoring and managerial functions. The Committee for Agrarian Issues and Food is now discussing the difficult situation that has developed with the work of enterprises producing protein-vitamin concentrates. As you know, a Supreme Soviet decision adopted at the second session and connected with the ecological situation in the country recommends that these enterprises should be switched to other uses, but there the matter rests for the time being. A very sharp conversation is in progress at the sitting of the committee, to which a large group of scientists have come. We will report in more detail on this sitting in evening editions of Mayak [radio second program] and the "Latest News" program.

The Committee for Science, Public Education, Culture, and upbringing is holding a conversation about the prospects for the development of public education in the 13th Five-Year-Plan period. I will acquaint you with the content of that sitting at 1430 [1130 GMT] on Mayak. For the moment, however, I am ending my account of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.

Committees Hold Joint Sessions

LD2302203790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1400 GMT on 23 February broadcasts a four-minute report by correspondent Andrey Nikiforov on the 23 February proceedings in the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions.

At a joint session of three committees—on agrarian questions; food, ecology, and use of natural resources; and health—the question of production and consumption of protein and vitamin concentrates (PVC) and of curtailing its production based on petroleum was discussed, he says. It was felt that a change of use of PVC factories could lead to a sharp reduction in the production of meat, and and a special commission set up on instructions from Gorbachev concluded that such a move would be inadvisable. Some scientists and deputies believed that PVC production is unsafe and could result in atmospheric and water pollution.

The committee on the work of people's deputy soviets and the development of management and self-management is examining the draft bill on the basis principles of local self-management and local economy.

A joint session of a number of committees and commissions was held in the commission for the development of industry, power-engineering, and technology, at which a draft bill on the social enterprise was discussed.

Three more draft bills which are among the priority ones on the agenda are those on emergency situations, rights and duties of internal troops and responsibility for encroachment on citizens' national equality, and these were discussed in the committee for economic reform. At the moment a session of another commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, that on nationalities policy and interethnic relations, is continuing. An article-by-article discussion of the draft bill on the sequence of tackling questions connected with the secession of union republics from the USSR is underway, the correspondent notes in conclusion.

Bill Proposes Penalties for Territorial Disruption

LD2302164490 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] A report by the INTERFAX news agency says one of the Soviet parliament's houses, the House of the Union, has been presented with a bill proposing stiffer penalties for encroachment on the national equality of citizens and violent disruption of the country's territorial integrity. A session is expected on 26 February. The need for a new law stems from the stepped up nationalist and separatist activities.

Supreme Soviet Committee Debates Concentrates

LD2302112690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Summary] The Committee on Agrarian Questions and Food is debating whether to cease production of petroleum based-protein and vitamin concentrates, in line with a Supreme Soviet decision which regards the process of their production as a pollutant. However, these concentrates are needed. Industry bosses have protested and asked the Supreme Soviet to reconsider its decision. A special commission set up to study this problem has concluded it would not be expedient to reconfigure the plants producing the concentrate. Two of its members dissent from this view, and they are supported by many deputies, so the debate around this problem is going to be heated.

Resolution on Legislative Program Published

PM2302120190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Morning Edition pp 1-2

[USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution "On Organizing the Work of the USSR Supreme Soviet To Implement the Decisions of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies" dated 15 February 1990 and signed by M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. Regarding fulfillment of the decisions of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies as a top-priority task, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet committees, and chambers' standing commissions must ensure efficient organization of the work to implement them, take these decisions into consideration when elaborating legislative acts and exercising controlling and managerial functions, and thoroughly analyze and make fuller use of the proposals

voiced by USSR people's deputies and received by the congress from labor collectives and citizens.

2. The USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions which have been entrusted with finalizing the draft laws on ownership and on the general principles of local self-management and the local economy and the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Land, along with the draft laws on income tax payable by USSR citizens, foreign citizens, and people without citizenship, on the socialist enterprise, on amendments and additions to the USSR Law "On the Cooperative System in the USSR," on the General Principles of Leadership of the Economy and the Social Sphere in the Union and Autonomous Republics, and on taxes from state, lease, cooperative, public, and other enterprises, associations, and organizations, which have been submitted to nationwide discussion, must finalize the aforementioned draft laws as a priority and submit them to the USSR Supreme Soviet for examination in February 1990. They must at the same time submit proposals on additions and amendments to the USSR Constitution on the aforementioned questions and on questions of the demarcation of authority between the USSR and the union republics. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium must ensure coordination and interaction between the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and the chambers' standing commissions involved in the preparation of these draft laws.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform Questions must examine the draft legislative acts on competition and joint-stock companies and also participate in examining other draft laws associated with the implementation of economic reform.

3. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Constitutional Commission, and the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, in conjunction with USSR Supreme Soviet committees and the chambers' other standing commissions, must prepare and submit for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1990 the draft of a new version of Section III of the USSR Constitution, which regulates the national-state system in the USSR and the demarcation of powers between the USSR and the union republics.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in conjunction with the relevant USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions, must finalize and submit for consideration by the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet as a priority a draft Law on the Procedure for Resolving Questions Associated With a Union Republic's Leaving the USSR.

The Soviet of Nationalities, in conjunction with the relevant USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions, must finalize and submit for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990 draft laws on free national development for USSR citizens who live outside their national-state formations or who do not have such formations on the USSR's territory and also on the languages of the USSR's peoples.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission on Citizenship Questions, with the participation of other USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions, must finalize the draft Law on USSR Citizenship and submit it to the USSR Supreme Soviet for examination in April 1990.

4. When analyzing the draft 13th Five-Year Plan the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions must pay particular attention to ensuring an organic link between the plan and the deepening of economic reform on the basis of the development of various forms of socialist ownership, market relations, wholesale trade, economic autonomy for enterprises, regions, and republics, reform of prices and the taxation and credit and finance systems, resource saving, and rational use of nature; accelerating scientific and technical progress; improving the training of qualified economic specialists; and improving the ecological situation, along with particular attention to the need to boost the prosperity and increase the social security of the population, particularly the impoverished strata, to creating economic and legal guarantees for the development of national cultures, languages, and to protecting the historical heritage.

When studying the aforementioned problems, the Soviet of the Union Planning, Budget, and Financial Commission and the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Questions of the Social and Economic Development of Union and Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs must cooperate closely with other USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions.

USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions must listen to reports from the leaders of state management bodies regarding the progress made in elaborating the appropriate sections of the five-year plan.

The Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Consumer Goods, Trade, and Municipal, Consumer, and Other Services to the Population and the Soviet of the Union Commission for Questions of the Development of Industry, Energy, Equipment, and Technology must step up their supervision of the fulfillment of the demands of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies that all the country's economic complexes, ministries, and regions accelerate the increase in production of nonfood consumer goods.

In April 1990 the USSR Council of Ministers must present the USSR Supreme Soviet with a report regarding the progress made in fulfilling the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 20 November 1989 "On

Additional Measures To Stabilize the Consumer Market and Intensify State Price Control."

5. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agrarian Questions and Food, in conjunction with the relevant USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions, must organize monitoring of ministries' and departments' implementation of the targeted directives of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies which make provision for a considerable improvement in the population's food supplies and eating patterns, bringing it closer to rational norms, the priority development of the agro-industrial complex, the social development of the countryside, and the acceleration of the use of modern equipment and technology in agriculture.

6. The USSR Council of Ministers, in conjunction with the USSR Prosecutor's Office, must elaborate the requisite legal norms designed to ensure citizens' unimpeded and safe travel on all modes of transport throughout the country and the timely and undamaged delivery of freight and submit them for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1990.

The Soviet of the Union Commission for Transport, Communications, and Information Science Questions and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order must produce their findings on the relevant draft legislative acts, including the draft Law on Railroad Transport, for examination at the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

7. With a view to speeding up the resolution of topical social problems in the life of society:

The Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Veterans and Invalids, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Women and of Family, Mother, and Child Protection, in conjunction with other USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions, must present their findings on the draft Law on Pensions for USSR Citizens for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1990;

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Women and of Family, Mother, and Child Protection must present for discussion by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990 a draft resolution coordinated with ministries and departments on urgent measures to improve the position of women, protect mothers and children, and strengthen the family;

The USSR Council of Ministers must speed up its elaboration and presentation to the USSR Supreme Soviet of the draft State Program To Improve the Position of Women in the USSR;

The USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee must finalize the draft Law on the Fundamentals of State Youth Policy and submit it to the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990;

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Veterans and Invalids must prepare by September 1990 and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on improving legislation on questions of social security provision for elderly people and invalids;

The Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Protection of the People's Health, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order must finalize and submit for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990 the draft Law on Vacations, along with their findings on the draft laws on amendments and additions to USSR legislative acts on labor and on cases of abrogation of the labor contract on the initiative of the administration without the consent of the trade union committee at an enterprise, establishment, or organization;

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Protection of the People's Health and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order must finalize the draft Law on Prevention of AIDS and submit it for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1990;

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources must:

Prepare its findings on the draft State Program on Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of the USSR's Natural Resources for the 13th Five-Year Plan and through the Year 2005 for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990;

Prepare and present for consideration by the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1990 draft laws on nature protection, special conservation areas, on the protection and rational use of the plant world, on the use of atomic energy and nuclear security.

In accordance with the decision of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies the USSR Council of Ministers must submit proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet by 1 July 1990 on guaranteeing employment for the population in conditions of the implementation of economic reform, the operation of a market mechanism, and the broadening of the cooperative movement and individual labor activity, and the Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions must produce its findings on these proposals.

8. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and of the Development of

Management and Self-Management must cooperate with the supreme soviets in the union and autonomous republics and their bodies and:

take steps to ensure that the newly elected soviets of people's deputies make active use of their powers and strive to ensure that they center their attention on specific questions of state, economic, and sociocultural life, primarily questions of food supplies, the improvement of matters on the consumer market as a whole, and housing construction;

increase checks to see that the requisite conditions are created to ensure soviets' responsibility and autonomy in resolving problems related to the comprehensive development of territories under their jurisdiction and also to the implementation of voters' instructions and proposals made during the course of elections to the soviets of people's deputies.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, in conjunction with the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and of the Development of Management and Self-Management, other USSR Supreme Soviet committees, and the chambers' standing commissions, must:

finalize the draft Law on the Status of a USSR People's Deputy, taking comments and proposals from USSR people's deputies into consideration and submit it for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1990;

finalize and then, taking the nationwide discussion into consideration, present for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990 the draft Law on the Procedure for Recalling a USSR People's Deputy.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, in conjunction with other USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions, must:

finalize the draft Law on the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Meetings, Rallies, Street Processions, and Demonstrations in the USSR and also, taking the results of the nationwide discussion into consideration, on the draft Law on the Press and Other Mass Media and submit them for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in March-April 1990;

finalize the draft laws on public associations of citizens in the USSR, freedom of conscience, and religious organizations and present their findings on these draft laws to the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990;

prepare a draft Law on Nationwide Voting (Referendum) and submit it to the USSR Supreme Soviet in September 1990.

The USSR Prosecutor's Office, in conjunction with the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, must finalize the draft Law on the Procedure for Considering Citizens' Complaints and Other Appeals Within State Management Organs, at Enterprises, Establishments, and Organizations and present it to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Soviet of the Union Commission for Questions of Labor, Prices, and Social Policy and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order must take part in finalizing the draft Law on the Rights of Trade Unions in the USSR in order to submit it to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

9. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order must:

examine as a priority draft laws on the legal provisions governing a state of emergency and on increasing liability for encroachments on citizens' national equality and for forcible violation of the unity of the USSR's territory, presenting its findings on these draft laws to the USSR Supreme Soviet in February 1990;

prepare and present for consideration by the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet amendments and additions to criminal and procedural legislation designed to ensure the inevitability of criminal liability for all members of criminal groups, primarily their organizers, along with draft laws on the Soviet militia and on USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops' duties and rights when safeguarding public order;

speed up the completion and examination of the draft Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics, taking the nationwide discussion into consideration, and USSR draft legislative acts on criminal responsibility for individual crimes, along with their findings on the draft laws on the USSR Supreme Court and on Military Tribunals and submit them for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1990.

10. USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions must devote particular attention to exercising their functions of checking compliance with and implementation of USSR laws and other congress and USSR Supreme Soviet decisions and fulfillment by ministries, departments, and other state bodies of the specific directives and instructions issued by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, while the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium must ensure close cooperation between the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and the chambers' standing commissions when resolving these tasks. Where necessary, use must be made of requests to state bodies and officials demanding an official explanation on problems of statewide significance.

It is deemed advisable to allocate one day a month during a USSR Supreme Soviet session for members of the USSR Government and leaders of other bodies appointed or elected by the congress or the USSR Supreme Soviet to answer questions put by USSR people's deputies.

11. The USSR Council of Ministers must elaborate and present for consideration at the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1990:

a draft Law on USSR State Security;

draft Fundamentals of Criminal Executive Legislation of the USSR and the union republics (in conjunction with the USSR Prosecutor's Office);

draft legislative acts designed to improve the system of crime prevention and also the social rehabilitation of people who have served criminal sentences.

12. The USSR Supreme Court, in conjunction with the USSR Prosecutor's Office, must elaborate and present for consideration by the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft Fundamentals of Criminal Proceedings in the USSR and the Union Republics.

13. The USSR Prosecutor's Office, the USSR People's Control Committee, and the USSR State Board of Arbitration have been instructed to submit draft laws to the USSR Supreme Soviet in fall 1990 on the USSR Prosecutor's Office, People's Control in the USSR, and the State Board of Arbitration in the USSR, respectively.

14. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium must examine questions of the USSR Supreme Soviet's international ties with foreign parliaments in light of the tasks of perestroyka at the contemporary stage and the concept of the new political thinking.

The USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee must:

regularly hear reports from USSR Foreign Ministry representatives on topical questions relating to the international situation and Soviet foreign policy;

discuss in conjunction with other USSR Supreme Soviet committees and chambers' standing commissions a report on the concept for the development of the USSR's foreign economic ties for the 13th Five-Year Plan, along with practical steps in this sphere.

The USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order must:

finalize the draft Law on the Procedure for USSR Citizens' Exit from and Entry to the USSR and present it to the USSR Supreme Soviet in March-April 1990;

prepare proposals on amendments and additions to the USSR Law "On the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and Denunciation of USSR International Treaties" and submit these proposals for consideration by the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

15. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium must prepare and submit proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the formation of:
a Commission on the Work Procedure of USSR Supreme Organs of State Power;
a USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Combating Crime;
a Commission on the Affairs of Former Servicemen From the Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan;
and a Commission on Questions of Deputies' Ethics.
[signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
[dated] Moscow, Kremlin, 15 February 1990.

Political & Social

Moscow Newspapers Report on 25 Feb Rallies

Council of Ministers Calls for Order

PM2402154490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] In its 20 February 1990 statement the USSR Supreme Soviet instructed the USSR Government and local soviets of people's deputies to adopt all necessary measures to safeguard law and order during the demonstrations and rallies planned for 25 February.

Having assessed the sociopolitical situation that has taken shape in the country, the USSR Council of Ministers has instructed union and autonomous republic Councils of Ministers, local soviet executive committees, and law enforcement organs to adopt the necessary measures to ensure strict compliance with the procedure for holding rallies and demonstrations. Particular attention is to be directed to the prevention of any attempts by extremist and criminal elements to take advantage of the mass rallies and marches in order to provoke disturbances. Executive organs of power in the localities are instructed to notify citizens of authorized rallies and the place and time at which they are to be held, and also of the responsibility of organizers of rallies, demonstrations, and marches for strict compliance with the procedure for holding them.

In adopting this decision the USSR Council of Ministers is guided by the country's Constitution and acts on the basis of the need to protect the lives, honor, and dignity of Soviet people regardless of their nationality or place of residence and to ensure the inviolability of housing and the protection of the property of enterprises and organizations.

The country's government appeals to all citizens and the labor collectives of enterprises and organizations to show restraint, prudence, and responsibility, not to yield to emotions or provocations, and actively to resist antisocial, unlawful actions.

The most important thing now is to consolidate all progressive forces for the sake of public calm and to safeguard the country's normal pace of work.

Rival Rallies Held in Gorkiy

PM2502164590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p4

[Report by own correspondent A. Yershov: "Rally Ended With Celebration of the Passing of Winter"]

[Text] A city rally of voters was held in Gorkiy's Minin Square on 25 February. It was held on the initiative of ten different social organizations: the War and Labor Veterans Council, the Women's Council, the Public Education Council, and others. The rally was chaired by USSR People's Deputy V. Payshchikov. The majority of speakers said that restructuring must be conducted more decisively and not be confined to half-measures and that lessons should be learned from the mistakes and blunders already made during restructuring. Slogans and banners saying "There is no such thing as democracy without discipline," "Democracy, glasnost, rule of law," and others could be seen above the crowd of many thousands. The rally resolution contains demands to stop the construction of the Gorkiy Nuclear Power Plant and not to raise the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir, and speaks out in favor of speeding up the democratization of the CPSU but against the defamation of honest Communists....

A group from the "Democratic Union" decided to hold their own rally in the same square, by the Chkalov monument. They found sympathizers who supported various extremist calls. When militia personnel tried to intervene in the unsanctioned rally, they began to be jostled and pushed from the steps of the monument pedestal. However, any serious excesses were ultimately prevented.

In the afternoon, a traditional celebration of the passing of winter was held in Minin Square, in which many thousands of Gorkiy's citizens took part.

Sunday Rallies Reviewed

PM2502184790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by parliamentary correspondent Vyacheslav Dolganov datelined "1754 Hours Moscow Time": "Sunday—a Rest Day"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] So 25 February finally arrived. Many of us came into the editorial offices after having walked around our neighborhood, street, or housing development. IZVESTIYA's own correspondents began filing their reports on the situation in other cities by teletype and other channels of communications. The first to come through were Boris Reznik in Khabarovsk and Yuriy Balakirev in Vladivostok. On the whole evrything is calm and within the law, they reported. Considering that the rallies are taking place on the eve of the Supreme Soviet and local elections in the Russian Federation (this was mainly the reason for gatherings in a number of other republics and regions), many speakers criticized local authorities and central departments for the slow rate of development in the economy and the social sphere and even for direct violations of their official responsibilities.

As the hours passed the reports shifted westward across the various time zones.

Aleksandr Solovyev, Tomsk: "Sensible ideas on ways to extricate the oblast from its socioeconomic crisis and proposals to democratically pool the efforts of all existing groups and organizations in order to really implement the principles of self-management and self-financing of the region came through increasingly forcibly at the rally."

Georgiy Shcherbina, Chelyabinsk: "Sense predominated over emotions. We realized that life would not by improved one iota by loud shouts into a microphone. People spoke in a businesslike and sensible manner about democratizing the paty and eliminating monopolism in politics, proposed ways to better organize the work of the renewed soviets, and spoke about the need to resolve all the problems that have accumulated in the country solely by parliamentary means."

Aleksandr Zinovyev, Ufa: "Many speakers sharply criticized the leaders of the Bashkir Oblast party commitee and the autonomous republic's Council of Ministers for failures in the development of the region and the exacerbated ecological situation. The rally was well organized and ended with its participants moving in a column through the city's central streets."

I could continue this list of reports ad infinitum. There is very little to distinguish one from another. Although, to be honest, there was more than enough strident demagoguery in some cities. It is gratifying that in some places representatives of the highest republic-level authorities or other local authorities did come out to address the people personally. In Frunze, as our own correspondent Gennadiy Shipitko, also a USSR people's deputy, reported, a meeting took place between the republic's leaders and the public on 24 February in the capital's Palace of Sport. The Kharkov City Soviet Executive Committee gathered tens of thousands of people together for a citywide dialogue, "Civic Accord." The city party committee and oblast Komsomol [Communist Youth League] committee, oblast trade union council, and the informal association "Anti-Bureaucracy Center" initiated a rally in Ulyanovka....

These reports draw special attention: People are moving away from confrontation and antagonism toward dialogue, looking for sensible, effective solutions, and ceasing to split up into different groups. The democratic movement in our country can only be a general, nationwide movement, without the dangerous division—well known in our history—into "us" and "them," "friends of the people" and "enemies of the people." We have had enough of this destructive approach. We really have had enough. It provides no real basis, no real foundation. It has long been the case throughout the entire civilized world that nothing can be built from the fragments of shattered human destinies and broken bricks.

Let us ask ourselves one question more and more often (ideally, we should ask ourselves this question constantly): Where are we directing our political activity and our thirst for freedom and change and why? Are we going to build a society that has everything we need? Or are we going to continue to destroy it? What else is there that we can destroy anyway in our poor home? Alright, suppose we do continue with our destruction: What then? Most important of all, what is the point...?

It seems to me that everyone, literally everyone must answer this question for himself frankly and honestly, without deceiving himself. Certainly not only and not so much in the turbulent atmosphere of a rally: There different psychological laws and different elements prevail. There it is hard to show that you are an individual, a person with your own original thoughts and opinions. I personally hold the view that we are at present acutely short of the kind of personalities and the kind of collective intellect made up of these personalities (and only of them—not some faceless "popular masses"!) that are capable of RADICAL CREATIVITY, as well as being acutely short of a collective mind. For this reason I am equally highly skeptical of appeals to immediately take to the streets and squares and of the people who see these appeals as nothing other than "extremist intrigues." Just stop and think for a moment about what is really happening. And ponder the question of whether there is any great difference between the label "opponents of transformations" (generously exchanged by social groups that are polar opposites) and the well known nuance "enemies of the people?" Are we really going to seek out one or the other again and again as the "class" struggle—forgive me, the restructuring struggle—"intensifies?" Only a poor harvest can be reaped from this kind of soil.

I think that many local representatives of power should think about this, too. As our own correspondents have shown, not many of them ventured to go out and address the rally participants. Some of those who did make up their minds to do so, began their speeches with accusations and "intimidation" and avoided sharp corners and their own mistakes.

Yes, it is easier to hide behind the "center." It is easier to sit it out and wait and see what direction events take or could take, so as not miss out when the "pies are handed out." Only, no pies or anything else grow on trees. Work is what is needed. Intellect, sharp wits, and eagerness, of course, are needed in everything.

...The Moscow correspondents were the last to come back from the rallies. In the capital, of course, there was a lot more going on. Some 50-60,000 people (these are our own estimates: The rally organizers can agree or disagree with us) listened to calls to "boycott the 4 March elections," intimidating warnings of "a dictatorship close at hand," the usual criticism addressed to the "partocracy," and unusual—and, we will be frank, disgraceful—accusations against the USSR Supreme Soviet. Evidently some of our compatriots are still finding it hard to learn to show respect to legally elected authority.

In conclusion, I will add that at the point when the newspaper was signed to press, the mass political actions in the capital had not gone beyond the limits of the law and had not, to use official language, prompted any excesses.

We are causing a stir, brothers, causing a stir....

Goals, Slogans of Rally Cited

PM2402154890 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed roundup: "What They Told Us About the Rally..."]

[Text]

...At Moscow City Soviet

"The Moscow Voters' Association submitted an application to Moscow City Soviet to hold a rally in Manezhnaya Square on 25 February. The following were mentioned among the main aims of the rally: Support for candidate people's deputies from the 'Democratic Russia' bloc, discussion of election platforms, evaluation of the present state of affairs in the country. The rally organizers also stated that they take responsibility for the safety of participants in the rally. Their application was examined on 21 February with the participation of representatives of Moscow City Internal Affairs Administration and USSR People's Deputy S. Stankevich. We explained that Manezhnaya Square simply is not big enough to accommodate all those wishing to attend, and gave permission for two rallies: alongside Gorkiy Park and in Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square. There is more room there..."

P.S.: Moscow City Soviet reminded us once again that the USSR Supreme Soviet has instructed local soviets of people's deputies to take all necessary measures to safeguard law and order.

...At the Ministry of Internal Affairs

"Our ministry is taking all necessary measures. Duties have been stepped up and the number of militia details increased."

...At the Coordinating Committee

"We approve Moscow City Soviet's decision to authorize the rally," USSR People's Deputy G.Kh. Popov said, "And we share the concern expressed in the USSR

Supreme Soviet and CPSU Central Committee statements to the effect that extremists could join the demonstrators. There is a great danger that conservative forces will join forces with thugs, sensing their coming defeat in the elections. But we will not allow a handful of provocateurs to terrorize the population.

"The rally has two main slogans: 'For the victory of democratic forces in the 4 March elections!' and 'Unification of democratic forces roundtable of supporters of perestroyka.'

"As for the rumors about plots of some kind and the desire to overthrow the authorities—that is ridiculous. I believe a normal democratic process is taking place here, and we have the strength to continue the process of transferring power to the soviets by peaceful means, without a revolution."

Some Rallies Cancelled Due to 'Rumors'

PM2402183890 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed roundup of correspondents' reports: "Beware: Provocations and Rumors Possible"]

[Text] It was not we who said it: There is no such thing as a good rumor. All rumors are harmful.

Our own correspondents' reports are similar in many ways.

Gennadiy Sapronov, Irkutsk: "A rumor about forthcoming 'hooliganism' has been spreading for a week. At the city's 'Elections-90' social committee, representatives of law enforcement organs, scientists, workers, journalists, military men (all of them candidate deputies), and members of the rally preparation team are considering in detail the organization of the rally. The rumors (if only one could find the source!) are hampering them."

Boris Vishnevskiy, Chita: "Rumors are flying. Even the watchmen at the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] obkom [oblast committee] decided to demand 'combat reinforcements.' Laughable, and a pity. The competent organs assured me that there are no forces in the city capable of mass provocations. Although on 14 February Party Obkom Secretary V. Sosnin informed representatives of the press about 'a plot by destructive forces.'"

The Chita People's Front has canceled a rally—against the background of rumors, the slightest incident will be turned against the rally organizers and "left-wing forces" and will serve as justification for those who are whipping up tension.

The same decision was taken by the Leningrad People's Front Coordinating Council, Irina Potekhina reports. In present conditions the Leningrad People's Front decided that the city's tranquillity is far more important than any political moves.

A similar decision, judging by the words of I. Sychev, leader of the national-patriotic front "Pamyat," was taken by that organization and by the Russian People's Front. "We do not want to inflame the situation."

A number of labor collectives in Moscow—the No. 1 State Bearings Plant, the tire plant, and others—decided not to go out into the streets on Sunday, a TASS correspondent reports.

The Don People's Front in Rostov has also adopted a decision to revoke its application for a rally, Yuriy Bespalov reported to the editorial office. The situation in Rostov is similar to that in Chita and Irkutsk.

In the light of all this, we wonder: Is it not time to study the mechanism by which rumors arise?

Komsomol Statement on Rallies

PM2302164590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 1

["Komsomol Central Committee Bureau Statement"]

[Text] In connection with the proposed holding of rallies and demonstrations 25 February in Moscow and other cities in the country, understanding the possible consequences of political confrontation in a situation of profound socioeconomic crisis and exacerbated interethnic relations, and bearing in mind the great probability of exploitation of peaceful popular demonstrations by conservative and antiperestroyka forces on the one hand and extremists on the other,

The Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Bureau deems it necessary to state:

—the sluggishness in the CPSU Central Committee's activity and the unwillingness of the USSR Supreme Soviet and leaders of the new political movements and associations—the inter-regional deputies' group, the "Democratic Russia" bloc, the United Front of Working People, and others—to listen to and hear one another and seek paths to civil peace and harmony are destabilizing the political situation in the country and creating conditions for new outbursts of social unrest;

—the path of mutual recriminations has shown itself to be completely hopeless;

—the USSR Supreme Soviet statement shows that the Supreme Soviet fears for people's security and that it fears possible displays of extremism. It can be supposed that, as has already happened frequently, the victims of the social and national conflicts may again be young people, including those who are carrying out their official duty in enforcing social order;

—in order to hear and understand one another, there is no need to wait for thousands of people to come out on the streets.

We propose that the country's leadership, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the CPSU Central Committee, and all constructive political movements and associations:

—urgently start open and frank dialogue at the negotiating table and start a search for a solution to our economic and political problems by civilized and democratic methods;

—that every participant in the dialogue appeal to his supporters for tolerance and reason;

—that people's deputies appeal to their electorate and USSR Supreme Soviet members to urgently discuss and, in conjunction with the government, adopt measures that are capable of ensuring the protection of citizens' lives, property, and personal dignity.

Today we are all responsible for preventing violence and bloodshed and stopping the increased distrust for the future, bitterness, and fear for the lives of friends and relatives.

The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau appeals to all members of our union and to young people, regardless of the diversity of their philosophies, political sympathies, and membership in organizations and informal groups, to unite in the effort to achieve a humane, democratic socialism. When you participate in rallies and demonstrations for the protection of perestroyka and democracy, do not give in extremists' appeals.

We support civic peace!

No to confrontation! Yes to constructive dialogue between all political forces on the road to profound and radical democratic changes! All power to the soviets of people's deputies!

Prokofyev Views Rally Plans

PM2402170090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee, by A. Gamov: "Showing Restraint"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Text] [Gamov] Yuriy Anatolyevich, how would you describe, in general, the situation taking shape in the capital during these worrying days?

[Prokovyev] I would not describe these days as worrying. I would rather say that they are more hectic than usual. Today we are living in the conditions of pluralism of opinion, with various political currents developing their turbulent activity. There is a particularly large number of them in Moscow; the entire spectrum of informal movements is represented here. In all, the city has on the order of 150 politicized associations.

As for some of their programs, to some extent these coincide with the CPSU's political programs and the platform of the city party committee [gorkom]. True, these movements have their distinctive features. Without having a more constructive program than the party, they try to obtain support and win prestige among the population by means of pressure on public awareness, making use of rallies and demonstrations to this end, and this cannot but cause concern.

[Gamov] People are currently talking and writing a great deal about the rallies and demonstrations planned for 25 February. Unfortunately, rumors are also circulating in the city about the conflicts, clashes, and even pogroms that are allegedly being planned. What can you tell us about that?

[Prokovyev] Unfortunately, some people are indeed spreading such rumors. When I was on my way to work this morning, two women came up to me in the yard and asked: "What is happening in the city? Will it be possible to go out into the street on Sunday?" I tried to dispel these fears. Apparently some people simply find it to their advantage to whip up such feelings. An atmosphere of fear and suspicion makes it easier to carry out various kinds of provocative actions.

As for the rallies and demonstrations planned for 25 February, these actions, as I understand it, pursue three objectives. First, the organizers intend to support their candidate people's deputies. Well, that is a good thing. But there are other ways of doing that—election meetings, work with voters in the neighborhoods. It is hardly necessary to hold rallies for this purpose.

Another objective is the discussion of questions connected with the activity of the interregional deputies' group. Yet the rally organizers, who include USSR People's Deputies G.Kh. Popov and Yu.N. Afanasyev, have the opportunity to use a unionwide platform to expound their views—Central Television shows extensively all the debates held at the USSR Supreme Soviet and congresses.

The third objective pursued by the demonstrators is, as they put it, to defend USSR People's Deputies T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov. As you know, at the Congress of People's Deputies a parliamentary commission was set up to investigate facts relating to the activity of the investigation group. I believe the commission is working competently and approaching a resolution of the question in an unprejudiced way. Should rallies and demonstrations be used to exert moral pressure on it?

I am sure that all these problems that are being raised at the Moscow rally could, and indeed should, be resolved by other means. After all, it is not reason, but feelings that prevail at rallies. I would like once again to tell Muscovites and our city's guests that in general the rumors are only rumors, and that the law enforcement organs do not have any information to confirm the presence in the city of extremist groupings, including armed groupings, which are allegedly planning to perpetrate pogroms. Furthermore I consider it my duty to report that subunits of the internal affairs organs have been placed in the necessary condition to ensure order in the city.

[Gamov] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA the other day published a telegram signed by the leadership of the "United Council of Russia" association, which incorporates numerous social organizations who, having themselves renounced the holding of mass actions, called on their compatriots, in order to avoid mass disturbances on the part of extremists and lawbreakers, not to participate in the demonstrations and rallies scheduled for 25 February. How do you assess this step?

[Prokovyev] As a manifestation of high civic maturity. We are very grateful to the "United Council of Russia" for this.

I would like to observe in passing that mass actions on the scale planned for Sunday, apart from anything else, do enormous material damage to the city's economy. It is necessary to change public transport routes, close stores along the route of the columns of demonstrators, and divert vast forces of the law enforcement organs to ensure order. The associated costs are a heavy burden on the city's budget. After all, the organizers of rallies and demonstrations do not pay these costs!

[Gamov] Are the Moscow party gorkom, the rayon party committees, and the capital's communists preparing to take part in the coming events?

[Prokovyev] At many enterprises, in particular the Moscow Shipbuilding Plant, rallies have been held in recent days in support of the CPSU Central Committee appeal and the USSR Supreme Soviet statement, and considerable explanatory work is taking place in the collectives. On Sunday communists and party workers will also come out into the city's streets. Alongside the informal organizations' printed matter, pamphlets from the party gorkom calling for the observance of order and the consolidation of all healthy forces will be distributed among the participants in the action.

25 February Rallies Previewed

PM2302162990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Roundup of reports from correspondents A. Gamov in Moscow, A. Molokov in Leningrad, V. Cherkasov in Volgograd, and D. Usachev in Sverdlovsk: "On the Eve of the Events: 25 February— Within the Bounds of the Law and Good Sense"]

[Text] The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA editorial office has received quite a few anxious telephone calls in recent days. Our readers express their disquiet concerning the rallies and demonstrations scheduled to take place in a number of cities on Sunday, 25 February, and ask for the aims and content of the proposed actions to be described as well as how law and order will be maintained. We today publish our correspondents' reports on the upcoming events.

Moscow

The session held last Wednesday might with full justification be described as extraordinary and unprecedented. Formally it was reminiscent rather of a discussion. There has perhaps never before been an occasion when a statement by a new social organization has been discussed in the presence of its representatives in such a detailed and scrupulous way for 2 and ½ hours in the Moscow City Soviet. On this occasion the statement came from the Moscow Voters' Association [MVA], which gave notice of its intention to hold a political demonstration in the capital in support of people's deputy candidates from the Democratic Russia bloc on 25 February. What was it that generated such heated debate?

"In principle we have nothing against such actions, which have already become traditional here," Yu.A. Vinogradov, secretary of the Moscow Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], told those present. "Certain disagreements with the petitioners have arisen over where they wish to hold the demonstration and rally. In order to ensure observance of security measures—a large gathering of the people is intended—we deemed it advisable to use Luzhniki Stadium—which is already 'tried and tested,' as it were—for these purposes. But that option was rejected. Another proposal was then made, namely that the event be held at Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square."

It was precisely around this issue that the argument basically developed. Nevertheless the lively participation in it of MVA representatives did lend the discussion of this difficult issue a constructive character.

"It is estimated that up to 300,000 people will turn out for the demonstration and rallies," MVA member V.F. Komchatov stated. "The possibility of conflict and provocation from extremist elements is naturally bound to concern us, too. But we hope that, in conjunction with the Moscow Gorispolkom and the Main Administration of Internal Affairs, we will be able to avoid undesirable excesses. We assume personal responsibility for observance of order during the conduct of the rallies and demonstration."

And yet, as was observed at the session, great responsibility for the outcome of the planned events does lie with the Moscow Gorispolkom and the law-enforcement agencies. How do they intend to organize their work this coming Sunday?

V.T. Saykin, chairman of the Moscow Gorispolkom, noted that it had been decided to operate all the city services as normal on Sunday, as is usually done on holidays. After the plan for the movement of the columns of demonstrators has been finally worked out the trade organization system will be altered and the sale of certain kinds of goods will have to be suspended for a while. Measures are being taken to ensure the normal functioning of the city's economic life.

"As the leader of the Moscow militia I would like to state that all our personnel, including administration apparatus officers, will be at their posts on 25 February," P.S. Bogdanov, chief of the Moscow Gorispolkom City Administration of Internal Affairs, said. "I think that we all have the time and the opportunity to ensure the well-organized conduct of the upcoming events. We should do our utmost to prevent any unforeseen situations occurring. If, however, they do arise, resolute measures will be taken."

The discussion at the gorispolkom session went beyond problems affecting just the upcoming demonstration. The following question, in particular, was raised: Haven't we perhaps become too carried away by rallies? Without denying the positive aspects of such actions, the gorispolkom members did acknowledge at the same time that they do cost the city exchequer a pretty penny. And the processions are inordinately large in scale. As P.S. Bogdanov observed, the costs involved in protecting law and order just in respect of the City Administration of Internal Affairs during the previous demonstration, on 4 February, came to 120,000 rubles [R]. It is now intended to treble the size of the militia contingent where Sunday's events are to be held; in other words, the costs will be even higher. Certain sections of the city, where the crime situation remains pretty bad, will have to be left exposed for a while. Moreover, as a result of the change in the city transport schedule and the suspension of trade in certain goods the losses, according to expert assessments, will amount to R20 million.

USSR People's Deputy S.V. Stankevich, who attended the session, remarked that Moscow has now amassed unique experience in holding mass actions amidst a pretty complex situation within the city. He requested in this respect that the Moscow Gorispolkom send proposals to the appropriate USSR Supreme Soviet committee to ensure that they are taken into account during the drafting of the Law on Rallies, Processions, and Demonstrations.

"That draft document has included, in particular, a provision whereby if unlawful acts occur and slogans contrary to the law appear during a rally, that event is to be suspended and its organizers must take immediate measures to eliminate the infringements of the law," S.B. Stankevich reported. "Only then can it be continued. I think that right now, even though the law has not yet been adopted, we can express our wishes to the organizers of the upcoming actions so that they act in conformity with these norms."

While sanctioning the rallies and demonstrations the Moscow Gorispolkom did warn their organizers that they should be conducted in line with the aims indicated in the statement and in the places and at the times fixed. These requirements are in full accord with current legislation. Note was taken of the statement by the organizers of the events that they will be taking all necessary measures to prevent any aggravation of social tension or manifestations of extremism in the light of the well-known USSR Supreme Soviet statement.

Leningrad

As V. Rogovtsev, first deputy chairman of the Leningrad Gorisipolkom reported, the main thing that the Leningrad Soviet has managed to achieve during its term of office is to maintain calm in the city and ensure the normal operation of enterprises and organizations. However, some people are put out, even annoyed by this situation.

This prompts the thought that certain groups of people who are uncertain of getting the election result that they want are seeking to exert psychological pressure on Leningraders and are ready to violate the democratic principles governing the formation of soviets. That is how we regard the action—a procession to Dvortsovaya Square and a rally—planned by informal organizations and also registered organizations (the Democratic Union, Memorial, the Leningrad People's Front, Peace Watch, and so forth), V. Rogovtsev stated. And therefore at its 21 February session the Leningrad Gorispolkom adopted a decision to ban the holding of the demonstrations and subsequent rally on Dvortsovaya Square in the light of the interests of securing order in the city for the overwhemlming majority of its inhabitants and based on the legal rights invested in it. However, mindful that voters and candidate deputies do wish to express their opinions, share their opinions, and talk about their programs, the Leningrad Gorsipolkom proposed to the initiators of the action that the rally be held the same day at the V.I. Lenin Sports and Concert Complex, the traditional venue for such mass events. The organizers of the "25 February action" have been officially warned of their responsibility for any violation of the set procedure governing the organization and holding of rallies and other mass events.

Volgograd

Fairs will be held on Sunday in all the oblast's cities and rayon centers. The people are bidding farewell to the Russian winter and celebrating Shrovetide. Hundreds of amateur artistic collectives are now ready to display their artistry at this festival. Trade workers, cooperative members, and collective farm members will set up colorful stalls at markets and in squares.

As far as a rally in Volgograd is concerned, the city's Tsentralnyy Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] has sanctioned one such at the request of V. Kritskiy, chairman of the rayon public committee of voters. The rally's aim is the acceleration of perestroyka, humane socialism, and a rule-of-law state. The square in front of the House of Youth has been allocated as the venue for the gathering.

This clearly does not suit the rally organizers. They are eager for a city center venue. Placards and slogans in defense of democracy and perestroyka were put up without prior permission at the Officers' House, Lenin

Square, back on Wednesday. That is to say, the organizers are planning to hold an unsanctioned rally and procession.

Sverdlovsk

The aims and tasks of the upcoming rally were described by D.A. Khalyapin, cochairman of the Citizens' Initiative association.

"On 25 February Sverdlovsk's inhabitants intend to support the democratic transformations in the country and help activate voters in the runup to the election of RSFSR and local soviet people's deputies. The idea of holding a special kind of rally emerged during dialogue with the gorispolkom. Initially each population group will hold preliminary, local rallies, as they have been called, at their assembly points. They will then move off toward the square in front of the city soviet. We are faced with the task of preventing any crushing, route violations, or major deviations from the timetable set by the organizing committee. It is necessary to be ready to counter any attempts to storm the city soviet building or other establishments. We democratic movements have to neutralize those hooligans who are capable of committing extreme acts under the informal flag. No democracy is worth even a drop of human blood."

Alarm was expressed by N.A. Voronin, deputy chairman of the Sverdlovsk Gorispolkom:

"Not everything is so simple. On the one hand, the initiators of the rally are pursuing noble ends: activating the electorate and discussing specific ways of democratization. That can only be welcomed. On the other hand, there are forces operating which would like to exploit the mass event for their own narrow interests—to win a big name for themselves and indulge in confrontation if only to ensure that they emerge among the victors on 4 March. Various rumors and conjectures are circulating; for example, that someone is telling the leaders of study groups and sections that they should bring their children to the rally after classes. Children should not be there at all, or do some people want to shelter behind children to commit antisocial acts? Slogans along the lines of "Down with communists!" and "Smash the party and soviet bureaucrats!" are being gotten ready. Hence our concern regarding the safeguarding of order. And we entered into dialogue with the rally organizers so that they should feel a sense of responsibility for ensuring that the rally passes without unwanted excesses and is unmarred by violence."

Today's Telegram

The editorial office has received a telegram signed by the leadership of the United Council of Russia, which includes numerous public organizations that favor Russian revival, which says that "after discussing the USSR Supreme Soviet Statement of 20 February 1990, the United Council of Russia (People's Accord) association, the Society of Russian Artists, and the Foundation for the Restoration of the Church of Christ the Savior, urge their compatriots to avoid mass disorders by extremists and lawbreakers and to refrain from taking part in the demonstrations and rallies planned for 25 February in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities in the country."

Planned Demonstrations Criticized

PM2302160190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[S. Karkhanin "Political Observer's Notes" under the rubric "Debates in The Kremlin": "Position and Ambitions"]

[Text] At the chambers' 20 February joint sitting, after turbulent debates, the USSR Supreme Soviet session basically approved the second reading of the draft Law on Land. The document has been referred to the deputies' committees and commissions for final work. After this decision was adopted, N. Pivovarov, chairman of the deputies' Committee for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies, asked to speak. He read out the text of a statement about planned rallies and demonstrations, and this was also adopted by the session's participants.

Admittedly, the question posed from the floor by one of the people's deputies remained virtually unanswered: Who precisely is calling for a mass demonstration 25 February and to what end? Leaflets containing these appeals were even distributed in the Supreme Soviet hall, and, what is more, it is not known by whom. They are appearing in many cities along with various sometimes inflammatory rumors, judging by the telegrams and telephone calls from agitated readers.

Of course, rallies and street marches in themselves are no longer a sensation, but demagoguery sometimes still clouds people's minds. This is why people want clarity about who is trying to exploit their political activeness and to what ends.

There is a clear answer in the Italian newspaper IL MESSAGGERO, which published an interview with the economist G. Popov and the historian Yu. Afanasyev. According to them, on 25 February in all Soviet cities "there will be mass demonstrations demanding that a 'roundtable' be held with the participation of the country's democratic forces. On the evening of the same day there will be a final demonstration, after which an action committee will be immediately elected." What are the organizers trying to achieve when the CPSU Central Committee Plenum spoke out clearly about Article 6 of the Constitution, the article which has probably caused the greatest fuss at rallies? It appears that a review of Article 6 is not enough for the leaders of the forces which call themselves "democratic": Appetite, so to speak, comes with eating. One more quotation from the interview: "Afanasyev: It is easy to delete a paragraph from the Constitution. But this is not enough. It is necessary to eliminate party organizations at plants, in the army, in ministries, and to abolish the practice whereby only those who have a party card can occupy official posts."

This should be understood as meaning that those who go out into the streets 25 February will have to demand that primary party organizations be disbanded.... Of course, the leaders of the Interregional Deputies Group did not think up the project of pitting communists against nonparty people only yesterday. But, it seems this is the first time that it has been unequivocally formulated. You cannot deny that they are consistent—the Interregional Deputies Group document "On Perestroyka Today and in the Foreseeable Future" circulated at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies noted that the group is keeping in its arsenal, "when necessary, emergency actions in which millions of people participate." Thus the aim of the planned "action" is to create a power vacuum and to clear a springboard for those figures who intend to subject to their influence worker, army, and management collectives to give free play to their personal ambitions.

To fight for political prestige in these collectives is too much trouble for the newfound influential leaders, and people in neither shops nor battalions are awaiting them. Zh. Mordval, a heat treater at the Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant, wrote about this to the editorial office: His comrades in the automotive industry are ready to join the party at a difficult time for it and will not allow the CPSU to be broken up. "My entire experience of life enables me to say that we ordinary people can find support only from the Communist Party, we will scarcely be needed by other parties," R. Podpryatova from Irkutsk is convinced. There are hundreds of these letters: Their authors realize that "rocking the boat" now is by no means a harmless pastime. Each blow to the existing power structures is a nudge toward economic and political confusion, disorder, and total license.

Disorder is advantageous only to those who intend to fish in troubled waters. Yet again, fanning people's discontent by fair means or foul and with the aid of blatant slogans, the adherents of "terrorist radicalism" intend to seek allies in the streets. Dissenting voices are not listened to at rallies, and the usual idlers are among the demonstrators.... But as a result, be that as it may, an illusion that public opinion is in complete solidarity with the party's opponents emerges.

As is well known, Yu. Afanasyev and G. Popov are USSR people's deputies. But what do the other participants in the present Supreme Soviet session think about their appeals?

P. Kazachenko, chairman of the "Voskhod" Kolkhoz in Tula Oblast:

"Through the examples of Azerbaijan and Dushanbe we have seen how successfully those who want to shed blood, to settle personal scores, or simply to rob take advantage of the authorities' indecisiveness and any disorder.... It doesn't take much of a spark for a fierce conflict to flare up. As a member of the Supreme Soviet I think that the reform process which is now gathering momentum must not be urged along by force. Calm and common sense are needed. Otherwise follies may be committed which it will scarcely be possible to rectify later. In general, I would call the appeals in question dangerous adventurism. This may lead to unpredictable consequences, and even casualties cannot be ruled out."

A. Korshunov, an aircraft industry worker:

"I have old files of OGONEK from the 1930's. To tell the truth some of the present rallies remind me of the 'expressions of the people's will' described in the journal, as a result of which there were mass repressions. Unfortunately, there is no hint of pluralism at the rallies now. There people are allowed to say only what is specified and approved by the 'producers.' It is impossible to make a constructive decision under pressure from a rally. Even our second congress, which brought together 2,000 deputies concerned with the grievances and problems of their own regions, found it extremely difficult to work. How can we get to the truth here and reach a common denominator? Incidentally, if the people who are calling for a demonstration on 25 February came to agitate at our plant, my comrades would certainly ask: But what are the agitators really proposing instead of party organizations? Their own power? Why should we be sure that it will be better than the present? Yes, the party has committed many faults before society, but it is renewing itself. Incidentally, in Romania, which is being discussed a lot at the rallies, 60,000 people died—there is nothing to envy there.... I regard the appeal for a demonstration as an attempt to torpedo our Supreme Soviet's work, and mainly as a desire, regardless of everything, to grab power at a time when discontent and chaos are being stirred up in society. I think that a USSR people's deputy should defend his own ideas here, in the Supreme Soviet, and not in the streets. But if a deputy, a representative of the supreme organ of power, appeals for those in power to be overthrown—and this is precisely how I assess the recent statements by certain activists in the interregional group—then, in my view, it would be more honest for him to resign straight away."

So, how will each of us react 25 February? Naturally, each will decide for himself, based on his own convictions and conscience. But perhaps it makes sense to listen to what Supreme Soviet members are saying. There is plenty to think about here.

Rallies Seen Portending 'Coups'

PM2402215090 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 1

[Yuriy Kurbatov article under the rubric "Journalist's Notes": "Rally Syndrome"]

[Text] Moscow is in the grip of rumors that leave citizens beside themselves. This Sunday, many people have canceled their usual trips downtown. Some people are hurrying to the theater box offices to hand back the tickets they bought earlier. Optimism was by no means boosted by the statement published by the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning the call by a number of social organizations and movements for demonstrations and rallies on 25 February in Moscow, Leningrad, and other major centers in the country. The statement contains an undisguised hint of speedy and resolute measures if...

To be honest, I do not like to think about that "if." But what can you do? The tragic events in Tbilisi, Baku, and Dushanbe are fresh in all our memories. There it all began with rallies and ended with much bloodshed and tragedy for innocent people.

Whatever we may say, a wave of rallies has swept over the country. Even the heated debates in our parliament about land and ownership have receded somewhere into the background.

We spent too long learning to chant what we were allowed to chant: "The five-year plan in four years!", "We wholeheartedly approve and support..."

Today, along with the anxious, insistent cry "Let us defend perestroyka!", people are also shouting: "Whose side are you on, Gorbachev?" and "Soviets without Communists!" These slogans, straight from the shoulder, are seductive and inflammatory primarily by virtue of their concreteness and their dissidence, which is more ostensible than real.

Paradoxically, despite being diametrically opposite, those loyal slogans of the past and today's extremist ones seem similar in their declarative and unsubstantiated nature, in their demagogic basis.

I think this is why: The more mud a particular orator slings at the party, the state, and the apparatchiks, the more applause he gets and the bigger he grows in the eyes of the crowd. And, of course, in his own eyes. And woe betide anyone who tries to prove the opposite, who goes against the majority at the rally: He is drowned out, slow-handclapped, or simply removed from the platform. Those, unfortunately, are the laws of street democracy. They mirror the "laws" that reigned in the days of stagnation. And even before... Some orators, who have by now become professionals, have adapted well to these conditions. But listen to their speeches, and you will sense an undisguised hatred of everything we created by our own hands, everything we paid for with millions of human lives; and a barely concealed contempt for the crowd, for the "herd," can be glimpsed in their ability to play on the feelings of that crowd, feelings which, for the time being, they are forced to reckon with. Sometimes you wonder what will become of us if these "fighters" for democracy and social justice ever seize power, God forbid.

Why is it that some rallies end with common or garden brawling, window-breaking, robbery, and violence? It is merely because our political ethics have not moved far since the times of Peter the Great. Fist democracy is so deeply entrenched in every one of us that it will take a good deal more time before we emerge from the political middle ages onto the path of true, civilized democracy. But some rally organizers are not in the least worried about these problems. The most important thing for them is to have as much noise, shouting, and ordinary bad language as possible. This could be disregarded, were it not for one "but." This "but" is that rallies have become, for us, virtually the only (for we have not yet been taught another) form of political struggle for power.

It was not only in the bloody years of Stalinism, but even in not so remote times that we had considerable success in the struggle against dissidence and freethinking. But even then it was clear that political and spiritual terror could not last forever. The political spring flood that has burst forth into the streets of our cities could have been expected. But like any spring flood, it not only carries away everything old and dead, but also sweeps away bridges, destroys homes, and erodes the banks. We felt its devastating force last year during the miners' strikes, which were a serious blow against our already ailing economy. Today's rally storm is whipping up to the limits an already heated political situation in society, at the risk of unpredictable consequences.

How many times, at these "parliamentary" debates in the streets, have we heard a categorical cry of "Resign!" And people resign. Here an obkom [oblast party committee] first secretary or an oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] chairman resigns; there, the entire bureau. Something else that happens is that people try to relinquish their party post beforehand—for reasons of health or retirement on pension. It is not only those who are compromised in the eyes of their fellow citizens who resign, but often efficient workers too. This phenomenon must be pondered and interpreted. Personally, I think that some of our party workers are losing their nerve in the face of the pressure of spontaneous forces. In the past, circumstances never required them to show a true sense of civic duty or political courage. An atmosphere of universal unity and benevolence created not fighters, but viceroys, to whom the oblast or republican throne was handed down, as it were, on a hereditary basis, in perpetuity. Perhaps that is why we so rarely see city or oblast leaders on the platforms at rallies, why we do not hear their voices, and you will not come across Central Committee members or state leaders there, either.

I think it is obvious to everyone by now that a direct and frank dialogue between party leaders and government members and the people is needed. You cannot sit it out behind the thickness of the Kremlin walls and keep quiet at a time when demagogues and political adventurists of various hues are trying to lead people astray, turn the people against the party, and counterpose rally anarchy to state power. You cannot evade an open struggle today. After all, let us not close our eyes to the fact that a fierce struggle for power, for our future, is taking place on the barricades at the rallies. And I believe that that is why the organizers launched today's rallies. It was no accident that the organizers planned them for the week before the elections to republican and local organs of power. I do not want to make any prophecies, but it looks as if they were conceived as a final review of forces, a kind of rehearsal for future coups, one more opportunity to put pressure on the country's leadership and turn perestroyka in the direction that certain forces want, or knock it off course entirely. I think one of the organizers' main hopes is to "play on the psychology" of the unsophisticated voter: Look, see what a force we are, vote for us, you will not be making a mistake.

The seriousness of the present situation is also indicated by the CPSU Central Committee appeal to the country's working people. It calls for the consolidation of all our society's healthy forces, common sense and responsibility, a resolute rebuff. Today, when, in essence, the future of the motherland and all our gains is being decided, every honest citizen and patriot should assume a heavy burden of responsibility for the fate of the fatherland. Yes, we live in shameful poverty and discomfort. But we must resolve our own problems by thinking, not yelling. Assert our views, our position, with our actions, not our fisis. Demonstrate our loyalty to perestroyka with concrete steps. With concrete action at every workplace. To be frank, I can see no other way.

Moscow Radio Reportage on USSR Rallies

Rally Participants Interviewed

LD2502190390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Report by special correspondents Yuriy Korotkov and Sergey Omelchenk—not individually identified]

[Excerpts] Voters' meetings in which many thousands of people participated took place in Moscow today.

[First correspondent] By 1100 [0800 GMT], thousands of Muscovites had arrived at the Smolenskaya Ploshchad and at the entrance to the Gorkiy Central Culture and Recreation Park to participate in meetings in support of candidate people's deputies from the Democratic Russia bloc. Many of them carried posters with the slogans: Power according to merit, not by allocation! Vote for the Democratic Russia bloc! For new thinking in domestic policy! Full freedom for the democratic movement! People's power for Russia! Power to the soviets, not the departments!

[Second correspondent] In my view, however, there also have been destructive slogans, aimed at destruction and not at creating. As far as some people are concerned, despite everything they have failed to learn anything from the experience of our country's history. They are saying again that, to begin with, it is necessary to destroy everything and subsequently they have nothing to offer, as yet. Among the least offensive slogans were: Down with the partocracy dictatorship! Leaders, you have been bleeding dry those that feed you for long enough! Party: Make a break with the past!

[First correspondent] On the whole, however, people arrived to take part in the rally with an inner conviction and a desire to change our lives for the better. Here are several interviews:

Why did you come to this meeting?

[Begin recording] [First unidentified speaker] To build a democratic society.

[Second unidentified speaker] [passage omitted on his intentions to address the rally]

[Third unidentified speaker] For 70 years we all have been called to meetings. We used to follow orders and go, but now we go voluntarily. We know why we are going.

[Fourth unidentified speaker] It is an inner need, to be together with the people.

[Fifth unidentified speaker] We are students, hence the most active part of society. That is why we should be at the forefront. [end recording]

[Second correspondent] Those who addressed the rally spoke of many things, controversial at times, but they all were united by a desire to turn the process of democratization into a constructive and practical channel. (Boris Vasilyevich Rakitskiy), candidate people's deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, said:

[Begin (Rakitskiy) recording] We must develop a peaceful mechanism of perestroyka, we will set up mass political organizations and mass political parties that reflect our interests. In their platforms we will strive not for destructive but for creative slogans. Those who confine themselves to destruction will never gain the upper hand in the struggle with what belongs to the olden days. Only if we think of things that are new and flourishing will we be able to win an unconditional victory over what is old. Apart from good organization, we need to be vigilant. We must prevent further complications in our situation, which is complicated enough as it is. [applause] Let our revolution be a peaceful one! Let it proceed under these slogans: Peace to peoples! Peace to towns and villages! Peace to your home! Peace, peace, peace! [applause] [end recording]

[First correspondent] USSR people's deputy Aleksey Mikhaylovich Yemelyanov is at the microphone:

[Begin Yemelyanov recording] Currently it is only a powerful and popular movement which represents the sole guarantee of deepening our revolution. I admire you and your civic courage. It is not for the sake of idle curiosity that you have come here! You came here to express the view of the people, their steady resolve in the struggle for a revolutionary transformation of society. Our leaders must, I think, make use of this unique opportunity to be with the people. They must come to these rallies! [applause] In our strugle for democracy we must bring in democratically minded deputies on the fourth! [end recording]

[Second correspondent] Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR state nature committee, is speaking:

[Begin Vorontsov recording] The condition of our country's environment, the world's largest country, or that used to be clean in the recent past, represents a direct result of the administrative-edict system. I fully share the platform of the Democratic Russia bloc, and I want to say that if we fail to proceed along the path of further democratization, we will not even have a clean sky over our heads. [end recording]

[First correspondent] (Sergey Kuznetsov) voiced the most extremist appeals here at the rally: Not to take part in the elections to the soviets. However, he altogether failed to say what is supposed to happen after that. When the meeting was coming to a close, I became interested in what its participants thought of it.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified speaker] Well, I think the meeting is taking place in a rather organized manner, and all those rumors and intimidation are something that plays into the hands of forces that are not democratic. [passage omitted: other man-in-the-street interviews, saying that no concrete proposals were voiced, that the democratic forces have yet to find their specific identity, that the party must deal with ideological matters, as stated in its platform, and that commonalities must be sought in order to tackle problems. [end recording]

Various Cities Hold Rallies

LD2502201990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Rallies were held today in a number of cities around the country, where, for the most part, support for perestroyka and democratic transformations was heard.

In Minsk, an appeal expressing a lack of trust in the central electoral commission was adopted. It calls on the electorate to vote in the 14 March elections for candidates running on a democratic platform. A demand was made to declare Belorussia an ecological disaster zone.

The resolution made by the rally in Ulyanovsk stresses the importance of consolidating all levels of society for further democraticization.

In Leningrad, speeches were heard against the present political structures, as were accusations of incompetency against the Leningrad oblast CPSU committee and its first secretary. Calls for achieving independence for Russia were heard.

Those speaking at a meeting of many thousands in Sverdlovsk called for the unity of all democratic movements and for speedy, radical changes in economic and domestic policies. Words of protest were heard against introducing the institution of a presidency in the absence of the necessary democratic institutions and laws capable of limiting absolute power without a universal referendum. Those present demanded the resignation of the oblast CPSU committees.

Demands for the national independence of Georgia and a boycott of elections could be heard at a rally in Tbilisi.

The participants in a rally in Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy adopted a resolution expressing a lack of trust in the partocratic system of power.

The main theme in Cheboksary [Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] were ecological issues. The rally's participants adopted a resolution which, in part, expresses a lack of trust in the buro of the oblast CPSU committee, the autonomous republic's Council of Ministers, and the oblast trade unions. Their resignations and the convocation of an extraordinary report-back and election conference were demanded.

In Ufa, a rally passed off without particular emotion. Candidate people's deputies laid out their electoral platforms. Speakers demanded that the authorities pay attention to the disastrous state of the militia. Calls to consolidate the forces of perestroyka were heard.

In Kazan, the main theme of the speeches was the forthcoming election. Expressing a lack of trust in the oblast CPSU committee, the participants spoke in favor of creating an independent Tatar party organization, and voted against the construction of the Tatar nuclear electric power station.

Rallies also were held in Gorkiy, Omsk, Volgograd, Kubyshev, Saratov, and other cities throughout the country.

'Extremists' Cause Concern

LD2402220590 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] On Sunday rallies will be held in Moscow and throughout the Soviet Union in the run-up to the elections of republican parliaments and local councils. The contenders coming from various public movements will once again outline their platforms.

The rallies are expected to attract tens of thousands of people. However, concerns have been voiced that they may serve to extremists and criminal elements for provocation.

To prevent unrest a number of organizations have called on their supporters to stay away from the rallies. These include the Popular Front of Leningrad and several other major cities.

The leaders of the National Artistic Union have made a joint appeal to the population to refrain from massive street processions. The leading bureau of the Young Communist League has urged the young people to pool efforts for democratic socialism in defiance of extremist appeals.

The Soviet government has assigned the republican and local authorities to take appropriate steps to ensure order during the demonstrations.

Criticisms, Concerns Voiced at Rally

LD2502143790 Moscow World Service in English 1400 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Up to 500,000 Muscovites have taken part in a rally in a downtown Moscow square. [passage omitted on background of rally]

There were posters and slogans urging resolute measures to democratize society. Among the speakers were members of parliament Gavriil Popov, Yuriy Ryzhov, Yuriy Chernichenko, and Sergey Stankevich.

The speakers bitterly criticised the forces slowing down perestroyka. They censured actions by the extremists fanning up ethnic strife. Concern was voiced over the worsening of the country's economic situation, living standards deterioration, and the growing shortage of prime necessity goods and foodstuffs.

Alarm was expressed at mounting crime and the retention of the shadow economy. The member of parliament Yuriy Afanasyev, who made public a resolution backed up by participants in the rally, called on the leadership to press harder for drastic political and economic reforms.

Another resolution approved by the meeting supports the members of parliament Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, the investigators who had been investigating corruption in Uzbekistan but were dismissed from investigation at present.

Participants in the meeting also approved a resolution to democratize the Army and strengthen the unity of the people, Army, and law enforcement troops.

On the whole the keynote of the rally in Moscow was the democratic forces' determination to clos the ranks in the fight for perestroyka. The action took place in a calm atmosphere, thanks to the measures to maintain order in the city.

Moscow Demonstrations Previewed

LD2402144490 Moscow World Service in Russian 1032 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature]

[Text] The "Soviet chronicle" continues with material prepared by the independent news agency "INTERFAX."

According to information given to a correspondent of the agency, a mass rally in Moscow on 25 February will be attended primarily by those who support the democratic bloc of left-wing forces at the elections to be held on 4 March for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet and the Moscow city and rayon soviets. The principal organizer of the rally is the Moscow Association of voters.

According to the intention of the organizers, it will start at 1130 [local time] in two places simultaneously: In Krymskiy Val and in the vincinity of Ploshchad Vosstaniya. Candidate RSFSR people's deputies from the Democratic Russia bloc will speak at both venues. Each candidate deputy will be allotted one to one-and-a-half minutes for his address. Additionally, lists of all candidate RSFSR people's deputies and Moscow city soviet deputies from the Democratic Russia bloc standing in these constituencies will be read out. The expected duration of the separate rallies is 90 minutes.

Then those taking part in both rallies will move off toward one another, and, in a section of the Sadovoye Koltso, between Zubovskaya Ploshchad and Smolenskaya Ploshchad, they will hold a joint rally, which will be addressed, specifically, by the co- chairmen of the Interregional Deputies' group. The joint rally on 25 February will probably be conducted by USSR people's deputy Gavriil Popov.

Meetings Called 'Well-Organized'

LD2602093590 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Well-organized meetings in support of perestroyka and democratic changes attracted a great many people in a number of Soviet cities on Sunday.

Participants in a grandiose meeting in Moscow called for voting at the 4 March elections of people's deputies in the Russian Federation and local governing bodies for Democratic Russian candidates. Speakers said they believed further progress required a multiparty system. The idea of presidential rule in this country drew clashing opinions. It was pointed out that presidential elections had to be general and direct. MP Sergey Belozertsev, Economist Tatyana Karyagina and some others demanded resigning almost all the nation's governing bodies [as heard]; MP Yuriy Afanasyev read a resolution that drew support from the meeting participants. He urged the national leaders to press more energetically for drastic political and economic changes.

The meeting also adopted a resolution in support of investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov. Both had investigated a case of corruption in Uzbekistan and were later removed from that work.

The meeting ended on an emotional note, which was set by MP Sergey Stankevich. We are going to the elections, he said, with the clear understanding of a noble goal--to build a free, prosperous and democratic Russia.

Democratic reforms were also supported by the people of Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Kazan, Ulyanovsk, Gorkiy, and Ufa. Meetings in these and other cities took place under slogans of party renewal, full government for local governing bodies, and down with ethnic strife.

Moscow TV Reports on Rally Developments

Correspondent Interviews Organizer

LD2502174690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Report by correspondnet Sergey Medvedev; from the "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev]

[Text] [Sagalayev] Good evening. The hour for a review of the week's political events has arrived. Possibly the "Seven Days" program will go slightly beyond the bounds of pure information. After all, events do not exist outside history, outside actual people, and outside your and my attempts to comprehend what is going on.

It is for this very reason that I would like to say that today, the last Sunday of winter, according to the Christian calendar, is the Sunday of mutual forgiveness before Lent, and according to the Muslim calendar, the last days are passing before the New Year arrives on the first of March.

Forgive us for deciding to remind you about these simple and eternal circumstances of life which, in actual fact, are no less significant than the political spontaneity [stikhiya] that has gripped the whole country's attention.

For the most part, the week has passed relatively calmly, by the standards of the present troubled times, and in my opinion, it would have been even more calm if it were not for the uneasy expectation of numerous rallies fixed for 25 February which have been flying around the public atmosphere.

Conversations and publications have predicted a very wide range of events, from a peaceful February revolution to political demogogy, extremism, and open provocations. Well, up to this hour, as far as we are aware, nothing unusual has happened in the country. In two hours, a sanctioned rally will begin in Moscow. Our television cameras are set up at various points of the capital. Now, I will ask "Seven Days" Correspondent Sergey Medvedev to come directly on the air and recount what is happening now on the squares of the capital.

[Medvedev] Our cameras are switched on. Literally an hour ago a sanctioned pre-election rally of the whole city began here. Although, as you can see, there are already thousands of participants, people still keep on coming. Among them—I have already chatted a lot—there are many who are simply curious, but there also are those who came here in quite concerted ranks, having brought slogans with them. All number themselves among the democratic forces. Here are the slogans that people have brought here. [camera pans the crowd; showing flags with diagonal blue crosses on a white background, which is the flag of St. Andrew, the patron saint of Russia. Legible slogans read: "Reform the USSR Supreme Soviet!" and "Special lackeys! Hands off Yeltsin, Gdlyan, and Ivanov!"]

Well, now let us meet one of the people who came here to the square. Here, at the rally we have made the acquaintance of Lev Aleksandrovich Ponamarev. He is a member of the organizational committee of this rally. Lev Aleksandrovich, what organization do you represent?

[Ponamarev] I represent two organizations, the Moscow Voters' Association and the Memorial Society.

[Medvedev] Why are you gathering here?

[Ponamarev] Well, we have two aims for our demonstration and rally. The first is to acquaint Moscow's voters with candidate people's deputies from the block of democratic Russia. This is a block of democratic candidates. The second is to proclaim the unification of democratic forces around the idea of setting up a roundtable around which the representatives of democratic organizations, the interregional voters' association, and the country's leadership should sit. These are the two basic aims for which this rally is being held.

[Medvedev] Now there is order here. We have seen that it is being maintained not only by the militia organs, but also by people wearing armbands. Who are they?

[Ponamarev] They are activists of the Moscow Voters' Association. The Moscow Voters' Association is now the largest mass organization in Moscow. It has been specially set up on the eve of these elections and has put forward a large number of people's candidates. In addition, activists will maintain order during the holding of the elections and will be observers.

More Interviews Given

LD2502204490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From the "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev: report by Moscow correspondent Sergey Medvedev]

[Text] [Sagalayev] On the whole, the week passed relatively calmly, by the standards of the current troubled times. In my view, it would have been even calmer were it not for the trepidation hanging in the social atmosphere surrounding the numerous meetings planned for 25 February. Discussions, rumors, and publications predicted events across the broadest spectrum, from the peaceful February revolution to political demagoguery, extremism, and open acts of provocation. So, a report by our Moscow correspondent.

[Begin recording] [video shows Sergey Medvedev speaking to camera. Behind him, a large crowd carrying numerous banners advances across a bridge. Russian imperial flags are seen.]

[Medvedev] A general political meeting—a sanctioned one, I will immediately stress—started simultaneously about noon in two parts of Moscow, in Smolenskaya Square and in the region of the Park of Culture. They were brought together via the Sadovoye Koltso [Moscow beltway], and now you can see how the demonstrators have rushed to meet each other, toward the venue for the general meeting in Zubovskaya Square.

As we were travelling here through the city, we naturally noticed that the streets in the city center had been closed off. The law and order enforcement forces were fully prepared. [video shows troops wearing helmets and what appear to be bulletproof vests forming a cordon and being filmed by an ABC cameraman, troops inside a truck]

I will tell you honestly that it is with caution that I am setting off on this reporting assignment. Would elemental street forces not rage? These fears proved fallacious, however. As you can see, there was order, even though there also were grounds to expect emotional flare-ups from people propagating different convictions, often diametrically opposed. [video shows a number of banners, one of which bears the legend: From camp zones to free economic zones. Another banner reads: Anarchy is not chaos, but a harmonious society and (?freedom of the individual).]

I will not try to enumerate all the organizations and movements that sent their representatives here. I will name but a few: the Moscow Association of Voters, the Memorial Society, the Democratic Union, the Interregional Group of USSR People's Deputies, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, the Russian Liberal Social Democrats, and supporters of the movement for the democratic platform of the CPSU.

Understandably, the slogans of all of them are different, too. Although both those who came here only out of curiosity and those who are in organized columns favor finding ways toward consolidation, of insuring that the reaction that thousands have declaimed today does not come about.

The country's way out of crisis is only by way of democracy! No splitting the union! These slogans were heard today, too, as were others like the following: Socialism is the policy of state banditry! Well, these and similar utterances are on the consciences of their authors.

Nikolay Ilyich, why are you here with your comrades?

[N.I. Travkin, identified by screen caption] In the first place, I am a member of the coordinating councils of two major movements, which are the organisors of this event: A member of the coordinating council of the Interregional Group and of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU. I attach very great significance to this meeting.

[Medvedev] Why?

[Travkin] Well, in general, for a long time I have been, and I remain today an opponent of constant meetings, demonstrations, and public manifestations, but this is no ordinary meeting. I would link it with 4 February. How? Because it is the logical continuation of 4 February. However, if then there was nevertheless a great deal of emotion, a great deal of emotion, a great deal of shouts and calls about smashing, then this is an even meeting. If the unity of democratic forces was then only just taking shape, here I feel it has been completed. But the most important thing is that people have come here having crossed the threshold of fear. After all, the situation has been seriously whipped up. If such numbers of people have been able to cross the threshold of fear, then I am certain that society will be free.

[Medvedev] Fear of excesses, to be precise?

[Travkin] Absolutely right!

[Medvedev] Yet, all the same, do you agree that many slogans here contradict each other? Comment, say, on these two slogans: All power to the soviets! and the second which we have heard here and which has been proclaimed from the platform: The soviets are the bodies that hide and camoflague the power of the partocracy! Do you agree? Are these opposite points of view?

[Travkin] These are opposite points of view, but we have to look at points of view and link them with the basic course of events. So that the main course of this meeting—only it is a healthy one—is toward the unity of democratic forces, toward the transfer of real power to democratically elected soviets.

We have everything: The resources, the brains, talented people and hands; we lack only complete freedom, the freedom of the producer, of the citizen. This is another breath of that freedom. That is the main guarantee that we will not go backward, the main guarantee. [video ends with a middle distance view of the mass meeting] [end recording]

Appeal for Peaceful Rallies Issued

LD2302213490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In connection with the many-thousand-strong voters' rallies and demonstrations set for 25 February in a number of the country's major cities, the heads of the USSR creative unions have adopted an appeal to Soviet citizens. It says, and I quote: In the present extremely tense and alarming situation in society, any chance clash and any street incident could have unpredictable consequences. While backing the democratic aspirations of the organizers of the rallies and demonstrations, we call on them not to bring people out into the streets where they will be at the mercy of unpredictable events. No motives can justify the risk of a violation of law and order, the appeal says. The tiniest danger to life must be avoided. We, the authors of the appeal say, call on the residents of Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and other cities to demonstrate prudence. Democracy must be strengthened and defended, and the most realistic opportunity for this is to vote for democratic candidates at the 4 March elections. Well, it is difficult to disagree with that.

The appeal was signed by Elem Klimov of the Union of Cinematographers; Andrey Vasnetsov of the Union of Artists; Vladimir Karpov of the Union of Writers; Yuriy Plastonov of the Union of Architects; Yuriy Solovyev of the Union of Designers; Tikhon Krennikov of the Union of Composers; and Mikhail Ulyanov of the Union of Theatrical Workers of the RSFSR.

TASS Summarizes Rally Events Around Country

Roundup of Rallies

LD2502172690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1629 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb (TASS)—Correspondents reports from where events have been taking place:

Today's rallies, which have been held in various cities around the country in preparation for the forthcoming elections to local and republican bodies of power, were held in an organized manner and without excesses. While supporting the democratic transformations in the country, people levelled sharp criticism at shortcomings, blaming both local authorities and the CPSU, as the leading party in the country.

Participants in a 10,000-strong rally in Sverdlovsk demanded the resignation of the local party leadership and the handing over of the building belonging to the oblast CPSU committee for use as children's and medical institutions. They applauded the speech by USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin, who spoke of the responsibility of party and local soviet leaders for the worsening—in his words —crisis situation in the country.

Participants in rallies in Kuybyshev (Volga Valley) and Cheboksary (central Russia) demanded the resignation of the local party leadership. In Kazan (Tatariya), participants in a 10,000-strong rally expressed a lack of confidence in the Oblast CPSU committee and proposed that an independent party organization be set up in this autonomous republic.

Speakers at a 10,000-strong rally in Leningrad, which took place in spite of torrential rain, also sharply criticized the bureau of the oblast CPSU committee and its leader, Boris Gidaspov, specifically.

The decision by the city authorities not to permit the holding of a rally aroused the dissatisfaction of the residents of Rostov-na-Donu (southern Russia). As a protest, about 100 people gathered outside the building of the oblast CPSU committee, and leaflets were distributed. People in Saransk (autonomous Mordovia), indignant at a similar decision by the authorities, carried out a protest demonstration.

The imperfect nature of the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Belorussia was the subject of sharp criticism at a many-thousand- strong rally held in Minsk, capital of the republic. Participants in the demonstration also were dissatisfied with the slowness of the local authorities in implementing the program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster which affected the inhabitants of Belorussia.

Speakers at Moscow Mass Rallies Reported

LD2502153490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1508 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb (TASS)—TASS special correspondents report: A city-wide meeting of working people dedicated to elections to the Russian Federation's parliament, due on 4 March, was held without incident in Zubovskaya Square in the center of the Soviet capital today. It wound up a series of demonstrations which took place today with the permission of the city authorities.

Among those taking part in the meetings were representatives of various political clubs, associations, alliances, and informal associations. Flying above their heads were flags in the colors of the Russian empire. The yellow and blue flags of the Ukrainian national "Rukh" movement were also there. Also present were representatives of organizations calling themselves the Social- Democratic Association, as well as anarcho-syndacylists, the Democratic Union, and the Christian-Democratic Union.

Before the city-wide meeting began the demonstrators delivered addresses on the two central squares of the Soviet capital. In particular, near the Gorkiy culture and leisure park, representatives of the Moscow Voters' Association called on people to vote for candidates which they support as deputies to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the local authorities from the "Democratic Russia" block. Candidate-deputies Ilya Zaslavskiy, Sergey Nakonechnyy, and Boris Rakitskiy stated that the March elections are a "real opportunity to speed up democratic transformations in the country," and "to remove the apparatus from power." The speakers' addresses stressed the need to create an economically strong and independent Russia. In their view there is a need to review relations between the republics which make up the USSR.

In the opinion of those who spoke, what is needed for further progress is a multiparty democratic system. Various views were expressed on the idea of presidential government in the USSR, and it was stressed that the presidential election should be a general direct election.

Nikolay Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Protection of Nature, spoke about the need to improve the ecological situation in the country. He stressed that protection of nature is one of the major tasks of representatives of all political forces. "Everyone—right-wingers, left-wingers, and communists, and nonparty people—suffer in equal measure from pollution of the environment," the minister said.

Those who went on to speak at the city-wide meeting, among whom were many USSR people's deputies, called for political reforms in the country to be speeded up, and for radical transformations in economic, spiritual and cultural spheres to be carried out. "Perestroyka should be not in words alone, but in deeds," declared Mikhail Bocharov, USSR People's Deputy. He called for a genuine handing over of power to the soviets and for elections to be conducted democratically.

USSR People's Deputy Telman Gdlyan drew attention to the danger for perestroyka proceeding, according to him, from the "right-wing reactionary section of the party apparatus, which uses power in its own narrow political interests, and also from highly extremist, nationalist, and essentially criminal groupings which by their actions destabilize the situation and bring down the foundations of statehood, not balking even at bloodshed in so doing."

A number of participants at the meeting, including Sergey Belozertsev, People's Deputy from Petrozavodsk, and economist Tatyana Karyagina, demanded the resignation of virtually all the leading bodies in the country.

The meeting adopted a resolution in support of investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov.

The meeting ended on an emotional note, introduced by USSR People's Deputy Sergey Stankevich. "We are going to the elections on 4 March," he said, "with the clear awareness of a great aim, that of creating a free, flourishing and democratic Russia."

The participants in the meeting thanked the law enforcement organs for their help in securing order during the events.

Rallies Urge Accelerated Reforms

LD2502093790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0850 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb (TASS)—The participants in mass rallies set for today in the centre of the Soviet capital intend to call for an acceleration of the political reforms taking place in the Soviet Union and for the implementation of radical changes in the economic, social, and intellectual fields. They are timed to coincide with the elections to the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics parliament set for 4 March.

The meetings were sanctioned Wednesday by the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies (city council).

USSR people's deputies Yuriy Afanasyev, Boris Yeltsin, and Gavriil Popov, who last summer set up the interregional deputies' group of the USSR Supreme Soviet, were among those who signed an application for the holding of rallies, organized by the Moscow association of voters.

In view of the mass character of the coming demonstration, the city authorities intend to pay special attenton to maintaining public order and ensuring the safety of the participants. Representatives of the forces of law and order do not rule out the possibility that the demonstrators may be joined by persons interested in destabilizing the situation in the city.

Thursday's CPSU Central Committee appeal to the country's working people in this regard notes that under the influence of such extremist forces, there have been quite a few demonstrations throughout the Soviet Union launched under slogans calling for renewal—demonstrations which have ended in anti-Soviet appeals, disturbances, hooligan forays, and pogroms. "These are impermissible and intolerable actions. They must be resolutely condemned," the document says.

In the statement adopted on Monday the USSR Supreme Soviet compelled the government and local power organs to take all the necessary measures to protect law and order with the aim of preventing the actions of extremists and possibly of criminal forces.

Having assessed the sociopolitical situation in the country, the USSR Council of Ministers instructed the governments of union republics, executive committees of local soviets, and law enforcement bodies to take the necessary measures to ensure stringent observance of the procedure for holding rallies and demonstrations.

Similar rallies are planned for today also in a number of other towns of the USSR.

No 'Excesses' Reported at Mass Rallies

LD2502135790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1223 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb (TASS)—According to correspondents' on-the-spot reports, mass rallies are taking place today in different regions of the country. These rallies are being held in a calm atmosphere and without any excesses. This calm is not least a result of the appeal of the USSR Supreme Soviet, CPSU Central Committee, and Soviet Government, as well as the measures for ensuring public order which were undertaken by the organizers of the demonstrations and law enforcement bodies. Preparations for the forthcoming elections to the parliament of the Russian Federation set for 4 March, acceleration of political reforms, and more radical transformations in the economic, social and spiritual fields are their main themes. While supporting the policy of perestroyka, the representatives of a broad spectrum of the population are expressing dissatisfaction with the pace of its implementation, citing local relics of stagnant phenomena, difficulties in providing necessities, and various other social disorders.

In the far eastern town of Petropavlosk-Kamchatsk, a mass rally was held, attended by many candidate people's deputies of the Russian Federation parliament. They spoke with concern about the complex situation taking shape today in the political and economic life of the country. Many justified reproaches were levelled at the oblast committee of the CPSU and other local bodies of power. A resolution adopted there voiced mistrust of the committee and demanded its resignation. The participants in the rally called for united efforts to carry out democratic transformation in society, and demanded a convening of the "roundtable" with the participation of representatives from positions of power and the public. The rally organizers considered it necessary to dissociate themselves from slogans such as "Down with the Communists" which were heard among the ranks of the participants.

About 1,000 people attended a two and a half-hour rally in Khabarovsk. Russian Federation candidate people's deputies and representatives of the local "people's front" called for electing the most meritorious candidates at the forthcoming elections so as to attain a radical breakthrough in improving people's living standards. No extremist statements could be heard at the rally, TASS correspondent Yuriy Vitrishchak reported. Representatives of the Japanese television companies NHK and NTV could see this for themselves, since no attempts were made to prevent them from filming.

In Kemerovo, the main city of the Kuznetsk coal basin, a rally organized by the "Rebirth" society of Soviet Germans was held in spring-like sunshine. The Siberians have expressed concern over the future of Soviet Germans residing in various parts of the country. Germans, the address adopted at the rally says, "are skilled at getting on with all peoples, and respect their culture, language, tradition, and way of life. They have the right to demand to be treated with equal respect."

Various Unions Urge Rally Cancellation

LD2302194590 Moscow TASS in English 1909 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—The Soviet Unions of Cinematographers, Artists, Writers, Architects, Designers, Composers and the Theatre Workers' Union of the Russian Federation have called upon the organisers of the rallies and demonstrations due in several major cities of the country on Sunday to cancel plans to bring people onto the streets.

They released an appeal here today saying that any clash, any street incident in the present extremely tense and alarming social situation may have unpredictable consequences. No motives can justify the risk of violating law and order. The slightest danger to peoples' lives should be ruled out.

They urged the residents of Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and other cities to display prudence. "Democracy should be consolidated and upheld and the most real opportunity for this is to vote for democratic candidates at the March 4 elections," the appeal says.

Novgorod Party Leaders Condemned

LD1702223190 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT 17 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Troyanovskiy]

[Text] Novgorod February 18 TASS—A rally held in Novgorod today passed a vote of non-confidence to the Bureau of the Regional Party Committee. The rally was organised by informal associations, the Vyeche, Ecology and other clubs.

The last such rally or Vyeche was held in the ancient Russian city over 500 years ago, in 1478. This time the rally was held not in the Vyeche Square but in a new western residential area, in front of the Palace of culture of the Azot Amalgamation where about 6,000 Novgorod residents gathered.

This Vyeche devoted to the forthcoming elections to local Soviets was being prepared long ago. Its organisers and rank-and-file voters were dissatisfied that many regional party and government leaders were running for their seats without rival candidates.

To dampen passions, the bureau of the regional party committee received, on the eve of the rally, resignations of the regional party committee secretary responsible for ideology work and the first secretary of the city party committee.

But communists and non-party people understood the trick. In addition, the speech at the rally by Ivan Nikulin, first secretary of the regional party committee, was larded with words more suitable for addressing docile staffers than independently-minded and resolute people.

Therefore, his attempt to establish his authority over rally participants failed. His speech was interspersed with catcalls and noise.

Speakers at the rally, including deputies to the Soviet parliament, workers and intellectuals, called on the people to vote for honest people who can accelerate the social and economic development of the region, republic and the country as a whole.

Leningraders Rally Against Ethnic Strife

LD1702173390 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT 17 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Rachko]

[Text] Leningrad February 17 TASS—Thousands of Leningraders carrying posters "against ethnic strife, for humanism and democracy" today participated in a rally sponsored by several public organisations, including Democratic Elections-90, the People's Front, the Democratic Platform in the CPSU Association.

Speakers at the rally said that in the recent past "reactionary forces" began to fan up anti-Semetic sentiments in the city to switch people's dissatisfaction with the aggravated social and economic problems to alleged "enemies of the nation" before the elections to republican and local soviets of people's deputies.

Candidates for soviets nominated by democratic movements called on rally participants to resolutely rebuff chauvinism and to seek a sweeping renewal of soviets.

Rally participants favoured the establishment of a "Russian Communist Party abiding by the position of the democratic platform in the Soviet Communist Party" and the urgent convocation of the report-and-election conference of the Leningrad party organisation.

'Massive' Demonstrations Demand Changes

LD2502122990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1117 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 25 Feb (TASS)—According to special correspondent's reports, the mass rallies of the working people of the Soviet capital, timed to coincide with the 4 March elections to the parliament of the Russian Federation, started today in the center of the city around noon. During the demonstrations which were sanctioned by the city authorities and took place on the big squares near Gorkiy Central Culture Park and not far from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the participants called for acceleration of the political reforms in Soviet society and for the implementation of radical transformations in the economy and in the social and spiritual fields.

The demonstrators include members of the interregional deputies' group of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was formed last summer, representatives of a number of public informal organizations and movements from various towns and environmentalists.

The marchers are carrying placards and banners reading "The Country's President Must Be Elected by the People," "Fascism Shall Not Pass," "No to the Severnaya TETs" [power station planned for northern Moscow] and "Power to the People, Not the Party." Many of the demonstrators are voicing solidarity with USSR people's deputies Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov. As is known, a commission is at work in the USSR Supreme Soviet studying the activities of the USSR Procuracy investigation group that was headed by the two lawyers in Uzbekistan. Gdlyan and Ivanov have now been relieved of investigation work.

An impromptu rally was held beside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building. According to the organizers, several tens of thousands took part. Many of them are carrying the tricolor of pre-revolutionary Russia. The "Democratic Russia" voters' association used the rally to announce its list of candidates for the election of deputies to the parliament of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics.

USSR people's deputy Yuriy Afanasyev emphasized that the purpose of the rally is "to demand from the leadership profound changes in Soviet society." Many speakers expressed dissatisfaction with the low standard of living, the shortage of basic essentials, and the poor standards of the health service. People's deputy Yuriy Andreyev stated in this connection that the government endorsed by the country's parliament has had sufficient time and opportunities to change things for the better, but, in his view, has "missed its chance."

Given the massive scale of the demonstrations, the city authorities are devoting particular attention to maintaining order and ensuring the safety of those taking part.

According to the law enforcement bodies, the demonstration is proceeding peacefully, and no excesses of any kind have been recorded.

A citywide rally began at 1400 in Zubovskaya Square in central Moscow.

Rally Organizers Hold News Conference

LD2302195390 Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—By TASS correspondent Ivan Vladimirov:

The organising committee of Sunday's demonstration planned here gave a news conference today. It was stated at the news conference that the purpose of the demonstration is to help voters decide for whom they will vote at the elections to the local Soviets of People's Deputies and Russia's Supreme Soviet on March 4.

Rallies will be held in one of the sections of the Sadovoye Koltso (Garden's Ring), an important transport artery of the city.

Historian Yuriy Afanasyev, one of the co-chairmen of the interregional group of deputies, (which unites radically-minded deputies) said that the demonstration "is directed against forces that intend to hold spurious elections, against those who stir up ethnic strife."

The organization, which describes itself as the Russian Liberal-Democratic Party, intends to participate in the demonstration with slogans calling for a condemnation of any forms of violence and checking manifestations of extremism. This was stated by the organisation's representative at the news conference in Moscow.

They said that the organisation, holding moderately-centrist positions, intends to establish partner relations with the Soviet Communist Party and to hold a round-table conference of representatives of "all the democratic forces of the country".

Sunday's demonstrations will undoubtedly be massive.

On the other hand, there are expressions of concern that actions of anti-democratic groups and organisations are possible during the event.

Meetings were held today at many Moscow enterprises and institutions. Many participants said that it is necessary to prevent instability and strife.

Collectives of the ship-building and ship repair plant, of the first bearing plant and other enterprises declared that "They are not going to be influenced by forces that interfere with the pace of perestroyka." They decided not to participate in Sunday's rally.

In the Taganka district, leaflets were pasted on shelters and at entrances to houses, urging [the] population to stay away from the rally.

The leaflets say that the organisers of the Sunday meeting do not advance any specific demands, that their slogans are vague and sometimes provocative.

Armenian United Front Formed, Views 25 Feb Rallies

NC2502104390 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] More than 40 informal organizations operating in Armenia and in the USSR have initiated the formation of the United Front for Pan-Armenian Struggle, which will participate in solving urgent problems confronting the Armenian nation, organize people's self-defense, consolidate the reunification of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and revitalize the disaster zone.

During the regular session of the Front's administrative board, a report was submitted on the situation in Armenia, Artsakh, Shaumyanskiy, and Getashen by (Feliks Zakaryan), member of the Armenian Operational Staff of the State of Emergency.

Following this, a report was studied on a call by various organizations for demonstrations and rallies in the Soviet Union on 25 February. According to information received by the front from various correspondents, the intention is, through various speeches, to destabilize the situation in Armenia. On this occasion the Pan-Armenian United Front issued a statement which states in particular:

Today, when the central authorities have allowed the forces of Pan-Turanism to blockade Armenia and Artsakh and are trying to bring our nation to its knees, the major national issue is consolidating the reunification and self-defense of Artsakh, not participating in suspicious attempts under the veil of democracy.

More on Moscow Rallies, Security Measures

AU2502150690 Paris AFP in English 1133 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, Feb 25 (AFP)—Between 30,000 and 50,000 pro-reform demonstrators took to the streets of Moscow on Sunday despite fears of violence and of a government crackdown, journalists at the scene said. The peaceful demonstrations in Moscow, where security forces deployed in large numbers, and at least one other Soviet city were intended as a show of strength ahead of local and republic elections to be held over the coming weeks. Organisers called for greater democracy and support for reform candidates standing in the March 4 republic elections in Russia.

The rest of the country appeared calm with reports of a demonstration taking place in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, but apparently none in Moldavia, Kirgizia and Tajikistan where local and republic elections were taking place Sunday. Lithuania, where the pro-independence Sajudis was claiming victory following Saturday's first multi-party polls, was reportedly quiet too.

In Moscow, two groups of demonstrators—one outside Gorkiy Park and one on Smolenskaya Square, on the main city ringroad—were hemmed in by large numbers of militiamen, while interior ministry soldiers, equipped with riot-shields, bullet-proof vests and gas masks stood by in the side streets. City trucks were drawn up to close off streets leading to the city centre and prevent any attempt by the demonstrators to move off towards the Kremlin.

Reformist deputy Yuriy Afanasyev told demonstrators that radical reforms were needed and he accused the authorities of doing everything possible to ensure the demonstration was a failure. "They even tried to frighten demonstrators through the official media," he said, speaking of week-long warnings by newspapers and government officials of possible violence and an unprecendeted campaign of rumours according to which "extremist armed groups" would be coming to town for a "pogrom".

City officials authorized the rally—providing demonstrators kept away from the town centre—but they warned that organizers would be held accountable for any trouble and that security forces would not hesitate to take strong measures against trouble-makers. [passage omitted]

Demonstrators in the crowd held up banners calling for the repeal of Article 6 of the constitution which gives the communist party a monopoly on power and for the election of a new state president through universal suffrage. [passage omitted]

Leaders of pro-reform groups have accused communist party hardliners of fuelling rumours that violence could be expected at the demonstrations. [passage omitted]

Economic

Views on Government Plans for Economic Restoration

PM2202171690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 5, 4 Feb 90 p 10

[Unattributed roundtable feature involving Oleg Bogomolov, Mikhail Bochorov, Otto Lacis, Len Karpinskiy, and Vladimir Gurevich: "Waiting for Real Economic Change"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Will the government plans to restore the economy to health be put through? Are they adequate? "I think that many people share my concern about the proposed program," said Len Karpinskiy kicking off the latest roundtable at MOSCOW NEWS. "The program leaves too wide a gap between the emergency-measures stage and the reform proper. Don't the two contradict each other? Meanwhile they're pressing the old administrative buttons as regards the transition to a normal market economy. 'This cannot be done in a hurry,' they say. 'No rash action here.' But which steps are not rash? Where's the mechanism to ensure the transition."

We cannot pull out of the economic crisis without taking decisive steps towards a market economy, but the mechanism to accomplish this is either absent or sketchy. This was the conclusion of our roundtable participants: USSR people's deputy Academician Oleg Bogomolov; USSR people's deputy and president of the Butek Concern, Mikhail Bocharov; Otto Lacis, D. Sc. (Econ.); MOSCOW NEWS political analyst Len Karpinskiy; and MOSCOW NEWS news analyst Vladimir Gurevich.

Gurevich: The program can be criticized forever but the question is: If it's wrong, what's right? If it's not enough, what else should be done? There are some fundamental problems like investments, planning, pricing, money circulation. How should these problems be solved?

Lacis: That the government plans to start the reform by emergency measures is not the problem. Without first eliminating the budget deficit, for example, we can't guarantee that "the market will work it all out." The problem is that these are not the measures that will lead to market economy. What immediate measure should be taken? The USSR State Bank should be released from Finance Ministry's and the government's control, so that the government realizes that it can no longer get whatever money it wants just like that. Also the huge demand for investments artificially created by the state should be eliminated. Thus the real emergency measures lie in curbing the inordinate appetites: This would mark the start of an economic recovery.

Gurevich: "Curbing the appetites" is one of the program's aims.

Lacis: This is a six-year program. But no one has succeeded in convincing society that the government will stick to it. I don't mean just Ryzhkov and Abalkin, but the government as a whole. There is much evidence to suggest that many cabinet ministers won't abide by any program. They would rather stick to their old practices-...Take the petrochemical complexes in Tyumen which will pose a real problem for the reform. Despite the desperate budget situation, there are plans for some new giant projects. And after all the debates, a decision has been taken on three complexes worth many billions of rubles. As long as there are industrial ministries, they will try to sustain themselves. Unless they are disbanded, it will be hard to curb the appetite for investment, to effect a financial recovery or a market economy.

Karpinskiy: There has already been an attempt to create a "market sector" through cooperatives and leaseholding. But the system rejects all that.

Bocharov: Because we move slowly. We should create tens of thousands of non-governmental enterprises run by shareholders, teams or individuals (co-ops would account for only a small fraction as they do elsewhere in the world).. You can't of course turn down the present planned system overnight, but we should start preparing the ground for a market right now. At last fall's economic conference at the CPSU Central Committee, I proposed that we leave intact 80 percent of all projects planned by the State Committee for Material Supplies and the State Committee for Planning for 1990, while 20 percent (in different proportions) should be left to the market, to real prices and a real choice of partners. Otherwise we'll never get started.

Karpinskiy: But they say: "This will plunge you into the abyss of market unpredictability." I think we stand a great chance of winding up in an abyss without a market economy.

Bocharov: That's more likely. No one would argue that a market should be controlled primarily by taxes and credits. Taxes only work when prices are normal. But isn't the reform of taxes, banks and prices being delayed?

Lacis: To let the market set the prices of basic consumer goods right away would mean social turmoil. But this has become a pretext for shelving the issue of prices altogether. The intention is to freeze the prices while the implied desire is to freeze the reform. But if no reform spells disaster, something must be done about prices. In this case, instead of having to negotiate with the coal-mining minister Shchadov on a price for their coal, coal-miners would have to set the price themselves since there would no longer be any minister. This would of course affect people with fixed wages and pensions. To offset this there should be indices reflecting the correlation between such incomes and prices. For example, if a teacher, doctor or policeman received not what the boss had decided on, but twice the average salary, the attitude to the problem would be different. Those who work at self-financing enterprises are supposed to negotiate their salaries while the prices of their products are dictated by the market. In this case, we would no longer rely on the government but on each other and our own efforts. This is a different concept of relations. But in their absence it's the same old story: should we raise prices or leave them as they are? When should we raise them and by how much? The people's answer? No and never.

Bogomolov: There should be a liberalization of prices with some degree of control. There is a tangible demand for a market. What was the coal-miners' first demand? A chance to freely sell a part of their coal. A limited market. A better start could be made of course in the area of agriculture and consumer industries because they are more responsive to market methods. Lease-holding has led to higher productivity even in unfavorable circumstances. But all our hopes are in vain unless there is real money. The farmer and the leaseholder will soon know that today's ruble is no incentive. Incentives are central to the reform. The program, which otherwise contains many good points, provides no solution.

Gurevich: Unlike in the past, many progressive ideas are now welcome, but the trouble is that decisions on them are taken by government agencies which have always rejected progress. That's what they exist for. But meanwhile the reform is trying to defeat itself. Take the decision to pay foreign currency for grain produced over and above the plan? The terms are such that the idea has become defunct. Or take the idea of selling shares to workers? The conditions are such that it hardly works. Then there is the idea of loans worth 60 billion rubles to be granted by enterprises and repayable over 16 years. Looks like enterprises would have to be forced to grant them. Now it has been decided to let individual citizens buy their own apartments. This decision has not begun to work even though it has been in effect for over a year, and even though people around the country are prepared to pay tens of billions for housing.

Bogomolov: An urgent task now is to find out "who is prepared to do what." The program contains none of the necessary calculations, no reliable statistics. How much ready cash does the population really have (100, 150, 200 or more billion)? What about enterprises? What portion of housing could be sold? And so on. Without this information, one can't solve our financial problems. There should be a housing market (with some apartments available for free). Land also has to have a price. Finally, one should know the size of the current assets of enterprises—all of their resources that can be put on the market. Half-measures cannot balance the market.

Bocharov: Today, projects worth 400 billion have been left unfinished; many of the completed projects stand idle. Besides, some enterprises which have switched to self-financing started building new projects. The government makes desperate moves to discourage these projects with taxes on their wage funds. So they can't buy equipment, can't buy goods...Why not let enterprises that are planning to expand buy those incomplete projects, complete them and start up production? Sell these projects at half-price and that would yield 200 billion rubles around the country. Nothing of the sort happens. Buildings are going up while the ministries try to hide them in the vain hope that finances will pick up one day. In switching to a market economy, there are complex things and there are obvious things. If the obvious things aren't being done, what can one say about the complex things.

Lacis: In addition to unfinished projects, enterprises have tremendous amounts of equipment and materials. These should be put to immediate use. While the current auctions, commercial centres and fairs operate on terms that allow transactions worth only tens of million of rubles, they should be allowed to deal in tens of billions of rubles. The bigget shortage in this country is not meat, but building materials. If the number of production projects is reduced this would solve the retail market's problems.

Bogomolov: Even all this would not be adequate to make the ruble strong. But we must make the ruble convertible, even if it comes to introducing a parallel currency. We have the experience of the FRG at the end of the 1940s, the current experience of Yugoslavia and our own experience of NEP (the New Economic Policy). Since we are not capable of major steps to improve the finances, a money reform is inevitable. What I have in mind isn't a reform to "take away" money but a tender reform with parallel convertible currency.

Bocharov: Still, some efforts should be made to bolster the existing ruble. As for the convertible ruble, the "tchervonets," it could take care of the 20 percent of all transactions to be handled on the markets. If this were possible of course.

Karpinskiy: I get the impression that there are rather sensible proposals on how to switch to a market economy, and many of them are not new. But some people fear that plans, quotas, principles, positions, and other things would be lost in the process. But as soon as the market gets into gear, there will be quotas and positions, those the economy really needs. But there is nothing to make up for the time that has been wasted.

Bocharov: Instead of a five-year plan we need a clear-cut, radical one-year program, plus guidelines for 1991-92. And people should have faith in these intentions. They have to know that even if we aren't yet out of the bog, we are on the way out.

Bogomolov: We have one year at our disposal. This year. Or are there people who seriously think that society will wait six years? I am not trying to say that the entire reform could be accomplished in one year. But we should realize the significance of this year. Today they attack us for our "radicalism," for our calls for the "degeneration of society and agriculture," but would society agree if per capita consumption dropped another five-seven percent this year?

Gurevich: The dynamics of events call for action. But which action? Consumers entertain hopes, then grow impatient and finally become intolerant. I have in mind the "consumers' conflicts in Sverdlovsk and Chernigov, tension in the country's north-east where non-residents can't buy anything in the shops.

Lacis: In terms of Poland, we are in 1979. Either we have to reconcile ourselves to the prospect of what happened in Poland in 1980-81, or we must draw timely conclusions. Besides, Poland has to decide today on a radical reform, a reform that after wasting 10 years may prove even more painful. This does not mean that our reform should be modelled on the one in Poland. But this does not imply we can afford to ignore the Polish experience.

Government Statistics 'at Variance' With Reality

PM2202174290 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 6, 6-12 Feb 90 p 35

[Larisa Piyasheva article: "Statistics And Reality"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The State Committee for Statistics has announced the results of the U.S.S.R.'s economic development in 1989. Unfortunately, they are strongly at variance with what we actually see around us.

First of all, a general assessment of the situation. What was the situation in our economy in 1989? Judging by random interviews with men in the street, and by the consumer shortages unheardof since the wartime, it was in deep crisis. Everything - soap, meat, TV sets, furniture - is gone from the shops. Even salt and matches are not always in stock. The government describes the situation as "the slowing of economic development dynamics." In the past year, the gross national product grew by three per cent (in physical terms, with the price rise taken into account). If that figure were true, such a "slowdown" would have been envied by most of the developed capitalist countries which, even in the "worst" years, have registered hardly any GNP growth at all, if not its decrease. To believe the Statistics Committee, we got slightly better off in 1989, our labour productivity grew, more consumer goods were offered for sale, and our budget became more socially oriented.

What's more, "centralized measures to raise the standard of living were carried out." Such as? The housing space turned over for tenancy was reduced, for instance: 128.1 million square metres instead of the 134.2 million planned. The growth of the turnover tax exceeded that of goods turnover.

Paper money emission topped the 1988 level by 56 per cent and amounted to 18 billion rubles, further depreciating our past savings and present earnings and further detracting from the supply of goods and services. Due to "latent inflation" (or, more accurately, as a result of the Finance Ministry's monetary policy) inflation rate in the consumer sector amounted to 7.5 per cent.

So what does the government mean by carrying out centralized measures, planned for the year, to raise our living standards? Did it imply that the depreciation of our savings was "legitimate" because too much money had accumulated in the savings banks, with nothing to spend it on? Or that the housing crisis is not included among the welfare standard growth indicators? Or could it mean the wage, salary and collective farm pay growth indices which constituted about nine per cent a year?

In its statistical reports the government is trying to assure us that in 1989 the economic situation in the country kept improving, even though at a rate slightly slower than that in 1988. Consumer goods production went up seven per cent, the output of TV sets, domestic refrigerators, radios, tape recorders, VCRs, washing machines, electric vacuum cleaners, furniture, crockery, detergents, confectionery and alcoholic drinks increased. True, the output of the zigzag-type sewing machines and cars decreased somewhat, but this is more than made for by the overall growth of commodity turnover. A question arises in this connection: what has become, then, of the queues for the so-called consumer durables? As late as in 1988, these goods could be purchased, even though there was an endless waiting line for them. In 1989, the shops - and even their stockrooms - hopelessly "emptied out," thus automatically ending all queues.

So what is meant by "growth" is anybody's guess. Do all the above-mentioned goods, the output of which has reportedly increased, go to the West (or to the East)? Or are these statistics fraudulent?

If our commodity turnover has increased eight per cent (19 per cent even, in terms of imports), why then are our shops so hopelessly empty? There is one explanation for that. It turns out that the state plan for the production of all the said items hasn't been fulfilled. Why?

The causes are both traditional (poor work discipline and rampant absenteeism) and non-traditional - strikes. Have you gone on strike? Well, you have only yourself to blame for the shortages.

What lessons has the government learned from an analysis of the last year's economic situation? "It is only conscientious and highly efficient work that can guarantee a successful attainment of the high production target figures set for 1990 and provide the material prerequisites for the country's rapid progress in the 13th five-year plan period." We have heard a lot of that talk over the past seventy years!

Are these statistical overstatements cunningly supposed to imply that there is no need for economic reform, for overcoming centralized planning and monopolism? Anyway, the Committee's report makes no mention of these problems.

Agricultural

No Early Vegetables Due to Film Shortage

LD1402035490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1200 GMT on 13 February carries a 2-minute report on a shortage of early vegetables in the Soviet Union.

Semen Astakhov, who is not identified further, announces that Gossnab, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, has advised him there will be no early vegetables this spring due to a failure to deliver polyethylene film, which greenhouses need. He says the January plan for this material was only 46 percent completed. Astakhov then lists the various factories that have failed to deliver the flim.

Scientfic

Cosmonauts Carry Out Experiments With Crystals

LD2602094690 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] The Soviet crew on the orbital complex Mir has begun an experiment with growing semiconducting crystals in conditions of weightlessness. The superpure substances are produced on the automatic device Gallar. The cosmonauts, Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin, are keeping a close watch on the production process. The bulk of the experiments will later be conducted on the research module Kristall.

Specialists believe that the materials produced on orbit will bring a profit of 25 million rubles.

Expert Describes Test Model for Buran Spacecraft

LD2402132490 Moscow World Service in English 0730 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] And now question time. [passage omitted] So, here is the first question. For the last six years or so there's been much discussion in the Western specialist media, particularly American, to the effect that the Soviet Union is developing a small quick-reaction reuseable spaceplane for both civil and military purposes. Most of these ideas come from photographs taken of the recovery of the Cosmos 1614 satellite. I was always under the impression that this craft and its sisters were used to test thermal protection for the Buran space shuttle. However some experts took the view that Cosmos 1614 was a subscale replica of a spacecraft under development, and lengthy articles continue to be written on this theme. I would like you to give a definite yes or no to the spaceplane idea. Well, that's Mr. (Ferrant's) question. Do you think you can answer it, Boris?

[Boris Belitskiy] I'm rather well familiar with the picture in question. It appeared in many Western journals covering space technology. In the secrecy that shrouded the Soviet space shuttle program at that time, I think it was quite natural for some space experts to make the assumption they made.

However, in the present climate of glasnost one of my fellow journalists has shown the picture in question to a very senior Soviet military man and asked him to comment on it. Army General Shabanov, a deputy minister of defence, emphatically denied that this was a military spaceplane prototype. He said that this was in fact a Buran test model. You're absolutely correct Mr. (Ferrant) in your interpretation of the picture. Four such models were launched in all as preparation for the real Buran's maiden flight.

The models were launched under the indices, Cosmos 1374, 1445, 1517 and 1614, the number you mentioned. The test performed covered thermal insulation during reentry, again your guess was correct, and control systems. So you see Mr. (Ferrant) the military spaceplane idea has been denied by our military authorities. I would also add that an entirely different Buran replica was used for flight tests in the atmosphere.

[Announcer] (?Now) can you tell us about that too Boris? It'll probably be of interest to Mr. (Ferrant) and other listeners who follow the Soviet space program.

[Belitskiy] This was an exact replica of Buran, except for the fact that it had aircraft turbojet engines, four of them, fitted to its tail. And naturally the termal insulation tiles were mere imitation in this case since there was no reentry into the atmosphere. The replica was made at the (Mesishchev) experimental engineering works.

The replica made 24 flights in all, providing valuable training for pilots as well as testing the performance of the craft and the automatic landing systems on the ground, which performed so well in Buran's maiden flight soon afterwards. [passage omitted]

Local Authorities Halt Arctic Nuclear Plant Work

LD2202204590 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Archangelsk, February 22 TASS—The local authorities in Archangelsk, a Soviet arctic city on the White Sea, have decided to halt work on a nuclear heat supply station. The local mayor announced on television the decision to switch over to gas fuel.

Nuclear power experts had tried to convince the people that there was no alternative to nuclear fuel. Scientists were sent to Archangelsk. The local population was accused of incompetence and radiophobia.

But, the Ecology of the North, a public organisation, and its supporters launched an active public campaign against the station's construction. They had no faith in what they were told after the Chernobyl nuclear accident and they had enough reasons for their concern.

According to geologists, the station's location—five kilometers from Archangelsk—was not well chosen because of the proximity of ground waters. Besides, the designers did not take into account the existence of rich natural gas resources in the Archangelsk region.

The building facilities used for the construction of the power plant will now be used to build a gas main.

Military

Armed Forces Anniversary Celebrations, Interviews

Yazov Issues Army, Navy Day Order

PM2302105990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[USSR Defense Minister's Order of the Day No. 55, dated 23 February 1990]

[Text] Comrade soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, ensigns and warrant officers, officers, generals, and admirals!

Comrade veterans of war, labor, and the USSR Armed Forces!

The Soviet people and their servicemen today celebrate the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy.

This festival is being marked at a crucial time for the country: Profound changes in the political, socioeconomic, and spiritual spheres and of renewal in the entire life of Soviet society. Socialism is regaining its true democratic and humane aspect.

As a result of the consistent assertion of the ideas of the new political thinking in international relations, confrontation, mistrust, and suspicion are being replaced by mutual understanding and dialogue. The negotiation processes are developing, and security is being strengthened. However, the positive changes in the world have not yet assumed an irreversible nature. The sources of aggression have not disappeared, and the threat of war has receded but has not yet been eliminated.

The USSR Armed Forces, being restructured together with the whole of society, reliably guarantee the security of the Soviet state. Army and Navy servicemen fulfill their patriotic and constitutional duty with high responsibility. They approve and support the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress, condemn separatist, nationalist, and extremist manifestations, and come out resolutely against attempts to render communist ideals worthless and to falsify Soviet military history.

The processes of democratization, of improving the moral atmosphere, and of enhancing the social protection of servicemen and members of their families have become widespread in the Army and Navy. The USSR Armed Forces are being built and trained in full accordance with the defensive military doctrine.

On this festive day I wish Army and Navy personnel successes in military labor, in further improving combat readiness, and in strengthening military discipline, law and order, and organization.

I wish veterans of war, labor, and the USSR Armed Forces and all working people robust health and the consolidation of forces in the interests of strengthening the might of our great Motherland—the USSR.

To mark the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy I ORDER:

That a festive firework display take place today, 23 February 1990, at 2100 local time in the capital of our Motherland, the hero-city of Moscow, in the union republic capitals, in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, Smolensk, and Murmansk, in the hero-fortress of Brest, and also in the cities of Kaliningrad, Lvov, Rostov-na-Donu, Kuybyshev, Novosibirsk, Chita, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Severomorsk.

Army General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense.

Moiseyev Speaks at Reception

LD2302182290 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, said that "a real chance has appeared for the gradual removal of the outdated model of the European balance of forces for the first time in the post-war period".

"This model developed during the 'cold war' years and was based on military confrontation."

Speaking today at a reception on the occasion of the 72nd anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Armed Forces, Moiseyev stresed that "A new system of relations should be established" in place of this outdated model. "This system will ensure stability and security in Europe."

"By agreement with the Warsaw Treaty countries, the Soviet Union is ready to withdraw or cut our troops stationed beyond Soviet territory."

According to the general, the USSR is now unilaterally cutting Soviet Armed Forces. It limits strike systems of weapons and has cut the number of military exercises.

In a search for universal security, one should proceed not from a balance of forces but from a balance of interests, he believes. New thinking has considerably increased possibilities for guaranteeing the country's security through political means.

"But, since the world is militarised and fraught with armed conflicts, we need reliable defences," Moiseyev said.

The reception was attended by marshals of the Soviet Union, marshals of arms and services, generals and admirals, military, naval and air-force attaches accredited to foreign embassies in the USSR.

General Lushev Interviewed

PM2302094590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Army General P.G. Lushev, USSR first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact states' Joint Armed Forces; date, place not given: "The People's Common Cause"]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Army General, our readers, particularly young ones, will certainly be interested to learn the feelings of someone who has devoted several decades of his life to military service on greeting the 72d anniversary of the Armed Forces at such a, quite frankly, complex time for them.

[Lushev] Yes, the times really are complex. Perestroyka is taking place in all aspects of our life. We have many cares. We have to resolve many problems which we have inherited from the past and which have arisen recently. This demands the consolidation of efforts by all of society, by all our country's peoples.

At the same time I will state frankly that the cause of perestroyka and the renewal of society on the path to humane, democratic socialism are being hindered by the actions of those groups and forces which essentially parasitize on the present difficulties, and which speculate on real problems and on the working people's dissatisfaction. These groups advance destructive slogans, resort to nationalist, separatist demagoguery, and sow alarm and social tension. In certain regions this leads to outbreaks of violence.

In order to prevent the tragic development of events in Azerbaijan and Armenia it was necessary to impose a state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and in a number of rayons of those republics, and to involve troops in stabilizing the situation. It was precisely thanks to the resolute actions of our officers and soldiers and of all servicemen—actions which, at the same time, were imbued with great restraint, courage, selflessness, and humanism—that it was possible to stop the violence unleashed by nationalist, anti-Soviet groupings and to avoid a greater tragedy.

It cannot fail to be seen that some people would like to distort the complex mission that servicemen are fulfilling in such "hot" spots, and to use lies and slander to fan anti-Army propaganda. Some mass media are pursuing the line of blackening the history of our Armed Forces, their combat path, and their activity today, and of undermining the prestige of military service. One-sided, tendentious materials have practically entirely ousted the themes of the heroic nature of military service, loyalty to the oath and to military duty, troop friendship, and soldierly comradeship. Constructive, earnest, valid criticism, which we regard as an important means of improving matters in the Army and Navy, is being replaced by malevolence and the fueling of fears and hostility toward everything military.

It also cannot fail to be seen that in certain regions the local authorities are trying to lend a legal basis to unconstitutional attempts to infringe servicemen's rights and to create obstacles in the allocation of housing, in registration, and in finding work for members of servicemen's families. A campaign is being organized to thwart the spring draft for military service. On the whole, the efforts of nationalist, separatist, and essentially anti-perestroyka forces are aimed at eroding the people's defense awareness. Of course, this perplexes many Soviet people and Army and Navy servicemen, and they cannot and will not tolerate such a thing.

Unfortunately, it is necessary to speak of all these not very pleasant things during a festival. Figuratively speaking, our Armed Forces have behind them 72 years of bleak life, of service devoted to their people and motherland. Their feat during the years of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War is immortal. In the postwar years people in uniform have not only ensured the country's security, but have also participated in opening up the virgin lands, conquering space, constructing the Baykal-Amur Main Railroad, and eliminating the aftermath of natural disasters.

Our military specialists have worked in Korea, the Near East, Cuba, and a number of African countries. Our servicemen fulfilled their international duty with honor in Afghanistan. They display fortitude, courage, and military skill in everyday life, in the fulfillment of various training and nontraining tasks.

Today our Armed Forces, together with the Warsaw Pact states' armies, continue to act as an important factor of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

This is what I think about upon greeting the festival.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] When recalling the past and analyzing the present state of the Army and Navy, we naturally cannot fail to think about their future, too. How do you see the future of the Soviet Armed Forces in the light of the current perestroyka and with regard to the demands of military doctrine and modern views on military building?

[Lushev] The nonstandard approaches to world problems conditioned by the new political thinking, and the radical changes in the life of the country, lead us to the need for military reform. This is also emphasized in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress. What could I say here as a military man?

There are many opinions on this score, and sometimes they are diametrically opposed. But the overwhelming majority of them have but one purport: that we should have a strong and modern Army and Navy. In fact, this is the chief goal of our modern defense building. The country needs Armed Forces that will resolve the task of preventing war and ensure that the necessary combat readiness is maintained at the minimum cost and with consistency in realizing the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

But in what direction are the Army and Navy to be further developed? What should their size, budget, structure, and manning principles be?

Here, I believe, we should take into account a number of objective factors conditioned by the specific features of our state. These are, first, its vast territory and the presence close to our borders of strong U.S and NATO ground groupings (whereas such a threat does not exist at all for the United States). Second, the multinational makeup of the population, the equal responsibility of all the USSR's peoples for the state's security, and certain difficulties in the demographic situation. Third, and most importantly, the state's economic potential.

The question of the principle of manning the Armed Forces is now being discussed in the press, on television, and even at the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is my opinion that the principle of manning the Army and Navy on the basis of compulsory military service will be retained in the future. However, this does not mean it is unshakable. Objective conditions prompt us to constantly increase the proportion of professional military men in the overall strength of the Army and Navy.

As for the structure of the Armed Forces, in my view it corresponds to the present military-political situation in the world and to the tasks facing the Army and Navy, and will probably exist for some time yet in its present form. But organizational-staff structures will undoubtedly be improved and developed.

I would conclude my reply to your question like this: In my view, however perfect the structure of the Armed Forces and however well they are armed, without the people's trust and respect and without the state's concern for its defenders there will be neither a strong Army nor a strong Navy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What, in your opinion, might the priority areas be here?

[Lushev] I see the future of our Armed Forces, above all, in the realization of qualitative parameters. This concerns the training of personnel and their readiness and ability to operate efficiently in various types of combat. It also concerns the further development of armament, combat hardware, and tactics. Control of troops and forces will be more efficient, on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology. A further reduction in the Army and Navy and also in the military budget cannot be ruled out either—only no longer unilaterally, as in 1989-1990, but on a mutual, strictly treaty basis.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Guided by the new political thinking and implementing the tenets of defense sufficiency, the Soviet Union is unilaterally reducing its Armed Forces. Other Warsaw Pact states have also embarked on unilateral reductions of their armies. At the same time the combat potential, including the offensive potential, of NATO's combined armed forces is still hardly being reduced. What do you think about this?

[Lushev] That, despite the appreciable warming of the international climate, the danger of war still persists, albeit on a lesser scale.

NATO's military-political leadership is virtually not abandoning the "cold war" stereotypes, and intends to continue building its relations with the Warsaw Pact countries from a position of strength and on the basis of the existing strategic concepts. In particular, it has recently made repeated declarations of adherence to the "flexible response" strategy and the "forward defense" concept, which NATO adopted more than 20 years ago.

This is also confirmed by the fact that no substantial changes are expected in the operational and combat training of the North Atlantic Alliance's combined armed forces this year. As in previous years, according to the plans of the combined commands, it is proposed to hold up to 200 various exercises, meetings and conferences of NATO leading personnel, and, in accordance with national plans, approximately 700 troop and command-staff exercises at "brigade" level and above.

In this situation one conclusion suggests itself. In order to prevent war and aggression and ensure our security it is necessary to strengthen our Armed Forces as the basis of the Soviet state's defense capability. This is the common cause of the entire Soviet people and of every USSR citizen.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Restructuring is proceeding differently in the countries of East Europe and, correspondingly, in their armies. How is this affecting the work of the organs that control the Joint Armed Forces, the atmosphere of the relations within them, and the state of the Joint Armed Forces as a whole?

[Lushev] Historic changes really are taking place in the Warsaw Pact states. The processes of restructuring and renewing sociopolitical and socioeconomic life are under way. Naturally, these processes affect the armed forces too. Profound reforms are also taking place within them. The structure of control is changing, and the armies are being depoliticized. At the same time the earlier announced reductions in armed forces, arms, and military budgets are continuing.

I will not hide the fact that to a certain extent this affects the combat readiness and the combat ability both of national armed forces and of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states. However, the leadership of the allied armies and the joint command are taking all measures to ensure peace and security for their peoples.

This is promoted by the work of the coalition military organs set up and operating within the Warsaw Pact framework. The generals and officers serving on them regard their activity as an honorable and responsible assignment from their national commands. Their high professional training ensures the fulfillment of the tasks facing the control organs of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces.

As for relations among representatives of the allied armies, they are very friendly and amicable. Mutual understanding and a sense of comradeship are inherent in them. Thanks to these qualities and, as I said earlier, the high professionalism of the generals and officers, a harmonious and efficient collective has been created to ensure the adoption and implementation of the joint command's decisions.

At the same time the Warsaw Pact is not some structure that has become frozen once and forever. The main area for improving the Warsaw Pact today is to turn it from a military-political into a political-military alliance. This process fully accords with the existing political realities.

In conclusion I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers on the festival—Soviet Army and Navy Day—and to wish them successes in service, work, and studies.

Deputy Minister Interviewed

LD2302180490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1402 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Interview with Dmitriy Semenovich Sukhorukov, USSR deputy defense minister, by V. Voloshin; date, place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [video shows screen caption reading, "Today is Soviet Army and Navy Day," then Sukhorukov and Voloshin seated at a desk] [Voloshin] Dmitriy Semenovich, permit me to congratulate you on this important holiday, the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, especially as you were a participant in the Great Patriotic War and went through the war from beginning to end, as they say, and this holiday is on the eve of the 45th anniversary of our people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. You have given half a century, 50 years, to service in the Armed Forces. Therefore, this holiday is a special one for you.

[Sukhorukov] Thank you for your congratulations.

[Voloshin] Right. Naturally, on the holiday one can speak of the results of the work that has been done. Perestroyka is now in progress in our country. I would like you to tell us, specifically, with what results the personnel of the Armed Forces are marking this day.

[Sukhorukov] Well, I would like to say first that all soldiers, sergeants, officers, and all Armed Forces personnel are marking their holiday with a feeling of pride in belonging to the socialist Armed Forces, a feeling of pride in duty toward their people which has been fulfilled. This duty is viewed, especially now, in connection, as you have said, with the approaching 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. In replying to your congratulations, I would like, for my part, to congratulate you and all my friends and comrades in arms on this holiday, the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, and to say that we are marking this holiday with an awareness of duty fulfilled. At the same time, we also see many unsolved tasks facing the Armed Forces. In other words, we are here adopting a critical approach to the evaluation of our labor.

[Voloshin] The Army is today fulfilling a slightly different role from its previous one, in connection with the defensive military doctrine. What mark is the fact that the Army is today living in a new manner in the course of combat training and servicemen's lives?

[Sukhorukov] The Soviet military doctrine has been declared by our country's political leadership; it is reflected directly and practically in the construction of the Armed Forces, the organization of their theoretical and practical combat training, and in their everyday activity. It is necessary to say that we operate on the principle of reasonable sufficiency, but at the same time, the main thing has been and remains the maintenance of the country's defense capability at a due level against any possible unexpected eventualities. The whole life and combat training of our soldiers, sergeants, officers, and all Soviet Armed Forces personnel, is devoted to this. Of course, there are certain difficulties here, and perestroyka has affected the Army. This process is continuing; it is a complex, long-term process. The main attention is concentrated on, while reducing personnel numbers—as you know, a unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces by 500,000 is under way, but this in no way relieves us of the duty to fulfill the main task, the defense of our state, its borders and its people. [sentence as heard] However, the whole process of construction, the process of training; operates, specifically, on the principles of the defensive doctrine declared by our state.

[Voloshin] All the same, Dmitriy Semenovich, you said that problems exist in the Army and Navy today. Could you talk about them in greater detail?

[Sukhorukov] There are problems everywhere in the life of our society, including the Army, of course. A particularly acute issue today is the question of social protection, as we say, for servicemen. This applies principally to providing housing and other facilities for the officers and their families who are going to be withdrawn from abroad. The necessary measures are being taken by the government and the Defense Ministry, but the Defense Ministry is not in a position to solve this problem on its own. This requires help from all the people, especially in the regions, to untie this tight knot which has been tied regarding provision for the families of the officer corps, the warrant officers, and the whole personnel of the troops being withdrawn. But decisions are being adopted on these matters, and we hope that we shall also manage to solve these questions more or less painlessly.

There also exist problems regarding the need for us to raise the authority and prestige of military service. Unfortunately, in recent years, and without going into the causes, I have to say that we have observed a decline in the prestige of military service. This sometimes provokes negative phenomena on the part of individual citizens, and all this has an effect, of course, on the authority of the Army. There is much which can be said here on this issue, but one thing must be remembered: The authority of the Armed Forces is the authority of the state, and the state and all the people should care about the authority of the Armed Forces. We say—and this is the truth—that the Army and the people are one. Since this is the case, all the people, specifically, should be proud of their Army and take the measures necessary to ensure that the prestige of military service does not decline. I think that a certain turnabout in raising the prestige of military service, including service in the officer corps, has now begun, especially with the February Central Committee Plenum which took place recently.

[Voloshin] Much has been said recently, both in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and in the press, about the fundamental transformations which are supposed to occur in the Armed Forces by 1995 and 2000. What sort of transformations are they? What is the point—will there be a military reform?

[Sukhorukov] In practice, a military reform has already begun and is under way in the Armed Forces. It has affected organizational matters, the structure of the Armed Forces, and the level and degree of personnel training. It is affecting, strictly speaking, the everyday practical activity of the Armed Forces. There are many issues which we still have to tackle, and this is not a one-off operation. Therefore, the party Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress states that we have to move toward a military reform. It is underway in practice, I repeat. At the same time, there are a number of problems which need to be tackled in the years immediately ahead.

[Voloshin] Dmitriy Semenovich, it has been said recently in the press and in speeches by individual leaders that the questions of national formations, of allowing conscripts from a republic to serve on their own territory, and of alternative service are being raised, especially in the Baltic region. What is the Defense Ministry's attitude to this, and what is your personal attitude?

[Sukhorukov] Yes, unfortunately, you are right. These questions have been raised insistently recently, not only in the Baltic republics, but also in some Transcaucasian republics. We believe here that many people simply do not have an adequate understanding of these things. Take the territory of our country, the extent of our frontiers, and the interests which we need to defend in the security of our motherland. The principle of the formation of the Armed Forces is exterritorial; the principle of their formation is based on the principle of general liability for military service. That is the main principle on which the Soviet Armed Forces are formed. Obviously, it must not undergo any changes, because that is even impossible in practice. We are slightly surprised by the attitude of even the leadership of some republics to these matters. One can see both a clear lack of understanding and even, perhaps, going further, certain plans of their own of some kind.

[Voloshin] Dmitriy Semenovich, all the same, officers and men sometimes have to tackle tasks today which are utterly unacceptable to them. In particular, let us take the recent events in Baku and the events in Armenia, even the earthquake and the event at Chernobyl, and so on. The Soviet soldier and officer today sometimes has to tackle completely different tasks both in protecting citizens and in defending order in particular regions, and states of emergency are being introduced. What effect is this having on the process of training and educating personnel and on their mood?

[Sukhorukov] I would like to say the following on this matter. Of course, we military men are in favor of the Army tackling the tasks for which it is meant—the defense of the country, the external defense, so to speak, of our frontiers and our state. However, the situation today is such that there are a number of issues where it is impossible to solve a particular problem quickly without the Army. This applies, say, to the assistance which the Army provided during the earthquakes in Armenia and Tajikistan and to the elimination of the consequences of the tragedy in Chernobyl, which is still continuing. We also fulfill a number of other national economic tasks, including road building in the Non-Chernozem Zone. Undoubtedly, that is not the Army's function, but today the state cannot yet manage without it. Therefore, we take an understanding view of the government tasks with which we are presented, although I stress again that it would, of course, be better for us if we dealt only with what we are meant for.

As for the questions which you touched on, the point about the situation in the republics of, say, Azerbaijan and Armenia and the involvement of troops in this recently, this question was discussed only a few days ago at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Army ended up in those republics with the sole aim of assisting the law-enforcement bodies in defending people's living and maintaining order. If the Armed Forces had not been used to assist—I repeat, to assist—the law-enforcement bodies, there would probably have been significantly more casualties there. We managed, all the same, to avert heavy bloodshed in those republics. But at the same time, those republics now possess sufficient forces and power to establish order in their own homes by themselves. Unfortunately, that did not happen, and it needed the intervention, besides the internal troops, of the Soviet Army.

[Voloshin] Now, in connection with the changes in Eastern Europe, will there be changes in the tasks and the whole interaction of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member countries?

[Sukhorukov] Yes, evidently, some sort of changes must occur. The Warsaw Pact countries and the joint armed forces will, evidently, acquire more and more a political-military type of alliance, and not a military-political alliance. They are being forced to do this both by the situation itself and by the processes which are going on now in the countries of Eastern Europe. But, in any event, we are fimrly convinced that until an alternative is found to the confrontation between the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact countries, which is not completely normal, such an alliance must be maintained until then, for it is a guarantor of the preservation and maintenance of peace in the countries of Europe, in particular. But, of course, it will change its orientation and, evidently, acquire more the character of a political-military alliance.

General Moiseyev Discusses the Defense Budget

PM2302125190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, by our military correspondent V. Litovkin; date and place of interview not stated: "Arguments of General Staff"]

[Text] [Litovkin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, the figures for our military budget have long since ceased to be news. It is well known that the total sum of defense expenditure for 1990 will be 70,975,800,000 rubles [R]. The budget is 8.2 percent less than last year. But why this particular sum? What is the concept of the military budget?

[Moiseyev] That question can be answered briefly: The military budget is determined on the one hand by the state's economic potential and on the other by the demands of reasonable sufficiency for its defense and by the need to reliably safeguard Soviet people's peaceful labor. Both these problems are dialectically interconnected and I should like to elucidate their interaction in a little more detail.

Yes, the country has constantly earmarked for defense as much as it could and no more, although it must be admitted that the people's money has not always been spent carefully enough. There were many reasons for this. One of them was that public control over military expenditure was weakened in connection with the secrecy of this expenditure. Today the situation has changed radically: Literally every ruble and the expediency of its use have been publicly and openly discussed at the Defense Council, in the party Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, and at Supreme Soviet sessions and we shall also regularly report on our expenditure. So that all this forces us to approach an analysis of our demands with particular thoroughness.

And defense requirements are determined by the concept of the Soviet military doctrine, its defensive orientation, and the transition to qualitative parameters in the building and development of the Armed Forces. In the economic respect this makes it possible to reduce military expenditure to a certain extent, to develop the conversion of the defense industry, and in military matters to count on more modern and effective equipment and weapons.

We cannot allow the reduction of armaments and Army and Navy personnel to entail a reduction in their combat potential and the country's defense capability or allow an imbalance to arise in military-strategic parity. Hence the emphases in the budget: The development of military science and experimental design work—we cannot lag behind the leading states and their armies; the purchase of modern armaments and combat equipment—it is clear that only the improvement of the tactical and technical specifications of weapons and the automation and computerization of combat equipment will make it relatively painless to reduce the number of servicing personnel and the number of weapons while retaining the troops' combat potential.

And a third very important element is the budget's social orientation. It has been the case that for many years we would merely declare concern for man, which, naturally, affected the prestige of military service. Now for the first time we have a real opportunity to rectify the situation, if only from the financial side.

[Litovkin] Our newspaper has told readers about the R1.2 billion allocated to improve the servicemen's material and domestic and social living conditions. Could you not give more detailed information about where the money will be spent?

[Moiseyev] Expenditure on social provision for the servicemen is not restricted to the figure you cited. It does not include money for housing construction, and as of today we have about 166,000 families of officers, ensigns, and warrant officers on active military service who have no apartment at all while 8,800 families are living in ramshackle houses and barracks. The problem of allocating housing for those released into the reserve in connection with the unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces is also acute. We are constructing 7,700 apartments specially for them, but that is only one-third of requirements.

Unfortunately, people are experiencing great difficulties because some leaders of local soviet executive committees and enterprises are ignoring the recent USSR Council of Ministers resolution and are failing to grant housing within the stipulated deadlines to those released into the reserve. They say: Let the military department allocate apartments. It is not only the legal nihilism of officials which is troubling but also the desire of some of them to see the Defense Ministry as the Ministry of Construction...

Understand me correctly: We have not and will not shirk concern for veterans although I think that everyone should do his own job. And another thing. People were serving not the Defense Ministry but the country, our entire society. Why is society, in the shape of some of its representatives, trying to repudiate them? I believe that the departmental approach, localistic tendencies, and the bureaucratic "kicking" of a person from one office to another are immoral and wrong in principle.

Today it is essential that we move from closed and isolated military townships thousands of the men who have completed their service and that we transfer their apartments to the officers who have arrived to take over. A problem has also arisen with the provision of accommodation for the families of officers and ensigns whose units will be withdrawn from the groups of forces and with the solution of other questions connected with this.

I hope that the increase in appropriations for housing construction, which is 12.7 percent more than last year, will make it possible to make the problem less acute, although it will not completely resolve it...

And as for the R1.2 billion you were asking about, it breaks down approximately as follows. An increase in official salaries of an average of R50. Awards for high class qualifications from R15 to R25 a month have been introduced. A 30-percent bonus is envisaged to the official salary of pilot officers for special conditions of service, the size of payments to servicemen on combat duty in field conditions has been increased and there will be partial compensation for subleasing housing. The commander has received the right, on the basis of the opinion of the officers' meeting, to introduce a differentiated approach toward the remuneration of the officer and to encourage the best specialists with money awards. The one-off grant to those released into the reserve has been increased. Servicemen who have been drafted have joined this category. Since the new year, they have been receiving R100 each when they leave their unit or ship.

Of course, we realize that given current prices this is no great sum, but our potential is not infinite, alas.

[Litovkin] The military budgets of the USSR and the United States are often compared but how in particular do they compare in terms of expenditure on the maintenance of personnel? Will the result not be that because of the difference in the funds earmarked for military building the threat of a qualitative discrepancy in military equipment and the training of servicemen will arise?

[Moiseyev] Such fears are understandable. But what can be said on this subject? The size of our budget is known. The United States' military expenditure for 1990, taking into account all components, is equal to $315.8 billion and has increased by $6,900 million or 2.2 percent compared with last year. Here their expenditure on the maintenance of the army and navy personnel comprises the main part, over 50 percent, and is equal to $166.2 billion, while we earmark about 30 percent, or R21.8 billion, counting pension provision.

I know the figures are a long way from being in our favor, but I must repeat once again that the size of the military expenditure for each state is determined by the military doctrine it has adopted, by the country's economic potential, and by other factors.

At the same time I want to explain that much, of course, depends on the specific military-political situation. As of today we believe that our defense expenditure, although it is considerably less than U.S. expenditure, makes it possible to maintain in full the parity we have reached.

[Litovkin] It is no secret that we have the task of reducing the proportion of defense expenditure in the national budget by 50-100 percent by 1995. At the expense of which programs? Will this reduction not affect the country's defense capability?

[Moiseyev] Yes, we are indeed now working on this task. The reduction of purchases of offensive arms, some types of aircraft and missile equipment, tanks, artillery pieces, and other types of weapons and the cessation of a whole series of experimental design projects will enable us to reduce expenditure.

Will this reduction affect the country's defense capability? Undoubtedly. But, considering that the United States and the NATO bloc as a whole are steering a line toward ensuring military-technical superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact and creating and deploying new highly effective systems of nuclear and, in particular, conventional arms, we will continue to be obliged to make the necessary efforts to maintain equilibrium through virtually the entire range of weapons systems, communications, control, and reconnaissance facilities, and also to improve the quality of personnel training. Here our response may be both asymmetrical and adequate [adekvatnyy].

Some publications raise the question of whether, given the restricted nature of our funds, it is sensible to resort to similar actions—to build heavy aircraft carriers and large nuclear submarines and other expensive military equipment. To me the answer is clear: The miser pays twice. Here, as in the development of space, you cannot lag behind, you will not catch up later. And another thing. Is it sensible for us, citing poverty, to cut back on those sectors where we hold leading positions?! Surely we should not become a second-rate military power here too?

At the same time, in the event of progress at the talks in Geneva and Vienna, and you know we are sincerely seeking it, and in the event of the relevant agreements being signed, there will be a considerable reduction in the levels of military confrontation and naturally defense expenditure will be reduced.

[Litovkin] And another question. It is very seldom covered in the press. How does our defense expenditure depend on the military-industrial complex? Is there not a danger that it will "extract" money from the military budget by unjustifiably increasing the cost of military equipment and by endless improvements to it? It is well known that one reason for the tragedy involving the submarine Komsomolets was the equipment shortages. Yet to judge from the newspapers, deliveries of poor-quality equipment are continuing. Is there a mechanism to prevent this?

[Moiseyev] You have touched on what is indeed an acute problem. There undoubtedly is such a danger. We can see it. After all we are all living in a society where there still exists the diktat of the producer over the consumer and technocratic egotism. It also pervades the defense sphere.

Our relations with the defense ministries rest at present on contract foundations, yet their enterprises have switched to full economic accountability [khozraschet] and self financing. The cost of equipment and of some types of work has increased 2-3 times and more. We are constantly having to ascertain how far this is justified. But as a whole, as we can see, this is an objective process and it will of course be reflected in our budget and lead to a reduction in the Armed Forces' possibilities for buying equipment and weapons. Although ultimately it is not a question of money. It is very important that the new equipment should be of the highest quality, that ships should not sink, that aircraft should not fall apart, that people should not die. That is what causes us the most anguish.

[Litovkin] I want to touch on one more "painful" topic. I know that the position of the Defense Ministry on the question of a professional army has frequently been set forth in the press. Nonetheless various mass media are returning to it again and again, claiming that the maintenance of professionals is more economical and not more extravagant financially. Arguments are cited and the military department is reproached for the fact that no one has seriously weighed on the economic scales what is better for us: universal military service or a selection of highly trained specialists. At the recent congress some deputies from military circles suggested switching to a professional army.

[Moiseyev] I know of this proposal and I must say that I well understand the young officers. After all, if you take the idea of a professional army in its "pure" form, so to speak, and separate it from present political, economic, social, military, and other realities, it is very attractive to us. Cadre officers and generals would only stand to gain. Do not think I am trying to accuse anyone of being mercenary, but you cannot fail to see that their salaries would increase sharply. The solution of socioconsumer and other problems would improve. It would become simpler to work with subordinates—their discipline and combat skill would improve drastically. We would no longer collect men but select them. And of course not those we have but the very best. And there would be no further need for expensive shipments, campaigns associated with the draft and the release into the reserve, people would stop arguing about national-territorial formations, and no one would break combat equipment simply because he had not understood his orders.

But, let's come down to earth, to the situation which exists as of today. We have calculated the sums necessary to maintain a professional army, and we have done the sums more than once. And although your newspaper has rebuked me for the fact that the figures I cited are not very convincing, I must repeat again that expenditure on the Army's maintenance will be five to eight times greater than at present.

Why the difference? Because of the different methodologies of calculation, because of the lack of unity in selecting the initial positions. Some people take as their point of departure a salary of R150-200 and believe that this is enough, while others take R300-350. But how much should an officer or a general receive? And here there are few people who think about the serviceman's family, about where, under what climatic and geographical conditions, they will have to live and serve, what their apartment will be like, whether it will have hot and cold water or have facilities "out on the street"; what people will buy in the garrison stores, where they will go in their free time, where exactly their wives will work, where their children will be raised and educated; about guarantees of their social and material provision after their contracts end... All this must be created and colossal funds and financial, material, and manpower resources must be spent. Where are they to be taken today?

We have already said that it is planned to spend about R21.8 billion, nearly 30 percent of the entire budget, on the maintenance of the Army and Navy in 1990. And that is the absolute minimum, which makes it possible to make ends meet. Here our officer and soldier is unfamiliar with the contract system and serves where there is a need, not where he wants. Estimate how much more must be spent, even on condition that the Army's numerical strength is halved, in order to interest a man in serving. And of course not in a garrison in the capital but in a remote one.

A simple example. Advertisements inviting bus drivers to work in Moscow promise them a wage of R350-500. But surely a driver's shift work is no more responsible than the constant tension experienced by the mechanic and driver of a tank, armored personnel carrier, or missile launcher, which have to be driven not over asphalt but over unpaved testing grounds, through cuttings in the taiga, or along winding mountain roads?! And the round-the-clock tension of combat duty?! How much is that really worth in rubles?!

Let's analyze the other arguments too. In particular our experience of many years of staffing individual posts with ensigns, warrant officers, and those on extended service. It is no secret that there are more than enough vacancies here. And it is not only a matter of financial maintenance. In Moscow, Leningrad, and the capitals of the union republics and in the groups of forces there is not full staffing, and as for the garrisons of the Transcaucasus, in the Turkestan and Transbaykal districts, and the "godforsaken corners" of the Leningrad and Far Eastern districts... Although the pay is respectable there. There are other benefits for both the isolation and for special conditions. Yet there are few people anxious to serve there. We took a relatively small group of military specialists, what can be said of the main soldiers' and sergeants' posts?! But service in climatic and geographic conditions ill adapted to normal living is by no means a whim of the Defense Ministry leaders but a necessity for defending the country on particular strategic salients.

There are also other grounds for doubting the expediency of a professional army at the present stage. They can be discussed in a special talk. I do not know whether I have persuaded readers, but I should like to stress that we are studying this problem attentively and as soon as the international, economic, material, and spiritual prerequisites are ripe for such a transition, we shall be ready for it.

[Litovkin] I think we cannot restrict our talk on the military budget to the sums spent on scientific research work, the purchase of arms, and the maintenance of the troops. After all, the Army could save considerable funds by eliminating various gaps of thriftlessness in operating equipment and in the sensible planning and economical performance of exercises and flights. What reserves are there here? And if possible, please respond to the criticism addressed to district commanders for their "extravagant" flights on "personal" aircraft.

[Moiseyev] I fully agree that the Armed Forces have an enormous potential for saving money and other assets through more rational economic management. We are constantly working on the problem of optimizing the training of the Army and Navy and reducing various expenses here. How?

In the new year we drastically reduced, by one-third, the number of all large-scale exercises and altered their cyclical sequence. Defense topics are being rehearsed, which will save resources. We are using simulators and automated training complexes. But I shall not cite specific figures. I can say frankly that they are relatively small. Smaller than those on which we had counted. The main reason is that the struggle against thriftlessness and extravagance at all levels is still being waged very feebly.

As for "personal" aircraft, here I think there is some misunderstanding. Any unprejudiced person understands that for a district commander—and our military districts, for instance the Transbaykal, Siberian, Turkestan, and Volga-Urals districts, are comparable, in terms of territory, to West Europe—an aircraft is not a privilege but a professional necessity. It is a means of communication and of controlling troops during a trip.

Incidentally, such flights for airmen come within the system of flight training and are envisaged by the estimate. But if we are speaking of how economical they are?! No one will object if our aviation industry produces aircraft cheaper and more economical than the Tu-154 or Tu-134 for business people, but unfortunately such aircraft do not exist yet.

In conclusion I should like to voice the following thought. We are grateful for fair but constructive criticism and are prepared for open, principled dialogue on any questions of military building and perestroyka in the Army and Navy. But let us not descend into trivia. I simply begrudge them the time.

General Shabanov Discusses Troop Cuts, Conversion

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[Interview with Army General Vitaliy Mikkaylovich Shabanov, deputy minister of defense, by correspondent Kim Kukholev; date and place of interview not given: from the "Army and Perestroyka" program—recorded]

[Text] [Kukholev] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, if you have no objections, I would like to start this conversation with a question that might be a trifle unexpected for you; one that has no direct bearing on the topic of the army and perestroyka. I know that literally in the past few days, you returned from a trip to the United States of America, which you were visiting as a member of our parliamentary group. I know you had meetings there at various levels. I wonder what question was asked of you most often over there.

[Shabanov] Indeed, we had a very interesting trip to the United States—our parliamentary group which was made up of some of the Committee for Defense and State Security. Our trip lasted almost two weeks. We not only had very interesting meetings with spokesmen for the U.S. Congress Armed Services Committee, headed by Mr. Aspin, but also a demonstration of quite diverse hardware—for land forces, the Navy, and the Air Force—strategic and tactical weapons. Naturally enough, there was discussion of issues relating to future relations between our Armies and Navies.

So, what questions were asked? Of course, the questions were very varied, but, both from them and from us, the main questions were how we could cooperate better. We came to the straightforward conclusion that probably the best form of interaction would be openness—naturally, within the limits imposed by the need to maintain state and military secrets. We believe that today already we have mutual understanding on interaction; now we must have mutual links in various branches of military-technological relations.

[Kukholev] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, let us recall that we are meeting on the air waves just an hour before the festive salvo in honor of Soviet Army and Navy Day. I know that undoubtedly there are things which darken our festive mood. We shall talk about that later, but an anniversary is an anniversary, and clearly we should speak now about the extent to which our Armed Forces have proceeded with their development in the past year. What has actually been done to restructure them?

[Shabanov] Of course, the main objective of perestroyka is the qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces. On the one hand, that sounds a very simple thing to say, but in actual fact, of course, this is an extremely difficult process. I should say that at the heart of the idea lies our defense doctrine. It is subordinated to the task of preventing war, and proceeds from the need for a radical reduction in the level of military confrontation. We believe it is essential to provide the Armed Forces with an unequivocally nonoffensive structure; the strike systems contained within them must be reduced, and the volume of military production cut. The sweeping reductions in the Armed Forces begun in 1989 are continuing. You will know that in the years 1989 and 1990 we must cut our numbers by 500,000 men. That is no easy task.

Half of these cuts will take place among the troops deployed in central Europe and in the European zone of our country.

What specific features could be noted in all this perestroyka? In the first place, what we have is not just a mechanical reduction in our Armed Forces: Their very structure and the deployment of the troops is being altered. The number of military districts, armies, and divisions is being reduced. The whole relationship between their offensive and defensive components is being reviewed. Following on from this, the number of tanks, artillery systems, and combat aircraft is being cut substantially. Part of the strike aviation, storm and assault river-crossing subdivisions are being redeployed together with their weapons and combat equipment from the zone of direct contact between the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact organization and NATO. And in the second place, as you will know, this year allocations on the country's defense have been cut by more than eight percent compared to last year. The quantity of weapons and military hardware produced has also been cut.

Given all of this, we must review many of our military hardware programs. Priority is being given to work that will go some way to ensuring the high quality of hardware and weapons and the fulfillment of those tasks facing the troops with a reduced pool of munitions. In the long run, we should end up with Armed Forces that will safeguard our country's defense on the principles of reasonable adequacy.

[Kukholev] You mentioned a staggering figure: 500,000 men. That's the number by which our army is to be reduced. But these are all vital people—young, healthy, strong lads.

[Shabanov] Of course, this is no easy matter. It is a major social issue. There is one mitigating factor. I believe that we have shown ourselves quite farsighted. As you will know, alongside military specialist subjects, in our colleges we provide a grounding in civilian professions. Many of our officers could work as teachers, engineers, or in various other specialist fields, especially in modern technological fields, such as computers, radio etc. I believe that although it is not an easy matter it will be resolved. To be perfectly frank, the question of each person's housing arrangements is a harder question, because today we need quite a large amount of housing due to the redeployment of the officer and warrant officer corps. I believe it should not just be up to the Defense Ministry to resolve the question of housing construction. Literally all the republics, all the oblasts, all the rayons should participate in this—in short, the state.

[Kukholev] This issue is being exacerbated by the general apartment shortage in the country, and by the numerous fugitives—by that I mean the families of servicemen.

[Shabanov] Yes, you are quite right. Our housing construction program is one of the most complicated programs and one that has fallen by the wayside. For that reason, the Defense Ministry has now drawn up our internal target program to provide officers with housing, but I would repeat that the Defense Ministry cannot cope with this task by itself. Many of the leaders of the state and many parliamentarians acknowledge this. Clearly we have to develop this program with dogged determination.

[Kukholev] We have started talking about things that darken the festive mood, and, if you have no objections, that is, I shall continue with the topic. Let's talk about weapons. Until recently, items such as machine-guns, mortars, submachine guns, carbines, the ammunition for them, bullet-proof vests, etc. were the attributes of army life and army life alone. But now the events in the Transcaucasus and now even Dushanbe have shown a different picture. It turns out that the population can lay their hands on more than enough such weapons. Tell me please, is all of this from the militia and the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] arsenals, as some newspapers would have us believe? If not, then what part is your military department playing, with regard to the extremists having a significant quantity of army firearms, that is?

[Shabanov] In the overwhelming majority of cases it is not army weapons that have fallen into the hands of the extremists. As has now been ascertained, the main sources of weaponry for the guerillas of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been the paramilitary security forces, subdivisions of the republics' internal troops, I regret to say, DOSAAF organizations, and the military departments and instruction rooms at various educational establishments. At the same time, of course, it should be acknowledged that there are instances within the Armed Forces of inadequate firearms storage security. Analysis has shown that, by and large, weapons are stolen to be sold for personal gain. We are waging a resolute campaign against this phenomenon. In 1989 around 30 percent of all those convicted by a military tribunal, attempted to steal and sell weapons. We will continue to wage a resolute struggle against this phenomenon. Of course, one of the most important aspects of this struggle is to step up the security of the depots, arsenals, or what have you.

[Kukholev] I see. I have another question now, since we have just started speaking about the events connected with the theft of weapons and with the flouting of our laws. Let us return to the subject of the Transcaucasus, and recall that not just in that area, but in the Baltic too, there were instances during the last call-up to active service of people refusing to serve in the Armed Forces, to put it mildly. There was resistance, deceit, malingering, and people tried to get out of donning their epaulettes. Or if they were to don them, then they wanted to remain within the confines of their home republic, near to home. That is the singular way some people now understand glasnost and democracy with respect to the Army. Right, Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, what would you say on this point, and in general can someone subject to call-up interpret or subject to revision the order of the defense minister?

[Shabanov] Well, first of all, I have to say that the listeners to your program no doubt know that USSR citizens do their active military service in accordance with the USSR Constitution. I would remind you that instructions from the Defence Ministry on dismissal from the ranks of the Armed Forces or a routine call-up of citizens for military service begin with the words: In accordance with the law of the USSR on general eligibility for military service, it is ordered... Those young people who in various ways evade service with the Armed Forces are in conflict with state legislation and not with the orders of the Defense Ministry. Therefore, evasion of the call-up to active military service is classifed as a state crime under the Criminal Code and entails appropriate penalties. That is the legal basis of this question.

As for young people wanting to serve within the confines of their own republic, unfortunately this trend has a destructive rather than a constructive character in society. The structure of the Soviet Armed Forces today is such that their formation according to territorial principles is simply impossible. One can, for example, cite such reasons as, first, the fact that the concentration of Army and Naval Forces is planned and effected on the basis of ensuring the defense capacity of the country as a whole and not of individual republics. Accordingly, subdivisions from republics or other regions must have the possibility of moving to others depending on the military situation. There, are, however, weapons systems that simply cannot be sited in a single republic and appropriate national units or sudivisions formed. These are the missile attack warning system, the space monitoring system, the air-space monitoring system, and the defense of the country as a whole from aerospace attack. Sadly, few of us know much about this in the republics and they always think in terms of motorized infantry or tank divisions. (?That would be) much simpler but who would serve in these most complex systems? I think, therefore, that this question is of fundamental significance and it seems to me that very serious work must be done to explain all the consequences of such separatist actions.

[Kukholev] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, I've many questions for you and I do understand that you won't be able to answer them all as we don't have very much time. You are deputy defense minister for armaments and, naturally, the conversion of the defense industry upon which, in general, great hopes are laid in our society, is within your field of vision. What new problems are arising in the Armed Forces in connection with conversion?

[Shabanov] You were quite right to say that our society ties certain hopes up with the conversion of the defense industry. At the present time, development is coming to a close of a state plan for conversion for the period up to 1995, implementation of which will permit a substantial increase in the contribution of the defense complex to normalizing the country's economic situation. I have to say that naturally we—and by this I mean the Defense Ministry—were active participants, myself included, in the development of this plan. The scientific and technical production potential of the complex is to be used for technically reequipping the national economy and, above all, the light and medical industries, the agro-industrial complex, commerce and public catering, as well as high-quality consumer goods production. In 1989, the proportion of nonmilitary output in the defense complex amounted to slightly more than 40 percent. In 1990 this will increase to 46 percent, while in 1995 this level will reach 60 percent. At the same time, I have to say that conversion is by no means manna from heaven nor a newly discovered source of free gifts. To obtain a positive effect from conversion, a certain amount of time and considerable expenditure are required: the conversion of all technology, the assimilation of all that unfamiliar civilian technology by personnel at factories and design offices. Of course, all this will take time. Expenditure on refitting production, restructuring joint production by producers, retraining workers and, if you like, providing for their social protection will, of course, amount to no little expense. Another matter, and a very important one, is the fact that we must retain our industry's potential for mobilization. Saying today that military danger has completely disappeared would, I think, be quite simply incorrect and impermissible and our industry must be prepared, should the need arise; it must have capacity for mobilization.

[Kukholev] I must ask you, as deputy defense minister, a further question on arms. Recently, glasnost has illuminated many negative phenomena in areas which until recently were considered closed. The mass media report, in part, many incidents of accidents with the Armed Forces' equipment, in the Air Force, in the Navy—we remember the submarines which have sunk. There have been deaths. How do you explain the reasons for these accidents, explosives? And what is being done on the restructuring plane that such things should not be repeated in the future?

[Shabanov] There are two basic reasons for the accidents and catastrophes which take place in the Armed Forces. The first reason is construction and production defects in weapons which are supplied to us by industry. The second, if one is to be frank, is the inexpert use of this equipment by personnel. We pay a huge amount of attention, and work with industry to eliminate construction and production defects.

What is the essence of the question here? The most important thing is guaranteeing high quality technology in arms production. Unfortunately, many defence enterprises and many design offices do not pay enough attention to technology. For this reason we direct our military representatives not only toward receiving products as finished products, but we direct them toward monitoring the technology. For example, I can say this: We have introduced a stringent control of technological processes in electronics, and the quality of electronic components has, in essence, increased by one and a half times, or rather their failure rate has been reduced by one and a half to two times. This is evidence of the effectiveness of our measures.

As concerns personnel today, it is clear that we are examining teaching methods. And examining is not just words, it is visual aids, reshaped and intelligible instructions, training simulators, and finally, it is various kinds of training which works not only through the complex of mutual interaction of equipment, but elements as well, and finally, I must say frankly, it is, of course, professional selection. It is impossible to make any man, let's say, a tank crew man; it is, naturally, you understand, impossible to make any man a sailor, if he is not capable of working with naval equipment.

[Kukholev] And here it is probably wrong to underestimate the role of military commissariats which send rank-and-file soldiers, conscripts, to one or other unit.

[Shabanov] I agree with you completely. At the moment we are restructuring the work of military commissariats in precisely this direction, so that a professional selection, if one can put it this way, can begin in these regional links, at the earliest stages.

[Kukholev] I know that—I often visit troops—training periods for those specialists who service military equipment are not being increased.

[Shabanov] We do not have time to increase training time for specialists, and for this reason we have to intensify the training of specialists. I must say that one of the most important tasks which lies in front of us, in my opinion, is the freeing of specialists from all auxiliary, supply works. This is also a very important reserve of perestroyka.

[Kukholev] Well, Aleksandr Mikhailovich, time has brought us nearer to the celebratory salute in honor of the Day of the Soviet Army and Navy, and you have the possibility of talking directly to our listeners. Please.

[Shabanov] Dear comrades, today the whole of our country celebrates the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. The most important task which we have had, and still have, is to guarantee the peaceful labor of Soviet people. On this holiday, I want to congratulate from my heart all the personnel of our Armed Forces, in the first place those who celebrate this occasion at stations of duty. We always remember the contribution by our veterans of the Great Patriotic War, who brought us a great victory, the 45th anniversary of which we will celebrate this year. I wish them good health and great human happiness. I want to express my great gratitude to all internationalist soldiers who gave invaluable help to the peoples in their struggle for their freedom and independence. I wish great creative achievements and success in labor to all workers in the defense branches of industry, who create the material basis for our Armed Forces. Happy holiday, dear comrades.

Cuts in Air Force Equipment, Budget Described

PM2302170190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Aviation A. Pozdnyakov, deputy chief of the Air Force Main Staff, conducted by own correspondent Colonel A. Manushkin; date, place of interview not given: "The Question of Competence"]

[Text] [Manushkin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, readers are ringing in and sending letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's editorial office asking us to comment on the speech made by People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin at the USSR Supreme Soviet Third Session. Speaking of the Soviet Union's unilateral cuts in its Armed Forces in Europe, he stated that some combat equipment, in particular one-third of the aircraft and helicopter fleet, will be destroyed. What can you say on this?

[Pozdnyakov] Some aviation equipment withdrawn from combat strength is naturally being destroyed in the course of the Armed Forces cuts. The figure indicating that in this context one-third of the aircraft and helicopter fleet will be destroyed is too high. The aircraft due to be cut are only roughly one-sixth of even the level laid down for the sides at the Vienna talks (4,700 combat units).

[Manushkin] Deputy Lopatin said: If we reduce this equipment and destroy it, it certainly means we need to produce less of it. At the same time, he said, we have approved for 1990 an increase in the proportion of the military budget directed toward purchasing this equipment. Is this so?

[Pozdnyakov] In the context of the processes of easing international tension, the strengthening of confidence-building measures, and the Vienna talks on conventional arms cuts I will cite the specific figures. The number of aircraft planned to be purchased in 1990 compared with 1989 and 1988 has fallen by 23 and 30 percent respectively.

The sums of money being spent on purchasing aviation equipment have also fallen by 12 and 14 percent respectively. The disproportionate reduction in expenditure in money terms compared with the quantitative indicators is due to the considerable increase in the cost of modern aircraft (50-100 percent).

[Manushkin] A year ago you told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent during an interview that 800 aircraft were to be taken out of combat service in line with the decision on the unilateral cut in the Armed Forces. How do things stand today? How many aircraft have been decommissioned and how many remain?

[Pozdnyakov] As of now the plan to withdraw aircraft from combat service as part of the unilateral Armed Forces cuts has been virtually carried out by the Air

Force command. As has already been announced, the Air Force combat strength has been cut by 800 combat aircraft in Europe.

[Manushkin] The deputy spoke about destroying equipment. His idea was clear: On the one hand, we destroy it, while on the other, we purchase and spend money on it. Readers are wondering whether the planes withdrawn from the Air Force strength are going for scrap metal?

[Pozdnyakov] The need to develop and upgrade equipment under modern conditions is a natural process. At certain stages it is completely replaced. This is seen particularly graphically in the sphere of military hardware, including Air Force equipment. Modern systems with higher performance and combat potential replace obsolete, ineffective aviation combat equipment which is unable to fully meet tasks to a high standard. The need to purchase new modern aircraft is therefore dictated by the nature and scale of the tasks facing the Air Force in the context of their compliance with the principle of defense sufficiency.

The aircraft which are being withdrawn from combat service are to be used for various purposes: As training aids in units, higher educational institutions, and the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy and for models and targets at firing ranges. Various units and their components which have not served their allotted period or exhausted their useful life are to be used as spare parts.

Aeroengines are to be used to equip machinery for the maintenance of airfields (heaters for the preparation of airstrips in winter) and in the national economy.

When the aircraft have been dismantled, the scrap metal, including nonferrous metal, will be passed on to processing enterprises.

It remains to be added that the people's deputy's speech undoubtedly demonstrates the need for a rational reduction of the Armed Forces. The allocation of budget appropriations for the country's defense must be thoroughly considered and sufficient to safeguard the peaceful labor of Soviet citizens in present-day conditions. The deputy's concern for the rational use of these aircraft in the national economy is understandable.

But I think that the deeper study by deputies of the processes taking place in the Armed Forces and their urgent problems will enable them to increase their competence and give them an opportunity to present and resolve questions at Supreme Soviet sessions in a well argued-way.

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Elections Begin

LD2402100190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0830 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Jazis Ustsila]

[Excerpts] Vilnius, 24 Feb (TASS)—Elections are being held today to elect deputies to the supreme organ of legislative power in this Soviet Baltic republic—the Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

The elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which began at 0800, should end at 2000 local time. In those constituencies where no candidate deputy obtains the required number of votes a repeat election is to be held in about one month's time.

Candidate Lists Confirmed

LD2302120190 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Summary] The republican election commission met yesterday in Vilnius. The next meeting will take place next Tuesday when the deputies elected to the Lithuanian Parliament will be registered.

The lists of candidates for the elections have been confirmed. From 473 candidates 141 deputies are to be elected. The candidates include only 28 women. The absolute majority of the candidates—400—are Lithuanians, 30 are Russians, 30 are Poles, and there are several Belorussians, Jews and Ukrainians; there is one Latvian, one Armenian, one Tartar. Of the 473 candidates 189 are communists, 22 social democrats, 17 members of the Democratic Party, 4 Greens, and 2 Christian Democrats. There are 139 non-party people.

Some 2.5 million rubles have been allocated from the republican budget to finance the elections. Five years ago 300,000 rubles were spent on the elections to the present Supreme Soviet. According to deputy chairman of the republican election commission, Vaclovas Litvinas, people are right in saying that democracy is expensive.

The official results of the elections will be published only next Tuesday, after a meeting of the election commission. Vilnius Radio hopes to publish unofficial election results on Sunday.

Parties Outline Platforms

LD2402101590 Moscow TASS in English 0708 GMT 24 Feb 90

[By ELNA correspondent Arciuras Mankiavicius]

[Text] Vilnius February 24 TASS—Candidates will run for the republic's supreme legislature this year on tickets from several parties for the first time in the past five decades. Previously, candidates were nominated on behalf of the so-called bloc of communists and non-party people—the Communist Party alone, to be exact, as was true in the entire Soviet Union.

This time, Lithuanian voters have a selection. Candidates have been nominated by two communist parties—200 by the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party and 91 by the republican Organisation of the CPSU (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the Social Democratic Party (22 nominees), the Democratic Party (17), the Christian Democratic Party (2), and the Greens (4). One hundred and thirty-nine candidates do not belong to any party.

The Lithuanian Communist Party was the first to publish its election platform. Its address to voters said: "The Communist Party of Lithuania is preparing for the elections with no constitutional guarantee of its leading role, having frankly reviewed its dramatic and contradictory past and won independence." The party's chief objective is "the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state".

The Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Greens and members of the Democratic Party also say their chief objective is an independent Lithuania.

Only the candidates nominated by the Republican Organisation of the Soviet Communist Party favour unity with the CPSU and reject the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state as it existed between 1918 and 1940. They want Lithuania to be part of the renewed Soviet federation.

Incidentally, most party representatives (except for the CPSU Republian Organisation) are supported by Sajudis, a popular movement for perestroika. Sajudis-backed candidates led in the last year's elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Lithuanian television and radio have offered each candidate numerous chances to address the electorate. The TIESA (TRUTH) newspaper published speeches by rivals. Pluralism is on the march.

Sajudis-Backed Candidates Win Majority

PM2502210390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent V. Matulyavichyus, under the general heading "Elections in the Republics"]

[Text] Lithuania—People here have been impatiently awaiting reports on the results of the elections of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies held Saturday. The preliminary results were announced at a special news conference organized by "Sajudis."

The first round in the elections decided 90 of the 141 deputy seats. The Soviet have been won by candidates officially supported by "Sajudis." These deputies account for 72 of the 90 so far elected. The independent Lithuanian Communist Party gained 22 seats, the

Lithuanian Communist Party loyal to the CPSU platform—7 seats, the Social Democratic Party—9 seats, the Green Party—2 seats, and the Christian Democrats—2 seats. Nonparty deputies have gained 48 seats or, in other words, the majority so far elected.

Whatever the outcome of the second round of the elections on 10 March, deputies supported by "Sajudis" already hold the majority in the republic's new Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, the distribution of forces is such that, when the elections are over, the only possibility will be to form a coalition government involving the communists, V. Landsbergis, chairman of the "Sajudis" Sejm, remarked at the news conference.

Further on Results

LD2602095190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Yesterday, Lithuania was electing its parliament. According to unofficial figures, among the 90 elected deputies, 72 are people supported by Sajudis, that is, 80 percent.

Unfortunately, so far we do not have a truly effective parliament. All important decisions can be made by it only when two thirds of the deputies take part in the session. Since the parliament will have 141 deputies, the required number is short by four people. In the second round of elections which will take place on 10 March, 90 candidates will stand for elections in 45 constituencies. Among them will be 38 candidates supported by Sajudis. In five constituencies, two Sajudis candidates will compete with each other in each of them. Thus, even according to the most pessimistic forecasts, Sajudis will have more than half of the seats in parliament. New elections are to be held in six constituencies where no candidate obtained more than half of the votes.

An interesting situation has developed in Snieckus. We have already reported that one candidate remained—an engineer at the nuclear power station, an activist of the Lithuanian Communist Party subordinated to Moscow, Sergey Pirozhkov. However, the Snieckus residents virtually boycotted the elections. Only about 35 percent of the electors took part. According to election law, the elections are valid when more than half of the electors take part in them. Thus although Sergey Pirozhkov did not have competitors, he has not become a deputy. This is a very eloquent fact bearing in mind that Snieckus is, in fact, a Russian town. New elections there and in five other constituencies will be held on 7 April.

And now more detailed statistics about the elections. As we already stated, from 90 elected candidates, 72 are supported by Sajudis. Among them are almost all members of the Sajudis Sajmas Council—Vytautas Landsbergis, Romualdas Ozolas, Kazimieras Antanavicius, Mecys Laurinkus, Zigmas Vaisvila, Vergilijus Cepaitis, and others. In the second round of the elections, the struggle against the competitors will be continued by Kazimiera Prunskiene and Jokubas Minkevicius.

Twenty-two members of the Lithuanian Communust Party were elected. Among them are all four secretaries of the Central Committee—Algirdas Brazauskas, Vladimiras Beriozovas, Justas Paleckis, and Kestutias Glaveckas.

Seven members of the CPSU Lithuanian branch were elected. Also, nine Social Democrats, two Christian Democrats, and two Greens were elected, in addition to 48 nonparty members. Almost 70 percent of the registered voters took part in the elections.

I must remind you that these are unofficial figures. Official results of the elections will be published after a meeting of the Electoral Commission which will be held on Tuesday.

Spokesman Views Elections

LD2602105690 Moscow TASS in English 1031 GMT 26 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Vstsila]

[Text] Vilnius February 26 TASS—The Sajudis Movement for Perestroyka won the Lithuanian parliamentary elections by a wide margin on February 24, TASS was told at the Republican Election commission.

The results of the elections will be endorsed on February 27. But unofficial results already show that most of the voters have cast their ballots for Sajudis candidates. Ninety deputies have already been elected to the 141-men republican Parliament. Eighty percent of them are Sajudis members.

"The new Lithuanian Parliament is to usher in a new phase in the Republic's history, in which communists will probably no longer play the leading role," commented Cheslavas Jurshenas, a spokesman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers. Only thirty Communists have so far been elected, mostly members of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania. Seven members of the pro-union Lithuanian Communist Party have also been elected.

Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania—Algirdas Brazauskas, Vladimir Beryozov, Kyastutis Glavyatskas and Justas Paletskis have been elected to the Lithuanian Parliament, as well as Sajudis leaders Vitautas Landsbergis, Romualdas Ozolas, Bronyus Genzyalis and others. Not one of the secretaries of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party has so far been elected.

Run-off elections will be held in 45 constituencies. New candidates will have to be nominated and repeated elections held in six constituencies.

Official Notes Election Turnout

LD2502131990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 25 February carries a three-minute interview by Guoda Salciute with Vaclovas Litvinas, deputy chairman of the Republican Electoral Commission.

Litvinas says 90 deputies were elected in the first round of elections; this constitutes 63.8 percent of the total number of deputies. He notes that the second round of elections will take place in 45 constituencies on 10 March.

Litvinas says that in the 108th constituency the elections did not take place because only 36 percent of the electors cast their votes. In the remaining five constituencies, Latvinas reports, no candidate obtained the required majority of votes so repeat elections will be held in these constituencies by 7 April.

Brazauskas Reelected

LD2502092290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] From the total number of 141 constituencies, deputies were not elected in some 50 constituencies. This happened for two reasons: Either there was an insufficient number of electors taking part in the elections or no candidate obtained the necessary number of votes. Thus, in the first case, the elections will be regarded as not having taken place and new elections will be organized, and in the second case, the second round of the elections will be held. [words indistinct]

Among the deputies elected are Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and Vladimiras Beriozovas, second secretary. [passage indistinct]

Constituencies not mentioned here are those where the deputies were not elected. Either the second round of the elections will be held there on 10 March, or new elections will take place on 7 April.

Of course, this information is not final and not official. We obtained it from the Election Commission by telephone and the Sajudis Information Agency. If we obtain some additional information, we will broadcast it in our bulletins today.

Pro-CPSU Party Statement on 1939 Events

PM2602150990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

["Against Distortion of Historical Truth"]

[Text] Secretaries of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) have forwarded to the TASS correspondents' office in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] a statement "On the Decision of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic of 7 February 1990 'Concerning the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 and the Elimination of Their Consequences for Lithuania.'"

In this decision the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet announced, says the statement, that "the declaration of Lithuanian People's Seym of 21 July 1940 on Lithuania joining the USSR is illegal and void because it failed to reflect the will of the Lithuanian people." The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet also deemed "the USSR law on admission of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics" of 3 August 1940, based upon the Lithuanian People's Seym's declaration of 21 July 1940, illegal and not legally binding on Lithuania."

The document notes that the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet is trying to justify its decision by the fact that the People's Seym 14-15 July 1940 elections allegedly violated the Constitution of the Lithuanian Republic and by concoctions, taken from the arsenal of the Smetona regime's political figures, removed from power by the revolutionary people, about "occupation" and "annexation" of Lithuania by the Stalinist USSR while implementing the 1939 secret accords with Hitler's Germany.

We state our resolute protest against the distortion of the historical truth of the events of the summer of 1940 in Lithuania and against the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuania SSR which declared invalid the declaration of the accession of Lithuania to the USSR. Such a resolution is not justified, either legally or politically. No one granted such a right to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR. Fateful questions should be decided by the Lithuanian people themselves, without any pressure on the part of extremist and separatist forces, taking real account of the path traveled and of the future of the working people of Lithuania. The document recalls that the declaration of the People's Seym on the accession of the Lithuania SSR to the USSR was adopted on the basis of the will of the absolute majority of working people, of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia of Lithuania. Of course, those who lost wealth, privileges, and the opportunity to exploit the working masses of Lithuania came out against such a step. On 14-15 July 1940, the voters, in voting for the deputies of the People's Seym, expressed the will of the working people of the republic on the accession of Lithuania to the USSR and support for the electoral platform of the union of the working people of Lithuania, which stated the necessity for the Lithuanian Republic's firm, indissoluble union with the USSR. Such a union in the then complex conditions could be guaranteed by the accession of Lithuania to the USSR as a sovereign union republic.

The adoption of the People's Seym of the declaration of the accession of the Lithuanian Socialist Republic to the Soviet Union received the approval of broad strata of the working people of the republic. The resolutions adopted then at numerous rallies and meetings of the working people of Lithuania bear witness to this.

Having taken power into their own hands the working people of Lithuania did not even try to hold elections in accordance with the letter of the Constitution of the anti-popular Smetona regime, the statement further stresses. Elections were held on the basis of the law on elections to the People's Seym, which was adopted on 5 July 1940 by the people's government of Lithuania.

Reasoning about the "occupation" and "annexation" of Lithuania in the summer of 1940 is groundless and unfounded, because Soviet troops were introduced into Lithuania on the basis of a treaty and agreement between the two sides. Soviet troops did not interfere in Lithuania's internal affairs and did not establish a regime of occupation.

Lithuania's entry into the Soviet Union had a beneficial influence upon the republic's economic, cultural, and political development, upon the raising of the level of well-being of all peoples of Lithuania, and upon the reunification of all ancient Lithuanian lands. Lithuania's ancient capital, Vilnius; the republic's industrial and cultural center, Kaunas; and the port city Klaipeda were united in a single state for the first time in the history of Lithuania.

Under the conditions of the Stalinist totalitarian regime and the domination of the administer-and-command system the socialist statehood of the Lithuanian people, like that of the other peoples of the USSR, was severely restricted, constrained, and distorted and to a considerable extent lost real content and independence. Under the conditions of revolutionary perestroyka real opportunities have made their appearance for renewing the socialist statehood of the Lithuanian people, as they have for that of the other peoples of the USSR within the federation—which is constantly renewing itself—of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Lithuania, which supports the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress of the party is in favor of that path of development of the Lithuanian people.

The text of the statement ends with the following words: We are in favor of free development, of the full and real socialist statehood of Lithuania and of the prosperity of the Lithuanian people in a community of Soviet peoples founded upon true sovereignty, friendship, and cooperation between all nations and ethnic groups of the USSR, in a community which is in favor of constructing a humane democratic socialist society at the center of the attention of which will be the person and his requirements and interests.

Party Protests Resolution on Treaty

LD2302131890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] The secretaries of the temporary Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform have handed the TASS correspondents in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic a statement on the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic of 7 February 1990 on the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 and on the elimination of their consequences for Lithuanian.

The statement expresses resolute protest against the distortion of the historical truth of the events of the summer of 1940 in Lithuania and against the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuania Soviet Socialist Republic which declared invalid the declaration of the accession of Lithuania to the USSR.

Such a resolution is not justified, either legally or politically. No one granted such a right to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Fateful questions should be decided by the Lithuanian people themselves, without any pressure on the part of extremist and separatist forces, taking real account of the path traveled and of the future of the working people of Lithuania, the statement says.

Lithuania's Brazauskas Interviewed on Developments

LD2302175790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 23 February carries a 13-minute report on a visit by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium to Kaisiadorys Rayon. The report, by presenter Benas Rupeika, includes a short interview with Brazauskas.

At the beginning of the interview, Brazauskas says that the electorate is mainly interested in Lithuania's independence, but they are also aware of the difficulties ahead and are thinking rationally. Speaking of independence, Brazauskas says: "All people in Lithuania are now on one side of the negotiating table and we will stay on one side of the negotiating table. Whether we like it or not, we must admit that the other side will also be at the negotiating table. These negotiations will be the main task facing the new parliament and the new government."

Asked about the prospects for economic chaos and the need for belt-tightening, Brazauskas says: "Chaos already exists. You can see for yourself what is happening. Many organizations are not working steadily." He notes that with things as they are, prospects do not look good. "I can see some organizations in the Soviet Union do not want to enter into contracts with us."

Commenting on the need for agricultural machinery, Brazauskas says "hundreds of millions of rubles worth" is required. "We need it. It must be obtained this year. If we do not conclude agreements on important deliveries of transport machines, tractors, and other agricultural machinery we may find ourselves in a very complex situation."

Brazauskas goes on to say that he is aware that the public is watching him and the results of his actions.

Lithuanian Secretary on Supreme Soviet Session

LD2602111390

[Editorial report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 26 February carries a three-minute interview with Liudvikas Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium, by Jurate Valanciute.

L. Sabutis says that there have been proposals to hold repeat elections in some constituencies as soon as possible. The Presidium will have to decide on the date, which might be 4 or 10 March. Discussing the possible date for the first session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet, L. Sabutis says that if the situation were favorable to Lithuania, then the session would take place at the beginning of April, about 10 or 15 April. March would be spent preparing for the formation of the government, determning the status of the deputies, and working on many other issues. "If life and the situation demanded it, then the deputies would be summoned to Vilnius right after the repeat elections to solve our pressing issues," says Sabutis.

'Democratic Minority' Chairman Interviewed

90UN0937A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 2 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Anatoliy Fedorov, representative of Lithuania's "Democratic Minority," by N. Zdanovich: "Introducing the 'Democratic Minority' Association"; place and date not given—first four paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA LITVA introduction]

[Text] A characteristic feature of our times is, perhaps, the continuous appearance of increasingly new socioeconomic movements, alliances, and so forth. The explanation for this is evidently not hard to find: none of the organizations born earlier has been able for this reason or the other to satisfy the social and spiritual requirements of all citizens experiencing the need for self-expression in precisely this area. A pluralism of opinions is reflected in a multitude of diverse formations.

News of the emergence of one more will elicit from some people merely a tired smile, but some people will, possibly, be seriously interested, feeling that this was precisely what they needed....

So, to business. An association of people calling themselves the "Democratic Minority" (henceforth "DM") is taking shape in Vilnius. The "Declaration" created by their joint efforts, contains an appeal "for the consolidation of all citizens who see the progress of society in its further democratization understood not as the omnipotence and absolute rule of the majority but in a process aimed at the achievement of a level of society's political development whereby any voice, even a weak one, will be heard and taken into consideration." The members of the new-fledged association consider it their civic duty "to seek the elaboration and enactment of laws which consider the interests of all and do not counter pose the interests of the state, society, and the individual but combine them."

Having learned of the new organization and wishing to elucidate for myself its idea and essence and in the hope of evoking readers' interest, I met with Anatoliy Fedorov, representative of "DM".

[Zdanovich] Why in our time, when all around people are speaking only of democracy, are you in no doubt that you are in the minority?

[Fedorov] It is precisely the point that people are only talking about democracy, but, unfortunately, showing little concern for the implementation of truly democratic principles. The current state of our society is such that many of the organizations and groups declaring their democratic positions are doing so merely to win the affections of the majority and then, by means of acquired influence, to exercise the diktat of their policy, subordinating to it the minority.

Living in a divided world, in which the interests of states, peoples, classes, and social strata and groups clash and where a struggle for one's own interests compels disregard for the interests of others, it is difficult to suppose that there could be all that many exponents of genuinely democratic ideals. We are a minority.

[Zdanovich] Denying the priority of the majority opinion over the minority opinion and recognizing the equality of all opinions, how do you conceive of the exercise of state power?

[Fedorov] Your questions is based on a misunderstanding. Of course, the majority opinion takes precedence over the minority opinion, and they cannot be equal. We are talking about something else—consideration and concordance. It is these that are served by civil rights and liberties—assemblies, mass meetings, public associations, and many others.

[Zdanovich] Please specify your understanding of the freedom of the individual in society.

[Fedorov] The progress of any society is determined by the level of rights and liberties which it accords its members. The popular notion consists of identifying freedom of the individual with arbitrary action. This is wrong. The freedom of the individual lies in his sovereignty and in the priority of the interests of the individual over the interests of the state and society. Society must create the legal and economic prerequisites for ensuring the rights and liberties of its least "minority"—man. A barrier should be erected only where the intentions and behavior of one individual limit the freedom of other such sovereign individuals.

[Zdanovich] Your "Declaration" pays attention to the rights of dissidents. What is meant by "dissidents" in a free democratic society?

[Fedorov] Truly, in a free democratic society the term "dissidents" would be devoid of content. But there is no such society anywhere as yet. In any country there are people who could be attributed to the ranks of dissidents. That the degree of a society's democratic character may be judged from its attitude toward them is another matter. One state destroys them, puts them in prison, and exiles them. Another tolerates them, through clenched teeth. Yet another affords them an opportunity to have their say and sometimes even listens to them....

[Zdanovich] How do you evaluate the degree of democratic character of our society?

[Fedorov] In my opinion, we are somewhere between the first and the second.

[Zdanovich] Do you, in the future, intend to fight for power or to confine yourself merely to propaganda of your ideas?

[Fedorov] The struggle for power is a normal state of society if different groups and parties operate therein. On the basis of competition these organizations aspire to have their representatives elected to elective bodies to defend to the fullest extent possible the interests of the groups of the population which support them and vote for them at the elections. For this reason it seems to me that were our opinion also represented in parliament, say, this would be only to the benefit of democracy.

[Zdanovich] Nonetheless, is democracy an end or a means?

[Fedorov] Democracy cannot be a means for the achievement of group ends, it is a means merely for the achievement of freedom.

[Zdanovich] Does it not seem to you that the struggle for democracy should be anticipated by educational activity? In other words, is the cultural level of contemporary Soviet society sufficient for the embodiment of democratic ideas when it is living under conditions of shortages at every step —both spiritual and material?

[Fedorov] The level of development of political culture, which is extremely low with us, is most significant here. Notice how extreme positions predominate with us all the time. And what can be said about mutual understanding if no one is capable of at least listening to the other side. All this is complicated by the impossibility of the harmonization and balancing of national aspirations. The struggle of each national group for its rights is unfailingly perceived as (and sometimes proves to be) an infringement of the rights of another national group. Incidentally, I am absolutely convinced that without national concord there will be no independent and free Lithuania.

We see our association as an attempt to create a center platform.

[Zdanovich] That is, you will seek the rational middle ground and stick to it?

[Fedorov] And prove the soundness of such a position.

[Zdanovich] In calling for respect for any opinion and for the exclusion of any ideological load whatever from legislative instruments—your "Declaration" speaks about this—are you renouncing ideological substantiation of your own movement? In what do you believe?

[Fedorov] The symbol of our belief is contained in Voltaire's well-known phrase: "Your beliefs are hateful to me, but I will defend to the death your right to express them." And the exclusion of the ideological load from legislative instruments applies to Article 6 of the Constitution, which, fortunately, no longer has any validity in our republic, and also all other documents capable of outlawing dissidence.

[Zdanovich] What do you see your association as?

[Fedorov] Organizationally the main task is the creation of a nucleus of like-minded people capable of confidently and cogently defending their position. The main forms of our activity will be canvassing and propaganda. We intend to take part in civic action conducted by other public organizations and corresponding to our aspirations. We will support deputies of a democratic mind.

Anyone who shares the "DM's" position participates in the activities it stages and who supports its representatives in elective bodies may be considered a member of the association. The "DM" telephone number to contact is 73-19-46.

[Zdanovich] Are you not allowing for the possibility, given a felicitous confluence of circumstances, of the growth of your "Democratic Minority" into a majority? Will your concept then change? What might this change generally?

[Fedorov] No. For, as I have said, we will not defend the special interests of any social strata or national groups. Although, on the other hand, we will defend their interests if they are infringed upon from the viewpoint of democracy, freedom, and justice. And inasmuch as our society is torn by contradictions and no contending party wishes to "go back on its principles" and is prepared to fight to the finish, come what may, we are not likely to become a majority in the foreseeable future. But this does not mean that, being a minority, we cannot do a great deal. On the contrary, I hope that we will succeed in containing the pressure and ambitions of the extremes.

The strengthening in society of center positions is evidence of its democratization. And if such a change in the social consciousness occurs, we will go into self-liquidation with satisfaction and join the broad popular movement.

Lithuanian Paramilitary Organization Restored

LD2302101690 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Summary] The Lithuanian paramilitary organization, the Union of Riflemen [Sauliu Sajunga, a paramilitary organization in independent Lithuania before World War II] has been restored. At present, there are in Lithuania some 3,000 members of this organization. A central board of the organization, consisting of 12 people, has been elected. Its chairman is Aleksandras Bendinskas, a member of the staff of the uprising in June 1941 and later the head of that staff. A congress of the Union of Riflemen is to be held in Kaunas on 22-23 June this year. The Union of Riflemen was originally established in 1919. It was forbidden in the summer of 1940.

Latvian Delegates Attend Independent Party Meeting

LD2402181690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1705 GMT 24 Feb 90

[by TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 24 Feb (TASS)—Supporters of the setting-up of an Independent Communist Party of Latvia, about 1,000 delegates from all the towns and rayons of this Soviet Baltic republic, gathered today in the capital for their conference. They are discussing draft rules, principles of activity, and the possibility of convening their congress even before the forum of all Latvian communists planned for June.

Experts do not see great divergences between the newly arisen wing of the Latvian Communist Party and the one existing at present. The former advocate complete secession from the CPSU. The latter consider that the sovereign status of the republic's Communist Party is achievable within the framework of the process of perestroyka in the Soviet Union as a whole. Common ideas, including the construction of a humane democratic society, run through the programs of both groups of Latvian communists, as does the CPSU Central Committee platform.

Most observers consider that if a demarcation occurs among Latvia's 175,000 communists, including 70,000 Latvians, then it will occur primarily on ethnic grounds.

"Today Latvia is standing on the threshold of developing a qualitatively new party of left wing forces," stated Ivars Kezbers secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee of this Baltic republic, who presented a report to the conference. He named the purpose of those gathered as the construction in Latvia of a "law-based, independent, free state." The secretary proposed putting their idea forward to the next congress of Latvian communists, and not to convene their forum before it.

The conclusion of the conference is expected at about 2200 Moscow time.

Inaugural Congress Set for 14 Apr

LD2402194690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 90

[N. Kasyanova reports; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Kasyanova] A party conference in Riga today attended by 1,080 delegates who support the Independent Communist Party of Latvia may make a decisive impact on the republic's political climate, which is already heated this winter: The Latvian Communist Party is being split.

The conference plans to debate the provisional rules and program and to adopt several resolutions, including one condemning the October 1940 decision by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party—Bolsheviks—on the incorporation of the Latvian Communist Party into the All-Union Communist Party—Bolsheviks—the grounds that it was adopted without a congress of the Latvian Communist Party being held. The republic's Independent Communist Party is thereby contending for the right to the old party's ideological legacy and quite definitely for the material legacy of the present Latvian Communist Party.

At a briefing for journalists prior to the conference we were told that the appearance of new rayon committees and a division of property and press organs are a real possibility. The matter of the future extraordinary congress is also being decided. [video shows speakers at a conference]

[Announcer] Here's another report we have just received from our Riga correspondent. The participants in the conference have decided to reestablish the Independent Communist Party of Latvia on the basis of the republic's existing communist party. A date has been set for its inaugural congress—14 April of this year.

1,000 Delegates Attend

PM2502205990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p2

[TASS report: "Will the Minority Become the Majority?"]

[Text] Riga, 25 Feb—A congress to restore the Latvian Communist Party to independence will be held on 14 April. This decision was adopted yesterday evening at a conference of people who support the independent Latvian Communist Party. The provisional statute and "Basic Principles of Activity of the Independent Latvian Communist Party (Provisional Program)" were published several days ago. In these documents the party is presented as "an independent sociopolitical organization of the people of Latvia, in which people in favor of restoring Latvia's state independence and implementing the principles of democratic socialism in society have come together on a voluntary basis."

Even the most careful reader will not find any reference to the CPSU in the draft program, although, on the other hand, he will find the following: "The political parties of Latvia must be independent in their activity and organizational structure, and their leadership must be based on Latvian territory."

In the opinion of those organizing the conference, the Communist Party needs radical reforms but it is unrealistic "to expect them from the CPSU Central Committee and Latvian Communist Party Central Committee." According to M. Rukmane, first secretary of the Kirovskiy Rayon Latvian Communist Party Committee, she "is not sure that the present party and its Central Committee will be able to pull the republic out of its socioeconomic crisis." That is why it has been decided to restore the independent Latvian Communist Party, deeming unlawful the decision adopted by the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee in October 1940 on incorporating the Latvian Communist Party into the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).

The approximately 1,000 conference delegates represented all the Latvian regional party organizations, although the precise number of those who support the independent communists has not been established. Only one thing is clear: They are in the minority among the republic's 175,000-strong party organization. A total of 54 percent of the conference participants were party, soviet, and trade union workers and other leaders who have been released from their duties, while only eight percent were workers and peasants. Latvians formed the overwhelming majority of delegates (92.4 percent).

I. Kezbers, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, said from the conference rostrum: "I know that we are called 'splittists.' We are not splittists but people continuing the ideas and traditions of brilliant forces within the party. In order to continue them, we must take our platform to the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, which must be held before 15 April. This will be the legitimate path: There is no other...."

But this proposal was not supported, and it was decided to break with the majority of communists at their own congress.

Further on Conference

PM2502150990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 p1

[Own correspondent K. Markaryan dispatch under the general heading "From Our Own Correspondent in...."]

[Text] Riga—A conference dedicated to restoring the Latvian Communist Party's independence was held in Riga yesterday. A total of 1,080 delegates took part in the conference's work. Radio listeners and television viewers were also able to take part in discussing the issues by means of a direct telephone linkup.

M. Rukmane, first secretary of Riga's Kirovskiy Rayon Party Committee, who was head of the republic Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] several years ago, delivered a report on behalf of the working group which prepared the conference.

It was pointed out at the conference that at the beginning of 1941, 61.4 percent of the Latvian Communist Party's members were Latvians. But now, Latvians account for only 39.2 percent of the party's 177,000 members and make up 52.4 percent of the republic's population as a whole. Only one in five members of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee represent the republic's rural areas.

The conference was also addressed by I. Kezbers, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and USSR people's deputy. He urged all non-Latvian members of the population to support an independent Latvian Communist Party and urged the latter to commit itself to legal parliamentary methods in its work, hold a referendum among all Latvian Communists, prevent any split in their ranks, and convene a party congress no later than the middle of April.

The conference delegates adopted the draft program and statute of the Independent Latvian Communist Party and also elected an organizational commission to prepare the constituent congress.

Latvian Independence Documents in Public Eye

PM2602150590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Irina Litvinova dispatch under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Declarations Under Discussion"]

[Text] Riga—Public attention in the republic is focused on two recently adopted documents.

The first is the "Declaration on the Question of Latvia's State Independence." It was adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet at its last session. The document says that certain public movements and organizations have made statements on the need to restore the Latvian Republic's state independence, and several local soviets have adopted similar decisions. The document condemns the "Declaration of Latvia's Entry Into the USSR," ratified by the Latvian Seimas 21 July 1940, as having been adopted without ascertaining the will of the whole people and having consequently resulted in the loss of the Latvian Republic's independence.

The declaration notes the need to implement measures "for Latvia's transformation into a free and independent state within a union of states marching along the path of humane democratic socialism, a state building its mutual relations with other states on treaty principles." The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium has been instructed to set up a commission which would in a qualified and expeditious manner prepare measures (including a referendum) for the restoration of Latvia's economic and political independence.

The second document, which has also generated keen interest, is another declaration. It is addressed to the UN Human Rights Commission and is signed by Daynis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian People's Front. The "Declaration on the Situation in Latvia" says that, back in 1940, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union, and it contains a request to the United Nations to include the question of the Baltic region's self-determination on the agenda of the appropriate UN committee. Until this question is resolved, however, "it is necessary to promote recognition of the Baltic region as dependent territories whose autonomy must be restored."

Both documents have produced different evaluations and interpretations in the republic. For the time being it is difficult to forecast what effect they will have on the development of the political situation.

'Compromise Option' for Latvian Divisions Noted

PM2302121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[LATINFORM-TASS report: "A Golden Mean?"]

[Text] Riga, 21 Feb—A document entitled "Guidelines for a Democratic Platform of the Latvian Communist Party" was published here. Its authors—communists who have rallied around "third way" positions—propose an original dual alternative as a way out of the crisis situation, which has worsened within the republic party organization just before its 25th congress. The platform counters the diametrically opposite positions which dominate here—either an immediate break with the CPSU or immutability of its foundations.

In the opinion of the "golden mean" advocates, the party's consistent democratization alone can guarantee a constructive approach toward the solution of problems and civic peace in Latvia. The party must maintain its organizational unity, having rallied round the principles of humane socialism. Political and economic stability, guaranteed equal rights and freedoms, and high living standards for the republic's entire population regardless of social and national affiliation are recognized as a necessary condition for society's development. As for the economic base of the new society, it should be provided by the coexistence of diverse forms of ownership in equal conditions for their development.

The "third way" does not rule out a multiparty system in conditions of adherence to democratic methods for clarifying the relations between political forces and free competition of ideas. The document indicates that the Latvian Communist Party's status would depend on the republic's continued membership of the federation. The question of whether the new platform will turn out to be the sole correct solution will be answered in the near future, but it is already obvious that the compromise option is not superfluous.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Session Held 25 February

LD2302122190

[Editorial report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1000 GMT on 23 February carries a six-minute report by correspondent Gunnar Paal from the session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet in Tallinn.

Paal reports that Edgard Savisaar was not endorsed as Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic minister of economy by the Supreme Soviet.

Paal says that this morning's session was important for the Estonian people with regard to their efforts to achieve independence. He reports that Arnold Ruutel had spoken at the session, proceeding from the 2 February resolution of various people's deputies.

Paal then interviews Arno Almann, secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on the subject of the resolution adopted today. Almann says: "I would say that this resolution is of extreme, principled importance, and that it continues the self-same problems which were raised and which already, through out resolution, were adopted on 12 November of last year when we provided a historical-legal assessment of the 1940 events in Estonia. Today's resolution also accepted the 2 February resolution of the full complement of people's deputies. And hence one now needs to take specific steps. And those specific steps were also set down in the Supreme Soviet resolution, namely by way of an address to the people's deputies of the USSR Congress, asking that the USSR Congress of People's Deputies provide its own assessment of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution with regard to accepting Estonia within the composition of the Soviet Union, since, as we decided on 12 November, the Estonian Riigivolikogu [lower house of parliament] did not have the right to put in an application of this kind, and this resolution was recognized as being legally void. Consequently, the 6 August 1940 USSR Supreme Soviet resolution has been adopted on the basis of a legally void resolution and and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies is authorized to provide a justification [corrects himself] or evaluation.

Today's resolution also says in writing that we will officially inform the USSR Congress of People's Deputies of the declaration which was adopted on 2 February on the issues of Estonian state independence. On that occasion, the restoration of the Republic of Estonia was considered necessary on the basis of the Tartu Peace Treaty concluded on 2 February 1920, and a proposal was made to start already official talks, and a proposal is also made to the congress [as heard]."

Paal reports that a resolution was also adopted on repressions of the 1940's. In addition Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution will be amended during today's session.

Constitutional Provisions on Parties Amended

*PM2402184490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2*

[PRAVDA correspondent I. Teterin report: "Session Held"]

[Text] Tallinn, 23 Feb—A session of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet held here examined a number of legislative acts and state resolutions. Among them were amendments to the republic's constitution making radical changes to the Estonian SSR's political system. Under a law adopted by the deputies, Article 6 of the current Constitution henceforth says: "Parties, social organizations, social movements, and other associations of citizens created in accordance with the procedure stipulated by Estonian SSR legislation and operating within the framework of the Estonian SSR Constitution and Estonian SSR laws form part of the political system of the Estonian SSR." An amendment has also been made to Article 7 of the Constitution, under which parties and social organizations participate "in the administration of state and social affairs and the formation of the positions of the public and social institutions on political, economic, and social questions and questions of culture."

Among other legislative acts adopted at the session, attention is drawn to the formation of a commission on questions of Estonia's economic and political independence.

Estonian Reporter Views Election Issues

*LD2302123790 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1800 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Summary] A meeting of the chief committee of citizens of the Republic of Estonia has taken place in Tallinn. It was said at the meeting that the two Europarliament representatives—Niels Anker Kofoed and Otto von Habsburg—due to arrive today or tomorrow for the elections of the Estonian Congress, have not been given USSR entry visas. Reporter Mati Kirotar says that the Estonian Foreign Ministry is now involved, and this may bring some success.

[Begin Kirotar recording] "Inviting foreign observers to Estonia also serves a definite aim, namely, to make known any possible excesses or attempts to interfere by force in the election process or to stop it, should that be possible, in order that international law can also learn of this. And there is also reason for concern. It is said that the Inter-Movement wants to thwart the elections for the Estonian Congress in Narva, at Sillamae, and in Tallinn."

Tunne Kelam, chairman of the chief committee, says that everything is ready for the elections. It is difficult to say how many people are likely to vote or how many have been registered. Registration continues and the numbers are increasing. "But one can say quite definitely that the figure is approaching 700,000, out of slightly over 900,000 citizens of the Republic of Estonia who live here. And this is a very good result. As this evidently includes around two thirds of those eligible to vote, then one could say that if over half definitely turned up to vote, it would be a good result, but we would like more than that, because this is an exceptional moment, perhaps, in the course of our entire post-war history, since we have for the first time gained ourselves—and I would also say, having willed a belief in it—some kind of a recognizable space for a free take-off, for a free self-determination." [end recording]

Estonian Russians on Local Self-Government

*LD2402112490 Moscow World Service in Russian
1032 GMT 24 Feb 90*

[Text] The Russian population in Estonia intends to actively defend its interests and opposes attempts to remove it from decisions on the future destiny of this Baltic republic. If Estonia secedes from thue USSR, the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and the civil rights of the Russian population intends to voice an initiative for the creation in the republic of a system of local self-government. It could apply to those towns in which the Russian population constitutes the majority. This was announced by (Vladimir Yarovoy), chairman of the committee.

Estonian Peoples Front Rally To Be Held 24 Feb

*LD2302101790 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1800 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Summary] The Estonian People's Front invites everyone to attend a popular rally in Tallinn, in Vabaduse [Freedom] Square, on 24 February, at 1400 local time, to celebrate the anniversary of Estonian independence and the start of the Estonian Congress elections.

Estonian Political Scene Discussed

*PM2302142190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Feb 90 First Edition p 4*

[Article by special correspondent Captain 3d Class A. Orlov under the rubric "Estonia: A Political Review": "The Course—An Autonomous Voyage?"]

[Text] Tallinn, Moscow—Estonia's political calendar in February is overloaded. You merely have to briefly list the main dates. On 2 February, the anniversary of the Tartu peace treaty, a meeting of Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] People's Deputies at all levels, adopted a declaration on the question of state independence. On 5 February another group of USSR People's Deputies took part in the creation of the "Committee for the defense of Soviet power and citizens' rights in Estonia." On 9-10 February there was a conference of the Estonian Communist Party, which adopted a resolution to hold an internal party discussion on the party's future prior to its 20th Congress. The nomination of candidate deputies to the republic's Supreme Soviet ended: Elections will be held in March. And on 24

February it is planned to begin the election of delegates to the Congress of Estonian Citizens.

The most fascinating thing in Tallinn nowadays is surely the newspapers. Actually managing to find some at the newspaper kiosks is not the easiest thing to do: They sell out within 10-15 minutes of going on sale. I couldn't help noticing an elderly woman open the latest issue of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA at the time of the Estonian Communist Party conference and say sorrowfully:

"We still haven't set up on our own? Good God, I've read enough of this, my heart isn't in it..."

I thought to myself: Given the characteristic restraint of Tallinn people, whatever their nationality, that amounted to a protest. Against what? Most probably against a fate which is often beyond the capacity of the ordinary man—that of "penetrating" the screen of garish words and slogans.

"Just yesterday I was speaking in a shop at the Volta production association," L. Annus, a member of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, a man well known in the republic, and an Estonian candidate deputy, told me. He is well known primarily for his firm stand on the future of the Estonian SSR which, in his opinion, is inseparable from the future of the USSR. "And then after the discussion," he went on, "a group of Estonian workers came up and said: 'We have read the declaration adopted at city hall recently on Estonian statehood. It all seems correct. Then we listened to you, a representative of the "Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power," and what you said was right, too. So what is the truth?'"...

I make no secret of the fact that my conversation with Lembit Annus took place because his voice today stands out from the chorus of voices of those public figures in the republic who have earned themselves the name of being "true fighters" for national rebirth. But Lembit is a leader of the committee created on 5 February which is regarded as an opponent of national rebirth. Talking with members of that committee (among the Russian-speaking representatives) would mean giving an opportunity to the Estonian People's Front press to repudiate the topic of the discussion on purely ethnic grounds. Admittedly, the former chief editor of the journal KOMMUNIST ESTONII is hardly insured against the "left-wing" press in this regard.

"The whole 'problem' is that I adhere to the CPSU platform," Annus explained. "The party is renewing itself, it is becoming more democratic, but even so to some people I have virtually 'betrayed' the nation's interests. Such crude logic is regrettable. Many people forget that respect for one's people can also be expressed through respect for another people..."

Yes, today the positions of the various sides in the republic seem to have finally crystallized. Fog is not a particular feature of February here. One side has already not only expressed itself with the utmost clarity but is also taking steps to create an independent Estonian republic outside the borders of the USSR: The other side has also signaled its "position" and is showing firmness in defending the ideas of a sovereign Estonian SSR within a renewed Soviet federation.

It must be said that such certainty expressed by both sides also cost Estonia a few tense days. It was too great an ordeal for some people to watch the intrigues hostile to the republic or national justice behind the ideological confrontation that is taking shape. Probably neither side was free of that to some extent.

To be fair, it must be acknowledged that the Estonian Communist Party Conference, whose sessions were broadcast live on radio, did a lot to lift the tension. The very atmosphere of the communists' restraint influenced people. Perhaps there is a very important lesson for everyone here?

Perhaps... But can everyone reconcile themselves to the search for a common platform, the need for which became particularly obvious after a number of drastic steps by both sides? This doesn't just mean communists, of course; they bear to a decisive extent the full burden of responsibility for Estonia's future and the confidence exists that they will be able to correctly overcome the contradictions that have occurred within the Estonian Communist Party. This also means those who hold extreme views polarized on all questions. I think that those in Estonia today who are perplexed at the "unduly belligerent tone" in the title of the "Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power" can easily find the root of this primarily in the text of the "Declaration on the Question of the State Independence of Estonia." It contains the full set of phrases characteristic of perestroyka in the republic: the "annexed state," "occupation"... And at the meeting of people's deputies itself on 2 February respect for the minority was clearly lacking.

However, these are already past events, these are the actual realities of Estonia's political life which, furthermore, cannot be ignored in the future. Just as the common mood of people today cannot be ignored either. And that depends on the common standard of living.

In this respect, too, a lot has been clarified in February. And it must be noted that the anxieties increased, too. Even despite the fact that the position of the consumer market in the republic is better than in the country as a whole and the shelves do not seem empty. But nevertheless, the food and consumer goods situation can hardly be called favorable. We wrote about the price situation in January, when Estonian self-management [IME] had only just begun in the republic. Prices today are still held at last year's level. But the price question remains open. All that is known is that the price reform, which is being described as inevitable, has been postponed. As for market control figures, they are as follows: Last year the population's income rose by 64 billion rubles [R]. The supply of goods, however, lags behind by more than one-third. R17 billion, the government account points out, consisted of issuing money, that is the population got "landed" with securities. For the purposes of stabilization and supplying the market with goods, at the end of January the Estonian SSR Government adopted a law on the regulation of the import and export of goods.

But despite these and other measures taken by the government and despite the fact that the strategy of republic economic accountability is hardly doubted by anyone, there is quite a lot that is unclear in IME, as they note even on this program's native land. First and foremost for production organizers themselves. It is said that they are entitled to expect the creators of the program to provide a detailed elaboration of it and furthermore to take part directly in organizing production in a new way. However, it must be noted that many people were troubled by what Academician A. Keyern, one of the "fathers" of IME, said recently about the political "emasculation" of this program. And you couldn't help noticing even the hint of a certain aloofness from this project. It cannot be denied, the introduction of any innovation does not run smoothly, especially now, at the crossroads, and science, too, is intended not for bureaucratic use but for introduction in real life. Incidentally, economists have come up with a new idea, one more adapted to circumstances—a kind of politico-commercial enterprise to help the Estonian People's Front. The so-called "People's Front Support Card" has gone into circulation in the republic, by the acquisition of which (and a single donation to the Estonian People's Front) "every one can answer in the affirmative: Should Estonian People's Front deputies begin talks on Estonian independence."

Thus, it comes full circle. Back to the single, now familir, question. And for many present-day political figures this point is the main point of departure. As we can see, even from the "support card" action, it still hasn't been fully defined just how far the desire to leave the USSR meets the fundamental interests of the Estonian people and working people. But meanwhile, the ground has been prepared. Listen to the following opinion: Neither the republic nor the USSR Supreme Soviet has yet elaborated a mechanism for the solution of problems of this kind (the union parliament is only just beginning on this), but some people are already hurrying to get their oars into the rowlocks so as to make their getaway from the bank more quickly. And, it would seem, few are bothered by the question of whether the sides of the departing boat are sound, how coordinated its crew is, and whether the navigators have detailed sailing instructions so as not to run aground?

But all this is an allegory, whereas for the meantime... For the meantime another political action is developing against the current background: the elections to the Estonian Congress. According to the scheme of the initiators of the new action—the movements forming the Main Committee of Citizens of the Estonian Republic—only those who have received the "registration document of citizen of the Estonian republic" can take part in these elections. And the right to that document belongs solely to those who lived in Estonia before 1939, their descendants, and people "seeking Estonian citizenship." (It should be noted that generally speaking, all who have lived long enough in Estonia can "seek" citizenship but that only a few can "claim" that—to use the terminology of the "Voter's Rules for the Congress of Estonian Citizens"). It is proposed to elect 499 delegates to the congress. What powers will they have? As far as may be judged, to determine the course of the independent Estonian republic's autonomous voyage.

Estonian Communist Youth League Program Outlined

90US0516A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 2

[Estonian Communist Youth League Program]

[Text]

Manifesto

The idea of communism has long since changed its white, transparent attire for red clothing. Red is the color of life, but also the color of spilled blood. Revolutions conquered and the socialist world was born under the banner of communism. Monstrous crimes against the peoples and against human rights and liberties were perpetrated under the banner of communism. The communist idea awoke and emancipated progressive thought. The communist idea became a nightstick in the arsenal of ignorant political intriguers, the custodians of the "purity of Marxism-Leninism" and unscrupulous frauds from the field of science and, at times, it became a lead bullet for dissidents.

Knowing all this and rejecting "communism" Stalin-style, "communism" Khrushchev-style and "communism" Brezhnev-style, in our understanding of communism we follow Marx and Engels and repeat after them word for word without any reservations about the historical eras separating us: "Communism for us is not a **condition**to be established and not an **ideal** to which reality should conform. We call communism the **actual** movement which is doing away with the present condition" (K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," Vol 3, p 34).

It is from Marx that we take the basic principle of communism—"the full and free development of each individual" (ibid., vol 23, p 605) and declare it our basic principle.

Adhering to this principle under modern conditions means for us: Putting at the center of all our actions the young individual, the defense of his rights, and the realization of his interests and creative potential for the good of society; influencing the shaping and implementation of the policy of the state, political, and public organizations and the work force; and struggling for the radical renewal of society for this is in the youth's interests.

We candidly acknowledge our connection with the restructuring policy of the Communist Party, but just as candidly declare: Do not expect us to blindly execute party directives. There is room today only in the archives for the slogan "The Party Has Said: 'It Is Necessary!' The Komsomol [Communist Youth League] has replied: 'Yes, Sir!'" We are going into perestroyka not behind the party but with the party, doubting, criticizing, and proposing, but, what is most important, acting. We acknowledge fidelity to Lenin's words that "socialism cannot be introduced by a minority—the party. It may be introduced by tens of millions when they have learned this for themselves" (V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 36, p 53). We are ready to lend our strength and energy to such training.

Our organization is open to all who are prepared to support our program. But we do not aspire to a monopoly in the youth movement and are prepared to formulate on an equal basis with all democratic youth organizations, groups, and movements, the platform of an Estonian Youth Democratic Forum.

We are open to the world and recognize ourselves as part of the international youth movement and are without sectarian prejudice. Humanism and the salvation of mankind in the face of impending global catastrophes—these are for us truly communist ideas.

I. Organization

The Estonian Communist Youth League [KSME] is an independent, voluntary, social and political Estonian youth organization in which young people have united in the name of the real transformation of society and the realization and defense of the interests and rights of youth.

The KSME is a **communist** organization.

The theoretical basis of our ideological activity is Marxism.

We advocate:
The elaboration of a modern concept of the building of socialism;

The surmounting of dogmatic ideological assertions and stereotypes in social science, agitation, and propaganda;

The consistent and complete renunciation of the ideology of Stalinism both in theory and practice.

The KSME is a **political** organization and a component of the political system of the republic. As politicians we: take as a basis the dialectical-materialist methodology of analyzing the development of society; are oriented toward building a society in which the "free development of each is the condition of the free development of all"; struggle for some commanding competence in society; employ political methods of struggle; and uphold specific youth interests via realization of our political platform—the actual transformation of society.

The KSME is an **international** organization by the very nature of its activity. We unite around an idea, not on a national basis; we unite around what is most important not for leveling-down but in the name of the flourishing of that which is national.

The KSME is a **voluntary** organization. We are a union of like- minded, and being a member of the organization means recognizing its program and supporting it with actual deeds.

The KSME is a **united** organization with a flexible and democratic structure reflecting the cherished aspirations of its members and taking the priority of the primary component as its basis.

The KSME is an **independent** organization. We have our own program and rules. We decide independently all questions of our internal arrangement and the functioning of our elective bodies. We create our own material resources and have our own budget. We understand the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [VLKSM] is a voluntary association of communist youth leagues of sovereign republics. We recognize the VLKSM Program and Rules drawn up with our participation.

We organize relations with the Communist Party on the principle of the **full** independence of the youth league. This means relations of comradeship, allied relations, and partnership based on the ideological proximity of program principles and affinity of political values and goals.

A monopoly on the expression of the interests of the whole youth is unacceptable to us. The KSME supports the creation of the legal conditions for the existence of all youth organizations whose activity is not in conflict with the republic constitution. We declare our aspiration to conduct a dialogue with organizations which are forming and which already exist. We will treat them and cooperate with them depending on their programs and specific actions.

II. Priorities

In implementing the basic principle of our organization—the full and free development of each individual—we take as a basis the humanitarian ideals formulated by mankind's millennia of experience.

Freedom of the Individual

We understand freedom of the individual as the degree of his social independence. He should be ensured guaranteed opportunities and conditions for man's self-realization in society.

Freedom of the young individual is limited not only by socially necessary prohibitions, without which there are no morals and law and no guarantees of personal security for all. It is also limited by the concentration of power in the hands of the older generations, in the lack of confidence in youth and its capacity for really participating in managing the affairs of state and society and in shock at their lifestyle and their thoughts and moral principles.

These stereotypes are holding back the development not only of the young personality but also of society as a whole.

We are not calling on the older generations to immediately part with their prejudices toward youth. Such calls would be naive. But we advocate: The creation of the socially necessary conditions for a normal start in life for the young person and the lifting of age restrictions in his choice of forms and place of activity, other than those which are geared to the protection of the young individual against physical and mental strain. We advocate the remuneration of the young individual exclusively according to the amount and quality of labor; and the money earned, furthermore, should be received by the young person himself, not his representatives (parents, school, public organization, and so forth), except for cases where he voluntarily waives payment for his labor. We advocate material and financial support for youthful initiative in all spheres of social life on the part of the state and public organizations. We advocate noninterference of the state and society in the sphere of youth culture, the creative quest of the young personality and the creation of new lifestyles and an "oasis" of a new environment acceptable to one group of young people or another, until a time when this "search for oneself in the world" comes into conflict with the law.

Equality

The communist demand is the only demand for equality amounting to the elimination of class privilege. "Any demand for equality going farther than this inevitably leads to absurdity" (K. Marx, F. Engels, vol 20, p 108). We do not, therefore, call for an equalization of each with everyone and reject any leveling-down.

Important for the young person is not simply the equality of the rights of citizens but also the equality of legal opportunities with other age groups of the population: He will, after all, have to learn to avail himself of them.

For this reason we advocate the elaboration and adoption of an integral system of legal instruments, which will enshrine not new, special rights and freedoms for the young person but additional mechanisms and guarantees of his exercise of pan-civil rights and liberties. We advocate reliable and full notification of the youth about all questions of social life in a form acceptable to the young person. We advocate reliable and full notification of society about the youth and its socioeconomic position, views, and interests and its ideas and initiatives. We advocate direct representation of the youth (by guaranteed quotas) everywhere in the mechanism of representative democracy operations.

Fraternity

We are opposed to the fraternization of the omnipotent and those without rights, the criminal and the victim. We are opposed to embraces creating a semblance of unity where it is not and could not be.

We understand fraternity as the inseparability of man's personal destiny, which he recognizes, with that of the people around him and the destiny of his people, other peoples, and mankind as a whole.

Today the fate of each of us is directly connected with the impending ecological crisis, the exacerbation of interethnic relations, and the loss of many cultural and moral values.

We therefore advocate immediate state and public measures in the sphere of rescuing the environment from man's destructive impact, an immediate halt to ecologically harmful industries and work on ecologically unwarranted projects and legislative recognition of ecological damage and the squandering of national natural resources as a particularly serious crime against the state and human rights. We advocate the creation of national nature parks, ecologically clean zones and ecologically clean foodstuffs (primarily for children). We advocate a healthy way of life for the youth; a buildup of the health care, mass physical culture and sports, and tourism and youth leisure industries; and social and medical measures to overcome drunkenness, alcoholism, smoking, drug, and substance addiction and psychological stress at work and in the school. We advocate support for the processes of national revival, the solution of interethnic conflicts by political means and the sovereign rights of national-state formations. We advocate the cultural and moral recovery of society, use of public experience and age-old wisdom and humanitarian traditions and the state's impact on society's cultural development primarily by economic means.

Happiness

We understand happiness as joy in life and well-being, pleasure from the realization of man's creative potential in labor and study and confidence in his own powers, in his friends and loved ones, and his own people, and in the soundness of path chosen—by man, by country, by mankind.

We advocate the priority of youth friendship, the priority of love, and the priority of the family over all state and social structures and the recognition of public interference in man's personal affairs and in family life as amoral up to the point where this interference is dictated by considerations of protection of the legitimate rights of the individual. We advocate charity toward the sick, invalids, and the elderly and social recognition of their rights and actual assistance in their realization. We advocate revocation of legal interference in one's sex life if there is no instance of a crime against the person.

III. For a New Character of Socialism (Our Reference Points)

We have united in an organization to make life better for all. We believe that society should develop along a socialist path. This will be the way to socialism with a human face.

How do we conceive of a renewed socialism, in the name of which values do we gather thinking and active people into our ranks?

We are convinced that in the **political sphere** the main direction should be democratization of the political system and state and social life. For this reason we consider it essential:

to revive parliamentary democracy: a political organization should obtain the right to administer the state from the people by way of general and democratic elections;

to switch to an effective multiparty system, enshrine it in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution and accord political and public organizations and movements equal and real rights;

to convert the USSR from an in fact unitary state to an alliance of sovereign republics and states;

to build a law-based state;

to create as little a centralized state as possible and transfer the appropriate political and economic rights to public self-management authorities; and

to shape a society of the mutual responsibility of the citizen and the state.

We cannot remain aloof from complex problems of **national relations** because the youth is always at their epicenter. It is the first to be poisoned with chauvinism, nationalism, and racism, it is the first to be used for lighting the bonfires of national enmity and it is the first to be consumed in their flames.

We are convinced that the main causes of national conflicts lie not in the national sphere proper but in the socioeconomic sphere. For this reason we are emphatically opposed to the substitution of the national for the social and we advocate:

the unification of Estonian landsmen around a common understanding of the path of society's transformations;

legal protection of the free development of the indigenous Estonian nation and recognition of the right of the nation to self-determination and to choose its form;

creation of a political mechanism for protection of the national dignity of all national groups of Estonia and development of their cultures; and

the safeguarding of equal civil rights for the representatives of all nationalities residing in the republic.

We consider the main task of **economic policy** the creation of a mechanism which interests each person in productive and high-quality labor. A socialist market economy could be this mechanism.

But whereas in politics the main question for us is that of power—whether it belongs to the people—in economics the main question is that of property. Only by having grasped this component can the economy be pulled from the mire of crisis. This is why we advocate:

the genuine conversion of state into public property, when the authority of the proprietor-public is realized via people's power authorities;

the division of state property into all-union property and that of the union republics, territories, and enterprises which are administered by the people via the corresponding organs of power and administration;

the equal development in the economy of all forms of socialist property; and

the economic independence of the republic and the extensive production self-management of the enterprises and other organizations and their actual independence in relation to republic and local administration.

No political and economic program is for us an end in itself. It is a means for the solution of urgent **social problems.** We consider as priorities:

exercise of the principle of social justice;

the obliteration of social differences between individual areas of the republic and the elimination of the backwardness of small localities;

provision of all inhabitants of the republic with a living wage;

concern for the material well-being and moral and physical health of the citizens;

creation of conditions for a dignified life for those who for various reasons are incapable of becoming socially established themselves;

support for harmonious family life as a most important human value;

realization of a socially fair housing policy and the creation and preservation of a healthy residential environment; and

restoration of and support for the harmonious development of man and nature.

A humane social policy—the yardstick of society's actual progress toward LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY and HAPPINESS.

IV. The Organization and You

Such is our program. You know our political views and our priorities and reference points in the actual transformation of society. But you have a right to ask what this organization could do for you as a citizen and individual. We answer:

defense of civil rights;

preparation for and enlistment in the administration of the affairs of the republic, city, rayon, and labor and educational outfits;

nomination of your candidacy for the organs of state and public self-administration;

the opportunity of demanding the fulfillment of decrees and decisions on affairs of the youth and the whole of society on behalf of the organization;

participation in political actions staged by the organization, in accordance with your proposals included;

actual assistance in the realization of your interests in the sphere of policy and culture and in economic activity and enterprise; and

well organized leisure time.

However, do not forget that the authority and possibilities of our league will be based on what is done by its members which is useful to and needed by people. For this reason the organization has a right to expect of you:

conviction as to the soundness of our common cause;

time, efforts, and purposefulness for its accomplishment;

capabilities, knowledge, and abilities; and

honesty and responsibility to yourself and the people.

Now you yourself must decide and it depends on you whether this is your organization or not.

We know that we have confronted you with difficult tasks.

We know that the ideas of Marxism are being tested for strength.

We know that a great deal will have to be done and that much will have to be changed and that this will not always be pleasant and painless.

But we are sure that we will contribute to the renewal and deepening of the values of socialism. We are decidedly ready to prove that we merit trust and support. We have no wish to embody dogmatic and lifeless plans. We wish to build, develop, and strengthen humane democratic socialism.

Our republic is our home. And it is very important for us what this home will be like. We say this with all seriousness and responsibility for each young person who has decided or will decide to be with us, the Estonian Communist Youth League.

Narva Soviet Session Opts for Sovereign Estonia

PM2302111390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report: "In Support of a Soviet Federation"]

[Text] Tallinn—The discussion at the Narva City Soviet session lasted two days. The deputies' opinions about the political situation in Estonia coincided, but they differed on tactics.

Let me remind you that on 2 February the republic assembly of people's deputies at all levels adopted a declaration on Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union and on the holding of talks with the union government. This was disputed by a group of deputies from the cities of Kokhtla-Yarve, Sillamyae, Narva, and Tallinn. They have set up a committee for the defense of Soviet power and civic rights in Estonia. It includes two representatives from Narva. Now, after a long discussion, the city Soviet session has reaffirmed its agreement to the creation of this organ and to the powers of the deputies represented on it. The deputies criticized certain incorrect phrases in the statement by the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium committee. They believe that all actions should be within the framework of the USSR and Estonian SSR Constitutions.

The Narva deputies proposed convening a session of deputies from northeast Estonia in late March and specifying at it the committee's name, composition, and rights.

"In our decision and assessments we proceeded on the basis of the main point: A sovereign republic should be part of a renewed Soviet federation," Soviet Chairman V. Chuykin said...

The same position was expressed by deputies at sessions in the cities of Kokhtla-Yarve and Sillamyae. They reaffirmed the powers of the new committee as a coordinating center and the powers of their representatives on it.

Estonian Social Democratic Program Discussed

90UN0855A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 19 Jan 90 p 3

[Report on interview with USSR People's Deputy Marya Lauristin by V. Ivanov; place and date not given: "Not Hoping for 'Rich Relatives'"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the first Estonian forum "Social Democrats in Modern Europe and the Political Future of Estonia" took place 10 through 12 January in Tartu. An information report on this event and an immediate account of it by our correspondent were published by the newspaper on 13 and 14 January respectively. Today we present for our readers an interview with USSR People's Deputy Marya Lauristin, who is one of the sponsors of the forum and of the creation of the Estonian Social Democratic Party of Independence (ESDPN).

[Ivanov] My first question is on the content of the ESDPN program theses published in the newspapers NOORTE KHYAEL and MOLODEZH ESTONII in

December of last year. Among the clauses of a political or legal nature we also encounter there some that relate rather to folklore. For example: We prefer to be free and poor rather than rich and dependent." Is this not reminiscent of the "Cuban imperative"—"The Motherland or Death!"? And are you sure that all the people of Estonia share your viewpoint in this case?

[Lauristin] In fact this phrase sounds somewhat pathetic and, I would say, romantic. But it is necessary to understand it in a very specific context, namely, Estonia now faces a choice of paths along which the economy can develop. And the phrase that you have quoted should be understood precisely as this: Shall we hope for someone to help us or shall we count only on our own efforts? For this is the choice that was placed before us about a year ago when the talk about a "special economic zone" started. A certain chance appeared: to become rich quickly (through joint-venture enterprises with foreign companies and other investments of foreign capital) but to lose the opportunity of developing toward full sovereignty (at that time that was the term used for "independence"), and to abandon the idea of achieving everything with our own hands—to extricate ourselves from the economic and political crisis itself, even slowly, but surely, and not to be lured by some quick success using foreign capital.

[Ivanov] So that is what is implied by "to be poor but free,"—poverty in the initial stage?

[Lauristin] Of course. Various kinds of sometimes very rich people are now coming to Estonia. Yes, our people have many contacts in the West. And several kinds of relationship can be distinguished. What alarms us? A quite real possibility exists that we shall give up our freedom in exchange for obtaining certain advantages. But that road is more suitable for whoever invests his money and dictates conditions, but it limits our own prospects. This kind of success will have an effect in the consumer sphere (which is why it is attractive to many people), but it will not create a foundation for an independent economy. And even less for independent policy. It is in this sophisticated context that the phrase about poverty and freedom should be interpreted. Of course, it will not be in the ESDPN program; the program should be developed in nature, with provision made for both the economic and the social parts, without anything pathetic or romantic. Until there are detailed versions on the socioeconomic aspect it is essential to make a study of the situation and the course of realization of self-government in Estonia. New problems and versions will necessarily arise that must be taken into account...

Let me emphasize once again that we are counting only on our own efforts as we try to create a solid foundation for further development, and are not being lured by the possibility of an easy path that may be fatal. And the experience of Hungary and Poland bears this out, for the desire to resolve domestic problems through foreign subsidies brought success neither in the economy, nor in the social sphere, nor in the political sphere.

[Ivanov] Nevertheless, in your opinion how will the majority of the people of Estonia relate to this kind of arrangement for achieving independence?

[Lauristin] I cannot, of course, offer any predictions or assessments, but I do assure you that this phrase was not born in some empty space, not behind a desk. It arose as the result of many meetings and discussions that started way back when the idea of the "free economic zone" was being debated. And we sense the support of a considerable proportion of the population, particularly those who are themselves used to working. Of course, there is another part that will perhaps be aggrieved by our approach... But our position relies on those who are themselves ready for what may be difficult labor to achieve the creation of the firm foundations needed for further flourishing.

[Ivanov] My other questions are more specific. During the course of the forum it was said repeatedly, and also in your speech from the rostrum, that Hitlerism and Stalinism have used for political purposes mimicry like the word "socialism." Should we understand by this that the very ideas of socialism are attractive to the popular masses or rather that they were used by the most dictatorial and totalitarian regimes as a camouflage?

[Lauristin] At that time, of course! But we should not forget that here we are talking about the twenties and thirties. The ideas of world revolution and a quick success along the path of full statization of the economy and of politics and ideology were still alive and strong. For Hitlerism was essentially striving for the same thing: merging the party and the economy into one concentrated force.

At the same time bitter experience teaches us that both Hitler and Stalin emasculated the social content from the concept of "socialism" and created an antisocial society. And for many this experience is now a barrier against acceptance of the ideas of socialism in general. Even the word "socialism" itself. I fear that even the word "socialism" is quickly acquiring a negative flavor.

[Ivanov] Well, what do you yourself think if we throw off all the layers or, oppositely, remove what has happened in past decades; how attractive and alive are the ideas of socialism today?

[Lauristin] If what we have in mind is the moment when these ideas were born, that is, the end of the 19th century, then today, of course, they are outdated. And yet the bitter experience cannot be expunged. And so in our program we have stated clearly that we are not setting ourselves the aim of building socialism. We defend the social foundation in any society, the human foundation. Resolving this task in today's society requires new approaches. For example, the problem of the information society is today being considered by some in isolation from social issues and from issues relating to culture and national relations. As a rule, what we have in mind is more technology and the modernization of production relations. But how does all this affect the individual? How does it affect property relations and interpersonal relations? Or the individual and society? This is what our program is aimed at—considering the role and place of the individual in a developing society.

[Ivanov] Permit me a question of a personal nature. How did you yourself resolve the question of membership in the CPSU?

[Lauristin] I resolved it unambiguously: I do not consider it moral to be involved in the organization of one party while being part of another. And in my own primary party organization I issued a statement that I would withdraw from the Estonian Communist Party. It had to go through all the levels of authority, but my decision was unalterable.

[Ivanov] In November of last year our newspaper published an article by Professor Walter Clemens of Boston University (the United States) entitled "The Austrian Solution for East Europe," which was reprinted in THE NEW YORK TIMES, in which the author looks at the quite painful scenario of the Warsaw Pact countries (and also the Baltic countries) making the transition to independence by means of declaration and guarantee of neutrality and loyalty to the Soviet Union. Do you think that this path is acceptable for Estonia?

[Lauristin] Yes, and this scenario has already been discussed in some detail, and not only on the pages of THE NEW YORK TIMES... In EDAZI, for example.

[Ivanov] Let us return for a while to the theses of the ESDPN program. They state that "...forces representing state institutions located abroad and that in their activities do not proceed from the laws of Estonia should be denied free participation in the domestic political life of the Estonian state..." In this connection you are a USSR people's deputy and even a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Does this mean that you are thus deprived of the right to participate in the domestic politics of Estonia, and if so, when should this be?

[Lauristin] Well, first it is still a question of a truly independent Estonian state in whose parliament or other elected political organs the above-named forces could not participate. This condition has not yet been achieved. With respect to my own mandate as a deputy.... Now, do you see, I represent Estonia in the Union parliament, not the other way round.

[Ivanov] Logical. And now this question: VESTNIK NARODNOGO FRONTA No. 34 carried an article by a republic State Planning Committee [Gosplan] official (as it was then still called), Vladimir Yushkin, who in trying to predict the future also talked about the fate of the nonindigenous inhabitants of Estonia. He admits that some of those people (we shall not specify how numerous they are) will not accept the changes taking place today in the republic and, in his words, "will be drawn to the East." It goes without saying that some will remain and manage to adapt to the new conditions. But nevertheless, many will still want to leave. And he went on to write this: "It will be very difficult and painful and will for many people be a personal tragedy." It is difficult to disagree with this. But here is the question: You talk about the intention to strive to build a society that exists on the principles of social justice and freedom. BUT CAN THIS GOAL BE REACHED AT THE COST OF PERSONAL TRAGEDY FOR SOME? And it is unimportant whether we are talking about hundreds of thousands or "just" a few dozen people.

[Lauristin] I believe that it is impossible. But in Estonia Soviet power was built at the cost of mass tragedy for the Estonians and for all the people in general; it was, so to speak, the starting point. But of course, no policy can or should be built on emotions, including the sense of place. With respect to so-called reimmigration, my viewpoint is (and always has been) this: It is a question of an absolutely free choice by the individual himself as to whether he should stay or leave. It should not be accompanied by tragedy. For in and of itself, migration, that is, a person moving from one place to another, should always be a personal motivation, when a person feels that for him "somewhere else" will be better than "here" at some given time. The motives will vary; they will be not only economic but also moral, political, cultural, and so forth. A change in the economic or political situation can also alter people's motivations for their behavior. I repeat that it is a question of only one thing, namely that it should be a free choice.

[Ivanov] In the program devised by your party has provision been made for a special section dealing with the so-called "Russian policy" (or should we call it national policy)?

[Lauristin] Among all social democrats the problem of the connection between human rights, national problems, and social guarantees of all rights is central. And today we are debating this heatedly with our foreign guests. We all have these problems and their interconnections are very specific, compared to countries in the West; and so the solutions are more complicated. But I believe that it is part of the set of problems that the social democrats must resolve.

[Ivanov] Thank you for the interview.

From the author: It happens that there are also "lacunae" in a journalist's work. I took it into my head to find out about M. Lauristin: How, in the case of the organizational formation of the ESDPN and its official registration, the leadership of the new party related to the idea of forming in the future a coalition (or bloc) with the Estonian Communist Party. And when the question arose it was already too late—M. Lauristin has gone abroad until the end of the month. However, I asked the same question, but in a reverse way, of Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Mikka Titma. Here is his answer:

I think that such a bloc, in general a coalition of all leftist, progressive and centrist forces occupying moderate positions in the republic is not only possible but even desirable.

...Thus, we await an answer from the member of the ESDPN initiative group.

RSFSR

Ryzhkov Appeals for Nairit Production Resumption

NC1602113990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 16 Feb 90

[From review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] On its front page, the paper has published the cable of Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers. The cable says in particular: I appeal to the state authority and highest governing bodies of the Armenian republic with a firm request for the resumption of production at the Nairit Scientific-Production Association. I am aware that this problem is not easy for you. However, it is of acute importance for the country's entire national economy, which is now deprived of (?chlorpranide) rubber and other rare chemical materials so essential for hundreds of enterprises engaged in machine-making, production of consumer goods, lighting technology, and pharmaceuticals. The losses for the national economy in 1990 could amount to at least 14 billion rubles.

The USSR Government, on its part, will do everything to ensure ecological safety around Nairit plant, says the cable.

Electoral Official Previews RSFSR Elections

LD0202231690 Moscow TASS in English 2308 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 3 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Lev Aksenov:

As many as 7,018 candidates will compete for 1,068 seats on parliament of the Russian Federation. This information was given to TASS by Anatoliy Petrov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission, at its meeting here on Friday. The elections of people's deputies of the Russian Federation will be held on March 4.

The absolute majority of candidates (82.4 per cent) are men. There are very few young people among candidates. KOMSOMOL, the largest youth organisation of the country, is represented only by 1.2 per cent of candidates.

86 per cent are members and candidates members of the Soviet Communist Party. Workers account for only 8.7 per cent of the total number of candidates, farmers for 3.1 per cent. Clergymen account for 0.1 per cent of candidates.

Kildibai Suleimanov, member of the Central Electoral Commission, representing Bashkiria, one of the largest autonomous republics in Russia, said the pattern in Bashkiria is approximately the same.

There are few young people and women among the candidates, and a small number of those who are usually described as grassroots.

Officials of law-enforcement bodies and heads of agricultural enterprises are represented quite broadly.

Suleimanov said that a relatively low voter activity strikes the eye. Apparently the voters are not much impressed by candidates' programme, he said.

Information about the election campaign in a number of regions of Russia, including the Primoriye territory and the Volgograd region, was delivered at Friday's meeting of the electoral commission.

Dissatisfaction of citizens with the violation of the principle of social justice by local leaders came to a head in these areas recently.

In the Volgograd region, the situation is complicated by tension resulting from the prospect of the autonomy for Soviet Germans in the Volga reaches.

The Central Electoral Commission recommended to district electoral commissions and executive committees of local soviets to ensure, in accordance with law, the possibilities for thorough debates on the candidates' programmes and to create equal opportunities for all candidates.

'Unobjective' Coverage of Writers' Plenum Deplored

PM1402135590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Feb 90 Single Edition p 4

[Vl. Kondakov report: "Meeting With Press. In RSFSR Union of Writers"]

[Text] The Sixth Plenum of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Union of Writers Board was held in November of last year and examined important and topical questions of the present and future of book publishing in Russia and the state of RSFSR Union of Writers literary and artistic journals. However, a number of publications devoted to the plenum have prompted various kinds of false interpretations and contradictory assessments. That is why the Russian Union of Writers Board Secretariat held a news conference yesterday for Soviet and foreign journalists. Its subject was "Truth and Lies About the Sixth Plenum of the RSFSR Union of Writers Board."

Opening the news conference, Yuriy Bondarev, deputy chairman of the Russian writers' organization board said, "Glasnost is the greatest benefit of democracy, and without it perestroyka is impossible. Glasnost is self-respect and human dignity, combined with a sense of sincere attention to every opinion. But since we have still not fully realized that true freedom is part of democracy, our freedom often turns into the willfulness of certain press organs in choosing the 'truth' that suits them, and glasnost turns into a fire of inextinguishable sensations, fantasies, and slander that have a negative effect on the moral atmosphere of our society."

In response to the unobjective evaluations of the activity of the RSFSR Union of Writers Board voiced in the press, a statement was adopted which says in particular: "We repeat what was said in the USSR Supreme Soviet: Russia does not need great upheavals, it will not tolerate bloodshed and lawlessness. Russia will affirm its greatness by action—despite all intrigues and provocations.

"We support the CPSU nationalities platform and the decisions of the Communist Party Central Committee February Plenum. We are in favor of the creation of a Russian Communist Party. Russian writers always have been and always will be on the side of the people. We call for fraternity and friendship, tested by rigorous trials, to be strengthened with all the peoples of the Soviet Union—a united renewed federation of equal union republics."

S. Kunyayev, N. Shundik, Yu. Prokushev, V. Belov, and other writers and poets answered numerous questions from journalists.

Such news conferences, it was noted, will become a regular event in the lives of Russian writers.

Commentary Views RSFSR Election Campaigns

90UN0927C Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 6, 10 Feb 90 p 3

[Commentary by V. Vyunitskiy, candidate for RSFSR people's deputy and member of editorial board of journal DIALOG, under rubric "Politics": "Whom Will Russia Prefer?"]

[Text] **Which of the reform trends will Russia prefer? The voters will give the answer on 4 March. But it will not be easy for them to make a choice: Many of the slogans and specific proposals of the candidates repeat each other almost word for word...**

Self-determination, independence, Russian sovereignty...

The creation of a Russian Communist Party...

The formation of Russian Government structures independent of Union organs...

The formation of a Russian academy of sciences.

A change in the economic relations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] with the other union republics...

The election campaign is picking up speed—elections for deputies to the republic and local soviets will be taking place soon. The election campaign has been heating up in the Russian Federation. How has the polarization of Russia's political forces affected this contest? How are their basic approaches to the republic's most important problems different? What will the road to Russia's reforms look like?

Vladimir Ivanovich Vyunitskiy, candidate for RSFSR people's deputy in the Sverdlovsk territorial district No. 46 in Moscow and member of the editorial board of the new journal DIALOG, ponders these questions.

The election campaign for RSFSR people's deputies had barely reached the halfway mark when it yielded its first, very practical result: The issue of the problems and fate of Russia, which only recently one discussed at the risk of being called a reactionary and a chauvinist, has finally acquired civil rights. It could not be any other way. The contest is for the mandate of Russian deputy, and each of the competitors, sincerely or otherwise, must express his attitude toward Russia. And although the candidates have not been rushing to parade their programs, in contrast to the 1989 campaign, they are conducting a complex tactical struggle and the points of views of many of them have already appeared.

The basic directions in which they gravitate have also appeared. First of all, of course, they have announced the formation of forces around themselves that are traditional in many ways and oppose each other. On the one hand, there are the numerous organizations that are known by the general title of democrats (true, this term has different shades of meaning depending on the speaker—from enthusiastic to abusive). On the other hand, a platform has been proclaimed by a bloc of Russian social movements uniting a significant portion of those forces which are defined—seriously by some, ironically by others—as patriots.

As a rule, the Democrats do not make a secret of either their positive attitude toward the political, economic, and spiritual experience of the West or their desire to borrow a part of this experience for perestroyka. They see the main task in renovating the country and Russia. As a result many of them sometimes find themselves in a bloc with the national movements of the other union republics, and they demonstrate a special loyalty to the interests of these movements that verges on a willingness to sacrifice in the name of the changes there some of the interests of Russia, as well as of the Russian-speaking population of these areas.

In turn, the patriots treat perestroyka as ruinous for the state and our social system, as the transfer of Western concepts of development onto Russian soil, and they reject it decisively. All their hopes are in the renaissance of Russia. Giving special importance to pointed questions about the preservation of the national cultural and historical heritage of the peoples of Russia, their environment, and their social, economic, and spiritual traditions, they associate the resolution of many of today's problems with protective or else restorationist approaches and with political formulas—alas!—from yesterday.

Many in these contrasting groups explain themselves by saying that both "wings" are equally troubled by Russia's present position but that the reasons for its position are interpreted differently. Partisans of the democrats rail for the most part at the past, refuse to accept the bureaucratic organization of society, and explain all of today's troubles by saying that the administrative-edict system has not yet been scrapped. Those who gravitate to the camp of the patriots, on the contrary, direct sharp criticism against today's problems and against the policies of the current leadership, and to a greater or lesser degree they seek a social and political ideal in the recent or distant past....

Of course one must be aware that the characterization of such "democrats" and "patriots" carries an elitist, superior character in many ways. In these groups themselves there are tens of thousands out of the tens of millions of voters. But one should see that the schism goes deep, always drawing into its orbit new people, running like a fissure through the whole state and social structure. It contains the potential danger of discord, which even today is already creating dead-end situations in a number of instances. No one can conceive of Russia's escape from its current crisis without consolidation, and there is a reason for this. Calls for accord have been heard recently from both movements. However a compromise between them, as the logic of political confrontation dictates, is hardly possible....

Nonetheless, an electoral campaign has been initiated to introduce a reassuring tendency into this arrangement of forces. In the opposing groups, or most importantly, in the political space between them, partisans of a new, joint approach are distinguishing themselves more and more. The political formulas and decisions that are proposed by these centrist forces are characterized by a desire to unite the ideas of a renovation and a renaissance of Russia and to unite democracy and patriotism. And although it is impossible to say that the adherents of joint, compromise platforms predominate, their very appearance in the political arena is the first positive result of the current electoral campaign in the RSFSR.

All these—and many other—themes may be found in the platform of a bloc of Russian social movements, in the program of the People's Front of Russia, in the publications of the Moscow Association of Voters, in the charter of the Moscow People's Front, and in the personal election programs of the candidates who do not belong to either of the groupings.

To see in these coincidences the precondition or the basis for the consolidation of Russian society would be, in my opinion, political naivete. They are like points of intersection of trends headed in different directions.

Take for example the issue of the sovereignty of Russia. It is as though everyone proposes to increase it today. But some see in it part of a program for reducing centralism in government, and in its most radical variants—for attacking the principle of a unitary state. For others, this is the road to the renaissance of governmental power and the preservation not only of Russia but of the entire present state system of the USSR.

It is probably worth evaluating the programs in their entirety without reducing them to a single one of their positions. I think that many of us sympathize with a number of the constructive ideas of the democrats and would just like to see them more patriotic. On the other hand, while we share the sincerity of the patriots we cannot help but wish they were a little more democratic. Many people accept the ideas for radical economic reform, economic accountability, and commodity-money relations, but at the same time they consider the creation of reliable economic and legal guarantees against the degeneration of our system necessary. In the same manner many consistent defenders of our social values and ideals wish that our social structure were democratized and freed from administrative-edict methods.

The consciousness of a people subjected to the pressure of opposing groups shows itself wiser than either of them and attempts to reconcile and unite in itself the ideas that are constructive and necessary for renaissance and renovation of Russia. In my opinion, the contours of a broad platform of reconciliation are arising under the influence of this consciousness in the course of the current electoral campaign. I would call this platform **patriotic democracy**.

Which of the tasks of Russian renaissance and renovation to the greatest degree reflect the mood of the people?

Perhaps the most important of them is a change in the position and role of Russia in the USSR. There is preserved today an unnatural situation, offensive to the national feelings of many of the peoples of the RSFSR, whereby the country's largest republic finds itself in a half-legal position and the autonomies which comprise it do not have any say in the affairs of the Union. The union-republic symbiosis of administrative structures simply chained Russia to the dictates and will of the central bureaus, from which it suffers more than the other republics. To restore equality for the RSFSR in the nation-state structure and to discriminate between the powers of Union and republic authorities—these are long-awaited solutions which would in equal measure answer the expectations of both patriots and democrats.

Another task closely tied to these solutions is the creation of full-fledged state structures in Russia. Here one must avoid the temptation to exchange the Union version of bureaucratic centralism for a republic variant. One must take advantage of historical chance, one must begin, as they say, from scratch the creation of a whole ladder of governmental powers. Relations between the higher and lower soviets, between the republic's bureaus and the local organs of power, between the soviets and the various forms of local self-administration, can and should be reconstructed along democratic lines. This would put Russia in the vanguard of the country's renovation.

The most complex task is to form Russian political structures. Some reduce this to the question of creating a Russian Communist Party. In my opinion the issue is much broader. Even now the widest possible spectrum of positions and movements has appeared in the political life of Russia—from monarchists to ultrarevolutionaries. This nascent political pluralism is growing without legal foundations, guarantees, and norms, but it is already leading Russian society to the border of a diversity of social organizations.

One must give legal form to this reality which has appeared (even if it is only some kind of definition), by radically reworking the entire first chapter of the RSFSR Constitution. In the new edition the constitutional rights and obligations of all social organizations should be strengthened. Issues of the mutual relations between party and state power, including economic relations, are also in need of regulation.

As for the issue of the Russian Communist Party, this question is not as simple as it appears at first glance. The restructuring of the political organization of Soviet society presupposes a decentralization of management, and that means a certain weakening of centralist principles. How does one preserve in these circumstances the basis of the unity of the Soviet federation? Recall that Lenin pondered this too while discussing the possibility of the decentralization of the Soviet Union, which had just been created, in his letter "On the Question of Nationalities, or on 'Autonomization.'" What did he believe the conditions for preserving the unity of the Soviet republics are? Together with keeping a number of state questions (military and foreign policy) for the management of the Union, the unifying role of the party was just such a condition for him. This role, of course, will come to nothing if the CPR [Russian Communist Party] is formed as a force fully independent of the CPSU or opposing it.

In my opinion the sole acceptable, compromise formula for the formation of the CPR (if we are going to set this question on a practical plane) is a clear differentiation between the functions, powers, and rights of the CPSU and the CPR under the authority of a binding political platform based upon the Program of the CPSU.

The task of guaranteeing the economic equality of Russia is just as important. It is no secret that Russia has carried and does carry on its shoulders most of the burden of the Soviet Union's economic problems and that it makes a decisive contribution to All-Union funds (from which, incidentally, many other union republics afterwards draw subsidies while they blame the RSFSR for "Socialist colonialism"). And the 70 billion rubles [R] which the RSFSR loses annually as the result of the inequitable exchange with the other union republics testifies to the fact that the matter is not at all the way some national movements try to present it.

As a solution it is often suggested that the administrative and economic power of the central authority be limited and that Russia itself be granted more rights. I think that this measure is necessary but that it is nonetheless insufficient by itself. If we stop here, then many concrete steps toward the renewal of economic equality may be lost through the agreements concluded by the apparat. This problem will be resolved effectively only when the demarcation of functions between the RSFSR and the central authorities is reliably supplemented by an operating mechanism of economic accountability for the republic which will eliminate the disproportion in the republic's relations with the center and the other republics.

True, when implementing reforms one must not allow the loss of those social gains and guarantees which are characteristic of our system—the rights to work, rest and leisure, social insurance, education, and protection of health (naturally with a substantial increase in their quality). Also Needed are reliable legal and economic guarantees against a renaissance of large-scale capitalist ownership and the exploitation of man by man as well as tax mechanisms that will reduce the possibility of an intensification of social stratification. With respect to small-scale commodity activity, cooperation, and leasing, they should be given support wherever they serve the interests of society and people.

The future of Russia also depends on the solution of interethnic relations. I think that peace among the nationalities in Russia would be better maintained by such democratic measures as granting all autonomies direct access to the level of republic, encouraging their economic independence, and developing cultural and national autonomy for all citizens living outside the places where their ethnic group has traditionally settled without wounding the national and patriotic sentiments of any of the peoples.

One may, in fact, object: Does patriotic democracy have a chance of being implemented? The polarization of Russian political life has gone rather far and will, of course, impede the formation of a new platform. I will not try to predict the future.

And I nonetheless believe that one may look upon the democratic renovation of Russia as a reliable component of its democratic renaissance [as published]. To preserve and maintain traditional Russian values and to give them a new content which will impart a mighty impulse to the progress of Russian statehood, political structures, economy, culture—this is a matter which is important in equal measure to true patriots and democrats.

The author is donating an honorarium for this article to the Moscow Fund for Charity and Health, account No. 704701 at the Zhilsotsbank in Moscow.

Murmansk Obkom First Secretary Replaced

LD2102201190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Feb 90

[From "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Murmansk Oblast Party Committee has taken place. It examined an organizational question. The plenum relieved Comrade Balagurov of the duties of first secretary of the oblast party committee in connection with the application handed in by him. The decision was taken to entrust Comrade Serokuruvphon, second secretary oblast party committee, with the duties of first secretary of the oblast party committee until the oblast party conference.

Journalists Union Publishes Leningrad Weekly

LD2602102590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Today in Leningrad the first issue of a new newspaper, CHAS PIK, has been published, with a print run of 100,000. This is the third publication of the oblast organization of the USSR Union of Journalists. The eight-columned newspaper with a PRAVDA-like format will come out once a week. The newspaper's founders have set themselves the task of making all articles topical, pointed, dynamic, and aimed at a wide circle of readers.

Apparats Fall to 'Genuine People's Power'

PM0602162990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Albert Plutnik article: "Real Power Displays Its Character and Invades Cadre Policy"]

[Text] Over the last few weeks reports of resignations have begun to be glimpsed in the press. Tyumen, Chernigov, and Volgograd Oblast CPSU Committee [obkom] first secretaries have turned over their duties and the chairman of the Maritime Kray Soviet Executive Committee has quit his post... In short, such incidents are not isolated occurrences, although they are not as yet typical either. A trend has emerged and so it is time to talk about the emergence of a new phenomenon in our political life. I would stress—in present-day, contemporary life. Since a great deal here is determined precisely by the historical moment. Resignation dramas are enacted in specific circumstances that are taking shape and changing under the influence of the new processes which have encompassed society.

There was an outbreak in Volgograd. It highlighted with striking clarity at least two circumstances characterizing public life in the oblast. Namely the political maturity of the masses and the political immaturity of the party apparatus. A. Kalashnikov, obkom first secretary, brushed aside just criticism in the press like an importunate fly, committing a most flagrant and unforgivable mistake these days by failing to realize the strength of glasnost. Then the obkom bureau came to the defense of the first secretary as in days of old, demonstrating "unity of opinion on all questions under discussion" and remaining true to type and subordination. In response "ordinary workers," who are not afraid of officials these days, took to the squares in indignation and demanded the resignation of the entire bureau. An obkom plenum met, accepted Kalashnikov's resignation in 5 minutes and, deciding as it were that the people's requests had been met, right away punished the "troublemakers"—those who had previously dared to vehemently attack the now former first secretary. It was they who were removed from the bureau, that is, the bureau was partially renewed.

I am convinced that this was only done to remind the "enraged informals" that the plenum wielded the power. That it was the plenum that decides the fate of obkom secretaries and bureau members. They pretended that they were not under the thumb, while they did in fact fail to heed the voice of the masses. They failed to realize, although the critical hour had tolled, that this time the obkom leadership's fate was not to be resolved by traditional means, by those whom they were accustomed to see as the controllers of such fates. In short, the partial option did not satisfy the people, and they once again poured out onto the squares with even more radical demands—namely the resignation of the entire obkom. The bureau belatedly acknowledged the plenum's uncritical nature and resigned in its entirety. A new plenum met and a new, interim bureau was elected.

Even on a fleeting glance at these events—and they are distinguished more by the people whom they targeted than their substance—it is striking how far-removed people in such lofty posts were from life and from understanding what was happening outside their offices. The apparatus' utter unpreparedness for serious political struggle is striking. And that, moreover, is strictly its paramount professional task. But obviously, they spent so long engaged in everything but their direct duties that they had quite forgotten how to perform them.

Note: Replacing a high-ranking leader is a question of cadre policy. It is well known to whose sphere of influence this pertains: Party bodies are vested with executive rights here. The implementation of cadre policy is undoubted evidence of real power—in many respects, exclusive power. At any rate until recently no one even aspired to take an active part in resolving key problems of cadre policy, say, in close cooperation with the party. Until recently. Until the perestroyka process, initiated on the initiative of the progressive core of the party, became particularly stormy.

A nontraditional means of resolving cadre questions has lately been glimpsed in many situations which have resulted in resignations of prominent leaders. How in fact did events develop in Tyumen? What "office" resolved to deem unsatisfactory the work of the CPSU obkom bureau and its first secretary G. Bogomyakov? This involves as it were a violation of subordination along with a manifestation of spontaneous initiative from so-called ordinary workers—communists and nonparty men. As for the origins of the conflict, there is a great deal that is striking here. For instance, the fact that party apparatchik M. Metakov, head of the obkom ideological department, did not publish his article expressing vehement disagreement with the first secretary's "line" in a central or republic newspaper, which are not under obkom jurisdiction, but in his oblast newspaper, the organ of the party committee in question. That is glasnost for you.

The Chernigov story may create the impression that L. Palazhchenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party obkom, was simply let down by an ill-starred bureaucrat—the head of an oblast soviet executive committee [oblispolkom] department, who was involved in a road accident when drunk and tried not just to walk away but drive away from responsibility. But the point is that in both Volgograd, Tyumen, and Chernigov an emergency situation existed long before it emerged in such a drastic manner. There had long been talk to the effect fact that the people's trust in the leadership was running out and that it was time to take concrete steps to defuse social tension. But usually no explanation was given as to which leadership precisely was referred to. The people clarified this, by identifying their oblast leadership.

Yet high-ranking officials who should take care of the cadre question in the course of their duties had not expressed particular dissatisfaction regarding the leadership of these oblasts. For instance, there were no particular complaints regarding Bogomyakov. At any rate it is hard to suspect that clouds of organizational conclusions were gathering over his head. It can be asserted that no one was about to remove Kalashnikov from his post either. Precisely the opposite—these leaders' careers were scheduled to take off.

You will remember that at the first USSR Supreme Soviet session V.I. Kalashnikov was proposed for the chairmanship of the State Commission for Food and Procurements, which entails the rank of first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Moreover it is naive to think that it was only during the previous few months that he had given people cause to doubt his ability to be such a prominent leader. What about before? It must be stipulated, though, that we can all be wise after the event. Now that events have taken this turn, there is nothing simpler than to find a former first secretary's mistakes, forgetting that "under Kalashnikov," for instance, the oblast food supply had somewhat improved. Everyone there was guaranteed 1 kg of sausage and 500 grams of butter a month, albeit on production of ration coupons. So was he suitable for the post which he had been given? USSR people's deputies answered unequivocally that he was not. What is the reason for this opinion? Probably the fact that, if you have a rough idea of the country's food situation, which is close to catastrophic, it is easy to picture in one's imagination the type of person who at such a time is entitled to aspire to the role of "savior of the nation" and who must in other words be immediately called to power, entrusted with the hot spot, and given complete freedom of action. Is it worth clarifying that this leader is simply bound to be a man of truly modern stamp, capable of consolidating all competent forces in a peasant society which have not yet lost the habit or even the need to cultivate the land. Of course, the "expropriation of the kulaks syndrome," which has been drummed into many of our leaders' heads must be completely alien to him. It is particularly striking to learn that Kalashnikov displayed this syndrome in all its glory, so to speak, mounting a wide-ranging operation in the oblast to eliminate cold frames on residents' garden plots, in the belief that he was wiping out not cold frames but manifestations of the private property instinct. In the belief that the ideological aspect—the suppression of "unearned income"—is more important than a sufficiency of tomatoes.

Bogomyakov was a candidate for minister of the petroleum and gas industry. Here the same question arose: Was he up to it? Although once again it would be absolutely wrong to see him merely as a negative character—for all that, he held the post of first secretary for 17 years—it must nevertheless be acknowledged that he hardly possessed sufficient advantages over those who might have proved worthy competition (IZVESTIYA described this at one time). What criteria prevailed? Given the age in which we live, it may be assumed that no dyed-in-the-wool devotee of the administrative-edict system will be proposed as a minister in our time of perestroyka. We have seen leaders who cherished the system which brought the country to economic crisis. But wasn't the contender in question from the cohort of "strong leaders"? Themselves accustomed to issue edicts, they were only accustomed to obey edicts. An absence of formidable instructions was perceived as a manifestation of weakness on the part of the leadership... Alas, this seemed to be the case.

Certainly, neither he nor Kalashnikov became members of the government. After all, that was not up to those who nominated them. Whose cadre selection principles did they turn out to match? Would that I knew the nature of those principles. The USSR people's deputies impeded the new appointments. All the same it was not for nothing that another filter was introduced in cadre policy—the examination of candidacies proposed by the government and the people's empowered representatives. Moreover, the people themselves are expressing their opinion on this subject with increasing frequency and determination. Not indirectly but directly.

The words "real power" always related to those people who held prominent posts in the party and state. But the usual phrase seems to have been vested with new substance. Although the term "people's power" has existed in our political lexicon for a long time, there has never before been genuine people's power. But are the aforementioned examples not proof of growing people's power and the people's direct involvement in resolving highly important questions of public life, above all those that apply to cadre policy, which is the political holy of holies?

It was not the authorities, not the Central Committee Organization Department that removed the aforementioned—and some that have not been mentioned—leaders from their work. This did not happen as a result of some careful inspection carried out by a high-ranking commission. No, it was all very different. Untypical. The people removed them.

Where people's power asserted itself, it was the people who became the real power.

The changing composition of the soviets, the emergence of a host of informal organizations, and the activation of "formal" organization all enabled people not merely to have an opinion but also to express it openly thanks to glasnost. And to make it public. In terms of influence they rival supreme state and party bodies. That is democracy for you.

New circumstances drastically revealed many problems, in particular the depravity of a system of virtual life appointments to leadership posts for those people knit together in the nomenklatura. It became increasingly noticeable that many traditions of cadre policy which date back to the time when there was a shortage of cadres, when personal acquaintance was an extremely weighty reason for rapid professional advancements, and when the people, downtrodden and illiterate, saw this as a matter of course have become hopelessly outmoded. Just as the behavior of many workers promoted by the bureaucratic apparatus has also become outmoded. The leaders it created only feel responsible to the apparatus. They only consider themselves accountable to and act to please it—which paid off for the time being, or at any rate did not trouble public tastes. It is only now—owing to today's perestroyka and the radical changes in psychology which rouse in people a sense of their own dignity—that the well-tried "orientation system" has began to malfunction.

With the development of democracy a leader's position has begun to change radically. The first democratic elections showed how dependent he now is on the will of the masses—his fellow countrymen, subordinates, voters, friends, and strangers. It is as if not only are they subordinate to him but also he to them. More precisely, he is now as it were involved in a complex system of dual subordination—both from above and from below. You have to guess whom to follow so as not to make a fool of yourself. You have to make a choice if you are not always accustomed to following truth and performing your duty to the cause and society.

Needless to say, not everyone has found the only correct line of action. That is why you hear the following so frequently today from leaders agonizingly unaware of the reasons for their downfall: We have served the party loyally all our lives, and now... Their personal drama is that they failed to understand social changes: a drama of wrongly chosen guidelines. After all, they did indeed serve loyally. They did not go to extremes. They did not go too far. They did what they said they would. They did not persist in principles. It was just that they thought that they could serve the party without serving the people. That is why the party was seen as an apparatus personified by two or three influential officials. In short, they were guided by men from up there. This was as it were the nature of party discipline and in fact some rules of the game—unwritten rules, of course, but observed far more strictly than all the written statutes and laws.

Is it not logical that many local leaders are incapable today of acting independently, on their own judgment, and with their sharp ear only catching instructions from the center? They have taught people as they have been drilled.

It is customary to repeat the same idea in various ways: Democratic changes within the party are lagging behind transformations in society. There is no tangible progress, in my opinion, even now. Although only a blind man could fail to see life itself instigating far more radical actions.

Pretending that steps have been taken is worse than taking no steps. Previously people may allegedly have sighed: Would that we had the choice—when particular secretaries did not suit them. Now in such cases they have only themselves to blame—they elected these people. Even union republic communist party central committee secretaries are sometimes elected from among alternative candidates. Hold it, though. What, strictly speaking, is this "alternative" basis?

I always read attentively reports of obkom and republic party committee plenums where an organizational question is examined. For instance, the first secretary of Magadan party obkom is retiring on pension. Who is to replace him? "The day before the plenum candidacies for the post of party obkom first secretary were proposed and discussed on a broad democratic basis in the oblast's party organizations. Some 21 names were cited here. No candidate won the first round of voting. In the second round the names of two candidates—V.T. Vechkanov, first secretary of Magadan City CPSU Committee [Gorkom], and V.V. Svekolkin, second secretary of Magadan CPSU Obkom—were added to the ballot paper. The voters gave preference to V.V. Svekolkin; he was elected first secretary of Magadan CPSU Obkom by a majority vote."

To avoid false interpretations I would point out that there are no grounds for casting doubts on the Magadan Communists' choice. The best choice may possibly have been found this time. It is not a question of a specific candidate—it is about the practice of electing party leaders. A practice which cannot help making you think about the dialectics of glasnost and the logical tightening up of public demands on it today. Whereas we went into raptures a year or so ago because democratic changes were finally noticeable even in intraparty life. Amazingly even obkom secretaries were being elected. How many contenders there were! Some 21 at a stroke. Presumably, to suit all tastes. But people today are not so much enthralled by an abundant supply of contenders as they are perplexed for quite a different reason on reading the report. They note that of a host of candidacies considered at the initial stage the same couple invariably find themselves at the final stage—the gorkom first secretary and the obkom second secretary, the obkom second secretary and the chairman of the oblispolkom, a former obkom secretary and another former official. That is, the actual people who were closest to the first secretary who has quit his post and under whom the oblast frequently simply failed to achieve particular success. The purpose of cadre changes is to fundamentally renew old approaches and help to drastically change the situation in the region.

But will there be a great deal of change in the style and method of leadership if the supreme post is taken up by the man who was the right hand of the former leader, who has fallen behind the times? If he, as it were, hands things over to his direct heir? When this happens, moral damage is inevitably inflicted on perestroyka. Since given this cadre policy public opinion obtains another argument to prove that someone is not very committed to radical changes.

But as for a "competitive" fight for the post of first secretary, one must bear in mind the fact that even 1,000 contenders do not constitute a "multiple-candidate basis." Such elections remind me personally of well-known roundtable conversations between political observers during the times of stagnation, when allegedly irreconcilable political sparring partners, whose views on all questions were absolutely identical, made a pretense of "fundamental" disagreement with one another before the broad public.

Quite recently N. Ivanov was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the Chernigov Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom with the rare wording: "for serious shortcomings in his leadership of the obkom bureau and violation of the norms of party ethics, which resulted in great damage to the prestige of the oblast party organization." The oblast did not rush to elect a new leader. They paused a while. They suspended the plenum's work to allow party organizations to discuss the candidacies for the post of obkom first secretary. The discussion lasted for approximately a week. Then a new report came: "After a recess the Chernigov Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom Plenum completed its work by considering an organizational question. As a result of a secret ballot Ye.I. Dmitriyev, who worked previously as party obkom secretary, was elected first secretary of Chernigov Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom from three candidacies."

Were consultations held, and was it decided that the apparatus could only nominate a worthy candidacy from its own ranks? It is not a matter of a particular name—it is a matter of principle. Doesn't such advice undermine trust in party democracy?

Perhaps, if the "top man" has shown himself up, if the first secretary has proved an utter fiasco, then it is not only all the secretaries who worked alongside him who must share responsibility with him but also the entire obkom apparatus, which should collectively resign in the event of this turn of fate. There are people who are materially responsible and there are those who are morally responsible. Is someone unaware of how and with whose blessing the party obkom apparatus is formed with our current usages and ethics? Everyone is aware of the apparatus' role in elaborating and adopting party bodies' decisions and resolutions. Along with the role of instructors, heads of department, assistants, and so on and so forth. A king is made by his entourage and a first secretary by his apparatus. Nevertheless the "top men" take personal blame far more frequently for erroneous, hasty decisions than the apparatus bears collective responsibility. By criticizing the bureaucratic-edict system, we often erroneously personify it, associating it solely with the names of more or less high-ranking leaders. Those who stand behind them, who create them, invariably remain outside the picture, they are invisible, they are the submerged part of the iceberg, whose strength and might is in many respects also determined by its invisibility. Thus, maybe it should ultimately become an inalienable feature of our political life for the entire apparatus to retire with the first secretary. The first step on this road already seems to have been taken in Tyumen, where all the members of the obkom bureau voluntarily surrendered their duties together with the first and second secretaries.

Democratization and glasnost are doing their work. Today every leader is simply obliged to remember who has the final say in assessing him—as a professional and as an individual.

But the real power will remind those who forget. It will remind them that democratization is not a thaw and thus a temporary phenomenon but is for good. This has been brought about by the natural climate. But even ruling circles nowadays are by no means fully aware of the immeasurable increase in the potential of the "real power." Not everyone realizes that Soviet people living in contemporary conditions of greater democracy are changing to become freer and more perspicacious. Greater freedom of thought among the masses also demands a better thought-out policy free from all slyness, and that includes cadres.

It is worth taking a look around: You can already see the unprecedented significance that a leader's moral qualities are assuming in the changing conditions in our life. That is why he can no longer today remain a hermit surrounded merely by a handful of attendants and can no longer work and live as it were in secret, away from people: Democratization has demolished the "barriers" around offices, homes, and dachas. It is becoming impossible for those who advocate disinterestedness, social justice, and moral purity to live any differently themselves.

But what is happening? Interlopers seem to be invading party bodies' sphere of exclusive influence now... It would, however, be a most flagrant mistake to regard the infiltration of outsiders into this sphere and committed public participation in the resolute improvement of cadre policy as an expression of mistrust in the party or more particularly as an encroachment on its authority or interference in its strictly internal matters. It is important to realize that it is not only organs of people's power that are being formed but actual people's power itself. It must not be confused with the power of the mob, which is inclined to mob law. Since a mob represents a triumph for blind, elemental forces and a total absence of responsibility, while people's power on the contrary represents a heightened sense of responsibility for our common destiny.

The cause, the decisions, and the principles which determine life in the country cannot be anyone's exclusively internal matter. Things that concern the entire people must be decided by the entire people or at least under their supervision.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum is coming up. How will the increasingly frequent cases of high-ranking party and soviet leaders' enforced resignations from their posts be seen there? And what about the fresh outbreaks of activity on the part of the masses, associated with changes in public awareness? Will the voice of the people be taken for the voice of individual extremist loudmouths, as has happened in the past?

A very, very great deal depends on a correct assessment of the current moment.

Further on RSFSR Komsomol Congress Developments

New Content Discussed

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[By TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Galina Vinitskaya]

[Text] Moscow February 16 TASS - The Congress of Russian Komsomol organisations is underway here.

Addressing the forum today, Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Yuriy Manaenkov described it as a major event, not only in the youth movement, but in society as a whole. The new content of the organisation, its functions and place in society are being discussed.

"The draft party platform for the 28th Congress stressed that the party will build its relations with the Komsomol on the basis of ideological unity and comradely cooperation and interaction, and that it is interested in the Komsomol's direct participation in the elaboration and fulfilment of party policy," noted Manaenkov.

He believes that the new Komsomol must be a voluntary, self-governed public and political organisation with its specific structure corresponding to the new understanding of the Soviet federation and contributing to the harmonization of interethnic relations.

Manaenkov called on Komsomol members and republican youth to actively participate in Russia's economic and spiritual growth that is obligatory for the country's progress.

Today delegates debated the report by the chairman of the Congress' Organisation Committee. Opinions about the expediency of the new union of Russian youth and its models differed greatly.

Some delegates feared tht the rights of Komsomol organisations of autonomous republics, territories and regions will be infringed upon, as the Russian Komsomol will become yet another "censor".

Others favor the creation of a Komsomol structure to defend the interests of all young people of the republic in the republican governing bodies.

Maksim Sotnikov, a leader of the opposition "Surgut Initiative" movement, claimed that many delegates are ready to vote for the creation of the Russian Komsomol without discussing it essence.

The majority of delegates will continue to support using the present Soviet Komsomol structure in the new organisation, Sotnikov said.

He expressed dissatisfaction with the speech by Manaenkov. "It was made according to the old style, which we have long abandoned, and did not correspond to expectations of Komsomol members," Sotnikov noted. "It would be much more interesting to hear his suggestions about processes in the Komsomol and possible solutions to youth problems from the point of view of the party central committee."

Draft Statutes Approved

90US0547A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 2

[Draft Komsomol Statutes]

[Text] The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [VLKSM] is a voluntary, independent, and amateur social and political organization of Soviet youth.

The VLKSM operates on the basis of its own statutes and in accordance with the USSR Constitution, Soviet legislation and international treaties signed by the USSR.

The basic purpose of the VLKSM is to help the young person in his development and unite young people for participation in the creation of a democratic socialist society.

The VLKSM has its own program, seeks to participate in the management of the country's state and public affairs and employs available opportunities and authority for the defense and realization of the interests of the youth, primarily members of the VLKSM.

The VLKSM exercises its activity on the basis of ideological unity with the CPSU and independently determines long-term and currents tasks and the directions and forms of work; and cooperates with other youth and different organizations.

I. Principles of VLKSM Intra-League Life

1. The basis of the intra-league life of the VLKSM are the following principles:

a) respect for the personal dignity and opinion of each member of the organization;

b) a collective approach in the work of all organizations and collegiality in decision-making and the personal responsibility of VLKSM members for their assigned work;

c) the electivity of all Komsomol [Communist Youth League] bodies top to bottom;

d) the periodic accountability of the Komsomol authorities to their organizations and the organizations' notification of the higher bodies about their activity;

e) freedom of discussion and complete glasnost in the work of all Komsomol bodies and organizations;

f) respect for the rights of the majority and the minority: The interests of the majority are secured by its right to act on behalf of the entire organization and the binding nature of the decisions which it adopts for all Komsomol members and Komsomol organizations; the interests of the minority are secured by the right to defend its position, an appeal to public opinion included, to structure itself organizationally within elective bodies or organizations and to engage in activity which does not conflict with the VLKSM Statutes;

g) the binding nature of the decisions of higher bodies for lower bodies, if these decisions have been adopted by them within their jurisdiction, with which these bodies have been endowed by the lower organizations;

h) the delineation of the jurisdiction of the higher and top bodies and also their apparatus is determined in the VLKSM. Their functions and authority are determined by a decision of the VLKSM congress, congresses of the union republic LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth Leagues] and Komsomol organization conferences and assemblies.

Unity in the implementation of the common line and tasks of the VLKSM presupposes the extensive independence of all Komsomol organizations in the choice of forms and methods of their realization.

2. The VLKSM Central Committee and the Komsomol committees establish Komsomol awards and use them to encourage the best Komsomol organizations and VLKSM members.

II. Members of the VLKSM and Their Rights and Duties

3. Any young person of the Soviet Union aged 14 to 28 who recognizes and fulfills the VLKSM Program and Statutes, works in a Komsomol organization and pays membership dues may be a member of the VLKSM.

The age limits of VLKSM membership may be extended by the statutes or normative documents of a union republic LKSM.

Note: Where necessary, a primary Komsomol organization may admit as a member of the VLKSM an applicant prior to his having attained the entry age of 14.

By decision of the primary Komsomol organization membership in the Komsomol may be extended upon the VLKSM member's personal application.

VLKSM members have a uniform Komsomol card and Komsomol badge.

4. The transition of a VLKSM member from one union republic LKSM to another should not infringe his rights determined by the VLKSM Statutes.

5. Admittance to VLKSM membership.

The question of admittance to membership in the VLKSM is examined and decided in the primary organization, and it itself here determines the need for applicants to present recommendations. The decision is considered adopted if no less than one-half the members of the VLKSM present at the meeting vote for him. The Komsomol papers of the VLKSM applicant are drawn up in the Komsomol rayon committee, city committee, or committee with rayon committee status.

6. The VLKSM member has the right:

a) to appeal to the Komsomol organizations and authorities and the Komsomol media for assistance in the defense and realization of his interests and rights and to take advantage of the political, organizational and material possibilities of the VLKSM;

b) to nominate, elect, and be elected to the Komsomol authorities and recall early and change members of elective Komsomol authorities if they have failed to justify the trust shown in them;

c) to discuss, criticize, and submit proposals and defend his viewpoint at assemblies, conferences, congresses, and meetings of Komsomol authorities and in the Komsomol press on all questions of Komsomol activity;

d) to personally participate in Komsomol assemblies and meetings of Komsomol authorities at the time of discussion of the question of his activity or behavior;

e) to appeal to the Komsomol organization for a recommendation for membership in the CPSU;

f) to address questions, statements, and proposals to any Komsomol body, up to and including the VLKSM Central Committee, and to obtain an answer on the point of the appeal;

g) to obtain information freely at the disposal of the Komsomol authorities and to participate personally in verifying the state of affairs in the Komsomol organization;

h) to participate in the work of other public and political organizations and movements, the principles of whose activity are not in conflict with the USSR Constitution and do not impede compliance with the VLKSM Program and Statutes;

i) to participate simultaneously in the work of both his own primary organization and any other or to transfer from one organization to another with the latter's consent.

7. The member of the VLKSM is obliged:

a) to participate in the accomplishment of assignments determined by the VLKSM Program and the program of his organization;

b) to respect the rights and dignity of the individual and values common to all mankind, affirm social justice, be by his labor of benefit to society, and contribute to a strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and the world;

c) to display concern for the authority of the VLKSM and his organization and a fitting replenishment of the Komsomol and to observe the demands of the VLKSM Statutes;

d) to build his relations in the league on the basis of comradeship, respect, and mutual assistance.

8. Termination of membership of the VLKSM.

Membership of the VLKSM is terminated:

a) by a member of the VLKSM at his own request after he has notified the primary Komsomol organization of this and handed in his Komsomol card;

b) in connection with his having reached the age restricting membership in the VLKSM if the Komsomol member has not by this time been elected to Komsomol authorities, is not employed in Komsomol work, is not a Pioneer leader and has not submitted an application for an extension of his membership of the VLKSM;

c) in connection with his expulsion from the Komsomol.

9. The question of expulsion from the VLKSM is examined and decided in the primary organization. The decision is considered adopted if more than one-half of the members of the VLKSM present at the meeting voted for it.

The decision on expulsion from the Komsomol of a member of an elective body is made by the organization which delegated him to this body.

10. A person expelled from the VLKSM has the right within two months to lodge an appeal with higher Komsomol authorities, up to and including the VLKSM Central Committee. The appeal is examined by the Komsomol authorities within no more than one month following its receipt.

III. Organizational Structure of the VLKSM

11. Primary Komsomol organizations are created according to the place of work, service, study, and residence and on the basis of affinity of socially significant interests of the Komsomol members.

12. For coordination of their activity and interaction with state and public organizations and authorities at the regional level:

the Komsomol organizations may unite in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic Komsomol organizations and union republic LKSM;

the union republic LKSM and the Komsomol organizations of the armed forces constitute the VLKSM.

Note: Members of the VLKSM who are overseas unite in Komsomol organizations of Soviet establishments and collectives in the corresponding countries.

Komsomol organizations of Soviet establishments and collectives overseas are directly a part of the VLKSM and operate on the basis of the VLKSM Program and Statutes and legislative documents of the VLKSM Central Committee.

13. Where necessary, the primary Komsomol organizations may be directly a part of oblast, kray, and republic organizations and the union republic LKSM. The decision on this is made by the primary organization and the corresponding elective body.

The primary Komsomol organizations created on the basis of affinity of socially significant interests may unite by territory and form their own organs of administration.

In these instances their place in the structure and their status are determined by them and the corresponding higher elective body.

14. Organizations united on a territorial basis in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic organizations, union republic LKSM and the VLKSM form their own

organizations of administration—Komsomol committees (secretary councils and such) and control commissions. The Komsomol committees (secretary councils) coordinate the work of the Komsomol organizations within the jurisdiction determined by these organizations' higher authorities.

The control commissions exercise control functions in accordance with the regulations governing the control commissions ratified by union republic LKSM congresses. The VLKSM Central Control Commission is guided in its work by the regulations approved by the VLKSM congress.

15. The elective authorities may create their own apparatus, independently determining its structure and list of personnel.

16. The highest authority of the Komsomol organization is for the primary organization the general assembly or conference; for the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic organization, the conference; for the union republic LKSM and the VLKSM, the congress. The assembly, conference, and congress are competent given the participation in them of more than one-half of the members of the Komsomol organization or elected delegates.

17. The elective authority of the organization uniting Komsomol members of a given territory is superior in relation to all the elective bodies and Komsomol organizations which are a part thereof.

IV. Primary Komsomol Organizations

18. The primary organization is the basis of the VLKSM.

The priority of the primary Komsomol organization in the VLKSM is secured by its rights:

a) to decide all questions of its life and activity without exception, aside from those whose solution it has referred to the jurisdiction of a higher authority;
b) to decide all questions associated with membership in the VLKSM;
c) to recommend VLKSM members for membership in the CPSU;
d) to independently determine its internal structure and create Komsomol organizations with the status of primary organizations and Komsomol groups;

e) to have the right of body corporate or to endow its elective body with this right and to dispose of its financial resources and property;
f) to engage in publishing activity and have its own information organs;
g) to nominate its representatives for elective bodies, give them instructions, make inquiries, receive accounts, and, if necessary, recall them. To participate via its representatives in the Komsomol elective authorities in the administration of state, public, and general Komsomol affairs.

19. A decision to create a primary organization is adopted by a constituent assembly of no less than three VLKSM members and is registered by the higher Komsomol authority.

20. The general assembly or conference of Komsomol members of a primary organization elects a Komsomol committee and (or) secretary. The Komsomol committee (secretary) organizes the current work of the Komsomol organization. The primary Komsomol organization may elect a control commission. The periodicity of Komsomol assemblies is determined by the primary organization independently.

21. A decision to disband a primary organization is made by a general assembly of the given organization. In the event of the actual termination of its activity and also if its activity is in conflict with the VLKSM Program and Statutes, the decision to disband a Komsomol organization is adopted by a higher authority.

22. In accordance with normative documents of the union republic LKSM, the Komsomol committees of primary organizations and organizations with the status of primary organizations may be accorded the rights of a Komsomol rayon committee on questions of the issuance of Komsomol documents.

V. The Union Republic LKSM

23. The union republic LKSM are voluntary, independent, and amateur social and political organizations of the youth of the union republics.

24. On the basis of a voluntary approach and equality the union republic LKSM unite in the VLKSM and participate in the solution of all-Komsomol questions via assured representation in the higher and central elective VLKSM authorities. They possess a plenitude of rights, with some of which they voluntarily endow the central elective VLKSM authorities, collectively enshrining them in decisions of the VLKSM congress and the Komsomol Statutes. In accordance with this, they are guided by the VLKSM Program and Statutes and decisions of the congress and Central Committee of the VLKSM.

25. The union republic LKSM may have their own programs and statutes which are not in conflict with the VLKSM Program and Statutes and the constitutions and current legislation of the union republic. In accordance therewith the union republic LKSM decide without exception all questions of their life and activity, interaction with the appropriate state authorities and public organizations and defense of the interests of the members of their league at the time of a decision on political, economic, and social problems of the youth, the exercise of relations with organizations overseas and publishing activity.

26. All union republic LKSM have the right to withdraw from the VLKSM. A decision on withdrawal is adopted

according to the results of a referendum and by two-thirds majority vote of all members of the VLKSM registered in a union republic LKSM. The VLKSM Central Committee is notified of the decision.

27. Within the exclusive jurisdiction of the union republic LKSM are questions of:

a) determination of the structure of the organizations of its league and the procedure for forming the elective bodies;

b) determination of the league's budget and the creation of various establishments and enterprises and leadership of their activity;

c) record-keeping in respect of the Komsomol members, office work, and determination of the types of penalties imposed on Komsomol members.

All rules of intra-league activity, except for those determined in the VLKSM Statutes, are within the jurisdiction of the union republic LKSM.

The union republic LKSM may have its own additional symbols.

VI. USSR Armed Forces VLKSM Organization

28. The USSR Armed Forces VLKSM organization unites Komsomol members who are servicemen, workers, and employees of establishments, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The USSR Armed Forces VLKSM organization works on the basis of the VLKSM Program and Statutes and the regulations of the VLKSM Central Committee and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. In all other things the Komsomol organization of the USSR Armed Forces has the rights of a union republic LKSM.

VII. VLKSM Central Authorities

29. The highest authority of the VLKSM is the VLKSM Congress. VLKSM congresses are convened once every three years. A decision to convene a congress is adopted by a VLKSM Central Committee plenum.

Special VLKSM congresses are convened on the initiative of a VLKSM Central Committee plenum and also in accordance with the demand of no less than one-fourth of the union republic LKSM's or in accordance with a decision of Komsomol organizations uniting no less than one-fourth of VLKSM members.

The convening of a congress and its agenda are announced not later than three months prior to the congress. The VLKSM congress representation quotas are determined by a VLKSM Central Committee plenum.

Delegates to the VLKSM congress are elected in the procedure determined by the VLKSM congress.

30. The VLKSM congress decides without exception all questions of the life and activity of the VLKSM and determines the Komsomol's general policy line and immediate tasks.

Pertaining to the executive competence of the VLKSM congress are:

a) the hearing and discussion of accounts of the VLKSM Central Committee and VLKSM Central Control Commission and the adoption of decisions in respect of them;
b) adoption of the VLKSM Program and Statutes;
c) election of the VLKSM Central Control Commission and adoption of the VLKSM Central Control Commission Regulations.

By majority vote of the delegates present the VLKSM congress elects the VLKSM Central Committee first secretary and confirms the authority of the VLKSM Central Committee members elected by the Komsomol organizations.

31. In the period between VLKSM congresses the Komsomol's work is coordinated by the VLKSM Central Committee within the competence determined by the VLKSM congress.

In addition, the VLKSM Central Committee:

a) forms the Central Committee Bureau from the ranks of Central Committee members for organization of the work of the Komsomol between VLKSM Central Committee plenums;

b) reelects the VLKSM Central Committee first secretary and confirms the authority of newly delegated VLKSM Central Committee members (by two-thirds majority vote of VLKSM Central Committee members);

c) approves the editor of the central organ—the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA;

d) adopts the decision to convene VLKSM congresses and All-Union Komsomol conferences, the date and venue thereof and the delegate representation quota;

e) elects the VLKSM Central Committee secretaries for the performance of current work and leadership of the VLKSM Central Committee apparatus;

f) approves the structure and list of personnel of the apparatus and the budget of the VLKSM Central Committee and the report on its fulfillment.

Note: The VLKSM Central Committee apparatus is formed by the VLKSM Central Committee first secretary and submitted for examination by the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau.

32. VLKSM Central Committee plenums are convened by the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau at least once every six months. The convening of the plenum and its agenda are announced, as a rule, not less than one month prior to the plenum.

A special VLKSM Central Committee plenum may be convened on the initiative of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau and also in accordance with the demand of no less than one-fourth of the VLKSM Central Committee members or no less than one-fourth of the union republic LKSM central committees.

The VLKSM Central Committee plenum is considered competent given the participation therein of more than half the elected VLKSM Central Committee members.

33. For the exercise of control functions the VLKSM congress elects the VLKSM Central Control Commission.

The VLKSM Central Control Commission exercises supervision of compliance with the requirements of the VLKSM Statutes and the established procedure for routing dossiers and the examination of letters, applications, and complaints in the Komsomol central authorities; monitors the soundness of fulfillment of the Komsomol budget and also the financial and economic activity of VLKSM Central Committee enterprises and establishments and other questions in accordance with the VLKSM Central Control Commission Regulations.

VIII. All-Union Komsomol Conferences and Referenda

34. In the period between VLKSM congresses an All-Union Komsomol conference may be convened on the initiative of no less than one-fourth of union republic LKSM's for the solution of urgent political and intra-league problems of the Komsomol. The procedure for organization of the conference and the representation quota and the procedure for the election of delegates are determined by a VLKSM Central Committee plenum.

An All-Union Komsomol conference may make alterations to the VLKSM Program and Statutes, except for questions of the formation and authority of the VLKSM central elective bodies and the election of the VLKSM Central Committee first secretary and members of the VLKSM Central Control Commission and also regulations limiting the rights of the primary organizations and VLKSM members.

The decisions of an All-Union Komsomol conference on alterations to the VLKSM Program and Statutes are considered adopted if no less than two-thirds of the delegates elected to the conference votes for them.

35. In the period between VLKSM congresses an All-Union Komsomol referendum may be held in accordance with a decision of a VLKSM Central Committee plenum or on the initiative of no less than one-fourth of the union republic LKSM's for solving most important political and intra-league problems which have arisen in the life and activity of the Komsomol, including those in respect of which the VLKSM congress was unable to adopt a decision.

An All-Union Komsomol referendum is competent to make partial changes to the VLKSM Program and Statutes.

An All-Union Komsomol referendum is considered competent if more than half the members of the VLKSM have participated in it. A referendum decision is considered adopted if more than half the Komsomol members who participated therein voted for it.

Note: In the event of questions affecting the rights of the union republic LKSM being submitted for examination by referendum, the decision is considered adopted if more than half the members of the VLKSM in each union republic have voted for it.

IX. The Komsomol and the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization

36. The VLKSM and the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization are bound by ideological unity and joint activity.

The Komsomol displays concern to create conditions for the efficient work and development of the Pioneer organization and renders it scientific-methods and material and financial support and assistance in the training of personnel.

The Pioneer organizations are guaranteed their representation in the elective Komsomol authorities. Members of the VLKSM working in Pioneer organizations are elected to the elective bodies by Pioneer organization councils according to quotas determined by the corresponding Komsomol committees.

X. Property of the VLKSM

37. VLKSM property is a form of socialist public property.

VLKSM property includes monetary resources, buildings, installations, equipment, enterprises created by the Komsomol, and other property necessary for the accomplishment of program and statutory tasks.

The primary, rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic Komsomol organizations, the union republic LKSM, the Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, and the VLKSM in the shape of its elective authorities exercise the powers of proprietor in respect of the part of VLKSM property which is formed at their level and are bodies corporate.

The procedure for the creation, functioning, reorganization, and liquidation of enterprises, publishing houses, and editorial offices of youth newspapers and journals and Komsomol establishments and economic organizations is determined by the VLKSM Central Committee and union republic LKSM central committees in accordance with legislation of the USSR and the union republics.

In accordance with its tasks and in the procedure determined by legislation of the USSR and the union republics, the VLKSM Central Committee and the union republic LKSM central committees engage in foreign economic activity.

The monetary resources of the VLKSM are formed from membership dues, money received from Komsomol organization activities, income from tourist-excursion and foreign economic activity, taxes on the profits of publishing houses and publications and enterprises and economic organizations of the Komsomol, and other types of activity. Voluntary contributions and citizen and enterprise transfers may be VLKSM income also.
The budget in the VLKSM is formed upward.
Monthly membership dues are determined in the following amounts:
with a monthly income of:
R80 and less, 20 kopecks;
from R81 to R100, 0.5 percent;
from R101 to R150, 1 percent;
R150 and over, 1.5 percent.

Trainee and student VLKSM members not in receipt of a grant pay membership dues only from their earned income.

VLKSM members without an income, like persons on authorized leave or leave to care for a child, and also those receiving benefits from the social insurance fund may be exempted from the payment of membership dues at the decision of the primary organization.

The property of Komsomol organizations is used for the accomplishment of tasks which they have determined in the interests of VLKSM members.

The VLKSM Headquarters is in Moscow.

Policy Declaration Published

PM2302091190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p1

["RSFSR Komsomol Organizations' Congress Declaration"]

[Text] We believe that the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Congress must be the congress of the league's organizational and ideological self-determination. The Komsomol's stand on a whole series of most important political issues must be clearly and unequivocally adopted.

In our opinion, the main objective of the renewed organization is to create the conditions for young people's development, the disclosure of their creative potential, and the fulfillment of their rights and interests.

The main task of the organization is to help to create a society of humane, democratic socialism, promote the country's transition to a real federal, rule-of-law, democratic state with a standard of living worthy of its citizens, and ensure that this transition is made without violence, by parliamentary means.

The means of realizing these objectives and resolving these tasks is to transform the Komsomol into a really democratic organization with its own political platform, as a federation of independent Komsomol organizations working for the development of the youth movement and contributing to this with its political, organizational, and material potential, and to make it part of the bloc of democratic forces composed of progressive deputies, innovators in the CPSU, and other organizations and movements of democratic orientation.

The Komsomol supports those forces in the CPSU which are in favor of the party's democratic transformation and its renunciation of its political monopoly.

The league's new substance must be matched by its new organizational structure:

Voluntary membership of the Komsomol and the right to freely leave the organization. The Komsomol member's right to use the organization's political, organizational, and material possibilities;

Elimination of the organization's rigid, ossified structure and the element of predetermination in the way it is built; creation of the necessary flexibility in its formation and structure on the basis of Komsomol members' real need;

Respect for the rights of the majority and the minority: The interests of the majority are safeguarded by its right to act on behalf of the entire organization, its right to dispose of the organization's property, and the binding nature of the decisions it adopts with regard to all members of the Komsomol organization concerned; the interests of the minority are safeguarded by its right to defend its position by appealing to public opinion, officially register as an organization as part of elected bodies or organizations, conduct activity that does not conflict with the Komsomol Program and Statute, and exercise the right to self-determination as an organization, to the point of separation;

The binding nature of decisions adopted by higher bodies with regard to lower-ranking bodies, if these decisions have been adopted by them within the limits of the powers invested in these bodies by lower-ranking organizations;

Komsomol organizations exercise the legal powers of owner in relation to that part of Komsomol property which is formed at their level; in the case of an organization leaving the Komsomol, the question of that organization's property is decided by it together with its higher elected body. (Footnote) (A dissenting opinion has been officially registered on this matter: Namely that "Komsomol property is shared. Komsomol organizations are the owners of resources formed at their level.")

Resolution of Komsomol Congress Published

PM2102171190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 1

["RSFSR Komsomol Organizations' Congress Resolution 'On the Formation of the RSFSR Komsomol'"]

[Text] Considering the objective processes in the development of Soviet society, the democratization of all social structures, the desire to ensure real sovereignty, and the need to unite RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] organizations to develop and implement an integrated youth policy in the RSFSR and create a new model on which to build the All-Union Komsomol, as a union of equal republic Komsomol organizations united on a federal basis, the congress resolves:

1. To unite, on a voluntary basis, Komsomol organizations of the All-Union Komsomol located in RSFSR territory in the RSFSR Komsomol, as part of the All-Union Komsomol.

2. To continue the work of the congress no later than the middle of June 1990, when the elected bodies of the RSFSR Komsomol will be formed and programmatic and statutory-normative documents adopted.

To authorize the relevant Komsomol organizations to reelect their congress delegates, if necessary, in line with the earlier approved procedure, and also at Komsomol committee plenums.

To confirm the procedure for forming central elected bodies of the RSFSR Komsomol.

3. To form an organizational committee for the purpose of coordinating the work of Komsomol organizations and preparing for the RSFSR Komsomol Congress. To confirm the status and procedure for forming the organizational committee.

During the discussion of the question "On the Formation of the RSFSR Komsomol," a dissenting opinion was officially registered:

To deem it advisable to register the RSFSR Komsomol as an organization based on strictly voluntary, democratic principles.

To address the following proposal to Komsomol organizations of autonomous republics and okrugs, krays and oblasts, and military formations located in RSFSR territory: To reach a decision on the question of their being incorporated into the RSFSR Komsomol. To convene an RSFSR Komsomol Congress no later than the middle of June 1990, when a decision will be made on the formation of the RSFSR Komsomol, central elected bodies formed, and programmatic and statutory-normative documents adopted. To confirm the procedure for forming central elected bodies.

Komsomol Secretary on Congress

90UN0966 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Feb 90 2nd edition p 2

[Report on interview with S.A. Smirnov, chairman of the organizing committee for preparing for and conducting the congress of Komsomol organizations of the RSFSR, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, by A. Gamov: "Young Russia"]

[Text] **In keeping with the decision of the 9th Plenum of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee, the congress of Komsomol organizations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] will begin its work on 15 February in Moscow. Just before the congress our correspondent spoke with S.A. Smirnov, chairman of the organizing committee for preparing for and conducting the congress and secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee.**

[Gamov] Stanislav Alekseyevich, recently we have been hearing more and more frequently that our Komsomol is in a condition of crisis and people are trying to find the reasons for this phenomenon within the organization itself. In your view, how justified is this approach?

[Smirnov] I think it is radically wrong. The assessment of the situation in the Komsomol should be based on the situation in which our society finds itself: disorder in the economy, the imperfection of the political structures. In a situation like this could the Komsomol really avoid a crisis? Naturally, problems within the union also have an effect. But the main thing to which we should pay attention is the unenviable position of youth in the society and the lack of the conditions that are necessary to realize their potential. During the past couple of years the Komsomol has reduced its membership by 10 million and this process is continuing. The rates of growth of the organizations from the entry of new Komsomol members are very low. I think that this shows once again the need for us to figure out the essence of the problems that face us and to determine the goals for which we are striving. One of them is to create the Komsomol organization of Russia.

[Gamov] In general how did this idea originate?

[Smirnov] We cannot say that it appeared from among the Komsomol workers. But still it was they who defined it clearly at a meeting of candidate USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol that was held in Krasnoyarsk. At that time they were discussing the problems of the Russian Federation, mainly economic ones. In particular they were speaking about the system of taxes and distribution in Russia and in other union republics. When the boys had dug down to the bottom of all the machinations it became clear that one resident of Russia receives much less from centralized funds than one resident does in the other union republics. They asked themselves the question: Why? They began to analyze the economic situation. And they came to understand that much of what has developed over the years had to be changed and fairly radically. And to do this it was necessary to delve into the legislative sphere and go to the government of the Russian Federation. But how were we to form a collective opinion? At that time we were also aware of the need to create a Komsomol of the Russian Federation which would be a full-fledged participant in the formation of policy in the republic.

This idea met with enthusiastic response from young Russians. There were several meetings, mainly in Kemerovi, Novisibirsk, and Sverdlovsk, in which representatives of almost all regions of the Russian Federation participated. There they developed positions concerning the creation of the Komsomol of Russia. It was first discussed in the bureau of the Central Committee and then at the plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee. And then painstaking preparatory work began.

I must admit that this was the first time we had encountered the practice of preparing for a congress without the apparatus. There were only 10 people—representatives of apparatus structures of various levels solve any minor organizational and technical problems, and everything else is done on the initiative of the enthusiasts who represent all territories of the Russian Federation.

[Gamov] What tasks are facing the congress?

[Smirnov] The goal of the congress, as the organizing committee understands it, is to lay a basis for the organizational formation of the Russian Komsomol within the framework of the new model of the All-Union Komsomol. Another question is how the new Komsomol structures should look. Will it be an independent youth organization or a republic Komsomol council? Or some other kind of structure? This should be decided by the congress.

Additionally, we intend to analyze the situation in the country and develop evaluations for forthcoming events. I think that delegates will have their own variants of ways the country can get out of the difficult situation it is in.

[Gamov] As far as I know there are polar viewpoints concerning the model for the Russian Komsomol. How are you overcoming the organizational disagreements that arise because of this?

[Smirnov] The majority of kray and oblast Komsomol conferences held in recent months discussed this question in detail and everyone was still in favor of organizing the Russian Communist Youth Union. But a number of organizations agreed to take this step only under certain conditions, particularly that a bureau be created instead of a central committee.

But there is also another kind of problem. We have ahead of us the 21st Congress which on the whole should be organized according to the Komsomol model. What position in it will be assigned to the Russian Komsomol organization? Are we not being too hasty; are we not anticipating events? This idea gives me no peace. Therefore the organizational committee decided to conduct a Russian congress in two stages. At the first they will solve problems of a particular nature and then they will develop the platform for our future development of the Communist Youth Union as a whole and take it to the 21st Congress. After that a final decision will be made concerning the management organs of the Russian Komsomol.

[Gamov] Stanislav Alekseyevich, it says in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress in particular that the CPSU arranges its relations with the Komsomol on the basis of ideological unity, fraternal cooperation, and interaction and is interested in its direct participation in the development and implementation of its policy. In your view, how realistic is this principle? Is it being reflected in the precongress discussion?

[Smirnov] I do not think we will be able to bypass this issue. Very frequently when the discussion comes around to party leadership of the Komsomol one recalls many concrete situations which show how critical the problem is. I was recently in Smolensk Oblast and encountered a case in which the secretary of the raykom [rayon party committee] ordered the first secretary of the rayon Komsomol committee to be on duty in his reception room instead of a technical secretary. Is this not an expression of a disrespectful attitude toward the youth organization?

For some reason we have started to forget that the 19th All-Union Party Conference has already declared the need to refrain from organizational tutelage of the Komsomol. They also discussed the fact that the work with the Komsomol should be built on a unified ideological platform. But today this principle is augmented with another formulation: The Komsomol has the right to participate actively in the development and implementation of party policy. We are trying to take advantage of this possibility.

[Gamov] In this connection, what is your opinion of the prospects for the development of the youth movement.

[Smirnov] The society needs our organizations and they will exist as long as we have young people. The Komsomol will also live but, naturally, in a different, renewed form. It will change numerically and its principles will become more complex. But it will remain an expression of the very important historical mission of educating and consolidating youth. So I can say with complete confidence that the Russian Komsomol has a great future.

Vorotnikov, Manayenkov at Congress

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1603 GMT on 20 February carries a 42-minute program entitled "Youth Herald", which is devoted to the Congress of Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Organizations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The program begins with the congress opening announcement. The correspondent presents a selection of excerpts from some of the speeches made by delegates, as well as interviews with delegates between sessions.

The correspondent asks Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, whether he would regard a Russian Komsomol organization as a rival. Vorotnikov replies: "No I do not think so. Like the first secretary of the VLKSM (All-Union Komsomol) Central Committee, I would welcome the organizational setting up of the Komsomol organizations of Russia. In my view, the right to decide what kind and in what form, belongs fully and totally to the delegates and the members of the Komsomol organizations of Russia. What kind of rivalry could there possibly be here? No, I think there are so many problems in Russia, for its Komsomol organizations, and for the central bodies. Not to mention problems of relations between the republics, of inter-ethnic relations, of international activity, and other widely diverse matters. Therefore, I would welcome it if the congress ended in such a way."

Asked about cooperation between the party and Komsomol organizations, Vorotnikov says: "It is still early to talk about this. Neither the party bodies nor the Komsomol bodies have been set up, and it is still unclear whether they will be set up. [passage indistinct] All in all, I believe that the young people should be given some kind of opportunity even to, say, speak on procedural matters. Let the congress have the right to resolve these matters without being regulated. This is where I see one of the most important, so to speak effects of democracy."

The correspondent speaks to a group of delegates about the role of the Komsomol as helper of the party, a role which they dispute. They see it more as a helper of society and of young people. The group of delegates argue in front of the microphone. The correspondent then speaks at some length to R. Safunov, identified as former candidate member of the bureau of the Bashkir Obkom [oblast party committee] of the CPSU, about the resignation of the bureau recently and the lesson this experience has been for him.

The video shows a delegate introducing Yuriy Alekseyevich Manayenkov, secretary of the party Central Committee, member of the Russian bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, who is to speak. Another delegate says: "The Sverdlovsk delegation proposes that we do the following—that we do not upset the standing order but that those invited should be given the floor when the entire list of delegates who have registered to speak has been exhausted." This is followed by applause.

Manayenkov says: "Dear comrades, I will not hold up the standing order any more, therefore I ask your attention for a few minutes. Despite the widely scattered nature of views on the question of whether the Russian Komsomol should be or should not be—this problem is ultimately for you to resolve—I believe that major events are taking place in this hall. What is more, not only from the point of view of the youth movement, but also in the broadest public sense.

"Why is this? Because the new content of the Komsomol, its new place in society and its new functions are being discussed. It is absolutely logical that the draft platform of the Central Committee for the 28th congress stresses that the party intends to build its relations with the Komsomol on the basis of comradely cooperation and interaction, on the basis of ideological unity, and that it is committed to its (the Komsomol's) direct particiation both in the working out and implementation of its (the party's) policy...."

"We have many concerns in Russia. Our republic is great, but the demands on it are also great. Bearing this in mind, it is essential to ensure the energetic rise of Russia, without which the progress of society as a whole is inconceivable. Russia has earned, has gained through suffering, our filial attitude to it. The rise in self-awareness of citizens places on the agenda the issue of granting the republic economic and state independence." The video shows the audience applauding, with many delegates raising their cards, possibly as some form of protest.

Manayenkov continues: "I ask for silence, comrades. I have the right to speak. Now, where's the need for this?

"The Russian Federation supports the fair turnover of goods and trade between republics and calls for the share of resources sent to the Union budget by each republic to be equally proportional and for material well-being to promote the contribution of labor. Much callousness has accumulated in society, crime is on the increase. Such lofty traits of the human soul as nobleness, decency, charity, and collectivism have been pushed into the background. Unfortunately, moral insensibility has also touched some young people. A profound analysis in life, the careful consideration of factors, and energetic work to implement adopted decisions—this is what is valued most today, and, of course, contact with the masses.

"Therefore, in conclusion, I would like to wish all the young people of Russia and Komsomol members of Russia great successes, successes and achievements in work and life. Thank you." There is faint applause.

An unidentified delegate says: "The speech by Comrade Manayenkov did not satisfy me, personally." There is applause. "I think that on such bases it is difficult to conduct dialogue with young people today. We have a specific proposal. We have expressed and substantiated it in a note. We propose that a telegram be sent, on behalf of our congress today, to Mikhail Sergeyevich, requesting that on one day (of the congress) he come here to see us, or to reply to our questions, or to speak. Personally speaking I have many questions for Mikhail Sergeyevich." There is loud applause.

The correspondent continues speaking to delegates about their views on the future of the Komsomol and presenting excerpts from other speeches to the congress. The video shows views of the congress, Manayenkov speaking at the rostrum, and interviews in the foyer, including with Vorotnikov.

Contrasting Views on Multiparty System Reported

PM2302160090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

["We Compare Opinions" feature as part of "Discussion Pamphlet No 8: The Party and Perestroyka—Toward the 28th CPSU Congress," comprising articles by E. Kulapin, chief of the Magadan Oblast CPSU Committee Ideology Department, and S. Afanasyev, CPSU member and lecturer at Moscow State Technical School Faculty of Political Economy, plus editorial commentary

[Text]

[Kulapin article begins] Borders of Pluralism

Why are people talking about the attractions of a multiparty system in a society where the social base for the emergence of real new political parties does not exist? Has a program been formulated anywhere for emerging from stagnation, an alternative to perestroyka? Yet at the recent Congress of People's Deputies even the most highly critical speeches amounted to saying that perestroyka is frequently stifled. Even the boldest formulas were invariably put forward within the framework of the CPSU's present agenda. And the "informals" are patently lacking in ideas.

Perestroyka is in its fifth year, and there have been substantial changes for the better in the democratization of public life and the widening of glasnost. Perestroyka is under way in the economic mechanism and the management system, economic reform is being implemented, and the functions of party committees and soviets of people's deputies are changing.

But at the same time there have been no marked changes in people's material well-being, the growth of their prosperity. Many food products and industrial goods are becoming scarce. In some places there is basically a return to the rationing system, based on the introduction of coupons. There is patently a gulf between the proclaimed objectives and the actual results, between word and deed. People are not satisfied with the explanations of what is happening. They are looking for reasons, and they see the one-party system, the lack of parties in opposition to the CPSU, as one reason.

In other words, the illusion is currently present in society that all problems will be resolved rapidly as soon as one or two more parties appear. This idea is supported by many nonparty people and by some holders of party cards. Not infrequently there are even calls, direct or indirect, for the party to be separated from the people, which certainly will not benefit perestroyka.

The Communists' ideal is the building of a communist society, combined with the withering away of the state and consequently a classless and partyless system. The question is, by what route shall we approach that system—by the more logical, simpler route of improving the one-party system, or by a more complex, zigzag route of creating alternative parties to the CPSU (although certainly they would adhere to socialist positions)? Only practical experience will show, and that means that, taking a long-term view, neither a one-party nor a multiparty system has any significance.

In principle, a multiparty system is not in conflict with socialism. This is indicated both by our own historical experience and by the practice in other countries today. But the democratism of a society is measured not by the number of parties, but by the degree of people's involvement in the resolution of statewide tasks. From the viewpoint of Leninism, the question of the superiority of a one-party or a multiparty system is not so much a question of principle as of political expediency.

First, we have no serious traditions of a multiparty system (since 1918 there has been only one party). Therefore I believe that from today's viewpoint, taking into account the highly complex tasks of perestroyka, it is expedient to have a one-party system, and, second, some people's desire artificially to impose a multiparty system is simply at variance with people's present aspirations.

Who said that with a multiparty system the economy will improve and we will begin to live better? History shows that if there are two or three parties, there will be a political struggle for power. If there is a struggle, there will be winners and losers, there will be gains and losses. I am certain that here we can hardly expect an improvement in the economic situation in the country.

One sometimes hears it said that a one-party system hampers the development of democracy, while a multiparty system promotes it. But is this true? History also shows that in conditions where two or three parties are active, it is possible to create a mechanism of control dominated by one party to such an extent that there is not a hint of democracy, since no one dares make a sound. And there are plenty of examples of this.

In our country it should clearly be a question not of political pluralism, but of socialist pluralism, the most important feature of which should be the strengthening of socialism, not its disintegration. Given the positive development of perestroyka and the further democratization of the party's life and the strengthening of its prestige as the leading and guiding force of our society, the idea of creating an alternative party to the CSPU seems to me to be unattractive.

Success—serious, long-term success—can only be achieved through the democratization of the life of the party itself. Its image cannot be allowed to fade. Perestroyka is a very serious test of our words against our deeds. The reality of today is that at present it is proceeding with difficulty, and the struggle for it often demands considerable personal courage from both Communists and nonparty people.

[Afanasyev article begins] A Law Is Needed

The CPSU Central Committee February Plenum set a course of revoking Article 6 of the Constitution. The right decision, in my view. But this is not (as people often write) because it is necessary to stimulate the party's activeness by removing the constitutional props supporting its authority. The main reason, I think, is that the political situation has changed.

In conditions where, in effect, other parties have already sprung up in the country, the majority of them advocating the renewal of socialism, the quest for ways of achieving these transformations has widened and become more diverse. It would be undemocratic and, moreover, harmful to the development of socialism to exclude in principle the possibility of choosing ways that differ from those proposed by the CPSU and by a government headed by CPSU members, and thus the possibility of a struggle for power by other parties.

It is necessary only to exclude the possibility of a return to the capitalist path, which certain groupings propose. There is talk, in particular, of the free sale of shares in state enterprises, which in practice should mean transferring control of production, labor collectives, their income, employment, and public life as a whole to the shadow economy dealers and reviving an official class of rentiers, that is, people living on dividends and interest. In this connection one of the CPSU's urgent tasks is to step up propaganda of the danger of a return to the capitalist path, since such views have become fairly widespread among the masses, who do not fully understand the consequences of such a step.

The need to abandon Article 6 also arises from the fact that its excessively general formulation, making it possible to interpret loosely the functions of the party in society, gave the "green light" for the party's transformation into a part—the decisive part, at that—of the state apparatus and the organs of economic management.

However, after the removal of Article 6 from the USSR Constitution (which is highly probable), a vacuum should not be allowed to form in the legal regulation of party activity. The party's functions in society should be strictly regulated, but on the basis of the new understanding of them. By way of developing the new constitutional provisions, a law on the party and other sociopolitical movements should be drafted and adopted. I will dwell on what I believe should be incorporated in these legislative acts.

First, they should apply not only to the CPSU, but to **any party** registered in the country. Furthermore a party and its main function in society should be defined. For instance: A party is an organizationally constituted group of people upholding the interests of specific social classes (or a class) and large strata of the population, which seeks to nominate representatives to state organs. The Constitution should stipulate that the means of political struggle available to a party are **exclusively peaceful** and consist in: 1) **the formulation of a strategy** for social development; 2) **propaganda** of this strategy among various strata of the population and in all spheres of activity —in the production sphere (in people's free time, naturally), in daily life, and so forth; 3) the **nomination** of representatives as **candidates for elections** to any state and social organs. It is fundamentally necessary to stipulate that a party **does not have the right** to determine the **tactics** and **methods** of work of organs of state and economic management or social organizations. Its influence may only be indirect—through its representatives who are elected to those organs and organizations by lawful means.

The law should give a detailed exposition of the party's relations with organs of state administration. This includes its right to nominate candidates to the state's executive and legislative organs. Particular significance will be attached to the participation of parties in presidential elections. If a candidate is elected president (it will be better if they are direct elections by the whole people), he should by law **renounce the posts** he holds in the party, especially if he is its general secretary or chairman. Because, when he is accountable to the people as a whole, he should not feel any pressure from relatively private, intraparty interests which could adversely affect the quality of leadership of the country. Nonetheless a president elected on the basis of a party's strategic platform will have a duty to all the people to uphold that platform and put it into practice, and therefore he will not basically lose his party allegiance.

Recently a good many groupings have appeared in our country that lay claim to power and preach the creation of special privileges for certain nations and the oppression of others. The Constitution should stipulate the state's duty to ban such groupings and parties, as well as their press organs.

The law should also make provision for **property relations** between the party and society. In particular, it must be stipulated that a party does not have the right to use state resources to supplement its own property. The state, in turn, should guarantee the protection of the parties' property arising from party subscriptions and income from the activity of economically accountable party enterprises (publishing houses and so forth) that are set up in accordance with the Statutes. Indicentally, I think that the law should specify compulsory points that a party must reflect in its Statutes. These include the purpose of the activity of party enterprises and a list of them.

Party organizations should be granted the right, **by contract** with the collectives and leadership of enterprises and organizations, to lease from them or to use free of charge the premises necessary for the implementation of their activity. As well as the right to build and equip such premises out of party funds and to accept subscriptions to their funds from social organizations, cooperatives, and individuals. However, party budgets must without fail be public as far as income and expenditure are concerned.

This, in my view, will promote the normal development of democratic processes in our country. The inclusion of a new article in the Constitution and the adoption of a law on parties must take place **simultaneously** with the repeal of the existing Article 6.

[Editorial commentary] Only recently the subject of a multiparty system was, you could say, banned, and many readers—judging by the editorial mail—are still convinced that it should not be discussed. But to do that would be to ignore a problem that troubles public opinion and evade the urgent issues of today. Especially since in a number of republics certain sociopolitical movements have already declared themselves to be autonomous parties. Other independent formations that express the positions and interests of various strata of our society are also becoming increasingly politicized. So even the most "inconvenient" problems must be discussed—there is no escaping that now.

All the same, one feels that those who warn against the illusion that a multiparty system is, so to speak, the imperative of the time and will deliver society from all our ills are right. The reality is that it will lead to the exacerbation of the political situation, a struggle for power, for influence over people's minds. Yet now, perhaps more than ever before, what is needed is the consoldiation of all society's progressive forces for the sake of the success of perestroyka, the formation of a rule-of-law state, and progress toward a humane, democratic socialism. That is indeed the imperative of the time. That is what we must strive for.

Moscow Party Secretary Discusses Pluralism

PM2302180690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 18 Feb 90 p 6

[Ygor Yakovolev interview with Moscow City CPSU Committee First Secretary Yuriy Prokofyev: "Loitering in the Rear Is Not the Best Way To Advance"—date, place not given]

[Text] Yegor Yakovlev: And so, political pluralism. The CPSU's status in our society is not determined by the Constitution. The appearance of other parties is possible. The CPSU is fighting for power and competing with other socio-political forces. In the Party itself there's a drive for power by the Party masses instead of power by the apparat... A third, basically new period in the history of the CPSU, is emerging, if we consider the first period to have been the pre-revolutionary struggle for power. The second was the individual possession of that power for 70 years. Let's imagine that the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee will be approved by the 28th Congress. Naturally, in the course of discussion it will undergo changes. But let's proceed from the fair remark made at the Plenary Meeting: so far this is the minimum, and not maximum, of the urgent steps that need to be undertaken. What will the Party be like in your opinion, given this minimum?

Yuriy Prokofyev: I think the main political aspects included in the draft reform—the likelihood of a multiparty system, the Communist Party's renunciation of its monopoly on power—won't happen immediately. External conditions are needed for this: the emergence of parties, a new political structure of society, which will take shape when the Soviets snap into action at all levels.

Yakovlev: As far as public opinion is concerned the decisions made at the Plenary Meeting are enough to realize that Article 6 of the Constitution has been abolished, thta the barrier blocking the way to a multiparty system has been lifted.

Prokofyev: What's important for me now is the other mechanisms about which, perhaps, less was spoken at the Plenary Meeting. The levers asserting the Party masses' power msut be switched on. I mean the direct alternative elections of Congress delegates, and the democratic elections of Party committee. Not as it is done today—if you collect 50 per cent of votes everything is OK—but really alternative elections with the victory of those who have received the actual majority of votes. This must be done at the first stage. At the second—when other political movements appear, I think it's necessary to do as Lenin once said: In order to unite, first it is necessary to separate. This will happen in the CPSU. Higher Party School experts count about eight trends inside the CPSU. I'm inclined to single out three: conservative, the centre and leftist-radical. The remaining are only nuances.

Yakovlev: I find it difficult to agree with Aleksandr Yakovlev who said at the Plenary Meeting that inherent in the draft platform "are opportunities for mutual accord and cooperation between all forces within the CPSU..." Reading the speeches by participants in the Plenary Meeting, each time I ask myself: What do they mean? For instance, Anatoliy Korniyenko, First Secretary of the Kiev City Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, said mournfully: "We continue to slowly but steadily lose our positions." What positions? Those in the administer-and-command system? Then thank goodness! "But the most crucial point is at issue—that of power, the prospects of preserving the ruling Party". Power for whom—for the apparat? The preservation of what Party—the one that is now in a deep crisis? With such differences of views the agreement cannot be sincere.

Prokofyev: A considerable part of Communists, including leaders, unfortunately do not see the ultimate goals of perestroyka. They do not understand that, ceasing to be a stronghold of the administer- and-command system, the Party cannot claim legislative and executive power. It is only a political organization, and this point must be stressed quite definitely. Otherwise, by a transfer of the functions of power to the Soviets, many people think they are losing everything. Meanwhile, they have worry about something different: who will be in the Soviets? I think that the forthcoming Congress won't reconcile positions in the Party. It will formulate the political platform. Part of it will aceept it wholeheartedly, another will simply be reconciled with it. A certain part will undoubtedly break off.

Yakovlev: It has long been fashionable for us to speak on behalf of all people, all Party members. Those doing so are no doubt sincerely sure that they express the general view. For instance, Valentin Mesyats, First Secretary of the Moscow regional Party Committee, assured the Plenary Meeting: "Our Regional Party organization firmly declared that it will stand for the Party continuing to have a leading role in society." I must say I don't see the difference between a guiding and a leading role. In general, can one speak today on behalf of all Communists, even if it is a regional organization? Are you prepared to make a statement on behalf of all Communists of Moscow?

Prokofyev: If you noticed, we raised the political demands of the City Party Committee before the elections. Although the theses were widely discussed in Party organizations, we considered it impossible to name them as the theses of the City Party organization. In order to speak on behalf of the whole organization it is necessary at least to hold a referendum it is necessary at least to hold a referendum. Indeed, it has become customary in our country to refer to public opinion, without making any effort to find out what that opinion is in reality.

Yakovlev: There was also such a statement at the Plenary Meeting: apart from the CPSU, there is none and cannot be any other force, other movement which would unite the people. It can be noted that not long ago such statements were made in East European countries. Today we know the truth. Non-acceptance of any other force is inserted in such statements from the start. Like you, I also covered the whole road from Krymskiy Val to Manege Square during the demonstration on Sunday, February 4. Then I read the TASS report which resembled more of a statement from the old days. The sincere impulse of the people in support of the democratization of our life was condemned, because any force other than the CPSU is obviously hostile.

Prokofyev: I think that today only the Party can consolidate society. But the situation may change. If the CPSU fails to go in the vanguard of the processes taking place in society, if it lags behind them as previously, the other force will arise by itself. No promises can be made here.

Yakovlev: What, in your opinion, are the causes of the Party lagging behind perestroyka: Don't you think this is because all this time we have been engaged in a tug-of-war from right to left and from left to right?

Prokofyev: We are not engaged in any tug-of-war. Different tendencies have freely taken shape in the Party and new political ideas, making consolidation possible, have just been formulated, i.e., five years after the start of perestroyka. The political and state structure underwent reforms, but the party was left as the only unshakable force against the background of the general movement. This was a mistake. It is impossible to lead the society by lagging behind. Today also, I'm sure that the party is dealt with insufficiently.

Yakovlev: The existence of different trends in the Party outlines the stand of the City Committee in the solution of practical issues. Will you back all the Communists who nominated themselves as candidates for election to Republican and local Soviets?

Prokofyev: The City Committee's stand is: it's not essential who has nominated, it is important who is nominated. We are against those who are dragging the country backward, who feel an insurmountable nostalgia for the past.

Yakovlev: But are you interested in Communists winning as many mandates as possible? Or is there no such task?

Prokofyev: But are you interested in Communists winning as many mandates as possible? Or is there no such task?

Prokofyev: No such task has ever arisen. No matter how strongly the Party is criticized, it concentrates the most active forces of society. Among the candidates Moscow has nominated for election to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 85 per cent are Party members, of those nominated to the Moscow City Soviet 75 per cent are Party members, and of those elected to the district Soviets, 66 per cent are Party members. No efforts were made to achieve this, unlike the past years when according to the plan, non-Party peoiple must make not more than 54 per cent. But we are interested in the election of those Communists who can really work for perestroyka.

Yakovlev: Many participants in the Plenary Meeting were concerned about the fall in the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Honestly speaking, I can't imagine how to link in practice Marxism- Leninism—a teaching on class struggle—with the priority of human values? Can you manage to do it?

Prokofyev: I think it is not correct to give preference to any class or stratum of society. For me, human values come first. Proceeding from them, I understand that, from perestroyka, the working class has so far gained less than others. It has empty shops, inflation, a bigger lag—not only in matters of social justice, but even in enterprises' technical equipment. The process of technically retooling enterprises, introducing new technologies and improving working conditions, has sharply slowed. And today I would speak not about the leading role of the working class but about the need to prioritize its interests.

Decree Institutes RSFSR Sciences Academy

PM0102101590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On Institution of Russian Federation's Academy of Sciences"]

[Text] The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium decrees:

1. That the proposals of eminent scientists and scientific collectives and a number of enterprises and organizations of the RSFSR, with a consideration for the opinion of the public and the USSR Academy of Sciences presidium, examined and approved by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission for science and technology concerning the institution of an RSFSR Academy of Sciences be adopted.

2. That the RSFSR Council of Ministers be instructed to implement practical measures for the formation of an RSFSR Academy of Sciences and the organization of its activity.

[Signed] V. Vorotnikov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium,
[Signed] S. Chistoplyasov, secretary of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium, Moscow, 24 January 1990.

Gostelradio Official Discusses Yeltsin Tape

LD1702205590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Phone calls are coming in to our editorial office from viewers asking us to explain how much truth there is in the frequently repeated reproach by USSR People's Deputy Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin accusing Central Television of allegedly having technically distorted a tape on his visit to the United States, which was shown 6 months ago. Yeltsin reiterated his reproach yesterday on the Leningrad program. In our studio today is Petr Nikolayevich Reshetov, first deputy chairman of USSR Gostelradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting], who has already offered explanations on this subject to a commission of the Supreme Soviet headed by People's Deputy Denisov.

[Reshetov] Unfortunately the story that the tape shown on television 6 months ago about Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's visit to the United States was technically distorted is still going the rounds of various meetings and cropping up in samizdat publications. I personally feel that Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin himself does not altogether believe what he is saying. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that he cannot fail to guess that both the idea itself and the story about the technical distortion and the unknown Yeremeyev who is supposed to have been involved in that work comes from Yeltsin's own obliging assistants.

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin cannot deny the fact that before the film was shown he was shown the original material on television, and he had no comment to make on that original material. Furthermore, we accepted his suggestion that we should supplement that material with other statements made by him in the United States which, as he put it, showed him in a more attractive light. And finally, before the showing of the film it was shown to a commission which, on the instructions of the Supreme Soviet, was looking into the critical press comment on the visit of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin to the United States. The commission did not object to the showing of the film either.

But one is struck by something rather different. All this is not, perhaps, the most important thing: In the film, Boris Nikolayevich is perhaps even flattering us when he exaggerates our technical ability to create this (?buratino) effect, as he calls it, with the tape that was shown. Our television does not have the technical resources to do this, let alone with several figures present in the frame. Well, perhaps that is not the main thing either.

For some reason, in speaking of this affair, everyone concentrates only on the moral aspect. But the many letters we have received at our editorial office and television generally draw attention to the content of the statements of the people's deputy in the United States. You'll agree that one cannot fail to be surprised by the fact that in his many statements during his foreign trip, the statements of this people's deputy contain not much that is partriotic about his country, Russia. Well, if we want to speak of Yeremeyev, he does indeed exist, and works in television. But he had nothing to do with the tape, and even gets angry when anyone asks about it.

I regret that we are having to hark back to this problem, but it is only the desire to tell the truth and investigate that truth that is forcing us to do so. I understand of course that, in itself, this matter is just a particular episode from his appearance on Leningrad television. His remarks contain a reat many controversial claims which it is very difficult to assent to. But that is another matter.

RSFSR Premier Vlasov Visits Yakutiya

PM2202141390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Power to the Soviets, Owners to the Land"]

[Text] A.V. Vlasov, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] candidate people's deputy for national-territorial okrug No. 146, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, met with his voters over a period of seven days in 10 rayons in Yakutia.

The head of the republic's government had to plunge into a huge number of problems, sometimes acute, urgent ones which today are worrying both workers of the Yakutia countryside and workers in the extractive sectors of industry. This is why the candidate deputy's lively and frank conversation with people primarily about the results of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum developed into a businesslike discussion about specific socioeconomic questions, and sometimes ended even with a decision by them made directly on the spot, as it were. That's how it was in the settlement of Amga, where it was decided to locate a hospital in the rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] building.

It was no accident that cordial, confidential, and at the same time businesslike contacts were established between A.V. Vlasov and the voters of Zarechnyy and Vilyuyskiy Rayons in Yakutia, and also Tommot and Aldan. At one time he, as second secretary of the Yakut CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee], did a considerable amount to develop the economy and culture of this extensive and rich region. An interesting detail: Twenty years ago many of today's production leaders and also veterans of labor voted to elect him to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

In his meetings with people in remote settlements and livestock units, rural hospitals and schools, and coal mines and gas and gold-extracting industry facilities the chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers consistently pressed the idea of the full power of the soviets as one of the most important tasks of the forthcoming period. A.V. Vlasov's words about the need to give the soviets real rights and economic independence and to ensure that a competent and enterprising body of deputies expresses people's interests met with a heartfelt response in every auditorium. Then it will be possible to overcome the alienation of power from the people and of the people from power which resulted in parasitism and civic passivity.

In Yakutia family forms of management have been widely used from the earliest times. The RSFSR candidate people's deputy demonstrated the opportunity and need to revive and develop "alas [Yakut word for depression in the ground used for crop planting] ownership"—independent peasant farms. Then the harsh land, which requires care and a huge amount of labor, will have a real owner. And then the pace at which the "Orosu" lease enterprise in Verkhnevilyuyskiy Rayon is moving ahead—in one year the production of livestock products doubled and instead of losses the farm earned profits of more than R1 million—will not seem fantastic.

It is typical that everywhere meetings with the candidate people's deputy as it were developed into discussions about the party's social policy, about the need to accelerate the provision of social amenities in the Yakut countryside. Specific targeted programs were outlined—for water supply, gas supply, and the creation of a rural construction industry, which together would accord with the main thesis of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress: to put people at the center of social development.

During his stay in Megino-Kangalasskiy and Ust-Aldanskiy Rayons A.V. Vlasov also met with three rival RSFSR candidate people's deputies.

The meetings on Yakut soil, A.V. Vlasov stated, made it possible to gain a deeper knowledge of the needs and concerns of people, provided plenty of impressions, and impelled a substantial rethink on questions which have significance both for Yakutia and for the RSFSR as a whole.

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6 Die, More Than 20 Missing in Vorkuta Blizzards

PM1402142390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Second Edition p 8

[TASS dispatch under the "On-the-Spot Report" rubric: "Trial by Hurricane Blizzard"]

[Text] Vorkuta, Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], 11 Feb —The real threat of catastrophic consequences from the hurricane blizzard which raged for several days and nights in the Vorkuta region has been eliminated.

The pumping station which supplies water to the central water-heating boilerhouse stopped work because the power transmission line was brought down. This boilerhouse, together with a number of boilerhouses in the city and outlying settlements, ceased operation. There were breakdowns in the water pipelines of the No. 2 TETS [heat and electric power station] and other utilities. A threat emerged that the heat supply systems for apartment blocks housing up to 70,000 people might freeze completely and cease operation. Hundreds of vehicles and their passengers were stuck in snowdrifts along the beltway linking mines and their settlements with the city.

We were told at the Vorkuta headquarters for combating the natural disaster that the city's vital services have been ensured as of today. The central water-heating boilerhouse and other heating systems are back in operation. But many homes are still without heat, water, or electricity. Work to eliminate the consequences of the breakdowns in the city's municipal services continues around the clock. More than 1,000 people have been rescued along the beltway. According to operational data, six people died during the natural disaster, more than 100 suffered frostbite and were given medical assistance, and more than 20 people are still listed as missing. They are being actively sought.

By order of N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who visited Vorkuta a few days ago, the polar city has begun receiving additional powerful snow-clearing equipment and all-terrain vehicles. Several AN-22 and IL-76 aircraft have already landed in Vorkuta this afternoon, bringing powerful bulldozers, all-terrain vehicles, and snow-clearing vehicles and machinery from Chelyabinsk, Minsk, Bryansk, and

Gorkiy. A total of more than 10 cargo aircraft are expected to arrive before the end of today bringing equipment and material that is in short supply from various cities in the country. By decision of the Komi ASSR government, more than 10 cars of heating radiators, pipes, sheet glass, slates, and other material for repair and restoration work are already on their way to Vorkuta by rail from Syktyvkar, Ukhta, and Sosnogorsk.

Ryabev on Implementing Kuzbass Agreement

LD0202204590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Feb 90

[N. Chirkov correspondent report from the Kuzbass, including interview with L.D. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter Aleksandr Krutov] A state commission worked in the Kuzbass for almost two weeks. It was studying the reasons why the decisions that were adopted are not being carried out and what needs to be done for the agreement to be, as they say, more precious than money itself. After all, it is the holdups and delays that are evoking people's dissatisfaction.

[Chirkov] Protocols that have been signed must become working protocols. That is the essence of the views held by all the participants in the joint work. Indeed, although the discussion became heated at times, it was not confrontation but interest in a joint quest for a way to give effect to all the clauses of the protocol, whomsoever they affect, whether it be the life of the oblast or a specific town or enterprise. [video shows commission at work; switches to interview with L.D. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers]

[Ryabev] Many unresolved problems have, of course, accumulated in the Kuzbass, first and foremost relating to the social conditions of the working people's lives. It is necessary to provide great assistance, including through government channels, so as to bring the social standards and the living conditions of the working people of Kemerovo Oblast at least up to the average indicators existing for the country at the present time.

What is the new approach in this respect compared with what was adopted earlier? First, considerable attention is being paid to the development of the construction industry base. The task has been set of going over in two years to more or less fully satisfying the requirements of the oblast for building materials. for the first time, the material and technical resources that will be allocated for these purposes beginning from 1991 have been precisely defined.

The program for the social and economic development of the oblast is now being given specific form. It will be brought to every town, rayon, and work collective and each collective will define its participation in tackling the complex and crucial tasks that are to be fulfilled in the 13th five-year plan period.

[Krutuv] Here is what Comrade Ryabev told the TASS correspondent, when he summed up the results of the commission's work. He said: After the visit to the Kuzbass, I can quite responsibly say that my confidence is yet stronger that everything contained in the summer's agreements can be fulfilled—true, with certain holdups regarding supplies and the construction of individual installations.

Well, let us hope that this is so.

Journalist Views Volgograd 'Mob Rule'

PM2302131590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by Yuriy Shcherbinin under the rubric "Journalist's Notes": "Meetings 'Virus'"]

[Text] Volgograd—On Monday morning a man in the first flush of youth entered the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] building. He looked round and asked the first person he came across:

"Comrade, where is the chairman's office?"

"On the third floor. What have you come about?"

"I haven't come about anything," the citizen replied. "I have come to work. I was elected oblispolkom chairman at the meeting yesterday..."

That is not an anecdote. Unfortunately it is all true. The day before, addressing a routine meeting, the man demanded the resignation of the oblispolkom chairman. A forest of hands supported him. Considering the question resolved, he immediately nominated himself for the vacant post. And he was given unanimous blessing.

It would be possible to attach no importance to this curiosity but the emergence of a chairman elected at a meeting—the natural result of the development of democracy into ochlocracy—is mob rule.

The euphoria generated by the free effusion at the first meetings has still not left everyone. Although the time would seem to have come to understand that it is easier merely to destroy with the mob, building can only be done in collaboration.

Party committee plenums are now more democratic and constructive. Communists from the primary organizations and leaders of public formations are invited to them. Everyone votes and speaks if they want to. When forming the provisional bureau of the Volgograd Obkom the communists coopted representatives of the "informals" onto the elected organ. Many "professionals" winced inwardly but under pressure from the masses (I mean the party masses) they agreed to this too.

I agree that the apparatus' leading monologue was ineffective and had therefore grown stale. But let's specify what we actually want—freedom and democracy or bread and circuses? Supporters of the former and of the latter gather at the meetings. But the circle of protagonists at the microphone is the same. To "prime" the audience the leaders produce the same old bunch of speakers. They warm up the audience with various exposures of the dark deeds of the leaders, charges of corruption against the law enforcement organs, and so forth.

Then there are aggrieved individuals (also a permanent contingent). Their complaints are primitive, but they are aimed at the same target: I made an appeal and they did not help me. Down with the bureaucrats. Why the man appealed, why he was given no help—that no longer interests anyone. "Down with" meets with universal approval. It was on this wave that a routine speaker suggested voicing lack of confidence in the oblispolkom chairman and put forward his own candidacy.

And what then? A meeting once demanded the resignation of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee] first secretary, and he left. The whole bureau was dispatched after him. The organizers of the meetings put this down to their credit without a moment's hesitation. And the local press in fright perhaps published the meeting's resolution in which all internal party clashes and their solution were credited to the meetings' organizers. Although several thousand people gather on the embankment, the communists of literally all party organizations were gripped with anger at the situation which had taken shape. Lack of confidence in the obkom leadership was voiced at the gorkom and raykom plenums. It was this which forced the compromised party leaders to resign.

The drugged state of the mob whereby it is believed that we can do everything passes rapidly. But it is restored instantly with the next dose of indignation. The meetings on the embankment are not in Hyde Park, although they are close in terms of their monologic essence. It is in vain that some journalists degree the fact that the campaign for democracy by 200,000 Muscovites did not become a constructive dialogue for the sole reason that the participants in the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum did not deign to speak. You can count on dialogue in a calmer atmosphere—in television debates, for instance, when the presenter controls the order in which speakers appear and viewers have no opportunity to hiss or "slow hand-clap" a speaker they do not like.

I come to meetings and on each occasion I see one and the same thing: The exposers are greeted with cries of "hurrah." So-called apparatchiks are not allowed to say even a couple of words. The gorkom first secretary is hissed. The oblast prosecutor is catcalled. The collective farm party committee secretary meets with a roar of dissatisfaction. It is true that a social democrat was also hissed...

The mob today has its own leaders and even idols around whom habitues group. When one of the meetings' organizers was given the floor at the CPSU obkom plenum, he stated proudly, looking into the television camera:

"Let anyone whom we would not allow to speak try to look me in the eyes."

And when such a person was found, there followed an instant attempt at justification:

"We have up to 200 people waiting in line..."

But all the usual bunch speak. And several times. Who are they? In order not to give them additional publicity I shall not cite their names.

A man grown hoarse from shouting in the election campaign puts on a display of bravado for the mob by saying that he was once convicted and now the obkom members have penalized him—they are not allowing him to be an RSFSR people's deputy. Therefore the main point of his program is down with the first secretary, the entire obkom, the gorkom, and so forth. The mob's sympathy is on his side—he went to prison because of the apparatchiks and he is still suffering now. But a TRUD correspondent did her homework and revealed that the citizen was convicted not for political free thinking but for robbery with violence, vile acts of violence against the weak, and theft.

But today the mob is applauding him. And does not want to listen to the prosecutor.

Ochlocracy is dangerous in that it can develop into extremism in any manifestation—economic or national. To our grief, we already have all this. Railroad blockades. Threats of reprisals against apparatchiks. Intimidation with Jewish pogroms.

What is this, the path to a rule-of-law state? We vote at a meeting—and pick up sticks. It is no accident that people of the older generation are increasingly frequently warning us:

"We have already seen and lived through all this in the thirties..."

The search for enemies and emotions are lashing on the mob. It is yelling "down with!" without thinking about what will come next. A new diktat? Quite possibly.

"Having attended several meetings I reached the conclusion that in protesting we are doing the same thing against which we are protesting. At meetings we are resorting to diktat. Diktat of the majority is just as immoral as diktat of the apparatus," Volgograd inhabitant V. Bukina wrote to VECHERNIY VOLGOGRAD.

I do not know whether any of the organizers of the recent meeting is interested in the opinions of that same VECHERNIY VOLGOGRAD, whether they agree to emerge "from under" party leadership only for soviet leadership, but the resolution stated: "Demand that the party gorkom voluntarily hand over the newspaper VECHERNIY VOLGOGRAD to the city soviet."

As you can see, here it is not only political infantilism but also a direct threat which is slipping in. And someone wavered. For instance, for several days the Volgograd people could not make out what had happened to the authorities in the oblast. The point was that one evening, interrupting the central television program, Oblispolkom Chairman A. Orlov made an appeal to the oblast's inhabitants on both channels. He spoke of the creation of a public coordination council under the oblispolkom. Nothing supernatural would seem to have happened. We have few councils. But the form in which the information was conveyed, the time, and the words to the effect that in the situation which had taken shape the ispolkom was assuming full power gave the impression that a coup had been carried out.

After the "statement" and reports about this in the central press and on the "Vremya" program, the perplexed voices of the oblast soviet deputies began to be heard in the correspondents' centers: Who gave the oblispolkom chairman such powers? And what kind of emergency circumstances pushed him to this strange statement? The indignation is understandable: Power has belonged and belongs to the soviets of people's deputies. The executive committee cannot usurp it. Even temporarily.

Thus panic was sown and—according to the Volgograd tradition—the culprits were the mass media.

The meetings course toward "electing leaders" was interpreted in a rather strange way by the oblast prosecutor N. Rudnev after "lack of confidence" was expressed in him. In his interviews in the press and on television you can trace an assertion that is hard to explain: It turns out that it was their party cards which prevented the law enforcement organ workers from being principled. Henceforth, N. Rudnev is convinced, the party membership of prosecutors and judges should be suspended for the duration of their execution of their official duties.

Surely a CPSU member cannot preach one morality in office and another in private? No, there are no "domestic" communists.

"The local authorities, having let slip the initiative, have recently begun to flirt overtly with the meetings' organizers and the representatives of public formations," I. Novakov, rector of the polytechnical institute, is convinced. "For instance, the polytechnical institute staffers are angry when a group speaks on the embankment on behalf of our institute collective. I assure you that no one has given them the authority to do this. We have our own aktivs and meetings and on many positions we differ with those who attend the meetings."

These are hard times. This can be judged by the mail arriving at the correspondents' center and the local newspaper editorial offices. The main mass of letters now are political. And I want to end my thoughts today with a letter from I. Bondarenko, a CPSU member (note this) since 1988: "The protest against all our troubles which undoubtedly exist in the economic field has developed into a protest against the leaders, as was the case in the ill-starred thirties, when gaps in the economy were mended with "patches" from "traitors" and "degenerates."

People's indignation has been exploited by a group of political romantics who, with inadequate understanding of the complex science that is politics, have advanced the concepts of "democracy" and "justice" as slogans. Here as they see it the "power of the people" is not the purposeful and considered work of the people's elected representatives in representative organs but something like the Novgorod veche and all those assembled are so educated, so informed, that they can immediately, without moving from their seats, make a diagnosis and write out a prescription. It is merely a pity that the medicines on offer are such that their side effects are worse than the disease itself. The Donbass, Vorkuta, and the Transcaucasus: A euphoria induced by the drug of emotion has smothered the warning voice of reason and here is the bitter result—human casualties and lost billions...

Today political thinking is steadily developing in two directions: Some people feel they must go beyond "embankment" democracy to fulfill its promises while others continue to cling frenziedly to the lifebelts of meetings populism.

But the competence of a leader cannot be replaced by any prestige or any "class sensibility." The time of 16-year-old regiment commanders passed 70 years ago and I fear that the cook has not yet learned to manage the state.

The conclusion is that whether we want it or not the best prepared people for this role are the party leaders, although they are sometimes losing today's battle but, having freed itself of ballast, having delimited its functions and united, the party against appears to us as the most organized force, with political concepts clear to the whole people. Not slogans but concepts on which the best intellectual forces of society have worked. Our representative organs must be a brain center embodying these concepts in specific measures. And there is no doubt that this center should be headed by an experienced, authoritative leader backed up by our trust.

But a mob of many thousands must not breathe down his neck! "Trust in response to responsibility and responsibility in response to trust"—that is what the main principle of democratic rule should be. Otherwise the leader will be obliged to sacrifice strategic tasks for the sake of achieving tactical victories to please an excited mob which, having conquered the dragon, will itself become a monster with a thousand heads.

Perestroyka is giving rise not only to detractors but also to new minds and people with common sense to not lay claim to chairing meetings. But it is with these people that we will win.